School of Civil & Environmental Engineering, UNSW, Sydney, Australia. Chris Rizos. President Australian Institute of Navigation

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1 The Threat to Space Based Service (for PNT applications) School of Civil & Environmental Engineering, UNSW, Sydney, Australia Chris Rizos President Australian Institute of Navigation Outline GNSS... a valuable utility/infrastructure GPS/GNSS risks/threats Resilient PNT... example GNSS vulnerability... natural GNSS vulnerability... jamming GNSS vulnerability... spoofing GNSS vulnerability... system failure Responding in a holistic manner Australia... 1

2 But do these numbers tell the whole story? 2

3 No, the economic & social benefits of specialist PNT applications are likely to be much greater than the mass market size No, the underlying dependencies are much greater than the obvious PNT applications But do these numbers tell the whole story? Brad Parkinson, ICG-9 presentation, November

4 8 28/05/15 Critical Infrastructure Sectors 15/18 use GPS timing +3 for positioning? 4

5 Risks & Threats... Recognition of GNSS Vulnerability Open service signals are very weak and can be disturbed Military equipment & signals more robust than civilian/open service signals GNSS is a critical civilian infrastructure & critical military capability GPS has been a remarkably reliable PNT technology... fostered complacency regarding its vulnerability There are a number of sources of vulnerabilities... natural & manmade Addressing GNSS vulnerability is a challenge... it is expensive & complicated 5

6 Risk Considerations: loss of GNSS availability GNSS System Vulnerabilities Threats Unintentional Intentional Probability of Loss/Degradation o GNSS Signal Consequences of GNSS Loss: Human Life & Health Environment Economy RISK Source: John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center. Vulnerability Assessment of the Transportation Infrastructure Relying on the Global Positioning System. 29 Aug 01 Consequences of GNSS Loss, Degradation or Spoofing Depending on Application involved Duration of signal loss, system degradation or spoofing Impact can be Minimal - quick recovery Operational - reduced effectiveness & efficiency Safety - potential loss of life, environmental, economic damage but Timing & Synchronisation outage can severely disrupt communications, data networks, electricity grid, etc. Authorities seem ill-prepared for GNSS failure... benefits of GNSS-enabled PNT are too seductive because this capability is so cost-effective (relative to alternatives)... 6

7 Resilient Positioning, Navigation & Timing (RPNT)... There are many safety-of-life, liabilitycritical or mission-critical applications... the number of such apps will grow Advanced ITS Applications... Positioning in vehicles is going from Passive to Active... from simple navigation to information about traffic to warnings about hazards to actively avoiding hazards 7

8 16 28/05/15 Driverless Cars... critical GNSS app 15# Stringent Positioning Requirements Three levels of accuracy: road-level (metre) lane-level (sub-metre) where-in-lane-level (decimetre) Continuity, availability, integrity, interoperability are also critical Why not an SBAS? 8

9 x x x 17 28/05/15 New C-ITS Positioning Design Requirements Surveying Accuracy New design space C-ITS Aviation Old design space Integrity GPS System Vulnerabilities & Threats Unintentional Interference: Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) Ionospheric disturbances Multipath Intentional Interference: Jamming Spoofing fake signals System Impacts: Requirement for integrity monitoring Guard against human or computer error Over-reliance on single technology No viable back-ups 9

10 GPS System Vulnerabilities & Threats Unintentional Interference: Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) Ionospheric disturbances Multipath Intentional Interference: Jamming Spoofing fake signals System Impacts: Requirement for integrity monitoring Guard against human or computer error Over-reliance on single technology No viable back-ups RPNT implies a holistic approach to GNSS vulnerability addressing issues that are technical, regulatory, standards/industrial in scope, as well as new frameworks and design methodologies GNSS Vulnerability... Natural disturbance of signal tracking 10

11 GNSS Vulnerability... space weather GNSS has always been vulnerable to loss-of-signal-lock (or interference) during extreme ionospheric storms A very severe storm could disable the satellites themselves... a catastrophic event! Thankfully they are rare events Carrington event of 1859 the largest in Industrial Age GNSS Vulnerability... monitoring space weather 11

12 GNSS Vulnerability... localised ionospheric effects Local effects in tropics & polar regions Multipath Signal Disturbances: typical scenarios 12

13 Multipath Signal Disturbances: typical scenarios An Act of God can mitigate it in various ways... but its effect is mostly transient... GNSS Vulnerability... The Jamming threat 13

14 Factors Impacting GPS Vulnerability Very low signal power: Jamming power required at GPS antenna in the order of a Picowatt (10-12 watt) Single civil frequency: Known signal structure Many jammer models exist: KWatt to MWatt output... e.g. North Korea Many low power units (<1 Watt)... e.g. PPD Easy to make Jamming signal types: State & non-state players... Narrowband which is scarier? Broadband Spread Spectrum - PRN modulation A 100 Watt bulb is times more powerful than a GPS satellite signal at the receiver s antenna! 1 Watt Jammer 200km GNSS Jamming... receiver performance 50km Source: DSTO Receivers most vulnerable to jamming when trying to acquire weak signals 14

15 1W SHB 1000 AGL Simulations by USAF 746 th Test Squadron 1W SHB 100 AGL Easy GNSS Jammer/ Blocker Availability Personal Privacy Device (PPD) Illegal in Australia 15

16 The Casual Terrorist Courier driver jams his van s GPS to visit his girlfriend near Newark Airport And here Real challenge is the jammer is moving!... 16

17 Criminal Interference? GNSS Vulnerability... The Spoofing threat 17

18 35 28/05/15 GPS Spoofing... transmission of fake signals GPS Vulnerability... spoofing 18

19 GNSS Integrity... System failure 10hr outage due to unusable Navigation Message... Human error... What if it was GPS that failed? 19

20 Effect of GLONASS Ephemeris Error > 50km error! International GNSS Monitoring & Assessment (IGMA) Initiative The International Committee on GNSS (ICG) has recognised the issue of GNSS vulnerability and system monitoring ICG has made recommendation 4.1: Determine Service Parameters to monitor Determine what gaps exist in current and planned monitoring and assessment Make recommendations to the ICG-10 meeting (Nov 2015) regarding the way forward with respect to an IGMA Service (or similar) 20

21 Addressing GNSS Vulnerability... Brad Parkinson s advice 21

22 Assuring PNT... PTA recommendations Protect... the clear & truthful signals Legal responses, e.g. ban jammers, penalties, prosecute offenders Geolocate jammers, apprehend offender & neutralise jammer threat Ban use of transmitters in neighbouring bands, e.g. pseudolites Designate GNSS as Critical Infrastructure Toughen... user receivers to use GNSS Increase receiver jam resistance, e.g. signal processing, antennas, etc Diversify, e.g. use other GNSS signals Augment... or substitute PNT sources Densify & diversify signal sources, e.g. interoperability & compatibility Worldwide integrity monitoring, e.g. IGMA, A-RAIM, SBAS Complementary PNT technologies, e.g. eloran, etc 22

23 GNSS Jammers National Legal Status Jammers US RU China EU manufacture illegal illegal illegal Nation-bynation sell illegal illegal illegal illegal export illegal illegal illegal Nation-bynation purchase Undefined (consumer import illegal) illegal illegal illegal own legal Undefined Undefined legal use illegal illegal illegal illegal GPS as Critical Infrastructure 23

24 48 28/05/15 GNSS as Critical Infrastructure? There is official Critical Infrastructure definition GPS is not a critical infrastructure US RU China EU GPS integrated in most of all critical infrastructures There is no official Critical Infrastructure definition Navigation is a critical technology GLONASS is integrated in most of all priority development directions of science and technique There is no official Critical Infrastructure definition BeiDou is Essential Space Infrastructure Beidou is integrated in most of all economy branches There is official Critical Infrastructure definition Galileo will be designated as critical infrastructure Galileo service is critical to Energy and Transport critical infrastructure sectors Hardening GNSS Receivers & Antennas Improved GNSS signals Improved receiver signal processing Advanced RAIM concepts CRPA beam-forming antennas Ultra-tight integration with IMU & CSAC Multi-sensor systems Integrity monitoring service(s)... 24

25 49 28/05/15 GNSS Interference Detection & Localisation GNSS Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS) II AOA/TDOA SNR Antenna developments Lots of similar R&D is many countries GEMS II: Initial Field Trials Actual Geo-Located Actual Geo-Located Distance (meters) R3 Interferer R2 R1 Distance (meters) R3 Interferer R2 R Distance (meters) Angle-of-Arrival Result Position error: 2.2m Distance (meters) Time-Difference-of-Arrival Result Position error: 2.0m 25

26 51 28/05/15 Jammer Localisation... using UAVs? + GNSS: GPS (31) (32) GLONASS (24) (30) Galileo (7-8) (30) BeiDou (13-14) (35) RNSS: QZSS (1) (5-7) IRNSS (4) (7) SBAS: WAAS MSAS EGNOS GAGAN SDCM Number of satellites: (Current) (Planned) 26

27 53 28/05/15 SBAS for Vulnerability SBAS: Integrity information... integrity Differential corrections... accuracy Range data... availability But also: Flexible data channels (authentication signals?) Geostationary Can be used for non-aviation applications: Multi-GNSS... autonomous response to system failure Perth, Australia 27

28 Multi-GNSS Constellation Status (May 2015) System Blocks Signals Sats GPS GLONASS BeiDou IIA IIR-A/B IIR-M IIF M K GEO IGSO MEO L1 C/A, L1/L2 P(Y) Same +L2C +L5 L1/L2 C/A + P +L3 B1, B2, B3 B1, B2, B3 B1, B2, B3 Galileo IOV E1, (E6), E5a/b/ab 7-8 QZSS IGSO L1 C/A, L1C, SAIF L2C, E6 LEX, L5 IRNSS IGSO L5, S (2) Future GNSS Satellite Visibility (mask angle 30 ) 2018: GPS(32)+Glonass(24)+Galileo(26)+BeiDou(29)+IRNSS(7)+QZSS(4)+SBAS(13) Open sky environments 28

29 Messy GNSS Challenging Environments... GPS is like Swiss cheese it s full of holes Nunzio Gambale 29

30 30

31 Ubiquitous Positioning... going beyond GNSS Very local augmentation to PNT, or even A-PNT... LocataLites form a time-synchronised positioning network supporting either GNSS+Locata or Locata-only positioning Addressing GNSS Vulnerability... Australia? 31

32 Australia... CIR No mention of GNSS (2010) Australia... TISN Space Community of Interest 32