Implications of GNSS SiS Disruption on Safety of PBN Operations Risks, Solutions and Steps Forward

Transcription

1 Implications of GNSS SiS Disruption on Safety of PBN Operations Risks, Solutions and Steps Forward Non-Intentional & Intentional RFI of the GNSS SiS Silvio Semanjski -

2 Content GNSS SiS disruption - Extent of risks ECTL and ICAO activities on GNSS SiS disruption Mitigation of GNSS SiS disruption GSINTA Project Safety Assessment with Scenarios of GNSS deteriorated environment Proposed steps forward 2

3 GNSS SiS disruption - Extent of risks GNSS Policy: the vision for the use of a multi-constellation and multi-frequency GNSS in This EUROCONTROL policy on GNSS is based on a gradual reliance on Satellite navigation that has as final goal its use as sole service, to the extent that this can be shown to be the most cost beneficial solution and if is supported by a successful safety and security analyses. AMC on NAVAID Infrastructure assumptions The acceptability of the risk of loss of LPV approach capability for multiple aircraft due to satellite failure or SBAS system failure, loss of availability of satellite signal or radiofrequency interference, will be considered by the ANSP providing the approach. 3

4 GNSS SiS disruption - Extent of risks GNSS SiS disruption Un-intentional RFI Intentional RFI Spoofing Counterfeit GNSS Signal Meaconing Delay & Rebroadcast Current ATM systems for PBN OPS unprotected from injection of misleading GNSS information! 4

5 GNSS SiS disruption - Extent of risks Example of safety risks associated with GNSS SiS degradation/loss for PBN OPS Excerpt from AIC A 21/12 FRANCE 4.4 Missed approach Most of missed approach paths in France are RNAV procedures based on a level of performance at least compatible with the use of a GNSS ABAS receiver (of RAIM-reinforced GPS type). Note: The availability of RAIM-reinforced GPS for missed approach is higher than the availability required for final approach. As a matter of fact, the accuracy of navigation required for missed approach is 1 NM for 95% of time vs. 0.3 NM for 95% of time for final approach. Therefore, RAIM availability forecasts obtained through NOTAM or tools specific to operators are not representative of missed approach availability. For similar reasons, a GNSS SBAS receiver may become unavailable for LPV minima, whereas its capability to follow the missed approach has not been affected. The main event leading to a simultaneous loss of GNSS guidance during final approach and missed approach is interference due to jamming. If the missed approach path is a RNAV procedure (not relying on conventional radio-navigation means): The operator may have defined previously in their procedures, an emergency procedure for the case where the loss of RNAV guidance during the approach does not allow to follow the missed approach procedure provided for the considered runway. 5

6 GNSS SiS disruption - Extent of risks Several issues: Are the LSAs covered risks of GNSS SiS disruption/denial for GNSS based PBN OPS already implemented? What are current GNSS reversion modes for RNP operations where missed approach are GPS based? Are the operators supposed to develop contingency procedures for operations in GNSS disrupted or denied environment? How pilots / ATCOs / NAV system know if the GNSS SiS spoofing is undergoing? etc. 6

7 GNSS SiS disruption - Extent of risks Current scheduled and non-intentional GNSS jamming threats: DME/TACAN on L5/E5 GNSS repeaters GNSS pseudolites Higher harmonics and intermodulation products of various RF emitters LightSquared GPS Interference (in USA) 7

8 GNSS SiS disruption - Extent of risks Un-intentional RFI types & sources 8

9 GNSS SiS disruption - Extent of risks Un-intentional RFI types & sources Interference Type Telecommunication Systems GNSS Bands DME TACAN Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) Aeronautical Multifunction Information Distribution System (MIDS) Galileo E5a E5b Communication Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTDS) GPS L5 Systems TCAS Identity Friend and Foe (IFF) ADS-B Radar Air Traffic Control radar Galileo E6 Solid State radar GPS L2 Satellite Communication Systems Mobile Satellite Service (MSS) close to GPS L1 Secondary harmonics TV Channels Galileo E1 Digital Video Broadcasting Terrestrial (DVB-T) GPS L1 Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB) Personal Electronic Device (PED) Others VOR ILS harmonics Ultra Wide Band (UWB) Systems all 9

10 GNSS SiS disruption - Extent of risks Effects of jamming on unprotected GPS performance 10

11 ECTL and ICAO activities on GNSS SiS disruption ECTL Navigation Steering Group (GNSS & Infrastructure Session) ICAO CNS SG PBN/GNSS TF ICAO EANPG (FMG) Other groups Aeronautical Spectrum Frequency Consultation Group (ASFCG) 11

12 ECTL and ICAO activities on GNSS SiS disruption ICAO 12 th Air Navigation Conference recommendations related to GNSS vulnerability Recommendation 6/7 Assistance to States in Mitigating Global Navigation Satellite System Vulnerabilities ICAO to assess the need for, and feasibility of, an APNT system Recommendation 6/8 Planning for Mitigation of Global Navigation Satellite System Vulnerabilities States to: Assess the likelihood and effects of GNSS vulnerabilities in their airspace and apply, as necessary, recognized and available mitigation methods; Provide effective spectrum management and protection of GNSS frequencies to reduce the likelihood of unintentional interference or degradation of GNSS performance; Report to ICAO cases of harmful interference to GNSS that may have an impact on International Civil Aviation operations; Develop regulatory framework governing the use of GNSS repeaters, pseudolites, spoofers and jammers; Support introduction on-board mitigation techniques, particularly INS Where terrestrial NAVAIDs are part of a mitigation strategy, give priority to retention of DME in support of INS/DME or DME/DME area navigation, and of ILS at selected runways. 12

13 Mitigation of GNSS SiS disruption ECTL NSG currently coordinating development of GNSS RFI mitigation framework and action plan at ECAC level! Passive measures GRF Spectrum protection Legal prosecution Real time RFI Mitigation Aircraft onboard IDLM Multi Constellation / Frequency GNSS Real time RFI Detection & Localization RFI Monitoring Networks APNT system 13

14 Mitigation of GNSS SiS disruption APNT Alternative Position, Navigation & Timing APNT required capabilities In TMA APNT should be able to provide RNP 0.3 to support NPA and to allow aircraft to get to the FAF of terrestrial based PA as an ILS. Support for 3NM separations by providing 0.1NM position accuracy. Previous coverage and performance studies conducted show that current specified accuracy of DME must improve by about a factor of two to support RNP 0.3 in the areas studied. The accuracy has to be even better if separation standards need to be met. 14

15 Mitigation of GNSS SiS disruption Adaptive Spatial Nulling Antenna/CRPA Advantages: Effective against large intentional Disadvantages: High cost and size Jammer sources difficult to localize Inefficient for multiple jammers BAE Systems Small Antenna System Assessment of the LightSquared Ancillary Terrestrial Component Radio Frequency Interference Impact on GNSS L1 Band Airborne Receiver Operations RTCA Report to FAA Adaptive Spatial (Antenna) Processing There are limitations to the number of interference sources that can be simultaneously suppressed. The FAA has dismissed the use of such technologies for civil aircraft since they are exportcontrolled, which combined with the above high costs makes this technology impractical for civil aviation. 15

16 Mitigation of GNSS SiS disruption NAVAID supporting GNSS reversions to RNP DME/DME/INS system Currently not capable to support RNP specifications for APCH OPS and 3NM separations APNT system Under definition and development The most promising DME/GBT (Ground Broadcast Transceiver ADS-B) modified system with use of signals of opportunity in DME band Multilateration & Pseudolite alternatives Signals for passive ranging: DME based Passive Ranging (DMPR) UAT Passive Ranging (by ADS-B GBT) Potential signals for passive ranging: Mode S on 1030/1090 MHz VHF communications Future Communication System (FCS) 16

17 Mitigation of GNSS SiS disruption Other means of mitigation eloran Robust Position & Timing Capability as timing subsystem for APNT Multilateration & Pseudolite Alternatives) Real-time differential corrections Corrections and integrity status via eloran data channel Supported application Prototype eloran eloran Resilient PNT Non-Precision APCH Stratum 1 frequency UTC Precise timing Interference detection & mitigation 17

18 GSINTA Project Gnss Sis INTegrity Assurance This research was supported by a Marie Curie IEF within the 7th European Community Framework Programme Host research institution: Royal Military Academy (Belgium) - CISS Supporters: Technische Universität Braunschweig Institute of Flight Guidance Objectives: Septentrio nv Maintaining and recovery of GNSS SiS integrity in intentional or un-intentional RFI environment Real-time IDLM on-board the aircraft Oriented on exploiting of aircraft FRPA-TSO antennas (instead of multi-antenna array/ CRPA; multiple TSO antennas) Minimum alterations of CNS sub-systems (adding signal processing component in the line between antenna assembly and GNSS Rx) 18

19 GSINTA Project Gnss Sis INTegrity Assurance This research was supported by a Marie Curie IEF within the 7th European Community Framework Programme Methodology RFI Data acquisition: Laboratory OTA RFI measurements Real world flight campaign measurements (controlled RFI by on-ground jammers) RFI model building IDLM solution development GNSS Antenna GNSS Timing RECEIVER RFI ACQUISITION CONTROLLER RFI SIGNAL GENERATOR SPECTRUM ANALYZER Horn Antenna Radiator RHCP Antenna Radiator TSO GNSS Antenna GNSS RECEIVER IDLM solution testing: Laboratory testing GNSS SIMULATOR Real world flight campaign validation 19

20 GSINTA Project Gnss Sis INTegrity Assurance This research was supported by a Marie Curie IEF within the 7th European Community Framework Programme TSO GNSS Antenna #1 TSO GNSS Antenna #2 Real world flight campaign - controlled RFI from ground jammers INS ACQUISITION & CONTROL TSO GNSS Rx #1 TSO GNSS Rx #2 Initial data acquisition SYNC SYSTEM SPECTRUM ANALYZER GNSS Rx FGS Solution validation TSO GNSS/VHF Combo Antenna RFI Emitter Antenna Isotropic Measurement Antenna GNSS Antenna Reference GNSS RECEIVER RFI ACQUISITION CONTROLLER RFI SIGNAL GENERATOR SYNC SYSTEM SPECTRUM ANALYZER 20

21 GSINTA Project Gnss Sis INTegrity Assurance This research was supported by a Marie Curie IEF within the 7th European Community Framework Programme Types of interferers considered: CWI NBI WBI Pulsed CWI Pulsed NBI Pulsed WBI Sweep-through GNSS frequencies considered: GPS L1/L2/L5 Galileo L1-E1-L2/E5/E6 GNSS signals/codes considered: GPS C/A GPS Y Galileo CS Galileo PRS Galileo SOL 21

22 GSINTA Project Gnss Sis INTegrity Assurance This research was supported by a Marie Curie IEF within the 7th European Community Framework Programme RFI tests using MOPS-based GNSS receiver : Carrier-to-Noise Ratio (CNR) Degradation Baseline Test Measurement Accuracy Test SBAS Message Loss Tests 1 st satellite loss threshold [db] 3D navigation loss threshold [db] Reacquisition threshold [db] Benefits: Short term oriented potential on-board IDLM solution Real-time IDL simultaneously by several aircrafts in TMA affected by RFI and reporting of interferer location to the service authorized to remove interferer 22

23 SA with Scenarios of GNSS deteriorated/denied environment Examples of critical scenarios to consider in LSAs for PBN OPS implementation: Scenario A Spoofing or Meaconing of GNSS SiS for RNP APCH and DEP operations GNSS RNAV protected Missed Approach (IMC conditions at minima values for APCH; complex geographic environment) Scenario B Spoofing or Meaconing of GNSS SiS for ATSA-AIRB ADS service in IMC or ATSA-SURF service during LVOs 23

24 SA with Scenarios of GNSS deteriorated/denied environment Disruption or loss of GNSS SiS can result in several operational issues especially when reverting to same or lower RNP application: Transitioning from 3NM to 5NM separation enroute and on arrivals outside of 40NM (DDI unable to assure 3NM separation); Sudden increase in radar vectoring within airspace volume affected (in RA; number of ATCOs available); Aircraft diverting to alternative APRTs (Contingency and Holding Fuel policy might not be covering such NAVAID related diversions); At APRTs with Parallel Runway Operations sudden fall in capacity; Load of TVs (impact on configurations and sector/tv capacities). 24

25 Proposed steps forward Consolidation of methodology, techniques and prospective developments in GNSS vulnerability mitigation initiative by ECTL and ICAO WGs Formally agree on APNT for the GNSS based PBN navigation applications Recognizing areas of interest in current R&D to consolidate past and future efforts in SESAR projects supporting on-board IDLM and APNT Need to consider re-evaluation of NAVAID infrastructure plans due to APNT Include scenarios with GNSS SiS deteriorated /denied environment into future LSAs for GNSS based PBN navigation applications implementation (including reapplication of LSA for past implementations where such scenarios were not considered) MS to contribute to ECTL NSG lead in GNSS RFI mitigation framework and action plan at ECAC level 25

26 General RFI Effects on Aeronautical GNSS Receivers Backup slide #1 Example from USAF (source: USAF 746th Test Squadron) Jamming event in Mesa, AZ Dec 2001, GPS jammer caused GPS failures within 180NM of Mesa, AZ Boeing was preparing for upcoming test Accidentally left jammer on L1 frequency radiating at 0.8mW Jammer operated continuously for 4.5 days Impact to ATC operations A/C lost GPS 45NM from PHX, performed 35 turn toward traffic NOTAM was not issued until 2 nd day Numerous pilots reported loss of GPS NAVAID 26