Guidance on Radio Electronic Token Block (RETB) Rail Industry Guidance Note

Transcription

1 GN This document contains one or more pages which contain colour. Published by: RSSB Block 2 Angel Square 1 Torrens Street London EC1V 1NY Copyright 2013 Rail Safety and Standards Board Limited GK/GN0554 Issue Two: September 2013 Rail Industry Guidance Note

2 Issue record Uncontrolled When Printed Issue Date Comments One August 2008 Original document Two September 2013 Revised to reflect that the only two remaining RETB systems are in Scotland and to reflect the recent upgrades to those systems Revisions have not been marked by a vertical black line in this issue because the document has been revised throughout. Superseded documents The following Rail Industry Guidance Note is superseded, either in whole or in part as indicated: Superseded documents GK/GN0554 issue one Guidance on Radio Electronic Token Block (RETB) Sections superseded Date when sections are superseded All 07 September 2013 Supply GK/GN0554 issue one, ceases to be in force and is withdrawn as of 07 September The authoritative version of this document is available at Uncontrolled copies of this document can be obtained from Communications, RSSB, Block 2, Angel Square, 1 Torrens Street, London EC1V 1NY, telephone or enquirydesk@rssb.co.uk. Other Standards and associated documents can also be viewed at Page 2 of 83

3 Contents Section Description Page Part 1 Introduction 5 G 1.1 Purpose of this document 5 G 1.2 Document structure 5 G 1.3 Copyright 5 G 1.4 Approval and authorisation of this document 5 Part 2 6 G 2.1 Overview 6 G 2.2 RETB history 7 G 2.3 RETB Working Group (WG) 10 G 2.4 Application 11 G 2.5 RETB description 13 Part 3 System Functionality 15 G 3.1 Introduction 15 G 3.2 Voice radio communications 15 G 3.3 Data communications with a driver 15 G 3.4 Signaller line status indications 16 G 3.5 The display of information to the driver 16 G 3.6 Electronic token 16 G 3.7 Data recording 17 G 3.8 Fringe signalling interfaces 17 Part 4 Physical RETB System Equipment 18 G 4.1 Signal centre operations 18 G 4.2 Signal centre equipment 23 G 4.3 Radio system 24 G 4.4 Trainborne, RRV and road vehicle (driver) equipment 30 G 4.5 Lineside infrastructure 36 Part 5 Operational Use of the RETB System 49 G 5.1 General principles 49 G 5.2 Trains 49 G 5.3 Method of operation 50 G 5.4 Documentation to support the operational use of RETB 55 Part 6 General Fault Procedures and Testing and Services 57 G 6.1 Fault reporting input / output 57 Appendices Appendix A RETB Test Box (Whiteley Test Box) 59 Appendix B RETB System Proposals for 2015 and Beyond 69 Definitions 77 Abbreviations and Acronyms 80 References 83 Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Far North Lines 8 West Highland Lines 9 Block layout of an RETB system 14 WHL Banavie South Signalling Centre 18 RSSB Page 3 of 83

4 Figure 5 WHL Banavie North Signalling Centre 18 Figure 6 FNL Inverness Signalling Centre 19 Figure 7 Touchscreen keyboard 19 Figure 8 Touchscreen keyboard areas 20 Figure 9 Universal Interface Processor 21 Figure 10 Audio console and peripheral equipment 22 Figure 11 SSI Mark 2 cubicle modified for RETB 23 Figure 12 Intelligent Interface Module (IIM) 24 Figure 13 West Highland Line system diagram provided by CDL, produced on behalf of Network Rail 26 Figure 14 Far North Line system diagram provided by CDL, produced on behalf of Network Rail 27 Figure 15 Base station (transceiver) 28 Figure 16 Example of the health monitoring system screen diagram provided by CDL, produced on behalf of Network Rail 29 Figure 17 A typical cabinet 30 Figure 18 RETB trainborne system 31 Figure 19 A train cab connected portable CDU 32 Figure 20 RETB radio head 32 Figure 21 An operational CDU 33 Figure 22 An unconnected portable CDU 34 Figure 23 General view of TTU Mark 2 36 Figure 24 Handportable radio 36 Figure 25 Distant board 37 Figure 26 Stop boards with TPWS lineside status indicators 37 Figure 27 Points set indicator single aperture LED PSI 38 Figure 28 Points set indicator two aperture LED PSI 38 Figure 29 Front view 39 Figure 30 Rear view 39 Figure 31 Annetts key sequence 45 Figure 32 Train-operated points 46 Figure 33 Example of a token exchange telephone 47 Figure 34 Channel change marker 48 Figure 35 RETB test unit 59 Figure 36 On-air test connections 60 Figure 37 Cab radio unit 61 Figure 38 Cab radio unit call display 61 Figure 39 RETB test unit FM 1200 transceiver reverse channel display 61 Figure 40 RETB test box operating guide on-air test only 63 Figure 41 RETB test box operating guide on-air test only (continued) 64 Figure 42 On-air testing direct (in-cab) connections 65 Figure 43 CDU only testing 66 Figure 44 RETB test box operating guide CDU test only 68 Figure 45 Example of a hydraulic ram arrangement 75 Page 4 of 83

5 Part 1 G 1.1 G G 1.2 G G G G G G 1.3 G G G G 1.4 G Introduction Purpose of this document This document gives guidance on the West Highland Line (WHL) Radio Electronic Token Block (RETB) and Far North Line (FNL) RETB. This document is intended to assist infrastructure managers (IMs) and railway undertakings (RUs) in understanding their responsibilities in relation to the WHL and FNL RETB systems. It does not constitute a recommended method of meeting any set of mandatory requirements. This document is also intended to provide a descriptive overview of the mid-life equipment upgrades to the RETB systems and future plans to enhance the understanding for new entrants to the rail industry. Document structure Part 2 sets out an overview of RETB for readers who require knowledge of the interfaces, equipment, history, and principles associated with it. Part 3 System Functionality, sets out the key functions of the RETB system. Part 4 Physical RETB System Equipment, sets out how the systems are physically implemented, with details of the signalling centres, signalling, and radio infrastructure. Part 4 also sets out equipment details relating to the signalling, radio, cab equipment and associated lineside interfaces. Part 5 Operational Use of the RETB System, sets out the general operating principles and documents applicable to RETB between the signaller and the driver, and is useful for those wanting to know how the signaller and driver transfer token information. Part 6 General Fault Procedures, Testing and Servicing of RETB, sets out how the IM and RUs manage corrective and preventative maintenance. Part 6 also sets out the equipment and testing techniques for establishing faults and how equipment is routinely serviced. Copyright Copyright in the Railway Group documents is owned by Rail Safety and Standards Board Limited. All rights are hereby reserved. No Railway Group document (in whole or in part) may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or means, without the prior written permission of Rail Safety and Standards Board Limited, or as expressly permitted by law. RSSB members are granted copyright licence in accordance with the Constitution Agreement relating to Rail Safety and Standards Board Limited. In circumstances where Rail Safety and Standards Board Limited has granted a particular person or organisation permission to copy extracts from Railway Group documents, Rail Safety and Standards Board Limited accepts no responsibility for, nor any liability in connection with, the use of such extracts, or any claims arising therefrom. This disclaimer applies to all forms of media in which extracts from Railway Group Standards may be reproduced. Approval and authorisation of this document The content of this document was approved by Control Command and Signalling (CCS) Standards Committee on 11 July G This document was authorised by RSSB on 29 July RSSB Page 5 of 83

6 Part 2 Guidance on Radio Electronic Token Block (RETB) G 2.1 G Overview Signalling philosophy G The essential purposes of a railway signalling system are: a) To maintain a safe distance between trains on the same track. b) To safeguard the movement of trains at junctions, and when crossing a path which could be taken by another train. c) To regulate the passage of trains according to the service density and speed required. G The signalling system should also maintain the safety of trains in the event of equipment failure. G Unlike double lines, on which it is only necessary to protect against rear collisions between following trains, on a single line it is also necessary to provide protection against collisions between trains travelling in opposite directions. To achieve this, there is a direct interlocking between the starting signals reading into each end of the single line section. The section remains interlocked until the train has passed through the section and is clear of the single line at the other end. G Once a train has entered the section at the starting signal, this signal is prevented from clearing for a following train until the initial train has either passed out of the single line section and has cleared the overlap of the home signal, or is clear of the overlap of the first of any intermediate signals. The same applies in the opposite direction. G It may not be practical to apply a direct interlock between opposing signals, in which case the train carries a unique signalling token as a method of occupying a section. When issued, the token prevents opposing movements, as well as maintaining a space interval between following trains. G Various signalling token methods are available, one of them being the single line key token system where possession of the token for a section of track enables the holder to retain sole access to that track section. G The token holders for a section of track are drivers. For the purposes of this document only, where the term driver is used, it applies to drivers of all forms of traction unit and, where appropriate, to road / rail vehicles and their operators, and to engineering personnel taking possessions by the use of tokens. G In a single line key token system, instruments are required at each end of a section, and links between them, in order to form a secure interlocking system to prevent the false issuing of tokens. The RETB is a modern development of the single line key token system where the token exchange between the signaller and the driver is by radio, instead of physically, by hand. G The RETB schemes have no intermediate signal boxes or signallers, and minimal lineside signalling equipment, because all of the signalling data and voice messages are communicated by radio. G The RETB tokens are held in the form of data and transmitted to the driver s receiving equipment as an addressed telegram representing an electronic token. This token may be a single token system, or part of a multiple token system in which only one token may be available at any one time. Page 6 of 83 RSSB

7 G 2.2 G G G RETB history First installed in 1984, the RETB system was born out of the need to reduce the renewal and operating costs of working lightly trafficked, long single lines found in Scotland, Wales and East Anglia. The first RETB controlled line was Dingwall Kyle in the far north of Scotland, and commissioned using a very high frequency (VHF) mid-band II radio system in July The FNL to Wick and Thurso commissioning followed in December Initially, control of these routes was from Dingwall, and the intention was that the Inverness re-signalling scheme would include the Inverness Dingwall section. However, RETB was extended to Inverness, the radio system upgraded to mid-band III, and control moved to the new Inverness Signalling Centre in August The FNL routes, totalling 290 km, as shown in Figure 1, are: a) Ness Viaduct (Inverness) Wick. b) Dingwall Kyle of Lochalsh. c) Georgemas Junction Thurso. G Following RETB s success with the FNL, the radio system was upgraded to VHF mid-band III, and implemented onto the West Highland Line (WHL) in late RETB was introduced on the WHL in three phases, and is controlled by two signaller workstations in Banavie signal box, which also controls the Caledonian Canal swing bridge. G The WHL RETB operation started firstly on the Mallaig section on the 7 December Helensburgh Upper Crianlarich Oban converted on 27 March 1988 and, finally, Crianlarich Fort William Junction on 28 May The South workstation controls Helensburgh Upper Crianlarich Oban. The North workstation controls Upper Tyndrum Fort William Junction Mallaig. The WHL routes, totalling 371 km, as shown in Figure 2, are: a) Crianlarich Oban. b) Craigendoran Junction Fort William Junction. c) Fort William Junction Mallaig. RSSB Page 7 of 83

8 Figure 1 Far North Lines Page 8 of 83 RSSB

9 Figure 2 West Highland Lines RSSB Page 9 of 83

10 G Two further RETB systems were commissioned: a) The East Suffolk line connecting Ipswich with Lowestoft. b) The Cambrian lines of Wales from Shrewsbury (Sutton Bridge) Aberystwyth Dovey Junction Pwllheli. G G In 2004 all four RETB lines were fitted with the Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS). The RETB Midlife Upgrade Project in 2009 provided an upgrade path to key parts of the FNL and WHL RETB systems to enable their continued use until 2015 and beyond. The changes introduced by this project extended only to equipment located within the signalling equipment and operations rooms, as follows: a) New interlocking cubicle incorporating: i) Multiprocessor Modules (MPM). ii) iii) iv) Panel Processor Module (PPM). Intelligent Interface Module (IIM) (replaces existing PPM). Radio Interface Module (RIM) (like-for-like replacement of existing RIM using upto-date components). b) New Man Machine Interface (MMI) incorporating: i) Signaller s touchscreen keyboard. ii) User Interface Processor (UIP) (replaced existing screen router). c) Dial-up replacement equipment incorporating: i) Audio console. ii) iii) Communications rack. Additional monitoring and alarms functions. G G G G 2.3 G G The trains retain National Radio Network (NRN) radio compatibility, and have additional Global System for Mobile communications Railway (GSM-R) fitment. The RETB system on the Cambrian line ceased in March 2011 and was re-signalled as a European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) route. The East Suffolk RETB system ceased operation in December 2012 and was replaced with a conventional signalling system. RETB Working Group (WG) The purpose of the Vehicle / Train Control and Communications System Interface Committee (V/TC&C SIC), a sub-group of the RETB WG, is to determine the future train control strategy for routes currently controlled by RETB systems. The purposes of the RETB WG include: a) Developing and providing recommendations to the V/TC&C SIC for the life-extension requirements of the WHL and FNL RETB systems and to provide a robust system, which is life-based, with an earliest replacement date of b) Developing and providing recommendations to the V/TC&C SIC for the preferred replacement options for 2015 and beyond. Page 10 of 83 RSSB

11 G In pursuit of the two objectives set out above, the RETB WG aims to: a) Define the responsibilities for system operation and maintenance. b) Consider potential system enhancements that could improve the safety and performance of the RETB systems. c) Define the future operational and maintenance responsibilities for any replacement systems. d) Define any changes to, or allocation of costs for, the life extension of the existing RETB systems. e) Define the changes to, or allocation of costs for, operation and maintenance of the future replacement systems. f) Understand the commonality and differences between the RETB systems and their operation. g) Undertake analysis of available operational safety performance data to enable reasoned decisions on life extension. h) Ensure integration and compatibility with future systems, as far as is reasonably practicable, for both life extension and renewal proposals. G IM or RU membership of the sub-group is comprised of representatives from the industry categories set out below: a) Infrastructure Manager (IM). b) Rolling Stock Owner (ROSCO). c) Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). d) Train Operating Company (TOC). e) Freight Operating Company (FOC). f) Signal & Telecommunications (S&T). G 2.4 G Application Low traffic density G The maximum capacity of either the FNL or WHL RETB system for single line routes is dependent upon train speed, length of sections, and number of token exchanges that can be handled in a given time. This restricts both RETB systems to low traffic density levels. G For one radio frequency and one signaller, the theoretical maximum is 30 exchanges per hour, based on a two-minute procedure. In practical terms it is around 20 exchanges, due to operational and human factors. G Radio coverage G Radio coverage is not continuous throughout either the FNL or WHL RETB geographical area. The signaller and driver in either RETB system need only exchange voice and data information by radio between train clear marker boards at token exchange points (TEPs) or other designated locations on the route. G Radio equipment G To operate on either the FNL or WHL RETB route, the driver needs radio equipment to communicate both voice and data information to the signaller. G The majority of trains that travel over the FNL or WHL RETB routes are fitted with a radio unit and microphone for voice messages that are permanently wired to a cab display unit (CDU). RSSB Page 11 of 83

12 G Trains fitted with only a radio unit and microphone can interface with a portable CDU, for data, by use of a military style connector. G All road / rail vehicles (RRVs) and road vehicles used by maintenance staff not fitted with a radio unit and microphone, use transportable token units (TTUs). All RRVs need a TTU when operating in rail mode. The rules for engineers RRVs follow the same general principles set out in G G For the purposes of this document only, trainborne equipment is referred to as a CDU, although it is accepted on some occasions, for example, steam specials, that a TTU could be used instead. G Signalling interfaces G Minimal signalling (and cabling) infrastructure is needed because of the radio system. G Signalling equipment interfaces with boundaries of adjacent fringe boxes. G FNL and WHL RETB line signalling interfaces that are present include ground frames, point set indicators, and an adaptation of the TPWS to the radio system. G Train length G The RETB system can be used for single or double lines where passing loops or station limits are long enough to accommodate the longest trains normally using the line. G Advantages of an RETB scheme G Advantages of an RETB scheme include the following: G a) There is minimal track-based infrastructure. b) It is applicable to single and double track, with bi-directional working on double track lines easily incorporated. c) It provides an acceptable time cost in token exchange, provided that passing loops are located at stations. d) The possibility of increasing line capacity, at acceptable cost, by sub-dividing into more sections. e) It provides ease of operation with engineering possessions. f) It is a low cost, flexible solution. g) It features interlocking with integrated civil engineering track occupancy, including permanent way road vehicles and track workers. h) It requires only one signal box (signal centre) RETB interlocks with adjacent signalling systems. Strategy Uncontrolled When Printed G The decision to life extend the existing RETB systems in Scotland with a view to their retention until ERTMS is deployed as the signalling system renewal solution, requires a change in the VHF band III radio frequencies by 2015 as a result of changes in OFCOM radio licence arrangements. G The changes to the FNL and WHL RETB operating frequencies by 2015 have much wider implications than simply changing the frequency of the base stations. The proposals to support these changes are set out in Appendix B. Page 12 of 83 RSSB

13 G 2.5 G RETB description Introduction G The essence of the current deployment of RETB system functionality is the secure transmission of uncorrupted data by means of a VHF band III radio system. Communication between drivers or maintenance staff and the signaller at the RETB signal centre is by means of the radio system, for both voice and data. The exchange of voice and data information is necessary to permit the signaller to issue an electronic token and return token for the purposes of either a train movement authority or securing a possession for maintenance staff. G The RETB systems do not require the provision of a train detection system to indicate the position of each train to the signaller. The movement authority is issued to the driver in the form of an electronic token, which is displayed by the CDU or TTU. G RRVs and road vehicles used by maintenance staff may be equipped with TTUs. The movement authority is issued to the maintenance staff in the form of an electronic token, which is displayed by the TTU. G The movement authority comprises verbal authority from the signaller, together with a token that is displayed in either the CDU or TTU, which uses the same token exchange point names to describe the beginning and end of the permitted train movements. G Token exchange G The token exchange procedures require drivers to report the train location to the signaller using the token exchange point name displayed on the stop board or lineside operational sign. G The token exchange procedure requires maintenance staff to make a request to the signaller to identify which track section is required for their possession. G Principal elements G There are five elements to the RETB system: a) Signal centre operations human machine interface (HMI), including audio and signaller s console. b) Signal centre equipment Solid State Interlocking (SSI) and radio control rack. c) Radio system equipment radio base stations, mast antennas. d) On-board, RRV and road vehicle (driver) equipment train radio unit, CDU, antennas, TTU, portable handsets etc. e) Trackside equipment TEP telephones, TPWS, train operated points, power operated points, signage etc. G These principal elements are shown in the block system diagram in Figure 3. RSSB Page 13 of 83

14 PC-VDU, Keyboard PC-Data Logger Block Interface Control Unit (WHL only) SSI Interlocking Radio Interface Module Power Operated Points TPWS TTU Cab Display Unit Cab Radio & Aerial Radio Control Rack TRCU Handportable DTU Voice Recorder Audio Console Radio System & Aerials Radio System & Aerials Figure 3 Block layout of an RETB system Page 14 of 83 RSSB

15 Part 3 G 3.1 G Introduction System Functionality The RETB systems include the following functions which are carried out by the architecture set out in Part 4 that enables the operations set out in Part 5: a) The provision of voice radio communications between the signaller and the driver. b) The provision of data communications between the control centre equipment and the trainborne or RRV TTU equipment. c) Signaller line status display indications. d) The display of information to the driver. e) Issuing and receipt of the electronic token. f) Support functions, for example, recording and on-board train data management. g) Fringe box interfaces for slot releases and communications. G 3.2 G G G G G G Voice radio communications Driver to signaller voice radio communications is a facility that allows a driver to supply to, request from or confirm information with the signaller. Signaller to driver voice radio communications is a facility that allows the signaller to provide verbal authority, instructions, or information to the driver. The signaller and driver voice radio communication precedes the exchange of an electronic token. Mobile-to-mobile voice radio communication is a facility that allows drivers to talk directly with each other in radio open channel mode. All communication through the system is recorded. A special procedures key is provided to remind the signaller of the need for additional voice procedures in the following circumstances: a) When it is necessary to issue a token for a train to proceed to the wrong side loop at the destination (on single line railways). b) When it is necessary to issue a token for a train to proceed wrong line (on a double line railway). c) When it is necessary for a train to return a token at a location other than the exit point of the token section. G 3.3 G G G Data communications with a driver The radio system permits the secure exchange of data communication of the electronic token between the signaller and the driver. The data transmissions are provided with enough coding redundancy to protect the information, and apply additional message redundancy to increase the probability of successful transmission. The first message for data exchange, for the control of fringe signalling information, can be initiated by either party. RSSB Page 15 of 83

16 G 3.4 G G Signaller line status indications The signaller s visual display unit (VDU) shows each line status through a series of train berth positions. A berth is capable of displaying: a) Train identity. b) Token issue / receipt. c) Train clear. d) Track blocked. e) Train direction. f) Vehicle on line. G G G G G G 3.5 G G G G G G 3.6 G Line indications inform the signaller of the present status of each line under the signaller s control. Each train logged into the system is given a unique radio identification number. The train s last reported position, the radio identification number, is superimposed in the berth position display, to display the last reported position of the train, with arrows to indicate the direction of train movement. The issue and receipt of tokens details the type of token (section, long section, shunting, test or engineering). An unoccupied berth is a berth that is not occupied by the issue of a token. The display of information to the driver The CDU has a receive function which, when operated, allows an electronic token to be received from the signalling centre. The CDU has a send function which, when operated, allows an electronic token to be received and returned to the signalling centre, or the display unit identity to be entered into the interlocking. A specially engraved RETB key is inserted in the CDU to power the unit and enable the exchange of tokens. The RETB key is permanently attached to a Castell key. The RETB key is removed from the CDU, and the attached Castell key is used to open a metal box on the ground frame to retrieve the Annetts key. The Annetts key is used to operate an insection ground frame. It is not possible for the CDU to return the displayed token to the signal box or to accept a new token while the RETB key is removed from the CDU. It is not possible to release the Castell key from the metal box on the ground frame until the Annetts key has been returned. It is not possible to release the Annetts key from the ground frame while the ground frame is in operation. The control of the CDU RETB keys for both the WHL and FNL is maintained by the operations manager. Electronic token A token should allow a movement of a train from the stop board at the entrance to the section, through the section to the starting signal notice board at the entrance to the next section. G A token is also required where a train exits from a siding and enters a siding at the next TEP or intermediate siding. Page 16 of 83 RSSB

17 G The types of token available are: a) Section token. b) Shunt token. c) Engineering token. d) Test token. e) Intermediate siding token. f) Long section token (two or more successive tokens). G G G 3.7 G G 3.8 G G The interlocking prevents the issue of tokens over a blocked section of line. An emergency (EM) key on the signaller s touchscreen is provided for use when radio data communication fails. When the EM key is used in conjunction with a security number and functional command entered by the signaller, the interlocking executes the command without transmission or reception of radio data, provided it is safe to do so. The command effectively deletes the token from the interlocking memory multiprocessor module. Data recording The data logger records all functional commands entered into the interlocking, such as responses, status, error messages and use of the EM key. Fringe signalling interfaces A slot release from Yoker Banavie provides a fringe signalling interface between the RETB areas on the WHL controlled by the Banavie signal box and the track circuit block line controlled by the Yoker Integrated Electronic Centre. The junction at Craigendoran represents the beginning (fringe) of the WHL. A token is issued by Banavie signal box directly to the driver to allow access to each of the sections. G For trains routed towards Yoker, the token for the last RETB section (Garelochhead Helensburgh Upper) can only be issued when a slot is given from the signaller at Yoker. For trains routed towards Banavie, the Yoker signaller can send the train onto the single line at any time, provided that the slot for the opposite direction has not been granted. Operationally, there are procedures in place requiring the signaller to request a line clear from Banavie. G G The communication between the Banavie and Yoker signallers is via block bells. Yoker is able to issue the slot via the Integrated Electronic Control Centre (IECC), which in turn acts upon the interfacing relay circuits. The slot is conveyed to Banavie via a reverse in polarity of the bell signals, which causes the SSI to allow the release of the token between Garelochhead and Helensburgh Upper. Inverness SSI is the fringe signalling interface for the FNL. RSSB Page 17 of 83

18 Part 4 Physical RETB System Equipment G 4.1 G Signal centre operations Control room Banavie G The WHL is controlled by two work stations in Banavie signal box, which also controls the Caledonian Canal swing bridge. G The South work station, shown in Figure 4, controls Helensburgh Upper Tyndrum Crianlarich Oban. G The North work station, shown in Figure 5, controls Upper Tyndrum Fort William Junction Mallaig. Mimic diagram VDU Touchscreen keyboard Audio console Figure 4 WHL Banavie South Signalling Centre Mimic diagram VDU Touchscreen keyboard Audio console Figure 5 WHL Banavie North Signalling Centre Page 18 of 83 RSSB

19 G Inverness Signalling Centre Uncontrolled When Printed G The FNL is controlled by one work station in Inverness Signalling Centre, as shown in Figure 6. Mimic diagram Gradient chart VDUs Touchscreen keyboard Figure 6 FNL Inverness Signalling Centre G Integrated touchscreen keyboard G The signallers have an integrated touchscreen keyboard, as shown in Figure 7, which is unique to the RETB. The touchscreen is controlled through a User Interface Processor (UIP) which reads the data needed to customise it for a specific site from a universal serial bus (USB) memory stick. G Inside the integrated touchscreen keyboard is a microprocessor based screen router. Information sent from the SSI panel control module contains routing information indicating which integrated touchscreen keyboard receives the information. G The touchscreen presents a schematic diagram of the lines under the signaller s control. Figure 7 Touchscreen keyboard RSSB Page 19 of 83

20 G The keyboard is split into six areas, as shown in Figure 8: Warning messages, Repeat from RETB panel, Geographical layout, RETB function keys, Radio number keys and Annunciator lights. G The touch monitor is divided into four distinct areas; some of these areas are active and contain keys that can be touched. a) The centre of the touch monitor is an active area showing the geographic layout of the line. b) The bottom third of the touch monitor is an active area containing the RETB function keys and the radio number keys. c) The top right area of the touch monitor repeats the information on the current operation from the RETB panel. d) The top left area of the touch monitor is used for warning messages. G The series of small annunciator lights at the very bottom left of the touch monitor screen give useful information about internal data communication within the system. Figure 8 Touchscreen keyboard areas G The integrated touchscreen keyboard allows the signaller to input the relevant data instructions into the SSI system. Separate icons are provided for entering radio numbers (train CDU) identification, messages (token section names, token type), location (geographical name of the token section limit), and functional commands, for example token issue and track block. G Repeat operation of controls (for example, double entry sequences of tapping the keyboard icon where one tap starts the process and the second tap cancels) may be used to provide additional security on functions (for example, to clear vehicle on line). Page 20 of 83 RSSB

21 G The integrated touchscreen keyboard has a means for setting the date, and also has an EM key for issuing and retrieving tokens for radio system problems, or degraded mode working. G Each driver logged into the system is shown on the touchscreen by means of their unique radio identification number, superimposed upon the touchscreen in the position at which the train, RRV, or maintenance staff road vehicle was last reported, with accompanying arrows to indicate the direction of the movement. The successful issue and receipt of tokens and the status of the token type is also displayed. G The touchscreen keyboard utilises commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology. It is site specific and easily configurable to allow a standard base design to be held for spares. G In the event of an integrated touchscreen keyboard failure and a spare integrated touchscreen keyboard not being available, the fixed track magnetic mimic diagram is used. The diagram shows greater detail of the track layout, including passing loops, sidings, signals, level crossings and telephones, together with mileages, gradients and other track and geographical features. G The UIP, as shown in Figure 9, connects to the SSI and replaced the existing MMI as part of the IM mid-life upgrade project. G The functionality of the UIP includes carrying out screen router and keyboard encoder functions. G The UIP enables the site specific configuration of the keyboard and router. Universal Interface Processor Figure 9 Universal Interface Processor G PC data logger G The PC data logger records: a) All functional commands entered to the interlocking. b) The response of the interlocking to these functional commands and key switch operations. c) Use of the EM key. d) The current value of the counter associated with the EM key. e) The interlocking initiated status and error messages. RSSB Page 21 of 83

22 G Voice recorder G The voice recorder (or recorders) records all radio and telephone voice related communications that involve the signaller s handset / headset and also all handportables to handportables. G Audio console Uncontrolled When Printed G The console is permanently powered and connects to the RETB rack equipment via a single cable. Power status is indicated by a yellow light-emitting diode (LED) located in the bottom left-hand corner of the front panel. The operator can talk via the RETB system control rack and radio base stations to mobile subscribers; primarily train radios, portable token boxes and handportables. The control rack also allows connections to public switched telephone network / private automatic branch exchange (PSTN/PABX) dial-up phone lines. G The main peripherals available for use with the console are shown in Figure 10. A handset rests on a cradle built into the console front panel and is equipped with a press-to-talk (PTT) switch to allow voice calls to be made. The console also comes equipped with a headset and foot switch, offering another method of voice communication. Figure 10 Audio console and peripheral equipment G The console has a number of internal settings that may be configured via its menu system for site specific operation on either of the RETB lines. G Telephones at token exchange points are available for emergency use at passing loops and level crossings. These telephones are presented as individually labelled circuits on the signaller s telephone concentrator. G The telephone dial-up facility on the console is capable of radio audio and data connections at specific route locations for voice contact between the driver and signaller in the event of radio system failure. G Four-wire cut-out switch G Under failure conditions the system requires the functioning of a four-wire cut-out switch and the connection of remote dial-up equipment. The four-wire cut-out switch disconnects part of the communication chain to prevent data clashes; however, incorrect use of the cutout switch can result in token failure. A PC data logger prints the date and time of each command or message. Page 22 of 83 RSSB

23 G 4.2 G Signal centre equipment SSI interlocking cubicle G Located adjacent to the signal centre is a facility containing the technical hardware of the system, including the SSI processor, radio rack, voice recorders, data logger printer and telecommunications interface equipment. The SSI is of the same basic format used for other signalling interlockings, but programmed to work in RETB mode. Each SSI also has the relevant geographical information programmed in. A special interface arrangement should link the SSI at Banavie South Craigdoran fringe signal box. G The electronic SSI has custody of the tokens and is responsible for their safe management. The tokens are in a data format, and transmitted to the CDU or TTU as an addressed telegram representing an electronic token. G The SSI Mark 2 cubicle replaced the SSI Mark 1 cubicle as part of the IM mid-life upgrade project. The cubicle contains the various SSI modules required for the RETB system, as shown in Figure 11. Panel Processor Module (PPM) Multi-Processor Module (MPM) Intelligent Interface Module (IIM) Figure 11 SSI Mark 2 cubicle modified for RETB G Intelligent Interface Module (IIM) G The IIM, as shown in Figure 12, replaced the Printer Control Module (PCM) as part of the IM mid-life upgrade project in G The PCM functionality is implemented on an industrial Single Board Computer (SBC). G The PCM mechanical non-volatile four-digit counter is replaced by a suitably robust micro electric equivalent located in the IIM. RSSB Page 23 of 83

24 Figure 12 Intelligent Interface Module (IIM) G 4.3 G Radio system Overview G There is no requirement to handle voice and data communications simultaneously, or to handle transmission and reception simultaneously. There is also no requirement for voice communication directly between trains, or to prevent the voice communication between a driver and the signalling centre from being overheard by other drivers. G The radio system should be: a) Free from interference with other systems. b) Capable of use in emergencies. c) Compatible with the infrastructure for train radio on the route. G The radio system should be configurable to permit the signaller to disable any part of the radio network which becomes defective. G Radio transmission G Secure radio transmission is by co-operation between the driver and the signaller, working over an open radio system that provides an open speech link between the two operators. All data and voice transmissions are recorded in accordance with the requirements set out in GE/RT8106. G The radio transmission should be capable of carrying voice and data communications between the signalling centre and CDUs, and other radios provided for operational purposes within the RETB signalled area. G Radio coverage G The radio coverage is not continuous throughout either RETB scheme geographical area. However, adequate coverage is needed at the following locations along the routes, to provide an operational service: a) At all TEPs. b) At and on the approach to automatic level crossings of the automatic half barrier type. c) At other locations where the signaller may have to give authority, or the driver may need to report their position. d) At radio channel change points. Page 24 of 83 RSSB

25 G Radio base stations provide communication cover over the route as a whole, with each base station covering approximately miles. Attenuation and signal to noise ratio (S/N) limit the effective radio communication distance. A schematic overview of the WHL base stations is shown in Figure 13 and the FNL in Figure 14. RSSB Page 25 of 83

26 Uncontrolled When Printed Figure 13 West Highland Line system diagram provided by CDL, produced on behalf of Network Rail Page 26 of 83 RSSB

27 Figure 14 Far North Line system diagram provided by CDL, produced on behalf of Network Rail RSSB Page 27 of 83

28 G Base stations Uncontrolled When Printed G The transceiver, shown in Figure 15, has replaced all previous variants of RETB base stations and has been designed to be compatible with both WHL and FNL RETB systems. G The transceiver fulfils two distinct roles: firstly, to act as a direct replacement for all versions of the current base stations and, secondly, to provide new and enhanced functions to assist with maintaining the RETB radio network. Figure 15 Base station (transceiver) G There are eight radio variants supported in a single unit via menu configuration, with adjustable transmission power from 1W to 25W via menu adjustment. G The base station is a single transceiver that can operate in fixed / mobile, and full / half duplex modes. G The transceiver is equipped with an internal Health Monitoring System (HMS). This system continuously logs a number of useful parameters such as received signal strength, power supply voltage and current, and equipment temperature. G Health monitoring system (HMS) G The HMS is capable of individually identifying each radio link in the RETB radio chain. This valuable data helps to identify poor radio links by offering continuous 24-hour signal strength information on every radio link in the RETB network. Other parameters, such as supply voltage and antenna voltage standing wave ratio (VSWR), should help to identify faults before they become failures. G HMS data is stored throughout the day in each base station and is downloaded over-air automatically every night to a server located in the signalling centre equipment room. An HMS controller in the RETB radio rack is responsible for collating the data from every base station in the whole RETB radio network. Figure 16 shows typical HMS received signal strength indication (RSSI) data collected from the WHL RETB. Page 28 of 83 RSSB

29 Figure 16 Example of the health monitoring system screen diagram provided by CDL, produced on behalf of Network Rail G RETB radio system control rack G The complete RETB system control cabinet is a 42U-high, 19" rack cabinet. G The rack is of modular form that enables the various requirements of each RETB line to be catered for. A typical cabinet configuration is shown in Figure 17. The various cabinet elements are connected together with structured internal cabling. The control cabinet is responsible for conditioning and routing audio and logic signals; these signals are presented on internal and external interfaces. RSSB Page 29 of 83

30 Figure 17 A typical cabinet G User manuals G Three user manuals have been issued by the IM as part of the FNL and WHL RETB midlife upgrade project. The manuals describe: a) The RETB Advanced Network Transceiver. b) The audio console. c) The maintenance operations. G The three user manuals are a guide to all signalling, maintenance and supervisory staff involved with RETB rail line operation. G 4.4 G Trainborne, RRV and road vehicle (driver) equipment Trainborne equipment G The majority of trainborne equipment consists of fixed or portable cab display units, radios, and aerials. Where this is not the case, a TTU is required, for example, steam specials. G The fixed CDU is mounted in the driver s cab where the display can easily be seen and where the driver can reach the control buttons. It requires a 12 V power supply and interfaces to the radio. G The portable CDUs can be plugged in to any cab fitted with the necessary bracket and data connection. G The radio equipment is compatible with the fixed radio infrastructure set out in GK/RT0094 and BR A schematic overview of the system is shown in Figure 18. The train overrun protection system is an optional feature that requires an emergency brake relay, a transponder and transponder system. Page 30 of 83 RSSB

31 RETB Trainborne System Radio Control Token Display Radio FFSK Modem & Interface Token Processor Send and Receive Buttons Emergency Brake Relay Transponder Interface Buttons and Indications Electronic Token Unit Transponder System Transponder Train Overrun Protection System (optional ) Figure 18 RETB trainborne system G Voice and data are passed between the train driver and signaller over a Band III VHF radio operating at around 200 MHz. The radio system operates in half-duplex mode, so voice and data are passed over the radio channel in one direction at a time. Electronic tokens are exchanged between the signaller and the train driver by a combination of voice and data messages. G To accept or return a token the train driver presses the relevant button on the CDU. To transmit voice communications the train driver operates the PTT handset while speaking. When receiving data or voice communications, the clear-to-send (CTS) signal changes state, inhibiting the transmission of data or voice messages. G There is no requirement for the driver to operate the CDU for the purpose of accepting or relinquishing tokens when the train is in motion. G As the radio system operates at VHF frequencies, the train cab aerials are externally mounted, that is to say, outside the cab. These aerials come in a variety of shapes, including ¼ wavelength whip aerials which are 35 cms long. There were maintenance and installation problems with the original whip aerials, mainly due to insufficient knowledge and training. RSSB Page 31 of 83

32 G Improved knowledge and training, and new aerial designs, such as coiled whip and low profile, have eased both installation and maintenance difficulties. However, these VHF aerials are externally mounted and this can be problematic when portable CDU (see Figure 19) rather than fixed CDU equipment is used inside driving cabs. G The radio control head can (usually) be separated from the radio. In fixed equipment this allows for the control head to be mounted close to the driver, with the radio, modem, interface circuitry and power supply installed away from the driving cab, where space is at a premium. An example of the train cab radio is shown in Figure 20. CDU Figure 19 A train cab connected portable CDU RETB radio head Figure 20 RETB radio head Page 32 of 83 RSSB

33 G Cab Display Unit (CDU) Uncontrolled When Printed G Trainborne equipment consists of purpose-developed CDUs and radios, and functions as follows: a) The CDU has a four-digit fixed unique number clearly visible to the driver. b) The CDU only responds to incoming data communications that contain its associated four-digit fixed unique number, and includes that unique number in all its outgoing data communications. c) A 2 x 16 character alphanumeric display, on which the identity of the electronic token, currently held, is clearly visible. d) A no token message displays when a token is returned and before the next token is received. e) The display unit has a secure RETB key switch so that the receipt and return of electronic tokens is only possible if the key is inserted and in the operating position. The RETB key switch is designed such that the RETB key cannot be removed when in the operating position. There is no requirement for the RETB key / lock combination to be unique to each CDU. The RETB key is held on a security ring with a Castell key that is used for ground frame operations, as shown in Figure 21. f) The display units have a receive function which, when operated, allows an electronic token to be received from the signalling centre. g) The display units have a send function which, when operated, allows an electronic token to be returned to the signalling centre, or the display unit identity to be entered into the interlocking. h) Both signal box and cab receive an audible indication of token exchange taking place. i) The voice communication facility that permits the audio level of incoming voice communications can be easily adjusted. Castell key Steel security ring RETB key Figure 21 An operational CDU RSSB Page 33 of 83

34 G Each CDU has a unique four-digit identity number in the range 0001 and The issue of CDU numbers is controlled by the IM s National Record Group, which ensures that each CDU has a unique number. A front view of a CDU displaying an issue number 2220 is shown in Figure 22. Kaba key inserted here Issue number 2220 Figure 22 An unconnected portable CDU G The four-digit identity number is programmed into a bipolar programmable read-only memory (PROM) located within the CDU, and the number is also clearly marked by being engraved or painted on the outside of the CDU. The number is used by CDU users for identification purposes when contacting the signaller and also by the interlocking, for vital safety functions and radio communications. The CDU does not require geographical data and does not store a list of tokens. G CDU safety G The CDU is not currently regarded as safety critical and is controlled by a single processor and single software program without redundancy. The safety CDU program ET011 was developed by British Rail (BR) Research, and controls the reception and return of tokens. The software is standard to all CDUs regardless of where fitted and how used, and apart from the unique four-digit identity number there is no stored data or geographical data. G At the time of the original development, the extensive procedures accompanying the issue and return of tokens between the signaller and CDU user, and the transmission of full token names, allowed for the CDU software to be designated safety related but non-safety critical. G Significant safety decisions taken for the design of the CDU include: a) Full token names to be issued to the CDU. b) The issued token should be permanently displayed on the CDU. c) Token names are not stored in the CDU, except when they are required for display. d) It is possible for the CDU program to check and monitor the display contents when tokens are displayed. e) The CDU display is blank at all times, except when it displays tokens. (This decision was made by the Signalling Safety Officer BRB and the BRB operating department. It was considered a safety decision of critical importance; hence the display cannot be used for displaying messages or symbols of any description, except issued RETB tokens.) Page 34 of 83 RSSB

35 f) For high availability, the CDU does not have a security fuse but does continually carry out self-checks for correct functioning. A software or hardware fault causes the CDU program to reset. g) Active physical co-operation by the CDU user and the signaller is required for the issue and return of tokens. G Where a signaller is unable to retrieve a token from the CDU user, due to poor radio reception or some other reason, the driver / CDU user is instructed by the signaller to switch off the CDU using a power on / off switch in the cab installation or on transportable CDU equipment. The signaller then uses the emergency key (EM) icon on the touchscreen to retrieve the token. G The signaller restores the token to the interlocking before the token has been removed from the CDU display. Consequently, the CDU user continues to occupy, or re-occupy, the section of track, even though it is no longer registered as occupied in the interlocking. G Disconnecting power from the CDU for more than 20 seconds clears the token stored in, and displayed on, the CDU. G If a token has been removed from the CDU, then the only means of restoring the token to the CDU is by re-issuing it from the signal box. G Re-issue of a token is subject to the normal interlocking checks. G To remove the token from the CDU, the driver / CDU user removes power from the CDU using a cab switch or other means, and ensures that on power restoration there is a blank display. G If the signaller cannot retrieve the token from the CDU, and if voice messages between the driver / CDU user and signaller are possible, the signaller is unable to use the EM key until the driver / CDU user confirms that the CDU has a blank display after power has been removed and restored to the CDU. G Transportable Token Unit (TTU) Uncontrolled When Printed G The TTU Mark 2 equipment (shown in Figure 23) is used by trains that occasionally travel over RETB lines which are not equipped with fixed on-board radio equipment, such as civil engineering track vehicles, or when maintenance staff request line possessions. G The RETB TTU requires a customer-supplied RETB cab display unit, which is fitted by the supplier during the manufacturing process of the TTU. G The TTU has been designed using proven National Radio Network (NRN) and RETB components to provide a reliable and portable method of exchanging RETB signalling tokens with the signaller. The TTU has been designed to be powered from an external 12 V power supply for the exchange of tokens, and contains an internal battery that is capable of retaining a token for up to five hours. G The internal battery can either be charged using the battery charger supplied with the TTU, or automatically charge if the unit is left connected to a suitable external power supply (that is to say, an automotive battery supply with the engine running). RSSB Page 35 of 83

36 Figure 23 General view of TTU Mark 2 G Handportable G A handportable radio is available for users who require communication only with the signaller, but do not need the facility of token issue. The handportable unit is selfcontained with an aerial and rechargeable battery, and is commonly known as a Handportable (shown in Figure 24). Figure 24 Handportable radio G 4.5 G Lineside infrastructure Introduction G At lineside, the associated train control signalling equipment is much simplified by the use of reflectorised marker boards (distant, stop and loop clear boards) and by the use of power operated points or train operated hydro-pneumatic point mechanisms. G The appearance of all signals, lineside signs, and blue lights for TPWS, is set out in GK/RT0045 and GI/RT7033. Signals may be supplemented by signs. Page 36 of 83 RSSB

37 G Lineside signals or indicators provide protection at worked points, manned level crossings, moveable bridges, or any other infrastructure requiring protection. Points signal indicators can be used to indicate that power operated points are correctly locked and detected. G Distant boards / signals are provided in accordance with GK/RT0045. A distant board (example shown in Figure 25) gives a warning of the approach to a loop (or TEP). An Automatic Warning System (AWS) magnet on the approach to the distant board helps drivers identify their position in conditions of poor visibility. Figure 25 Distant board G The commencement and termination of RETB working is indicated using either a stop board, or a stop signal associated with a lineside operational sign. Because the movement authority for a train movement through an RETB section does not require the display of a signal aspect, stop boards are usually provided. Further requirements for positioning stop boards and associated cautionary aspect sequences are set out in GK/RT0045. G Stop boards / signals are provided to indicate the commencement and end of each token section. Stop boards (see Figure 26) contain the token exchange point name and the wording Stop Obtain Token and Permission to Proceed. At stop boards where long section tokens are applicable, an additional yellow sign worded Drivers in Possession of Long Section Token May Proceed is provided. The stop board or stop signal ON aspect identifies the point at which the driver should stop the train at the end of the movement authority. Figure 26 Stop boards with TPWS lineside status indicators RSSB Page 37 of 83

38 G The operational rules for RETB working require the driver to report the location of the train to the signaller. The driver uses the token exchange point name displayed on the stop board or lineside operational sign to do this. G The wording displayed on the lineside operational sign or stop board is intended to remind the driver that a token and verbal authority from the signaller is required before the train proceeds into the next block section. G Parameters for instructions displayed on stop boards are set out in GK/RT0045. G Parameters for lineside operational signs are set out in GI/RT7033. G The RETB system may be configured to issue long section tokens which permit the train to proceed through more than one block section without stopping at the stop board denoting the end of movement authority when a short section token is issued. G Worked stop signals may be provided at transitions between RETB working and a different method of working that uses lineside signals. G Where a lineside signal controls access onto the RETB fitted line, the signal route onto the RETB fitted line should be interlocked with the RETB system. All transitions between RETB and lineside signalling systems should be designed in accordance with GK/RT0036. G Uncontrolled When Printed Points set indicator (PSI) (home) signal G The single aperture LED aspect PSI (shown in Figure 27) is activated by plungers at the platform and authorises the driver to pass the facing points at up to 15 mph and enter the loop. Figure 27 Points set indicator single aperture LED PSI Figure 28 Points set indicator two aperture LED PSI G The alternative to the single aperture LED PSI is the two aperture LED PSI, as shown in Figure 28, where the second aperture replaces the requirement for the driver to operate a plunger. The two aperture LED PSI authorises the driver to pass the facing points at up to 15 mph and enter the loop. Page 38 of 83 RSSB

39 G Uncontrolled When Printed Train clear of loop marker boards G A train clear of loop marker board is an upright white rectangular reflectorised board with three light blue stripes. This is the marker to remind a driver to inform the controlling signal box that the train has passed clear of the loop. It indicates the token overlap which should be clear before a succeeding train may approach the passing loop. This indicator is only required in RETB installations. The train clear marker (also known as loop clear marker or station limits board) is provided a train length beyond the points at the last token exchange point. G The diagrams below show the front (Figure 29), and the mirror image reverse of the loop marker boards (Figure 30). Figure 29 Front view Figure 30 Rear view G AWS cancelling indicator G On passing the distant signal for the opposite direction, the driver passes over its AWS inductor; 185 m in advance of this point is the cancelling indicator a square reflectorised blue board with a diagonal white cross. This is to remind the driver that the AWS indication which they have just received is not applicable to that direction of movement. RETB lines are fitted throughout with the AWS in accordance with GE/RT8035 and GK/RT0075, where AWS cancelling indicators are permitted in preference to AWS suppression. G Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS) G The TPWS has two separate but related functions: a) To stop trains that are approaching a red signal so fast that a signal passed at danger (SPAD) is likely to occur. This is termed the speed trap function. b) To stop any train that passes a signal at danger. This is termed the trainstop function. G The speed trap function can prevent many potential SPADs, due to either misjudgement in braking, or inattention caused by successive cautionary aspects. However, it cannot influence SPADs where trains pass the speed trap at a suitable speed but then fail to brake further, possibly due to wheelslide or a lapse in concentration. RSSB Page 39 of 83

40 G In 2003 railway safety legislation mandated that RETB areas were to be fitted with the nationally introduced TPWS. This presented a challenge, as the trackside RETB equipment consisted of only reflectorised marker boards. To overcome this, engineers developed a software system which effectively listened in to the radio data transmissions and controlled lineside indicators fitted below token exchange stop boards and transmission loops installed in the track. G The trainstop function is intended to stop trains that pass the signal, either because they fail to brake to a halt having earlier reduced their speed, or that have started from rest against the signal mainly at platforms. G TPWS overlay in RETB areas G TPWS fitment is generally concentrated on worked signals, buffer stops, and permanent speed restrictions (PSRs). However, on RETB single line sections train controls do not use signals. The fitment of TPWS trackside equipment at RETB Token Exchange Points (TEPs) is generally as required by the conventional TPWS equipment installation standards, with the exception that the RETB stop board replaces the signal as the prime reference point for the positioning of TPWS equipment. G As the section tokens are issued directly to the train driver, additional equipment is required to control and indicate the status of the TPWS system. This additional equipment consists of the Trackside Radio Control Unit (TRCU) that is mounted in a housing. Other equipment at the side of or on the track, consisting of the LSI and treadles to trigger activation and the cancellation of the TPWS. G Trackside Radio Control Unit (TRCU) is the term used to describe the whole system, including the TRCM, the Global Positioning System (GPS), the Location Identity Device (LID), and the Trackside Functional Modules (TFMs). G A typical installation of TRCU equipment comprises three apparatus cases as follows: a) TRCU and one or more TFMs. b) TPWS Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS). c) TPWS modules and a TPWS UPS. G RETB antennae are attached to lattice masts, close to the apparatus cases, or on masts attached to the RETB. G Lineside Status Indicators (LSIs) are installed below the stop board. TPWS transmitter loops and train detection treadles (where required) are installed in the four-foot. G A Maintainer s Terminal (MT) is used to facilitate fault-finding of the TRCU. G The TRCM is a line replaceable unit. It cannot be repaired in the field and, if faulty, should be returned to the authorised repair agent. G The TRCM has three main components / sub-systems: a) The radio sub-system. b) The computing sub-system. Uncontrolled When Printed c) The interface to the I/O modules (using the TFMs). G The radio sub-system is based on two identical COTS radio receivers, which contain modems with software configured for RETB protocols. The modem is only responsible for demodulation, framing and packaging of received data. Unlike the radios fitted in the trains, these radios are receivers only; they do not transmit. Page 40 of 83 RSSB

41 G The two radio channels are individually configured within the Site Configuration Information (SCI) of the TRCM. Where possible, they are configured to listen to different channels, with the aerials direction set so as to optimise the reception for that channel. Hence, if the antenna cables are crossed, then it is possible that neither radio channel will work. G The audio volume of the radio sub-system is controlled by four buttons. Each of the two channels has a button to increase the volume and another to decrease the volume. This enables the maintainer to listen to radio traffic. G The radio channel selection is part of the SCI held within the computing sub-system. G The computing sub-system is responsible for message decoding. It is based on a COTS single board computer. The use of special features is minimised, and standard interfaces are maximised. There is a simple bespoke intelligent interface to the TFMs. The computer stores the SCI within its memory. G All TRCM activity is logged. The log is held in non-volatile memory within the computing sub-system, and can be downloaded to the MT. G The I/O sub-system G All connections to the TRCM are on the front panel. The two RETB radio antennas are connected at the top left, and care should be taken not to cross-connect these if they have been disconnected. The Location Identity Device (LID) is built into a 50-pin connector. G The connections to the TFMs, DLMs and the input from the GPS sub-system are through a 75-way connector on the right of the panel. The MT connects through a multi-pin connector (protected by a screw cap) towards the bottom of the panel. G The TRCM needs a clock so that it can give a consistent time stamp to the tokens it receives. It uses a clock signal which is provided by a GPS unit, giving Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) based reports. (In summer time, the clock will still be on GMT.) The GPS is another COTS unit, in the form of a grey mushroom antenna on top of the RETB or apparatus case containing the TRCM. G The GPS smart antenna contains no serviceable parts and is a Line Replaceable Unit (LRU). If it is necessary to change the GPS smart antenna, the new antenna should have been pre-configured in accordance with the MT Users Guide. It is not necessary to align the GPS smart antenna, as it is omni-directional. A signalling maintenance testing handbook (SMTH) maintenance test plan is available from the IM for the TRCU GPS module. Once the new GPS smart antenna has been installed, the TRCM should be reset to check that the new GPS module passes the TRCM power on self-test. G The LID contains a unique identifier for each site along with a current Site Configuration Information (SCI) version number. It connects to the 50-way connector on the TRCM front panel and is held captive to the apparatus case / RETB by a short cord. If the LID needs changing, then a replacement should be obtained coded with the correct version of SCI. G The LID is also labelled with the SCI version configuration number. Rigorous version control and security checksums are used to secure the SCI. A TRCU only accepts a SCI assigned for that specific location and of the correct version. The LID can only be programmed by using a special tool and cannot be re-programmed on site. G Trackside functional modules G There is a clear separation between the computing sub-system, housed in the TRCM and the TFMs. The interface between these sub-systems is by means of the TRCM I/O data link. G The TFM has four indicator lamps on the front panel: a) Power. b) System. Uncontrolled When Printed RSSB Page 41 of 83

42 c) Receive (RX) data. d) Output. G At some sites, the TPWS trackside equipment may be located further from the main apparatus case than the permitted 500 m of loop feeder cable allows. In these circumstances an SSI data link, consisting of a pair of data link modules (DLMs) is used to extend the distance from the TRCU to the TPWS trackside equipment. In this case the TPWS control modules and TFMs are housed in a separate cabinet remote from the TRCU apparatus cases. A separate TPWS UPS may also be provided at the remote location. G To ensure the continuous operation of the TRCU, a TPWS UPS is housed in a separate apparatus case. The TPWS UPS provides a minimum of 12 hours backup supply time for the TRCU system. The TRCM is programmed (via the SCI) to indicate power failure via the LSIs after six hours of operation on standby batteries. The TPWS UPS may also be used to power TPWS Over Speed Sensors (OSSs) for Permanent Speed Restrictions (PSRs) or buffer stops within 500 m. G TRCU radio antennas G Two antennas are used for reception of main, and in some instances secondary, RETB radio channels appropriate for the location. They are located on dedicated masts as near to the TRCU apparatus cases as reasonably practicable. G The radio antennas are situated in a position to provide optimum signal strength, in order that the probability of correct message reception exceeds that of the train. The radio antenna connects directly to the radio receivers in the TRCM. G TRCU operation G In normal operation when no token has been received, the LSI shows a steady blue indication and the TPWS is not suppressed. G When a site-specific token is received, the event is logged; the TRCM suppresses TPWS, and the LSI(s) flash when any required external inputs are present. G The TRCU equipment is unable to determine on which line the train receiving the token is standing. Therefore, all TPWS equipment protecting entry to a particular single line section is normally suppressed, and all of the LSIs at stop boards protecting entry to that single line section start a blue flashing indication on receipt of a valid token for that section. Exceptions to this include trains standing on track-circuited lines at diverging junctions or level crossings where these are operated by a train crew plunger. G The usual sequence for section tokens and long section tokens is that the train is assumed to have passed after a time of five minutes (this is site specific, but nominally five minutes) although there are some exceptions, where time-out is initiated by a suppression cancellation treadle. The TPWS suppression is cancelled immediately following this timeout. The LSI returns to a steady blue indication 30 seconds before this time-out occurs. G For shunt tokens, the suppression period is usually 60 minutes. Engineering and test tokens do not cause TPWS to be suppressed. G The withdrawal of a token from a train is a co-operative process between the signaller and the train driver. The TRCM recognises that the token has been withdrawn by the signaller and cancels the suppression of TPWS immediately. G If a train is delayed in departing for some reason, then the time-out may take place prior to train departure, the LSI returns to showing a steady blue indication and, after 30 seconds, the TPWS suppression is removed. In this case, the driver should ask for the token to be re-issued. G Lineside status indicator (LSI) Page 42 of 83 Uncontrolled When Printed G The LSI is a single aspect blue LED indicator located below the RETB stop boards that are fitted with TPWS, and indicates the status of the TPWS equipment to the driver. RSSB

43 G The indicator operates as follows: a) A steady blue LSI indicates that the TPWS equipment is not suppressed, and should stop the train. b) A flashing blue LSI indicates that the TPWS equipment is in a suppressed state (that is to say, TPWS is not energised and will allow the train to proceed). c) An LSI showing no indication, indicates a fault with the TRCU or TPWS equipment. In this case the TPWS equipment may or may not be suppressed. d) A flashing blue LSI returns to the steady blue indication 30 seconds prior to TPWS suppression timing out. G The LSI is mounted underneath the stop board to allow adequate sighting by the train driver prior to passing the TPWS track equipment. Multiple, co-acting LSIs are provided where there are two or more entries to a single line section, indicating the status of all TPWS equipment at the TEP protecting one single line section. G Certain TEPs can be passed through at permissible speed by trains with a long section token; these TEPs are normally on the approach to a converging junction. A repeater LSI is mounted at the distant board and triggered by a treadle. G Train detecting devices G In order to ensure that LSIs are not left flashing for long periods at TEPs with long section tokens, long section token controls are used. On the approach to an intermediate TEP, a train with a long section token strikes a suppression activation treadle, which initiates the TRCM suppression timing function, which has already been primed by the reception of a valid token. This starts the LSIs flashing for the onward route and suppresses TPWS for a set period (usually five minutes). G Siding connections G All siding connections are provided with ground frames. A simple connection would require a frame of two levers, one of which would be the release and facing point lock. An Annetts lock is provided on this lever, which requires either a section key in the case of key token working, or a radio controlled key in the case of electronic token block working. G Ground frame Uncontrolled When Printed G It is necessary to define as a token exchange point any ground frame operated siding where shut-in facilities are required. Procedures should ensure that the electronic token is returned when the train is clear of the running line, or has operated under normal token exchange procedures. Ground frames which are not at token exchange points can only be released by an Annetts key. G The Annetts key should be physically connected to the CDU Castell key, such that it is not possible to release the ground frame without withdrawing the CDU Castell key, thus preventing the electronic token from being returned if the ground frame is in the released state. G At all ground frames controlling points, it is not possible to return the relevant token unless the ground frame has been restored to normal. G It is only possible to remove the Annetts key when the ground frame release lever is in the normal position. The Annetts key sequence is shown in Figure 31 below. RSSB Page 43 of 83

44 Steel Annetts key box 1. Lift dust cover and insert Castell key Unique and individually identified Castell key to open the box and access the Annetts key Annetts key and box lock mechanism 2. Open door to obtain Annetts key 3. Remove Annetts key As the new Annetts key is secured to the box with a chain, the box cannot be closed with the Annetts key out of the box. 4. Place Annetts key into mechanical frame Page 44 of 83 RSSB

45 The Annetts key chain has just enough length so as not to catch in the segments 5. Move mechanical lever into position 6. Key remains in situ while lever is in position 7. Key can only be removed if lever is returned to home position Figure 31 Annetts key sequence G Train-operated points G A simple passing loop has a single turnout at each end, the points being normally set in the facing direction for entry into the loop from a single line. When leaving the loop in the trailing direction, the points are reversed by the action of the wheel flanges, and restored to their normal position once the train has passed. An example of train-operated points is shown in Figure 32. RSSB Page 45 of 83

46 G Each installation consists of: a) An energy pack, or accumulator unit, comprising a single-acting hydraulic actuator connected to the normally closed switch, a control valve block with pressure gauge, a pressure detection switch and overload safety device, and a hydro-pneumatic accumulator. b) A manual operation pack, comprising a second single-acting hydraulic actuator connected to the normally open switch, a hand-pump and a manual control valve. c) An electric detector. Uncontrolled When Printed G Ground connections are provided to second or third point drive stretcher bars, as necessary, from the leading drive stretcher bar. G The accumulator is pre-charged to the required pressure (75 bar) to generate a force in the extended actuator to hold the points closed in the normal position. G When the points are traversed in the trailing direction, the force generated by the wheel flanges exceeds the hydraulic holding force. This opens the closed switch and causes the actuator to retract. The hydraulic fluid thus displaced passes via a flow regulator control valve into the accumulator, so increasing the pneumatic pressure. As soon as the wheel flange generated force is removed or reduced, the potential energy in the accumulator is released into the system to re-close the points, in a controlled time of up to 20 seconds to minimise wear on the points as they are trailed. G The points can be moved to the reverse position manually by operating the hand-pump and can be secured in that position by a manual override valve. Releasing this valve allows the points to be restored to normal under the action of the stored energy in the main system. Both energy pack and manual operating are self-contained and do not require hydraulic interconnections. G Because of the nature of the operating arrangements, the maximum permitted speed over such installations is restricted to 15 mph. To avoid possible derailment, trains passing over the points in the trailing direction should not stop immediately over the points and reverse. G Train-operated points are only able to traverse the points in a trailing direction when manually operated. Figure 32 Train-operated points G Token exchange telephones G Token exchange telephones are provided at each TEP. These are used to communicate with the signaller in case of failure to the radio systems. An example is shown below in Figure 33. Page 46 of 83 RSSB

47 Figure 33 Example of a token exchange telephone G Level crossings and swing bridges G Running line signals present for the protection of intermediate level crossings or swing bridges on a RETB line, are of a non-block type. G The stop board at each token exchange point acts as a protecting signal. GK/RT0192 states that the 10 minute time limit applied to AHBs should not be applied to the running time between the protecting signal, or stop board and the crossing, if either: G a) Continuous voice communication between the signaller and the train crew (using the RETB voice facilities) is available from the protecting signal or stop board to the level crossing or swing bridge, and it can be demonstrated that the risks are acceptable. Or b) Before passing a designated point on the approach to the crossing or swing bridge, the driver of each train should contact the signaller to obtain permission to proceed over. Radio channel change marker G A radio channel change marker is a reflectorised black oval-shaped board, with a white upright diamond (see Figure 34), upon which is a number indicating which radio channel should be selected by the driver. Channel change markers are provided in accordance with GI/RT7033 to indicate where the driver is to set the radio to the channel number shown on the sign, in order to maintain optimum radio coverage. G Further requirements for channel change marker signs are set out in GI/RT7033. RSSB Page 47 of 83

48 Figure 34 Channel change marker G Fouling point marker G The fouling point marker is provided at each end of a crossing loop between adjacent running lines, which indicates the point beyond which a vehicle on one line fouls a vehicle on another line. This takes the form of: a) A miniature, reflectorized yellow post (yellow on one side only), facing into the loop (Banavie RETB area). b) A small, post-mounted, orange pot with a white, lateral stripe around the body (Inverness RETB area). Page 48 of 83 RSSB

49 Part 5 G 5.1 Operational Use of the RETB System General principles G The principles set out in this Part 5 are explained in terms of single track lines, but are directly applicable for double track lines, even if not explicitly stated. G The operational use set out in this part is a general approach. Specific detailed instructions for a particular RETB route are to be found in the appropriate IM territory Sectional Appendix. G Except where permissive operations are allowed, as set out in GK/RT0044, the RETB system can only permit one train in a token section at a time. G A train clear marker sign is provided a train length beyond the points at each token exchange point. G Determination of train position is spoken by messages between the driver and the signaller and supported by the issue and return of electronic tokens to and from trains. G Under normal train movements, the signal box interlocking is programmed for the sequential issue and retrieval of tokens, and the signaller s integrated touchscreen keyboard automatically indicates train position following the issue and retrieval of tokens. However, provision is also made for train movements under abnormal and emergency conditions. For these conditions the signaller has the means to enter the appropriate information into the integrated touchscreen keyboard so that the interlocking can be updated. G Specific detailed instructions for either the WHL or FNL RETB routes are to be found in the IM Scotland territory IM regulations, and the Sectional Appendix. G 5.2 G Trains General G A train can be a motive power unit, or an engineering on-track machine operating in the RETB controlled area. The train cab is wired to interface with a CDU, which is either engraved or painted with its own unique number. This unique number is also referred to as the radio number in this document. G The cabs at each end of a train can have a CDU, but only one CDU can be active, and there is no physical wiring interconnection between the CDUs on the train. G All road / rail vehicles need a TTU when operating in rail mode. The rules for engineers road / rail vehicles follow the same general principles as a train. G General conditions for token exchange and radio number entry into interlocking G Motive power units (including locomotives, multiple units, and other powered passenger and freight vehicles) that are assigned to work the line are either permanently fitted with radio equipment and portable CDUs, or carry TTUs. The unique radio identification numbers assigned to CDUs and TTUs are: a) Totally independent and different for each piece of equipment. b) Permanently installed into the CDU / TTU and not particular to any cab, locomotive, RRV or road vehicle. G Vehicles can only enter RETB controlled areas at designated locations (token exchange points) and these are predefined in the interlocking. It is only at these predefined designated locations that radio numbers may be entered into the RETB interlocking system. RSSB Page 49 of 83

50 G Radio numbers may only be entered at: G 5.3 G a) Fringe boxes. Fringe boxes are used for the transition between RETB and non-retb controlled areas. b) Passing loop sidings and intermediate sidings. These allow trains to be stabled in a siding. This entails the train relinquishing its token. On entry back into the loop a new token should be requested. c) Any section while in road mode for RVs and RRVs. For RVs or RRVs, radio numbers can also be entered at any section while in road mode and clear of the track. This enables the vehicle to receive the relevant token, for example section engineering or shunt token for the section of line. These radio numbers appear as independent berths clear of the line diagram berths. Method of operation Test token G Prior to the train arriving at the point at which it enters the RETB area, or being brought into service at a stabling point, a test of the on-train equipment is undertaken as follows: G a) The driver requests the signaller to send a test token to the train. b) On receipt of the test token and its display on the CDU, the driver returns the test token to the signaller. The CDU should then show a No Token' display, proving that the equipment on the train is in working order. c) The train is not permitted to enter the RETB area if the test token procedure fails. d) A test token can be issued at any one time to any token apparatus that does not already possess a token. Radio number entry Uncontrolled When Printed G Radio number entry registers the identity and location of a train when it initially enters the RETB area at an authorised location. G The procedure requires the co-operation of the driver and signaller, with the CDU in an operational condition. The train is identified by the number of the CDU on that train. G The radio number entry process requires the signaller to input the appropriate command to the RETB interlocking by means of the touchscreen keyboard, and involves the exchange of securely coded data between the signalling centre and the CDU. G With the exception of the issue and return of the test token it is not possible to perform any other RETB functions involving the train until the radio entry number function has been completed. G The interlocking retains the train identity until it is deleted or changed by the signaller, or the train leaves the RETB area. When required by the IM, it is permitted for the signaller s display to display a standard four character train identification code, as well as the radio number. G The identity and location of all trains for which radio number entry has been completed is shown on the signaller s display. The CDU on the train then shows a No Token display. Page 50 of 83 RSSB

51 G Normal sequence of events G The logical sequence is repeated for each token section along the line, as follows: a) The interlocking only permits the issue and return of tokens in a logical sequence. b) The interlocking only permits the issue and return from a logical location, except where a TTU is being carried on a road vehicle, or by track maintenance personnel. c) A driver is not able to enter a token section unless the train possesses an electronic token for that section, and has received verbal authority from the signaller to enter that token section. d) Equipment on the train displays to the driver whether or not an electronic token is held and, where one is held, it displays the token section to which it applies. e) Where lineside signals are provided the driver should obey them. f) The driver verbally reports to the signaller when the train has entered the new token section and the rear of the train has cleared the previous token section, to allow following movements to take place. This position is noted by the train clear marker board positioned at maximum length after the TEP. G The presence of unequipped rail vehicles, track obstructions, and road vehicles in the RETB is recorded in the RETB interlocking, and this is taken into account when determining if it is safe to issue an electronic token. G Different types of electronic token G Although there are operationally six different types of token available, they are issued and processed by the system in the same way. G The types of token available are: G a) Section token. b) Shunt token. c) Engineering token. d) Test token. e) Intermediate siding token. f) Long section token (two or more successive tokens). Section token Uncontrolled When Printed G Possession of a section token, with the appropriate verbal authority, permits a vehicle to traverse a given block section of track. For single lines, the types of token are outlined below; for double lines, a similar principle applies. G A passing loop to passing loop token can only be received or transmitted by a track vehicle when it is at a fringe box or one of the intermediate passing loops. G A passing loop to passing loop siding token can only be received or transmitted by a track vehicle when it is at a fringe box or one of the intermediate passing loops. G A passing loop to passing loop intermediate siding token is where it is received by a track vehicle that is in a passing loop or intermediate siding; the tokens are unidirectional. Possession of such a token permits a track vehicle to travel from the passing loop to the intermediate siding (or vice versa). G The pre-programmed interlocking software has the capability to issue a long section token. This is a maximum of two consecutive section tokens. Overlapping long sections are prohibited. RSSB Page 51 of 83

52 G Shunt token G A shunt token can be received or returned by any track vehicle that is in a passing loop or passing loop siding. A token of this type permits a track vehicle to shunt round a passing loop, within lineside marker boards, and to enter and leave passing loop sidings. G If a token has already been issued for an approaching train in a passing loop, the interlocking controls prevent the issue of a shunt token to a train in a passing loop siding. G Engineering token G An engineering token can be received or returned by any track vehicle and any token equipped road vehicle. The display on the token apparatus clearly shows it is an engineering token. G A road motor vehicle can only receive and return engineering tokens at locations not on or near the line, and at a time and place that is acceptable to both the signaller and the person in charge of the road vehicle. Possession of this token, and verbal permission from the signaller as well, permits a track gang to work in-section between lineside marker boards of adjacent passing loops. G When road / rail vehicles are in road mode and not on the track they can receive and return engineering tokens at a time and place that is acceptable to both the signaller and driver. Possession of a token, together with permission from the signaller is required before the road / rail vehicle may transfer from road to rail. The transfer may take place at any authorised location, in a section, between lineside marker boards of adjacent passing loops. G For in-section engineering purposes only, all rail vehicles are permitted to receive and return engineering tokens when in a passing loop or passing loop siding. Rail vehicles, includes motive power units, track machines and road / rail vehicles travelling in rail mode. G When in possession of such a token, and in a passing loop within lineside marker boards, the train driver can only move under instruction from the signaller. In-section rail vehicles in possession of an engineering token can travel between the lineside marker boards of adjacent passing loops. G An engineering token and shunt token can be issued at the same time. G Test token Uncontrolled When Printed G A test message can be transmitted to any token apparatus that does not already possess a token, at any time and any place that data can be received. These messages are usually issued to test radio token apparatus before vehicles enter the electronic token system. G Co-operative action between the driver and the signaller is required for the issuing and return of a token. G For rail vehicles, including road / rail vehicles operating in rail mode, token exchange should be executed at a designated token exchange point. G Possession of a token does not permit a driver to put a rail vehicle into motion, or a track gang to obstruct the running lines, until specifically given permission to do so by the signaller. G Vehicles can only enter RETB controlled areas at designated locations (token exchange points) and these are predefined in the interlocking. It is only at these predefined designated locations that radio numbers may be entered into the RETB interlocking system. Page 52 of 83 RSSB

53 G Intermediate siding token G An intermediate siding token is unidirectional, applicable from either: G a) A stop board or section signal at a token exchange point to an intermediate siding. Or b) A stop board at an intermediate siding to a stop board, a designated line or siding, the first stop signal, or the opposite direction crossing loop at the first token exchange point ahead. Long section token G A long section token authorises movement from the stop board (or section signal) at the entrance of the section to a stop board (or signal) ahead, without the need to stop at intermediate TEPs. G A long section token is applicable (in one direction only) from a stop board or section signal at one token exchange point to: G a) A stop board. b) A designated siding. c) The first stop signal. At the second token exchange point ahead. Track blocked and track clear G Track block should be used to record the presence of obstructions on the line. G The application and removal of track block requires the signaller to input the appropriate command to the RETB interlocking by means of the signaller's integrated touchscreen keyboard. G The track block function prevents the issue of any electronic token on that section. However, it is possible for the signaller to input a track block command to the interlocking, even if a token has already been issued for the section concerned. The track blocked condition is indicated on the signaller's touchscreen as track block. G A track clear function removes the track blocked condition. G Track block and track clear are not used as a method of passing through an RETB area for a train not equipped with RETB equipment. G Vehicle on line Uncontrolled When Printed G Vehicle on line is used to record the presence of rail vehicles not equipped with RETB trainborne equipment. G The application and removal of vehicle on line requires the signaller to input the appropriate command to the RETB interlocking by means of the signaller's integrated touchscreen keyboard. G The vehicle on line function prevents the issue of any electronic token on that section. However, it is possible for the signaller to input a vehicle on line command to the interlocking, even if a token has already been issued for the section concerned. The vehicle on line condition is indicated on the signaller's touchscreen. G A clear vehicle on line function removes the vehicle on line condition. RSSB Page 53 of 83

54 G Train clear G Train clear takes place when the rear of the train has cleared the limit of the passing loop, station area, or other location where token issue has taken place. G It permits the passing loop, station area, or other location to be occupied by another train. G Train clear requires the signaller to input the appropriate command to the RETB interlocking by means of the signaller's integrated touchscreen keyboard. It is performed in response to a verbal message from the driver. G Train clear is shown on the signaller's display but the electronic token shown on the CDU remains unchanged. G Token return G Token return returns an electronic token from a train. It takes place when a train is at a location authorised for that purpose, and requires the co-operation of the driver and signaller with the CDU in an operational condition. G Token return requires the signaller to input the appropriate command to the RETB interlocking by means of the signaller's controls, and involves the exchange of securely coded data between the signal centre and the train. On completion of token return, the CDU shall show a No Token display. The train is shown on the signaller's display as possessing no electronic token. G The train is not permitted to leave the token exchange location until it has been issued with another electronic token, or authority in the form of another signalling system (for example, lineside signalling) has been given. G TOKEX G Further operational benefits are achieved through the use of a TOKen EXchange (TOKEX) facility, whereby a current section token can be returned and the next section token can be issued in a single transaction. This is achieved by the driver pressing and holding the send button. These tokens can be either single section or long section tokens forming the following four configurations: a) Single section token return single section token issue. b) Single section token return long section token issue. c) Long section token return long section token issue. d) Long section token return single section token issue. G The operational benefits of a TOKEX are: G a) The speeding up of token exchanges, which leads to reduced station dwell time. b) The reduction in overall journey times within the RETB system. c) The reduction in radio air time especially when trains are queuing up to use the system. d) The reduction of speech intensive radio transactions that take place. Radio number clear Page 54 of 83 Uncontrolled When Printed G Radio number clear removes a radio number from the RETB interlocking when a train is cleared from the running line, for example, at a siding. This function is also executed automatically by the token return procedure when a train on the running line returns a token prior to leaving the RETB area. G Radio number clear requires the signaller to input the appropriate command to the RETB interlocking by means of the signaller's controls. RSSB

55 G The system is designed such that it is not possible to perform the radio number clear function with any train that holds an electronic token. G Exceptionally, the radio number clear function may be used to remove the radio number from the interlocking, for emergency purposes. G The indication of the train is removed from the signaller's touchscreen display after radio number clear has been completed. G Radio number change G Radio number change is where the identity of a train in the RETB interlocking is changed. The new identity is shown on the signaller's integrated touchscreen keyboard. Radio number change is prohibited if the train is holding a token. G Special procedure G Where the SSI has pre-programmed special procedure data, then token issue is also available under the following circumstances: a) For a train to proceed to the wrong side loop at the destination (on single lines). b) For a train to proceed along the wrong line (on double lines). c) For a train returning a token at a designated location other than the exit point of the token section. G Availability of tokens to road, rail and road / rail vehicles G All vehicles equipped with radio token apparatus should be able to receive all types of token. G 5.4 G Documentation to support the operational use of RETB Rule Book G The GE/RT8000 Rule Book applies, except where modified by the documents set out in the following sections. G Sectional Appendix G The Sectional Appendix, required by GO/RT3215, identifies all of the lines worked using the RETB system. This information is available to IMs and RUs. G Requirements for the Weekly Operating Notice, Periodical Operating Notice and Sectional Appendix are set out in GO/RT3215. G Regulations for Train Signalling by the Radio Electronic Token Block System G The document Regulations for Train Signalling by the Radio Electronic Token Block System modifies the GE/RT8000 Rule Book issued by the IM Scotland route and applies to signallers in Scotland Route RETB areas. G RETB working by Pilotman G The document RETB working by Pilotman is issued by the IM Scotland route to be used when there is a failure of the signalling system. G If a radio channel or other radio system fails, or a signalling system fails which prevents the exchange of tokens with all trains in the area concerned, in addition to making arrangements to have the fault repaired, arrangements should also be made immediately for RETB working by Pilotman, as set out in the RETB working by Pilotman document. RSSB Page 55 of 83

56 G Single Lines Worked by Radio Electronic Token Block Instructions to Train Crews, Persons Carrying Out Engineering Work and Others Concerned G The document Single lines worked by Radio Electronic Token Block Instructions to Train Crews, Persons Carrying out Engineering Work and Others Concerned modifies the GE/RT8000 Rule Book issued by the IM Scotland route and apply to drivers of trains, machines etc and persons carrying out engineering work. Where other staff are involved, the instructions show the individual duties of the staff concerned. G Special Instructions to Signallers at Inverness (RETB) Signal Centre (SC) G The document Special Instructions to Signallers at Inverness (RETB) Signal Centre (SC) is issued by the IM Scotland route and apply to signallers at Inverness SC, and detail methods of working requirements additional to the Rule Book module items and also for special operational purposes. G Special Instructions to Signallers at Banavie (RETB) SC G The document Special Instructions to Signallers at Banavie (RETB) SC is issued by the IM Scotland route and apply to signallers at Banavie SC, and detail methods of working requirements additional to the Rule Book module items and also for special operational purposes. G Uncontrolled When Printed Voice Protocol RETB Signalling System G The document Voice Protocol RETB Signalling System is issued by the IM Scotland route, and describes the voice communication protocol throughout both RETB systems to provide compliance with GE/RT8000 Rule Book Module G1 section 5 Giving and Receiving Safety Messages, and Handbook (HB) HB1 section 9. G The document applies to all operating, maintenance and Train Operating Company (TOC) employees authorised to transmit radio messages on RETB networks. G The document applies to all messages concerning the transference of tokens, positioning of trains or vehicles, cautioning of trains or vehicles, carrying out protection of the line procedures, and communicating the state of signalling equipment, which are all considered as being safety-critical communications. Page 56 of 83 RSSB

57 Part 6 G 6.1 G General Fault Procedures and Testing and Services Fault reporting input / output Failure of the system G The IMs and the RUs should ensure that suitable operating procedures are available for the safe working of trains during all credible failure modes and their subsequent restoration. G The requirements for sharing information relating to reported safety related failures of control, command and signalling (CCS) systems between IMs and RUs when the complete system includes both a trainborne CCS equipment sub-system and an infrastructure equipment CCS sub-system is set out in GE/RT8106. This is to ensure that sufficient, timely and relevant information about failures is available to support a failure management process, with the aim of establishing the cause of each failure so that the necessary corrective action is taken. G The purpose of GE/RT8106 is to ensure that: a) Necessary information about safety related failures of these CCS systems is shared by RUs and IMs. b) Shared information is correctly communicated so that it can be used by RUs and IMs when decisions are taken to return assets to operational use following completion of failure investigations. c) Implementation of new CCS systems and each duty holder's responsibility for the equipment in their control is supported by a Defect Reporting Analysis and Corrective Action System (DRACAS). G An EM key on the touchscreen monitor is provided for use when radio data communication fails. When the EM key on the touchscreen monitor is used in conjunction with a security number and functional command entered by the signaller, the interlocking executes the command without the transmission or reception of radio data, provided it is safe to do so. G Each use of the touchscreen key increments an electronic counter. G The IM is responsible for identifying the circumstances when the EM key on the touchscreen monitor can be used, and ensures that secure procedures are in place for the operational use. G The RETB radio is an essential part of the train movement control system. Therefore, a train is prohibited from entering service from any location without the operative radio present. Furthermore, if the radio becomes defective in service, the instructions published by the IM for the operation of the system for the route concerned, contain the measures to be taken by the driver. Contingency arrangements involving passengers should take into account the remoteness and availability of road access to areas served (see also GO/RC3537). G RUs are free to implement their own process or to collaborate with other RUs to operate a common process. This can include the utilisation of DRACAS of the manufacturer / owner of the rail vehicle when permission is given. G The IM applies a uniform methodology for the classification of infrastructure failures into one of three groups: a) Safety related failures (high risk). b) Safety related failures (low risk). c) Other failures (negligible risk). RSSB Page 57 of 83

58 G The classification of RETB trainborne equipment failures used by RUs to ensure consistency for investigation and monitoring purposes is set out in GE/RT8106. G As part of the communication and reporting process: a) Where safety related failures identified by IMs or RUs are thought to involve equipment which is under the control of another IM or RU, details are brought promptly to the attention of that IM or RU in order that investigations can be undertaken. b) IMs or RUs share information and co-operate with other IMs or RUs for the purposes of carrying out investigations or reaching conclusions as to the cause of a safety related failure. c) IMs or RUs report safety related failures of signalling and operational telecommunications equipment to the IMs, for the purposes of monitoring, analysis and subsequent dissemination of national trend information. G Each IM or RU periodically calculates and analyses safety related failures for principal types of equipment under their control. The frequency of analysis is commensurate with the risks and the quantities of equipment under control. G IMs or RUs ensure that significant changes in the quantity of equipment under their control, and in the methods of classifying and recording failures, are highlighted to all users of the performance data, where such changes may affect perceived safety performance. G Uncontrolled When Printed Failure recording and investigation G RUs should have a process in place for recording and investigating all safety related failures of signalling and operational telecommunications systems fitted to vehicles they operate. G In either case, each RU remains separately accountable for their process. The process may be paper-based and / or use IT systems. G When tasked to investigate an operational telecommunications failure, the maintainer should comply with its own standards processes. G It is recognised that the processes set out in the Telecommunications Maintenance Testing and Fault Investigation Handbook are not exhaustive for maintainers. The processes are intended to ensure that the reported failures are thoroughly investigated, properly recorded and that vital evidence is not destroyed through testing. Page 58 of 83 RSSB

59 Appendix A RETB Test Box (Whiteley Test Box) G A.1 G A.1.1 G A G A G A RETB test box RETB test unit The RETB test unit is manufactured by Whiteley and sometimes referred to as a Whiteley test box The RETB test unit is used for on-air tests prior to a train entering service. Where this is undertaken at a depot, for example, Corkerhill the unit is referred to as a Depot test unit. The RETB test unit also has a second mode of operation, the CDU only test. This test is carried out by the direct connection of the CDU under test to the RETB test unit G A Figure 35 RETB test unit The following list identifies the numbered items of the RETB test unit, as shown in Figure Handset. 2. Token send button. 3. Token retrieve button. 4. CDU / radio switch. 5. On / off switch amp, quick blow fuse. 7. Test indicators and battery condition indicator. 8. FM1200 transceiver. 9. Cab display unit number thumbwheel switches. RSSB Page 59 of 83

60 G A.1.2 G A G A Loudspeaker. 11. Software reset button. 12. CDU direct connection. 13. Power supply unit. 14. Attenuation unit. Test mode 1: on-air test only The on-air test performs a token exchange between the cab radio / CDU and the RETB test unit. Performing the test involves two operators: one to operate the cab radio / CDU and the other to operate the RETB test unit. The testing sequence is as follows: 1. If the RETB test unit, antenna load box and antenna are not already connected, then connect them, as shown in Figure Switch the unit on and the LEDs should illuminate and an indication of the battery condition is displayed (see Figure 35, item 7). 3. Set the radio / CDU switch on the RETB test unit (see Figure 35, item 4). 4. Set the RETB test unit radio to channel 3XX. 5. Set the cab radio to channel 1XX, where the XX for both the channel settings are the same (Figure 37 shows Channel No. display). 6. The cab radio logs on to the RETB test unit radio. Successful logging on results in the presentation of the cab radio call display, shown in Figure 38, and the RETB test unit FM 1200 transceiver radio display shown in Figure 39. To Antenna End Panel of RETB Test Unit Antenna Load Unit 12 Volt Input 240 Volt 50Hz Input RETB Test Unit Power Supply Figure 36 On-air test connections Page 60 of 83 RSSB

61 A P M S E Channel No. 1xx Figure 37 Cab radio unit RETB Call F:xxxx RETB, Chan 1 xx A P M S E Figure 38 Cab radio unit call display Reverse Channel F:xxxx Duplex Chan 3 xx A P M S E Figure 39 RETB test unit FM 1200 transceiver reverse channel display RSSB Page 61 of 83

62 7. The cab radio can now establish voice communication with the RETB test unit operator. 8. The RETB test unit operator is now able to ask the cab radio operator what the cab display unit number of the cab CDU is. Having received this information the RETB test unit operator can now set the thumbwheel switches to the same four-digit number (see Figure 35, item 9). 9. The RETB test unit operator can then contact the cab radio operator using the radio and request them to press and hold the CDU receive button (see Figure 43). 10. The RETB test unit operator then presses and releases the send button on the RETB test unit (Figure 35, item 2). During the token exchange, the handshake LED on the RETB test unit flashes on and off. When a successful token exchange has been completed, the handshake and token exchange LEDs permanently illuminate. During the token exchange, the data that is being passed between the test unit and the cab radio can be heard on the test unit and cab radio loudspeakers. 11. The cab radio operator is now able to return the test token. 12. The cab radio operator can now press and hold the CDU send button (see Figure 43). 13. The cab radio operator instructs the RETB test unit operator to press and release the RETB test unit retrieve button (see Figure 35, item 3). 14. The display on the cab CDU returns to a blank screen, and the token exchange and handshake LEDs on the RETB test unit is then permanently illuminated. 15. It is confirmed that the CDU has a blank display. 16. The RETB test box operator now confirms the successful return of the test token. 17. The operator now may wait for 10 seconds for the LEDs to extinguish or press the software reset button (see Figure 35, item 11). 18. The testing is now complete. 19. If the test was unsuccessful, refer to the Test Box Operating Guide flowchart for onair test, as shown in Figure 40 and Figure 41. Page 62 of 83 RSSB

63 Start Switch on test unit Yes Does battery indicator show fully charged No Plug in power supply/charger RETB Test Box Operating Guide On Air Test Only Set radio/cdu Switch on Test unit to Radio position Ensure that antenna/dummy load unit is connected Set test unit radio to channel 3xx Yes Set on train radio to channel 1xx Is this the first attempt for the train radio to Log-on No Does train radio under test display RETB call and the relevant channel No Attempt to log-on With test unit using Another radio/ handportable Yes The test radio has logged on with the test set Does the Alternative radio Display RETB call and the relevant channel Yes Disconnect Antenna from test unit No Test unit operator to speak to ontrain radio operator test call Test unit operator asks on-train operator what is the train cdu number Allow test equipment Battery charge if Not already charged Test unit operator sets \CDU number on thumb nail switches Take test unit and antenna load unit to train Test unit operator to instruct on train operator to press & hold CDU receive button Plug test unit into antenna from radio tray Test unit operator press and release the send button on the test unit Disconnect train antenna from radio tray Connect train radio to other side of dummy load unit Handshake LED on test unit flash as handshake cycle is completed Change train radio Retry log-on Enter 1xx on Train radio Are handshake & token exchange LED s both on green permanently Yes No Both LED s Red No Does Train radio Under test display RETB call and the Relevant channel Does train CDU display the test token Yes No Release CDU receive button Release cdu Receive button A B C D E F G H Figure 40 RETB test box operating guide on-air test only RSSB Page 63 of 83

64 A B C D E F G H Possible Installation fault Confirm release By voice Is cdu number on test unit correct Release CDU Receive button Yes Antenna VSWR test Train operator to Press &hold cdu Send button Is this the First test run On this particular CDU Yes No Change antenna No VSWR Pass or Fail Confirm pressing Of button by voice Are all Interconnections correct No Reconnect correctly Yes Yes Call engineerr Press & release Test unit Retrieve button Perform CDU test Does cdu Display go blank No Is this the first time that you have changed the CDU Yes Yes No Are token exchange &handshake LED s on test unit permanently green No Possible test Equipment Or installation fault Yes On train CDU Has passed Mark up with appropriate labels Any CDU s that have apparently failed End Figure 41 RETB test box operating guide on-air test only (continued) Page 64 of 83 RSSB

65 G A.1.3 G A Test mode 1 on-air test only (direct connection) The RETB test unit and antenna load box can also be used to carry out the in-cab testing if the vehicle antenna installation is suspected as having a fault. The connections for the in cab testing of the cab radio and CDU are shown in Figure 42. End Panel of RETB Test Unit Antenna Load Unit DO NOT REMOVE Connect Directly into Radio Under test Antenna Port 12 Volt Input To Cab Figure 42 On-air testing direct (in-cab) connections G A The in cab testing sequence is as follows: 1. Connect the RETB test unit / antenna load unit (see Figure 42). 2. Switch the unit on. The LEDs illuminate and an indication of the battery condition is displayed (see Figure 35, item 7). 3. Perform the test sequence as for the on-air testing set out in section G A.1.2.2, numbers 1 to This test effectively bypasses the antenna installation on the vehicle and transmits the depot test token directly into the cab radio. 5. If this test passes, but the previous on-air test had failed, then the vehicle antenna installation should be investigated further. The antenna installation can be checked using the VSWR test detailed in the depot vehicle maintenance instructions. RSSB Page 65 of 83

66 G A.1.4 G A Test mode 2 CDU only testing This test checks the operation of the CDU only. It is a single person operation. The testing sequence is as follows: 1. Connect the CDU and the RETB test unit as shown in Figure 43, using the cable supplied with the RETB test unit. RETB test unit CDU receive button CDU under test CDU send button Figure 43 CDU only testing 2. CDU LED screen lights up initialise system. Insert the RETB key and switch on, and the LED screen goes blank. 3. Set the thumbwheel switches on the RETB test unit to the identity number of the CDU under test (see Figure 35, item 9). 4. Set the radio / CDU switch on the RETB test unit to the CDU position (see Figure 35, item 4). 5. Simultaneously press and hold the token receive button on the CDU and press and release the token send button on the RETB test unit. While the token exchange is being performed the LEDs start to flash during the handshake and token exchange LEDs are permanently illuminated. 6. The CDU displays the test token message. 7. Release the CDU token receive button. 8. Wait for the software time out or press the software reset button on the RETB test unit. Page 66 of 83 RSSB

67 9. Simultaneously press and hold the token send button on the CDU, and press and release the token retrieve button on the RETB test unit. 10. The CDU then returns to a blank display and the handshake and token exchange LEDs on the RETB test unit are permanently lit. 11. If the test is unsuccessful, refer to the test box operating guide for CDU test only flowchart in Figure 44. RSSB Page 67 of 83

68 Start Switch on test unit Yes Does battery indicator show fully charged No Plug in power supply/charger RETB Test Box Operating Guide CDU Test Only Connect test unit cable between CDU under test and test unit Reconnect CDU cable Set cab display no. switches on test unit to same as ch cdu under test (4 digit No.) Set radio/cdu switch on test unit to cdu position Press and hold receive button on cdu. Press and release send button on the the test unit Release cdu receive button The green handshake LED on the test unitshould flash as the handshake cycle is completed Are handshake & tokenexchange led s both on permanently No Both LED s red Release cdu release button Does the cdu display show depot test token message No Is the cdu/radio switch in the right position No Yes Yes Does battery indicator show fully charged No Is the cdu No. correct No Release cdu receive button Token has been successfully received by the cdu Yes Is the cdu/test unit cable correctly connected No Change CDU 10 second led reset period (or press reset button) Release cdu receive button No Press & hold retrieve button on test unit. Press and release send button on cdu Have you already replaced the cdu during the test sequence No Yes Does battery indicator show fully charged No Are handshake & token exchange led s both on permenantly Possible test equipment malfunction, label those cdu s that have failed on the test sequencefor retest on another test unit Yes Test completed cdu passed Call engineer End Figure 44 RETB test box operating guide CDU test only Page 68 of 83 RSSB

69 Appendix B RETB System Proposals for 2015 and Beyond G B.1 G B.1.1 G B.2 G B.2.1 G B.3 G B.3.1 G B G B G B G B G B.3.2 G B G B.3.3 G B G B G B.3.4 G B Introduction Changes to the RETB operating frequencies have much wider implications than simply changing the frequency of the base stations. A requirement of the proposals will be to develop and renew, or modify a variety of on-train, depot, engineering and trackside equipment to ensure a complete RETB system; details of the requirements of the building blocks of the system are included here. This Appendix is split into four asset specific sections which aim to explain the requirements for each asset, and give an overall indication of how these systems make up the RETB system. Telecoms proposals The decision is to life extend the existing RETB systems in Scotland with a view to their retention until ERTMS is deployed as the signalling system renewal solution. In order to achieve this, various works have been / are being undertaken, including plans to amend the RETB system to operate on new frequencies that are not constrained in the same manner as those for NRN, thus enabling RETB to remain in service after RETB base stations Introduction As a result of the success of the base station development and an increased confidence in the reliability of the system, it is planned to develop similar units based on new operating frequencies. To reduce costs and maximise the life of these renewed base stations the proposals should, as far as reasonably practicable, utilise these base stations by modifying them to accommodate the revised frequencies. As a result of providing radio transmitters at a different frequency, clearance will be required in accordance with IM standards. The project should, during the feasibility stage (GRIP 3), bring radio coverage into compliance at known black spot areas by introducing new cell enhancers. Greater detail should be known about black spots on completion of the existing base station roll-out project. Where new cell enhancers are deployed, location approval should be in accordance with the requirements set out in IM standards. Masts At sites where the IM is the owner of the masts the IM should inspect the mast condition to identify any remedial works. Antennas and feeder cables As a result of changing the RETB frequencies, there will be a requirement to renew all existing antennas and feeder cables. Dependent on the migration strategy adopted, there may be a further requirement to dual-operate RETB legacy and new equipment, leading to a requirement to duplicate base station antenna and feeder arrangements. This requires temporary site sharing agreements to be negotiated by the IM with the third-party owners. An assessment should be made of the most suitable location for temporary antennas, based on the space available on masts, antenna separation and required coverage. On decommissioning of legacy RETB equipment, all antennas and feeders should be recovered to the satisfaction of the site owner. Power supply and battery chargers The existing battery chargers have not been subject to renewals as part of previous life extension projects and, as such, should be renewed as part of this project. Due to the remote location of these sites the battery should provide a back-up supply for a minimum of 24 hours in the event of a mains failure. The chosen chargers should be able to report alarm conditions through the RETB base stations and the RETB health-monitoring system. RSSB Page 69 of 83

70 G B.3.5 G B G B.3.6 G B G B G B.3.7 G B G B G B G B.3.8 G B G B.3.9 G B G B Earthing and lightning protection Where new masts are proposed or modified, these should be earthed in accordance with IM standards. Where masts are not being renewed, this is because the earthing and bonding was upgraded as part of earlier life extension projects. Masts should not require upgrading unless changes are made to accommodate mast modifications or feeder earths. 2-wire / 4-wire / dial-ups The private wire connections were provided with additional earthing protection as part of earlier life extension projects and should not require additional work as part of this project. Dependent on the migration strategy, there may be a requirement to duplicate these links to interface with legacy and new base stations. Alternatively, it may be possible to operate dual systems from the same line connection. Where applicable, for example, Nairn, the project should make use of the FTN, for provision of links. Additionally, where dial-ups exist, the project should consider replacing these with fixed line connections. IM sites At IM locations an assessment should be made of the existing buildings to determine any renewal or life extension works to ensure the life of the buildings to Where reasonably practicable, new base stations should be installed in their final position utilising spare wall space within buildings. The project should consider a new location for an existing repeater site at Bishopton. This site houses National Radio Network (NRN), Cab Secure Radio (CSR) and RETB equipment and, as it is intended to decommission CSR and NRN in 2015, it would be an ideal opportunity to also remove the requirement for RETB at this site. Possible locations could be Craigendoran relay room, or co-locate with GSM-R at Bowling. Dependent on the migration strategy, there is no requirement to move the legacy equipment to a new location, and it is assumed that it will remain at Bishopton until decommissioning. The project should provide options for bringing back heating and ventilation alarms and status from IM-owned sites. Third-party sites At third-party sites the IM should negotiate a location for the new equipment with the site owner, and temporary site agreements for the duration that there is additional equipment on site. Audio console New audio consoles were provided as part of previous life extension projects. As the system should be life extended for another asset life cycle, this may require further renewal during this project. Additionally, the existing consoles were designed to mimic the operation of the previous versions of the console, and the requirement to interface with previous control racks. Because the control rack has evolved along with the health monitoring system, the new console should be designed to only interface with the new control racks. The project should consider the design of this interface to improve the console and the requirements of the user. G B.3.10 RETB control rack G B New RETB control racks were provided as part of previous life extension projects. The project should ensure that modified base stations are compatible with the new control rack without major changes. The project should provide options for splitting the system at Inverness into two separate geographical areas, manned separately for daytime working, and reverting to one system, or one operator at night-time or at times of low system use. Page 70 of 83 RSSB

71 G B.3.11 Uninterruptable power supply (UPS) G B IM standards identify RETB as a vital safety system, and it therefore requires a minimum standby period of four hours. Use of existing back-up supplies at Inverness and Banavie is acceptable, assuming that they can support the load. G B.3.12 Health monitoring system G B A health monitoring system was developed in conjunction with the new base stations and control racks as part of previous life extension projects. This system should be improved as a result of modifications to the base stations and train radios. G B The IM may consider providing options for future development of the health monitoring system. In addition to providing on site access to the health monitoring system, the IM may also provide remote access to the health monitoring system from the IM Management Centre at Doncaster. G B.3.13 Telephone concentrator G B The telephone concentrator at Inverness is currently planned for renewal in The concentrator is to be provisioned with sufficient capacity for existing services and, as such, it is not expected to require major works as part of this project. There may be a requirement for the renaming or provision of additional circuits only. Signaller Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs) are to be provided as part of the concentrator works. G B.3.14 Token exchange telephones G B Token exchange telephones were renewed as part of previous life extension projects. At this time new secure telephone housings were also provided. G B An asset condition report should be requested and, if necessary, spot renewals carried out to telephones and security boxes; renewal should be by exception. G B If TEPs are to be relied on as part of the migration strategy, then this should be looked at in greater detail prior to migration. G B.3.15 Level crossing telephones G B No additional work has been identified by the IM to carry out any works on level crossing telephones as part of these proposals. G B.3.16 Depots G B The starting points for trains running on these routes are at times outside the operational areas of RETB. There is a requirement for trains to test the operation of their radios prior to leaving the depot. The current RETB system uses Whiteley developed depot test boxes as a method of checking train radios and token exchange functionality. G B As a result of changing frequencies, a new depot test box should be developed. The IM should purchase and install these within depots where they currently exist, which may also require renewal of antenna and feeder cables within the depots. The current locations of these units are: a) Inverness Traction Maintenance Depot. b) Glasgow Queen Street Station. c) Corkerhill. d) Mossend. e) Colas Rail (Polmadie). f) Unipart Rail (Crewe). Uncontrolled When Printed RSSB Page 71 of 83

72 G B Dependent on the migration strategy, there may be a requirement for dual fitment at depots until the legacy equipment is decommissioned and all train fitments are completed. The IM should determine the requirement for site licences at depots. It is not expected that licences will be required, as the depot test boxes are effectively mobiles. G B.3.17 Test equipment G B The IM should purchase applicable test equipment to pass on to maintenance staff. Actual equipment should be agreed once greater detail is understood on product selection. Detail should be included within the IM Maintenance Strategy and Asset Management Plan. G B.3.18 Possible system improvement / opportunities G B The link between Taynuilt and Pulpit Hill at Oban has been unreliable, and the system requires the use of the dial-up from Oban Station as the primary method of receiving tokens at Oban. It was thought that the installation of the new base stations would enhance the current link between Taynuilt and Pulpit Hill; however, this has not been the case. G B Due to the reliance on the dial-up and historic issues with the line interface unit it is important that this link is improved, and a new location for the repeater has been identified to the west of Connel Station. IM maintenance staff have carried out investigations at this site and determined that it is a feasible location for the repeater. G B The existing site at Dosmucherran is owned by a third party, and access is difficult. The IM proposes to investigate options to relocate the two existing repeaters at Dosmucherran to the disused site at Achnasheen and to the existing dial-up site at Strathcarron. This would allow the chain to go from Garve Achnasheen Glencarron Strathcarron Duncraig. G B Additionally, the project should investigate options to move the dial-up from Strathcarron Kyle of Lochalsh, and provide a type of cell enhancer to improve coverage at Kyle of Lochalsh. The IM also proposes to investigate options to relocate the site at Salen. G B.3.19 Transmission (Inverness to Dingwall) G B There is a legacy copper cable and transmission system between Inverness and Dingwall; both the cable and the transmission system are life expired. As a result of non-provision by FTN on this route, there is a requirement to either renew the cable and transmission or to provide an alternative solution using third-party circuits between Inverness and Dingwall. The IM plans include considering the following options: a) The provision of super armoured cable between Inverness and Dingwall. The fibre may be terminated within FTN, as long as infrastructure is provided at Inverness and an FTN node is provided at Dingwall. The new node is to be connected to the wider FTN network and be managed by the IM at Stoke. b) The provision of a third-party bought-in leased circuit. As the transmission and cable effectively only accommodate circuits from Dingwall Inverness and do not pick up circuits between these two points, it could be more cost effective to put these circuits over a third-party leased circuit. G B.3.20 Radio reference system Uncontrolled When Printed G B To facilitate effective maintenance support for the existing CDL RETB system, the IM plans to approach the equipment manufacturer to negotiate the purchase of the RETB reference system and additional system spares. This should enable the current RETB to be supported by the manufacturer through a third-party maintenance agreement. Page 72 of 83 RSSB

73 G B.4 G B.4.1 G B Signalling plans TPWS Changes in the radio operating frequencies of the RETB radio bearer result in a change to the listening frequencies of the Trackside Radio Control Modules (TRCMs). Antennas and feeders should be changed to align with the new frequencies. Due to the high cost of providing power supplies to TPWS, the IM has an approved deviation against clause of GE/RT8030 at the following four sites: a) Gorton. b) Corrour. c) Fearn. d) Altnabreac. G B G B G B G B G B.4.2 G B G B.4.3 G B G B.4.4 G B G B.4.5 G B G B.4.6 G B There is no work required to bring these sites into compliance with GE/RT8030. At most of the TPWS locations, the TRCMs are tuned into two RETB channels, and confirmation of tokens on any one of these channels deactivates the TPWS. At a small number of locations, TRCMs are tuned to only one RETB channel and this has an implication on train movements if there are problems with the base station transmitting on this channel. There have been instances in the past where drivers have changed channel in order to pick up an alternative channel at a TEP; however, the TPWS is activated, as the TRCMs do not confirm the token transfer. The project should reconfigure the TPWS, where possible, so that two channels are received by the TRCMs. The IM proposes to investigate options to provide an output from the TRCMs that could be used for the power operation of points. Details are included within this Appendix. TPWS masts There are currently 19 masts on the WHL and 19 masts on the FNL. TPWS masts are all in locations owned by the IM, and are not expected to be renewed as part of these plans. Antennas and feeder cables As a result of changing the TPWS TRCU receive frequencies, all antennas and feeder cables at TPWS sites should be renewed; there are two antennas at each location. Dependent on the migration strategy it may be possible to carry out a staged renewal of these systems after the new base stations are installed. Power supply and UPSs The UPSs were renewed in 2010 and there is no requirement within this proposal to renew TPWS UPSs. Lineside cabinets There is no requirement to renew the TPWS lineside cabinets. Solid State Interlocking (SSI) It is understood that the SSI data rate could be adjusted, which would improve the speed of token transfer. The IM proposes to investigate how this can be achieved and then consider making improvements to the interface between the SSI and the radio control rack. The IM also proposes to investigate options for the upgrade or replacement of the SSI system user interface, not limited to the replacement of the VDU. RSSB Page 73 of 83

74 G B.4.7 G B G B.4.8 G B G B Cable routes Existing troughing installed at the same time as the TPWS is made from Glassfibre Reinforced Concrete (GRC) and has in many cases been damaged. If not fit for purpose, then it is recommended that the troughing be replaced with Tro-Trough. An assessment is required during initial site surveys to determine where the GRC is not fit for purpose. Points On Scottish RETB lines there are currently three sets of power worked points, 55 sets of Train Operated Points (TOPs) and a number of ground frames. The TOPs are obsolete and not supported by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM); most defects can be repaired by Unipart Rail in Crewe, but not all. A sustainable solution based upon progressively reducing the number of TOPs is required. Accordingly, the IM plans include developing technical solutions to replace existing TOPs at Muir of Ord and Dingwall (4 no. point ends). Options to be investigated are as follows: a) A solution based upon the concept of delivering outputs from the existing SSI Trackside Functional Module (TFM) connected to the TRCM at each site. These outputs are in the form of SSI buffer relays to specification BR 966. In turn, contacts of these relays are to be used in local circuitry to call the points in the relevant route (stop board at originating TEP to stop board at destination TEP). b) Alternatively, the call may be applied to only one set of points, either at origin or destination, and the other set may self-restore on the same basis that the junction points at Dingwall operate today. G B G B Local train detection is provided to lock the points when in use. For trains which depart from the opposite platform, a train crew operated plunger may be used. Additionally, at Dingwall, the forward route selection from the platforms which calls the junction points should be integrated with the token issue; this avoids the driver needing to leave the cab in normal operation. Plungers should be retained on the platform for degraded mode operation when it is not possible to issue a token and card, or Pilotman working is in use. Options for replacement of Point Operating Equipment (POE) are proposed for investigation, as follows: a) A novel solution which mimics the functionality of the existing TOPs based on the use of approved components, albeit in a new configuration. A standard permanent way spring point mechanism should be used to self-restore the points to the right-hand switch closed position. The points should be fitted with a standard face point (FP) lock stretcher bar cut with only one hole. A standard mechanical FP lock should be provided and fitted with a BR 998 detector box which should be configured to detect the position of the lock plunger only (that is to say, lock proved in or out only). The FP lock itself should be driven by a modified clamp lock ram. b) A hydraulic ram arrangement solution based on the use of a standard clamp lock (example shown in Figure 45) requires the points to be locked and detected for all movements. For consistency with the arrangement presented to train drivers at Dingwall, a single yellow aspect should be mounted above the STOP boards at each loop exit. When illuminated, this proves that the loop points are set, locked and detected in the required position for the movement about to take place. c) Any other solution considered to be viable. G B All TRCMs are proposed to be reprogrammed with the chosen solution such that point conversion in the future can be rolled out on the basis of a simple minor works-type project, which should not resort to data changes. Page 74 of 83 RSSB

75 G B Where required, training should be given to train crews and maintenance staff in the operation of these points, both in normal operation and degraded mode. Consideration should be given to painting the pump units and associated components blue, or some other distinctive colour, to denote that operation by duly authorised train crews and others under RETB instructions is permitted. Figure 45 Example of a hydraulic ram arrangement G B.4.9 G B G B.5 G B.5.1 G B.5.2 G B.5.3 G B.5.4 G B.6 G B.6.1 G B Signalling record deficiencies A review of all signalling record deficiencies is also expected to be carried out with the IM, and corrective action delivered as part of this remit. On-train proposals As a result of changes in the radio operating frequencies of the RETB radio bearer, there is also a requirement to change the frequencies of the train radios. The project should develop a replacement train radio, and provide options as to the radio s ability to interface with existing CDUs and any new CDU developed by this project. The migration strategy for changing out the train radios should consider the programme for migration of the radio bearer, commissioning of GSM-R and decommissioning of NRN. GSM-R is already commissioned as far as Helensburgh Upper and it is expected that trains that operate, utilising the RETB system beyond Helensburgh Upper, will be fitted with, and operating, GSM-R by the time that this project replaces the current NRN / RETB train radio. For the lines to Inverness from Perth and Aberdeen, it is expected that GSM-R will be commissioned by the end of ScotRail plans to finish the fitment of GSM-R for the parts of the network not included within the GSM-R trial, by the end of The final fitment of RETB rolling stock with GSM-R affects the date that NRN radios can be decommissioned. Actual dates and fitment plans should be discussed with TOCs and FOCs when developing the migration strategy. Cab display units (CDUs) Introduction The existing CDUs are becoming unsupportable. Although there will be some CDUs released by other TOCs, as the Cambrian and East Suffolk RETB systems are decommissioned, the project should develop a replacement CDU to be installed at the same time as the on-train radio. The design of the replacement CDU should consider the requirement to store the Annetts key in the loco cab, and should be supportable beyond RSSB Page 75 of 83