CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

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1 CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE CARNEGIE INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION CONFERENCE 9:00 10:30 A.M. TAKING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT SERIOUSLY CHAIR: KARE AAS, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NORWAY AMBASSADOR ABDUL SAMAD MINTY, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SOUTH AFRICA GEORGE PERKOVICH, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE ASHLEY TELLIS, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE MONDAY, JUNE 26, 2007 RONALD REAGAN BUILDING AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTER AMPHITHEATER WASHINGTON, D.C. Transcript by: Federal News Service Washington, D.C.

2 KARE AAS: Good morning, everybody, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for joining us at this morning s panel entitled Taking Nuclear Disarmament Seriously. I think it is fitting that we are having this discussion at a venue named after Ronald Reagan, who had such strong beliefs about nuclear disarmament. Reagan called nuclear weapons, quote, Totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization, end of quotation. Strong words in a world with tens of thousands or more nuclear weapons than exist today. Reagan was nevertheless committed to their abolition. Let me apologize for my minister s absence. He promises to make it up at a further Carnegie conference. But let me also say that it is heartening that yesterday morning and afternoon many of the points which my foreign ministry wished to make at today s lunch were made by Secretary Beckett, Senator Nunn, and Ambassador Kampelman. Norway believes strongly in the power of the ought, as Senator Nunn put it. We believe that the vision of disarmament enshrined in the NPT is foundational for the nonproliferation regime as a whole. Disarmament is necessary for its own sake, and it is essential for securing the national cooperation we need to deal with the wide range of threats confronting the nonproliferation regime. As we see it, we must not endanger the present through naïve idealism about the future. But we also must not endanger the future through self-fulfilling cynicism about the present. That said, as we all know, the NPT agreed in the throes of the Cold War did not compel anyone to believe that nuclear disarmament was imminent. It did not provide for how and under what conditions it would be accomplished. That is what we are here to discuss. Now, why has Carnegie asked a Norwegian to chair this panel? I hope it is because, at least in part, Norway is a leader in the seven-nation initiative on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation which was established in The initiative was formed after the 2005 NPT review conference, and it is premised on the notion that too often we are presented with false choices between nonproliferation and disarmament, between non-proliferation and counter-proliferation, between expanded use of nuclear energy and rampant proliferation, between arguments of realists and abolitionists. The challenges we face are too serious for polemic and false choices. We require a wide-ranging and comprehensive approach to the challenges confronting the global nonproliferation regime. The seven-nation initiative s diverse membership Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, South Africa, and the United Kingdom demonstrates that there is a common ground for a wide ranging agenda. As we move towards the NPT review conference in 2010, I hope the initiative will contribute to a renewed consensus. To support the work of the initiative, Norway is funding research institutions and NGO s around the world to answer important questions and improve nonproliferation and disarmament policy. One of our centerpiece programs is with Carnegie and here is the

3 clincher it is entitled, Taking Nuclear Disarmament Seriously. Now before I hand over the floor to our speakers, I want to take my prerogative as the chair to encourage the panel to parse just a bit the tricky title of this session. When we say taking nuclear disarmament seriously, three questions come to mind immediately. First, who exactly needs to take disarmament seriously? Second, what kind of disarmament are we talking about? Third, what do we mean by seriously? More specifically, who decides? Let me offer some provocations which I hope the panelists will address in one form or another. First, the who question. Who needs to take disarmament seriously? There is no escaping that disarmament is not only for nuclear weapons states but for all states. Fissile materials in the civilian programs can be vulnerable to theft or misuse, and as the number of warheads declines, the more concerned we become about all nuclear materials. But there is frequent debate about who moves first. Is the burden on nuclear weapons states to lead the way? Is the burden on the non-nuclear weapons states to, ironically, make the world safe for disarmament? Second, what kind of disarmament do we have in mind? Are we talking about steps which could diminish the so-called currency of nuclear weapons? These could be the comprehensive test ban treaty, no-first-use policies, and negative security assurances. Do we have in mind deep reductions? For instance, going from thousand of warheads each in the U.S. and Russia to hundreds in each, but status quo levels elsewhere? Or are we talking about getting to zero? Since the dawn of the nuclear age, we have debated whether a transformation of international relations must precede the approach to zero. On the other hand, some would argue that landmark progress toward disarmament could help to defuse long-standing conflicts. Yet others would argue that the transformation question is a ruse, an argument not relevant today when we are trying to move from thousands to hundreds of weapons. The challenges of disarmament, many of which George will discuss, correspond to the particular stages under consideration. We should be clear and honest about what stage we have in mind when we raise specific challenges. Third, who decides what we mean by seriously? It matters not because disarmament by the U.S. and other nuclear weapons states is, as Sam Nunn likes to put it, likely to inspire Iran, North Korea, or al-qaeda to say, we have seen the light. Instead it matters because more convincing progress towards disarmament could lead many more nations to join in concerted efforts to halt proliferation, to increase demands for a fuel bank, and to secure nuclear materials worldwide. But the trouble is that we are at the point where many nuclear weapons states believe they have been taking nuclear disarmament seriously, but that is a contention in which many non-nuclear weapons states would balk. I suspect that Ambassador Minty, for instance, will beg to differ. So with those provocations to our panel, you have the full biographies in your program, so let me just introduce the plan for this panel. Ambassador Abdul Minty, who

4 is South Africa s leading light on nuclear disarmament issues, will be the first presenter. He will share with us the view of what nuclear weapons states will have to do to demonstrate that they are serious to the rest of the world. Carnegie Vice President George Perkovich will offer some key questions that nuclear weapons states and nonnuclear weapons states must explore rigorously in order to take disarmament seriously. Dr. Ashley Tellis, a senior associate at Carnegie and key adviser on nuclear issues to the Bush administration, will highlight the challenges of deep cuts in the current political environment by way of illustration. He will discuss whether and how China could meet its vital national security objective of maintaining one China or preventing independence of Taiwan without nuclear weapons. This kind of argument could, of course, be relevant for other regions as well. I ll ask the panelists to keep their presentations to approximately 12 minutes so that we can maximize discussion. With that, Abdul, the floor is yours. AMBASSADOR ABDUL MINTY: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to, of course, at the outset thank the organizers for inviting me to share our views and thoughts on this very important question. I should just explain for the purposes of context that my experience is based on efforts since the 1960 s, or the early 1960 s, to campaign internationally, and especially in Western countries, against the apartheid bomb in the hands of a desperate racist regime increasingly acting as a terrorist state which had illegally occupied Namibia, propped up the illegal Rhodesian regime, attacked independent African states with impunity, and enforced a domestic policy which was deterred by the United Nations as a crime against humanity. And since 1995 I ve had the privilege of serving in the South African ministry of foreign affairs. Chairperson and colleagues, we have to reflect on the problem that one of the major questions that will be asked by succeeding generations, especially in Africa and the South, but also in the North, is, how did it come about that some of the greatest democracies of the world collaborated so extensively with the apartheid regime and repeatedly protected it, often with triple vetoes, from Security Council action in terms of the arms embargo and ending nuclear collaboration? And thereby effectively also extended the survival of that regime? That is not what I wish to speak about today, but it is a major question of our time. However, I do wish to emphasize that during our long liberation struggle, we too were traumatized by the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, and that contributed to building a deep revulsion against nuclear weapons among the people of South Africa. And it created also a lasting commitment to eliminate them as a threat to humanity. Thus, during our democratic transformation, like apartheid itself, the apartheid bomb was dismantled. And after 1994 the Mandela government declared that it would in future act as a good global citizen that is responsible to the international community as well, and as such it would no longer be part of the problem but part of the solution. This we have tried to do. Also in the field of disarmament, which in our view includes nonproliferation. If you are committed to eliminating nuclear weapons on

5 principle, you work for nonproliferation as well as nuclear disarmament. I should point out that many suggest that countries like ours with a long legacy of apartheid and many other pressing problems maybe do not have nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as a priority. I think the case of South Africa and several countries in Africa and Asia reflect the fallacy of this position because we all believe that this is also our world and we have a responsibility to making it safe. Chairperson, there has been increasing realization concerning the inherent risks associated with nuclear fuel cycle activities, and as a result various demands have been made to curb the so-called proliferation of fuel cycle capabilities that can be used for both peaceful and non-peaceful purposes. Many of the proposals stand in direct contradiction of article 4 of the NPT. Concerns possibly emanating from the situation in Iraq, DPRK and Iran are cited to strengthen measures against real or perceived threats are mere symptoms of a larger problem within the non-proliferation regime that is not being addressed. By not addressing the underlying factors to these problems, we will not be able to find any durable solution. That is also probably why the additional protocol to strengthen safeguards has not found universal acceptance. The NPT is an inherently discriminatory treaty. And yet it has many state parties because it is a normative instrument based on the set of carefully balanced rights and responsibilities. In 1995, when a decision had to be taken as to whether the treaty s lifetime should be extended or not, the state parties took the decision to do so based on a number of bargains. The decisions on the principles and objectives on the strengthened review process and the resolution on the Middle East all formed an integral part of the strategic decision that in turn resulted in the indefinite extension of the treaty. On April 19, 1995, the late South African foreign minister Alfred (ph) introduced at the review and extension conference the concepts and proposals for strengthening the review process for the treaty and for the principles and objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. He stated, So as not to draw these issues and here he meant criticisms about the failure and the delays in the implementation of the NPT s provisions so as not to draw these issues into the debate about the continued existence of the treaty, it is desirable that the review process provided by article 8 should be strengthened. This, he said, and I quote, could be done by the adoption of a set of principles for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, which would be taken into account when the implementation of the treaty is reviewed. These principles would not be an amendment to the treaty. They would rather be a lodestar which would focus attention on the importance of these goals. Commitment to these principles would be renewed at every review to ensure that they are dynamic and that they adapt to changing circumstances. They would be the yardstick by which all the state s parties can measure their nonproliferation and disarmament achievements. Chair, if we are to understand the challenges facing the treaty, it is vital that we do a critical analysis of the bargains reached in 1995 as well as those agreed to during 2000.

6 Central to the 95 decision was the reaffirmation of the non-nuclear weapons states, that they will not pursue the nuclear weapons option, in return for reaffirmation by the nuclear weapons states that they will disarm. The latter was reconfirmed in 2000 with the unequivocal undertaking toward nuclear disarmament. However, events subsequently and during the review process and at the 2005 review conference provided a clear indication about the reversal of the latter commitment by the nuclear weapons states. The selective emphasis on the nonproliferation provisions of the NPT, to the almost exclusion of the disarmament provisions by some parties, resulted in others questioning the 95 decision. This situation has led some to argue that the treaty is indeed in crisis and it may even have served its purpose and is no longer relevant. Chair, the NPT remains the only existing instrument that, although limited, provides assurances against the use or threat of use of these instruments of destruction. We, therefore, cannot allow this instrument to be further discredited or discarded. It is important to highlight some of the challenges that continue to confront the nonproliferation regime, and I want to list 10. One, nuclear test explosions. Two, the continued existence of weapons of mass destruction programs and unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in especially some of the more sensitive of regions. Three, problems of compliance with the nonproliferation and disarmament provisions of the treaty. Four, the compliance implications of nuclear sharing. Five, the continuing difficulties pertaining to the entry into force of the CTBT. Six, the continuing inability of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to commence its negotiations on NFMT. Seven, the potential repercussions of missile defense systems. Eight, the failure of bilateral arms reduction treaties. Nine, the continued, or even greater reliance which is being placed on nuclear weapons in the strategic doctrines of the nuclear weapons states and their military alliance partners. And ten, the implications and operations of the Khan illicit network. Chair, some important considerations, which is the best way in which I can contribute because I think we need to look at these considerations and how we respond to them if we are to make a change. One, as the late minister Donzo of South Africa said in 95, many have, with good reason, been critical about the failures and delays to fully implement the disarmament provisions of the treaty by totally eliminating the arsenals of the nuclear weapons states to provide the non-nuclear weapons states with effective security assurances, and to ensure unencumbered, unencumbered, transfer of peaceful nuclear technology. Two, without credible evidence of a clear and unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament, the world will always be confronted by the risk of a breakout from the nuclear nonproliferation regime established by the NPT. It would also demonstrate commitment to the full implementation of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice in its 96 advisory opinion. Three, the renewed commitment in 95 to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective nuclear disarmament measures included a commitment to the determined pursuit by the nuclear weapons states parties of systematic and progressive efforts to

7 reduce nuclear weapons globally and by all state parties to achieve specific multilateral measures. There has to be real and irreversible progress in this area. Four, in the process of nuclear disarmament, the priority pursuit of force reductions by the nuclear weapons states must be paralleled by the conclusion of instruments necessary to guarantee the conditions of confidence required for a world without nuclear weapons. Five, nuclear disarmament is the responsibility of all states, and all states must be involved in the process leading to this goal. A nuclear weaponsfree world will ultimately require an instrument or a series of instruments negotiated multilaterally which will result in a non-discriminatory, nonproliferation regime. Six, the conclusion of the CTBT was an essential building block in the nuclear disarmament agenda. The commencement of negotiations on an FMT must be another essential element providing the beginning of the extension of multilateral verification to cover all fissile materials for weapons purposes in a world free of nuclear weapons. Seven, the further extension and development of nuclear weapon-free zones and respect for their status by the nuclear weapons states through adherence to the relevant protocols reinforces the global thrust of nonproliferation efforts. Eight, the free states that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and engage in nuclear weapons development are central to the achievement of nuclear disarmament. It is therefore vital that means be found to engage their involvement in the disarmament process. Nine, despite the commitment of most parties to the treaty, it should be noted that no treaty can be upheld if the bargains which underpin the original agreement are not kept. Ten, the NPT is at a crossroads or, some say, in crisis, and is in urgent need of revitalization through progressive and systematic actions that would strengthen all its provisions. Chair, it is only through the provision of objective assurances in the areas of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy that we will be able to arrive at a situation of improved security for all, in the knowledge that sensitive technologies will not be abused for weapons purposes and that nuclear disarmament is not just a pipe dream. Chairman, many know that we have said this over many years and in many conferences, and so the question we often ask ourselves, is someone listening, is anyone listening? Can we then at this conference at least see the beginning of a process whereby we can agree on a new pact for nuclear disarmament? Do we have the necessary political will? Thank you. (Applause.) GEORGE PERKOVICH: Good morning again. I m going to pick up in a way from where Ambassador Minty left off, and explore some of the questions that I think are very, very difficult questions which the world has to address if we are to take nuclear disarmament seriously. And I start with the assumption that actually the total elimination of nuclear arsenals has never been taken seriously, either by nuclear weapons states or non-nuclear weapons states, with the laudable exception of South Africa. No nuclear

8 weapons state has a full-time employer or an inter-agency task force that s assigned the challenge of figuring out what would be required actually to eliminate its nuclear arsenal. Non-nuclear weapons states, with the exception again of South Africa, have tended to view disarmament as something that the nuclear weapons states should do, and then report back when it is accomplished. Non-nuclear weapons states generally have not seriously worked through the political and mechanical measures that would have to be taken to build confidence that disarmament would not raise rather than lower the risk of warfare. My colleagues at Carnegie, many people in this room, IISS, the seven-nation initiative that Norway is leading, and others are beginning to marshal resources to address some of these issues and try to encourage a discussion between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states on some of these questions. And here I just want to highlight in a few of the categories what I think some of the more intriguing questions are. The first one is, can future and past production and stockpiles of fissile materials be verified? The director general of the IAEA, Mohammad ElBardei, last year at a speech at Georgetown University, said, quote, We do not assume that we have a perfect verification system for a fissile material cutoff treaty, but it s still better than a treaty that has absolutely no verification clauses. ElBardei cited verification of civilian reprocessing in Japan as an example of the effectiveness of verification capabilities today. But in 2003, Japan admitted that it had, quote, lost 206 kilograms of plutonium at the Takai-mura (ph) reprocessing plant. And the IAEA only learned of that five years later and still didn t take further action. Now that didn t cause great alarm in the world precisely because countries have nuclear weapons in great number. The U.S. has thousands, China has hundreds, and so the countries that might normally be most concerned about that unaccounted-for material in Japan more or less shrugged. But if we re going to take seriously the prospect of eliminating all nuclear weapons, all nuclear arsenals, we have to ask, would China get rid of its last 10 or last 1 nuclear weapon in a world where there s tons, hundreds of tons of unaccounted-for plutonium in Japan? This is a difficult problem. Now the fissile material cutoff treaty, which is being negotiated and which many people in this room, including myself, think is a very important step, that gets around this problem in a way because what s being proposed is to ban future production of unsafeguarded fissile materials. But it doesn t address past production. However, if we re talking about, again, taking seriously the elimination of nuclear arsenals, you have to get into the question of past production. At a very minimum, then, you would have to get all states that have produced highly enriched uranium, plutonium, and then the question would be, for example, U-233 and other materials, would those also have to be declared. But all states would have to declare all of their production so that you could try to verify it and reduce the risk that some had been hidden away as everyone was disarming.

9 But there are inherent uncertainties in accounting for and monitoring fissile material. Steve Feder (ph), who s here, wrote in a great paper in 1996, 11 years ago, he talked about an uncertainty of 5 percent in the U.S. and Russian stockpiles, which would be a normal uncertainty, leaves enough material unaccounted for or uncertain to build 5,000 nuclear weapons. In the United Kingdom, France and China, that 5 percent uncertainty amounts to 100 nuclear weapons. And Israel and India, more than five nuclear weapons. And these are inherent uncertainties. So if we re going to try to if you move to eliminate nuclear arsenals and you have to deal with that problem, some of the questions that arise, would all states be willing to produce declarations of their past production? Would states have records necessarily of all past production? What would be done if the state didn t have records, or that those records could not be authenticated? What rules and procedures would be agreed to investigate uncertainties that would arise if a state had records or didn t have records, but there were questions about the authenticity and the verification? How do you resolve those disputes? How intrusive would verification have to be to try to get at these problems? Now given that it s impossible to account for an amount of material smaller than a nuclear weapon, is it even worth expending all the effort to try to do what I ve just laid out in terms of accounting for all of this past production? I think the paradox that we have to wrestle with is that the answer to the question is, in a world with a few nuclear weapons, if someone the UN, somebody had a few nuclear weapons, you might not want to go through all of the hassle and the expense and the inherent difficulty of trying to verify the last few kilograms. But if you posit no nuclear weapons, then it s very difficult, at least now, to figure out how people would be reassured given those large uncertainties. So this is a question that s been avoided basically in the fissile material negotiations, which already are difficult enough, but if we re taking disarmament seriously, it becomes a very, very challenging set of questions. Next category. How can nuclear industry be made compatible with global security in a world without nuclear weapons? Now paradoxically we have an intensifying call for nuclear disarmament just at a time when many are arguing that there must be an expansion, a renaissance of nuclear industry to deal with climate change and other imperatives. But the tension between that expansion and the need for disarmament needs to be addressed more fully. Is it practical to imagine moving to a nuclear weaponfree world without first moving to a world in which all enrichment and reprocessing capabilities are multinationally controlled? Many people would say it s not, that in order to have a nuclear weapon-free world you have to have fissile material production outside of national control. And indeed, you just have to ask yourself a couple of questions. For example, would India dismantle its last nuclear warhead if the Kahn research laboratory in Pakistan were still enriching uranium, even with IAEA safeguards under Pakistani control? Would the U.S. or China dismantle their last 10 weapons if Russia were continuing to reprocess plutonium in its once-secret nuclear cities, albeit under IAEA controls? So many people would say, are multinational controls necessary, even though there s lots of resistance to it today, it s hard to imagine how you do it today. There are

10 lots of legal questions about currently privately owned and nationally owned facilities. Let s say you take all of those away and stipulate somehow we have to get to multinational control. But then you remember that A.Q. Khan came from a multinational facility, Urenco. So does that actually relieve or solve the proliferation concerns that we have about national controls? We don t have answers to these questions, but there are some of the questions that, if you re taking this proposition seriously, we need to wrestle with in a much more intensive way. And I think a core question would come up, which is, which goal do key non-nuclear weapons states care more about? Creating or maintaining national fuel cycle capabilities for a nuclear energy-rich future, or creating conditions for eliminating every last nuclear weapon? Another category of problem, of question comes up. How would nuclear knowhow be managed in a nuclear weapon-free world? Today we have thousands around the world, thousands of nuclear weapons designers, engineers, people who are knowledgeable in key facets of making nuclear weapons. You posit eliminating all nuclear arsenals. Would somehow it be necessary or desirable to limit the movement and activities of former nuclear weapons designers and manufacturers? How would this be done if it were desirable? If it couldn t be done then how do you deal with the know-how dispersal problem? But how would you attempt this, given countervailing values of freedom, academic freedom and so forth? Would the standards be the same in different countries? Or would you make distinctions based on the transparency and openness of certain societies versus others? These again are questions that aren t merely academic, but if you were actually serious in moving in this direction, those questions would arise. And again, that question came up in much of the world when South Africa disarmed, but it was a very different question when many of the people asking it were, for example, Americans or Russians sitting with thousands of nuclear weapons, when there wasn t then a concern that even if South Africa or its scientists were going off elsewhere that that would pose a dramatic threat to the security of at least the permanent five members of the Security Council. But if you re positing they ve given up now all of their nuclear weapons, these questions about nuclear scientists and engineers become much more important. What is the relationship and sequencing of international enforcement mechanisms and nuclear disarmament? It seems unavoidable that real movement toward the elimination of all nuclear arsenals will be structured and paced by establishment of effective mechanisms for preventing warfare among key states, and for enforcing prohibitions on nuclear weapons. The two issues prevention of major warfare and prohibition of nuclear arms building are related. If the United States, for example, lacks full confidence that the U.N. Security Council would take timely and effective action to prevent or reverse aggression and to enforce international rules, the United States will retain the military capabilities to do this on its own. But if the U.N. Security Council collectively or as a coalition of like-minded states is not strong enough to stop the U.S. from exercising military power on its own, then states such as Russia, China and others will retain their most effective deterrent power, which is nuclear weapons, to keep the U.S. from using force unilaterally.

11 The stronger conventional military powers, and here the U.S. is most obvious, the stronger conventional military powers might think they could do without nuclear weapons to protect themselves against warfare or blackmail, but the others will worry precisely that the conventionally superior could dominate them. One could posit rules of behavior that would prohibit warfare, but this begs the question of who would enforce the rules. And the simplest way to think about the problem today, and it s somewhat unfair to the U.S. but it makes the image work, is to extrapolate from today. In a world without nuclear weapons, who would stop the U.S. from conducting warfare against weaker states? And how would they do that? And if you posit that and you ask that question not just to the U.S. but to China, Russia, and others, it becomes an interesting problem. Ashley is going to talk about China, the challenge that China in particular faces or would confront in meeting its core security requirements without nuclear weapons. But these are issues that need to be addressed much more seriously between the non-nuclear weapons states and the weapons states. How do current efforts to tighten rules affect prospects of nuclear disarmament? Before the world gets close to a point where the last arsenals would be eliminated, there would have to be great confidence in barriers to withdraw from the NPT, or a subsequent treaty on nuclear disarmament. Today we see, and Ambassador Minty mentioned it just now, we see that even modest efforts to tighten NPT withdrawal clause meet with firm resistance from many countries. But if NPT parties cannot agree to tighten conditions under which states may withdraw from the treaty, how could the international community have confidence that a nuclear weapons-free world would be enforced? Now there s one clear answer to that today, which would be, well, today s resistance to preventive measures to tightening the withdrawal clause from the NPT, that resistance stems from resentment that the nuclear weapons states have not taken nuclear disarmament seriously enough. Fine. But nuclear weapons states cannot be expected to move seriously to dismantle their arsenals if such provisions aren t in place. So the question arises, at what point in the evolution of nuclear disarmament on the one hand, and nonproliferation on the other, will states agree to tighten options for withdrawal and make more automatic the punitive responses to it? This is a who-goes-first problem that again has been avoided by the non-nuclear weapons states, as by the nuclear weapons states. In conclusion, then, I would say that there are clear benefits, and indeed a legal obligation, to pursue the elimination of nuclear arsenal, but these benefits and disarmament itself will depend on reliable mechanisms to enforce the prohibition on nuclear weapons. This is obvious enough, but we re confronting problems of enforcement with North Korea, with Iran, and so forth, which are framed now as a nonproliferation problem, but if you truly had the objective of nuclear disarmament, these enforcement issues, you would see them as dire to the objective of nuclear disarmament.

12 The who-first problem clearly has to be resolved. Failure to enforce current nonproliferation rules and norms in Iran and North Korea and other states that may be in noncompliance makes it impossible for the nuclear weapons states to proceed further. But key non-nuclear weapons states are reluctant to strengthen the nonproliferation rules and their enforcement without clear action in the field of disarmament, as we ve heard over and over so far in this conference. Recent experience shows that insisting on progress in one area before moving in the area leads to paralysis. The few actors with uncertain or subversive intentions exploit this paralysis to move past the guardians of nonproliferation. It seems to me the only way to re-mobilize the system then is to move on both fronts simultaneously. This requires different strategies than in nuclear weapons states, and the non-nuclear weapons states have pursued in recent decades. Both groups need a new strategy if we re to move together and avoid the paralysis that we face in the current system. And let me stop. Thank you. (Applause) ASHLEY TELLIS: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Good morning. Ambassador Minty ended his very thoughtful presentation by asking the question whether we have the will to take nuclear disarmament seriously. With great respect to the ambassador, I would suggest that that is one of two important questions that we have to confront when we think about the question of nuclear disarmament. There is a second issue, which I think is equally pressing and may be more problematic. And that is, do we have the capacity to take nuclear disarmament seriously? By which I mean, does the nature of the international political system and the current relations between states in that system permit us to meet our nuclear disarmament goals, even if we were to choose as a matter of principle that we were going to pursue those goals? I think the case of China is actually an interesting exemplar of this dilemma. I m not usually in a position where I m called to defend China s nuclear weapons, but I must confess that it s an interesting case to examine because it reflects many of the things that my colleague George Perkovich talked about. How do you take nuclear disarmament seriously when a core state in the international system such as China has pressing national security goals which cannot be achieved without the possession of nuclear weapons? And where a state like China actually runs a serious risk of losing its national security interests if it did not have weapons of this caliber in its possession? Let me say a few words about China specifically to illustrate this problem, and then I want to just end by making some larger reflections on the issue of disarmament itself. If one were to ask Chinese leaders today what their core political objective is, I think they would have no doubt, no difficulty in saying that their core objective is essentially peacefully development, which is creating an environment for sustained economic growth in order to protect domestic order, survival of the regime, and the recovery of China s great power status. I have no disagreement, I have no difficulty in believing the Chinese when they profess these objectives.

13 Inherent in these goals, however, is also a Chinese desire to protect their national unity. And that national unity is tested in a most pressing way through the contingency of Taiwan, and the prospect that Taiwan might make good on this threat to separate in some sense from the mainland. This is a problem that China faces in the near term. And yet this problem, at least insofar as it bears on nuclear weapons, is not strictly a Chinese- Taiwanese problem. It s fundamentally a problem between China and the United States because embedded in the crisis and the dilemmas over Taiwan is the U.S. commitment of course to assist the Taiwanese, should any change in the status quo occur as a result of Beijing s initiation of the use of force. When one games through a scenario of this kind, one finds very quickly that you are confronted with the situation where you have two great powers with very strong political commitments, very strong national security objectives, but with essentially asymmetric conventional capabilities. China, a weaker power, seeks to prevent a much stronger power, the United States, from essentially undermining what the leadership in Beijing considers to be absolutely crucial, not only for the survival of their regime but also for the survival of the Chinese state. In such circumstances, China can certainly mount a defense of its interests in Taiwan through conventional means. But to the degree that the conflict gets more intense and escalates to higher levels of violence, you inevitably reach the conclusion that the Chinese would have no alternatives but to take recourse in their nuclear deterrent as the ultimate protection of their interests. This does not in any way imply that the Chinese are planning to use nuclear weapons either against Taiwan or against the United States. But the possession of these nuclear weapons becomes absolutely critical for China as a weaker state in this situation to protect its interests. And as long as situations like Taiwan are replicated elsewhere in the international system, it becomes extremely difficult for states to contemplate an environment in which they give up their nuclear weapons. This is only one half, I think, of the necessity of nuclear weapons for China. There is another half to the story, and that half is rooted in the dynamic character of China s own growth and the future of China vis-à-vis the United States and the international system. We all know that China is a rapidly growing economic power, that at some point this growing economic power will seek all the considerations that other great powers have arrogated to themselves since time immemorial. This dynamic, what academics call power transitions, is likely to bring the Chinese into some degree of difficulty with the existing great power in the international system, the United States, which will be equally zealous of protecting its own interests and its own ambitions in Asia and worldwide. In such an environment, as long as the fundamental nature of the Sino-American relationship is competitive, as long as the international system always has room for conflict, including war, it is hard to imagine that either the Chinese or the United States would find themselves in a situation where they actually feel comfortable without nuclear weapons. It is the pressures imposed by this dynamic rivalry, which is likely to evolve in

14 different and unanticipated ways over time, that will have two consequences as far as the nuclear arsenals of these two countries are concerned. First, it will put a brake on the U.S. ability to reduce its stockpiles to the maximum degree that it might otherwise lack. And second, it will produce great incentives for the Chinese to increase their own nuclear stockpile, to deal with the contingencies of power for the United States to levels beyond which they might otherwise slide. I use the example of China this morning primarily as a way of illustrating a larger problem that we have to confront as we think through the issue of taking nuclear disarmament seriously. And that is, countries preferences for nuclear weapons are intimately associated and linked to the character of their security environment. And as long as the larger security environment in which these countries are embedded always upholds some possibility of armed conflict, it would be hard to imagine any of these countries giving up their interest in nuclear weapons. In other words, the bottom line is that the existing nuclear weapons states, whatever their professions might be in the NPT, would find it hard to realistically move to the kind of world that the NPT eventually envisaged. And for the same reason, the currently non-nuclear weapons states that have given up their rights to have nuclear weapons will episodically and perpetually be tempted to contemplate going back on their commitments because every now and then nuclear weapons might seem like a pretty good solution to the problems that they face in terms of national security. Why does this situation arise? I think it arises for a simple root fact, because of a simple root fact that we cannot erase, and that is nuclear weapons are wonderful instruments of power politics. They are awful weapons, but it is precisely their awfulness which makes them so attractive and so effective as national deterrents. And for this reason there will be a perpetual temptation on the part of non-nuclear weapons states to contemplate their acquisition every time these are seen to be antidotes to their security problems. And for that very same reason, there will be a consistent reluctance on the part of nuclear weapons states to give up nuclear weapons even though that is the end-state that all countries have committed themselves to in the NPT. I want to just flag four consequences of this reality that we ought to think about as we grapple with the dilemmas that my fellow panelists have identified this morning. The first consequence, which is of practical import, is that the structural inequality that exists within the NPT system in particular, and the international system in general will persist more or less forever, and for good reason. The second consequence is that the goal of at least complete disarmament is essentially chimerical. Short of some extraordinary development like large-scale major nuclear war, or high entropy nuclear proliferation that threatens the interest of all states in the international system more or less equally, it is hard to imagine a situation where, for all the reasons that George Perkovich identified, they re arriving at a real momentum to reach that final goal that the NPT system has identified.

15 In this context we also ought to take seriously one of the issues that George raised again this morning, that the kind of complete nuclear disarmament that we all profess to be our final goal could actually be dangerous for the stability of the international system because a future of a world without nuclear weapons cannot be considered outside of the future of major war. And unless we can conceive of a rational system of organization that allows us to protect ourselves against the consequences of major war, especially major war between great powers, it is going to be extremely difficult to contemplate a future where we can think of one without nuclear weapons. The third consequence that I would urge you to consider is that this does not mean that the NPT is obsolete or irrelevant and does not have value. It becomes extremely important, but it becomes important essentially as a corralling device, to prevent largescale and disorderly defection on the part of the state parties. That becomes the utility of the NPT as long as the current rules of international politics basically stay in place. What would taking nuclear disarmament seriously therefore mean in a practical sense for the foreseeable future? I think it essentially means three things. It means that we need to restructure our objectives from the ultimate goal of abolition, of complete disarmament, to something that is less ambitious. I would suggest that this less ambitious vision ought to have three components. First, to help reduce the size of the arsenals in the existing nuclear weapons states to the lowest levels that are possible, compatible with these states concerns for their security. Second, to try and reduce the rate of spread of nuclear weapons globally, until such time we can find an alternative ordering principle for international politics. And three, to try and reduce the salience of nuclear weapons as instruments of international politics, or as much as we can do. What does this mean for the vision of complete disarmament, or a world free of nuclear weapons? I think we ought to treat it, as Plato might have said in The Republic, as a noble lie. It s an important regulating device that ought to shape our objectives, but it ought not to be the goal that interferes with our ability to achieve more practical aims. The organizer of this morning asked me to provoke you. I hope I have succeeded in doing that. (Applause.) MR. AAS: Thank you very much, Ashley. I would say that I came here this morning and also yesterday as an optimist. I m not sure what I am right now. But I believe what we have heard from our three panelists is that disarmament obviously is an important element in broad security policy context. I think that George Perkovich, he raised a lot of questions regarding nuclear disarmament, and sort of what my feeling after I ve heard these three intervention (ph) is that has also to do with my own job in Oslo dealing with sort of security policy and nuclear disarmament, and that has to do with, of course, the Norwegian government. We realize that it is important to move the NPT agenda forward. And in that regard we have as a main objective to identify what we call do-able steps when it comes to nuclear disarmament.

16 So what I would very much like to address and ask the panelists to explore upon is, what could really be the do-able steps in preparing the NPT review conference in 2010? Because we know, and we have the experience both from the NPT review conference in 2005 but also in preparing for the U.N. summit in September 2005, the same year, that it was very difficult and it was impossible to reach the positions among those countries underlining, and especially very forcefully the objectives of nonproliferation, while at the same time there was a lot of other countries underlining the need, and as we have heard today from Ambassador Minty, there is also this need to achieve more concrete steps when it comes to nuclear disarmament. And perhaps before I open the floor for comments and questions, it could be of interest to hear, for example, from Ambassador Minty what he considers would be the single unilateral step which the U.S. government should take towards disarmament in order to reach out to the countries and the public opinion that there is a move towards nuclear disarmament. From what we have heard from Ashley Tellis, I think that he painted probably a realistic but also a grim picture about the challenges, but I will let the audience perhaps to ask him and comment about his intervention. But Abdul, it could be of interest to hear your views on sort of the concrete and the do-able steps necessary in order to move the disarmament agenda forward. Thank you. AMB. MINTY: Thank you. I don t know if I m the best one to speak as to what the U.S. should do because we ve been saying that to them for a long time. So I suppose basically what one would need is a kind of method of work that encourages confidence and trust because the reason I went into the 95 and 2000 review process is precisely because of that. Most of the developing world and non-nuclear weapons states find that promises were not kept. So how do we work for new promises? I want to challenge one fundamental thing George said, and I think it is a fashionable thing among a lot of academics, and that is this question that we in the South hold hostage nonproliferation issues because we cannot get movement on disarmament. I would come close to say it s a lie. Most of the non-nuclear weapons states have got safeguards agreements with the IAEA. We comply fully with the NPT. The problem, as I mentioned, for additional protocols and so on is because the underlying reasons and the factors where the NPT is not taken seriously by some of the bigger powers is the reason for lack of that. But South Africa has implemented all of these, and so have many others. So you see, it is very dangerous to make generalizations about perceptions when we talk loudly and sometimes even scream about disarmament issues because we feel passionately about it. So I think we should look at the actual evidence. Where are the developing countries that are not implementing the provisions of this issue? But I want to warn with one issue, and maybe this is the issue, Kare, that I should emphasize. There is a great tendency to secure compliance from developing countries with enormous pressure by the big powers. And you simply have to see it acting in various forums, in terms of the