June 6 9, 2016 Alexander Glaser Princeton University. CVT Consortium for Verification Technology. Revision 2

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Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development University and Industry Technical Interchange (UITI 2016) Review Meeting Treaty

1 Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development University and Industry Technical Interchange (UITI 2016) Review Meeting Treaty Verification: Characterizing Gaps and Emerging Challenges CVT Consortium for Verification Technology June 6 9, 2016 Alexander Glaser Princeton University Revision 2

institutions and groups POLICY RESEARCH THRUST: A TREATY ENABLING APPROACH Emphasizes mission-focused dimension (as defined by

2 CONSORTIUM FOR VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY BACKGROUND TWO WAYS OF APPROACHING THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM Technology-focused and mission-focused approach; CVT seeks to combine both; unique opportunities for synergisms given diversity of CVT partner institutions and groups POLICY RESEARCH THRUST: A TREATY ENABLING APPROACH Emphasizes mission-focused dimension (as defined by existing and expected future treaties); support and guide CVT technology developments toward specific treaty applications; track emerging technologies

RELEVANT NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL TREATIES NUCLEAR

weapons by non-weapon states and commits the five weapon

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY Bans all nuclear explosions in

verification mechanisms (International Monitoring System,

would ban fissile material production for weapons purposes;

NEXT-GENERATION NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT TREATIES Agreements that

3 RELEVANT NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL TREATIES NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY Bans the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-weapon states and commits the five weapon states to nuclear disarmament; verified by IAEA safeguards COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY Bans all nuclear explosions in all environments and would be verified by extensive verification mechanisms (International Monitoring System, CTBTO) FISSILE MATERIAL (CUTOFF) TREATY At a minimum, treaty would ban fissile material production for weapons purposes; Issue about treaty scope: Would it also cover existing stocks? NEXT-GENERATION NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT TREATIES Agreements that place limits on total number of nuclear warheads in arsenals would pose qualitatively new verification challenges

4 So What Are the Existing Gaps and Emerging Challenges for Nuclear Verification?

5 CVT SCOPING WORKSHOP December 2015, Nuclear Verification at Low Numbers NUCLEAR VERIFICATION AT LOW NUMBERS A SCOPING WORKSHOP Princeton University, E-Quad December 10 11, 2015

6 APPROACHING THE PROBLEM SELECTED SESSION QUESTIONS THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT What are the expected (treaty) commitments and what are the political and technical concerns states may have with regard to possible verification? MINDING THE GAPS What are the key verification gaps, and how do they relate to important non-compliance scenarios? What are the main verification concepts and technologies that might help address them? Source: IAEA Imagebank (top)

7 MAPPING NUCLEAR VERIFICATION (verification.nu) Fissile Material Production Assembly & Maintenance Deployment & Storage Dismantlement Hinterland (no declared facilities or materials) Disposition Nu (A Fictional Weapon State)

8 MAPPING NUCLEAR VERIFICATION Fissile Material Production Reprocessing Assembly & Maintenance Deployment & Storage Support NPT/FMCT CTBT Enrichment Reactors Bombers Submarines New START Materials Materials Components Warheads Storage Storage ICBMs Dismantlement Hinterland (no declared facilities or materials) Disposition Nu

9 MAPPING NUCLEAR VERIFICATION Fissile Material Production Reprocessing Assembly & Maintenance Deployment & Storage Support NPT/FMCT CTBT Enrichment Reactors Bombers Submarines New START Materials Materials Components Warheads Storage Storage ICBMs Dismantlement Hinterland (no declared facilities or materials) Disposition Nu

10 WARHEAD DISMANTLEMENT FACILITY & MANAGED-ACCESS SIMULATOR FULL-MOTION VIRTUAL REALITY SYSTEM WITH REAL-TIME RADIATION FIELDS

11 What s New Here? Mapping Nuclear Verification allows exploring strengths and weaknesses of different verification approaches

12 A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE ON NUCLEAR VERIFICATION Some weapon states might seek minimal inspection activities at military nuclear sites Much less intrusive, but highly dependent on effective perimeter control Fissile Material Production Enrichment Reactors Reprocessing Assembly and Maintenance (off limits) Bombers Support Submarines Materials Military Stocks of Fissile Material (off limits) Deployment and Storage (off limits) ICBMs Dismantlement (off limits) Disposition Nu

13 MAPPING NUCLEAR VERIFICATION CVT projects help strengthen existing verification technologies and approaches, close the remaining gaps, and address emerging challenges Fissile Material Production Reprocessing Assembly & Maintenance Deployment & Storage Support NPT/FMCT CTBT Enrichment Reactors Bombers Submarines New START Materials Materials Components Warheads Storage Storage ICBMs Dismantlement Hinterland (no declared facilities or materials) Disposition Nu

14 MAPPING NUCLEAR VERIFICATION CVT projects help strengthen existing verification technologies and approaches, close the remaining gaps, and address emerging challenges Fissile Material Production Reprocessing Assembly & Maintenance Deployment & Storage Support NPT/FMCT CTBT Enrichment Reactors Bombers Submarines New START Materials Materials Components Warheads Storage Storage ICBMs Dismantlement Hinterland (no declared facilities or materials) Disposition Nu

15 Locating CVT Projects (Selected Examples)

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY GAPS AND CHALLENGES WAVEFORM TECHNIQUES: SEISMIC AND INFRASOUND SIGNATURES Paul Richards (Columbia), Milton Garcés (U Hawaii) Detect very low-yield

RADIONUCLIDE SIGNATURES John Lee (U Mich), Abi Farsoni (Oregon State), Michael Schöppner (Princeton) Advanced detector technologies (higher energy resolution; lower MDC)

16 COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY GAPS AND CHALLENGES WAVEFORM TECHNIQUES: SEISMIC AND INFRASOUND SIGNATURES Paul Richards (Columbia), Milton Garcés (U Hawaii) Detect very low-yield explosions and discriminate against other sources Potential for improved event location and identification through the integration of infrasound with seismic monitoring RADIONUCLIDE SIGNATURES John Lee (U Mich), Abi Farsoni (Oregon State), Michael Schöppner (Princeton) Advanced detector technologies (higher energy resolution; lower MDC) State-of-the-art ATM, backward and forward Finding the origin of a release versus catching the plume Source: Milton Garcés (top) and Radionuclide Station RN56, Russian Federation, (bottom)

DISTINGUISHING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FROM EARTHQUAKES DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED METHODS (USING ALL THREE COMPONENTS OF RECORDED MOTION) TO DISTINGUISH SEISMIC

17 DISTINGUISHING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FROM EARTHQUAKES DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED METHODS (USING ALL THREE COMPONENTS OF RECORDED MOTION) TO DISTINGUISH SEISMIC SIGNALS FROM (VERY SMALL) NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FROM (VERY WEAK) EARTHQUAKES Explosion Earthquake Ongoing CVT work by Paul Richards et al., Columbia University

NPT AND FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY GAPS AND CHALLENGES REAL-TIME CHARACTERIZATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS Sara Pozzi, Zhong He, Igor Jovanovic (all U

instruments with information barrier DETECTING CLANDESTINE FACILITIES (AND ACTIVITIES) Paul Wilson (U Wisconsin); Al Hero (U Mich), John Fisher III (MIT),

18 NPT AND FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY GAPS AND CHALLENGES REAL-TIME CHARACTERIZATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS Sara Pozzi, Zhong He, Igor Jovanovic (all U Mich), John Mattingly (NCSU), James Baciak (U Florida), and others Determine mass, enrichment, and location of nuclear materials Possibility of combining instruments with information barrier DETECTING CLANDESTINE FACILITIES (AND ACTIVITIES) Paul Wilson (U Wisconsin); Al Hero (U Mich), John Fisher III (MIT), and others Fuel cycle anomalies (CYCLUS) Data analytics Emission source terms and atmospheric transport modeling Source: U Michigan (top) and Google Earth (bottom)

DETECTING CLANDESTINE PLUTONIUM SEPARATION WITH KRYPTON-85 MODERN ATMOSPHERIC TRANSPORT MODELS CAN BE USED TO ESTIMATE PLUME DISPERSION FROM (RANDOMLY PLACED) FICTIONAL REPROCESSING PLANTS TO

19 DETECTING CLANDESTINE PLUTONIUM SEPARATION WITH KRYPTON-85 MODERN ATMOSPHERIC TRANSPORT MODELS CAN BE USED TO ESTIMATE PLUME DISPERSION FROM (RANDOMLY PLACED) FICTIONAL REPROCESSING PLANTS TO DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS FOR DETECTION Michael Schöppner and Alexander Glaser, Present and Future Potential of Krypton-85 for the Detection of Clandestine Reprocessing Plants for Treaty Verification, under review (Journal of Environmental Radioactivity)

NEXT-GEN DISARMAMENT TREATIES GAPS AND CHALLENGES PROTECTING SENSITIVE INFORMATION Clair Sullivan (Illinois), Dave Wehe (U Mich), and others Inherent

20 NEXT-GEN DISARMAMENT TREATIES GAPS AND CHALLENGES PROTECTING SENSITIVE INFORMATION Clair Sullivan (Illinois), Dave Wehe (U Mich), and others Inherent information barriers: spectral/spatial, soſtware/hardware Minimally intrusive verification approaches Confirming numerical limits (e.g. using new tagging techniques) CONFIRMING AUTHENTICITY OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS Richard Lanza (MIT), Francesco d Errico (Yale), Alex Glaser (Princeton) Advanced gamma-spectrometry detection systems Nuclear resonance fluorescence Neutron radiography and fission signatures Source: Paul Shambroom (top) and U.S. Department of Energy (bottom)

21 INFORMATION BARRIERS REMOVING SENSITIVE INFORMATION VIA HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE ORIGINAL (HIGH-RESOLUTION) SPECTRUM FEATURELESS SPECTRUM Measured spectrum from combined Cs-137, Co-60, Na-22, Bi-207 calibration sources; but only Cs-137 allowable Output spectrum preserves allowable energy information; all other spectral information appears as background Ongoing CVT work by Fred Buhler, David Wehe, and Mike Flynn at U Michigan

CLOSING VERIFICATION GAPS AND ADDRESSING EMERGING CHALLENGES SUMMARY Understanding the expected treaty commitments treaty is critical for exploring the

to understand how they can fit into the big picture PROGRESS IN 2015 2016 Mapping Nuclear Verification as a tool to explore alternative and to facilitate

22 CLOSING VERIFICATION GAPS AND ADDRESSING EMERGING CHALLENGES SUMMARY Understanding the expected treaty commitments treaty is critical for exploring the potential role of different verification technologies and approaches Numerous promising technologies under development (as part of CVT and elsewhere); key is to understand how they can fit into the big picture PROGRESS IN Mapping Nuclear Verification as a tool to explore alternative and to facilitate discussions between thrust areas Several new collaborations between research groups in different CVT thrust areas (involving both university partners and national laboratories)

TREATY VERIFICATION. Closing the Gaps with New Technologies and Approaches

TREATY VERIFICATION. Closing the Gaps with New Technologies and Approaches TREATY VERIFICATION Closing the Gaps with New Technologies and Approaches Alexander Glaser and Tamara Patton 2016 CVT Annual Meeting, Ann Arbor, Michigan Revision 5a CONSORTIUM FOR VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY