TREATY VERIFICATION CHARACTERIZING EXISTING GAPS AND EMERGING CHALLENGES REVIEW, CVT THRUST AREA 1, NOVEMBER 29, 2017

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1 TREATY VERIFICATION CHARACTERIZING EXISTING GAPS AND EMERGING CHALLENGES REVIEW, CVT THRUST AREA 1, NOVEMBER 29, 2017 Alexander Glaser Princeton University Revision 2x

RELEVANT NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY Bans the acquisition of

safeguards BILATERAL/MULTILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS-CONTROL AGREEMENTS Protocols negotiated to ensure

the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA, 2000/2010) COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY Bans all

Monitoring System, CTBTO) FISSILE MATERIAL (CUTOFF) TREATY At a minimum, treaty would ban fissile material

NEXT-GENERATION NUCLEAR ARMS-CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT TREATIES Agreements that place limits on total number of

2 RELEVANT NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY Bans the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-weapon states and commits the five weapon states to nuclear disarmament; verified by IAEA safeguards BILATERAL/MULTILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS-CONTROL AGREEMENTS Protocols negotiated to ensure compliance with specific agreements, for example: the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, July 2015) and the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA, 2000/2010) COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY Bans all nuclear explosions in all environments and would be verified by extensive verification mechanisms (International Monitoring System, CTBTO) FISSILE MATERIAL (CUTOFF) TREATY At a minimum, treaty would ban fissile material production for weapons purposes; Issue about treaty scope: Would it also cover existing stocks? NEXT-GENERATION NUCLEAR ARMS-CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT TREATIES Agreements that place limits on total number of nuclear warheads in arsenals would pose qualitatively new verification challenges; this could also include verification of the TPNW ( Ban Treaty )

VERIFICATION CHALLENGES AND GAPS MAJOR AREAS OF RESEARCH Timeliness at large enrichment and reprocessing plants Proliferation of advanced enrichment technologies Verifying numerical limits on

3 VERIFICATION CHALLENGES AND GAPS MAJOR AREAS OF RESEARCH Timeliness at large enrichment and reprocessing plants Proliferation of advanced enrichment technologies Verifying numerical limits on declared nuclear warheads New START Monitoring nuclear warheads in storage Reconstructing historic fissile material production Establishing confidence in the absence of undeclared stocks, production, or other clandestine activities Confirming the authenticity of nuclear warheads Revision 4

4 Revision 2

in Computational Engineering Science (AICES), Germany wws.princeton.

5 RECONSTRUCTING HISTORIC FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION A NEW NUCLEAR ARCHAEOLOGY LABORATORY CVT Postdoc Malte Göttsche receives a fellowship to establish a new research group on nuclear verification at the Aachen Institute for Advanced Study in Computational Engineering Science (AICES), Germany wws.princeton.edu/news-and-events/news/item/g%c3%b6ttsche-awarded-1-million-fellowship-study-nuclear-archaeology

for example, does it interfere with operations; is sensitive information put at risk?

6 UNDERSTANDING NUCLEAR VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGIES AND APPROACHES IN CONTEXT ROBUSTNESS How difficult is it to defeat or circumvent the technology? NON-INTRUSIVENESS How intrusive is deployment and use of the technology? for example, does it interfere with operations; is sensitive information put at risk? SIMPLICITY How easy is it to deploy and use the technology? for example, passive systems are generally preferable to active ones Source: IAEA (top), defenseimagery.mil (middle), author (bottom)

7 NON-INTRUSIVE MONITORING & INSPECTIONS

INSPECTIONS FROM A DISTANCE (MONITORING OF TREATY-ACCOUNTABLE ITEMS IN LONG-TERM STORAGE) MAGTAG blanket containing randomly oriented magnets cover each

Bomb, DigiComTV, 2010 MAGTAG, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2000 verification.nu/technology/magtag S. Philippe, M. Kütt, M. McKeown, U. Rührmair, and A.

8 INSPECTIONS FROM A DISTANCE (MONITORING OF TREATY-ACCOUNTABLE ITEMS IN LONG-TERM STORAGE) MAGTAG blanket containing randomly oriented magnets cover each weapon container; a magnetometer in the magazine detects changes in the magnetic field Plutonium Storage, Pantex Plant, Amaraillo, Texas Dismantling the Bomb, DigiComTV, 2010 MAGTAG, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2000 verification.nu/technology/magtag S. Philippe, M. Kütt, M. McKeown, U. Rührmair, and A. Glaser, The Application of Virtual Proofs of Reality to Nuclear Safeguards and Arms Control Verification 57th Annual INMM Meeting, July 24 28, 2016, Atlanta, Georgia.

Princeton University and Princeton Plasma

9 INSPECTOR BOT (ROBOTICS AND MACHINE LEARNING FOR NON-INTRUSIVE INSPECTIONS) Robotics Group, Naomi Leonard Autonomous Mobile Robots for Managed Access Inspections, Princeton University and Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (PPPL) Seed funding from U.S. Department of State, V-Fund,

10 Closeup of detector and information barrier with simulated radiation spectrum and shielding material handled by user

VERIFICATION CHALLENGES AND GAPS MAJOR AREAS OF RESEARCH

Proliferation of advanced enrichment technologies Verifying

Monitoring nuclear warheads in storage Reconstructing historic

nu Establishing confidence in the absence of undeclared

11 VERIFICATION CHALLENGES AND GAPS MAJOR AREAS OF RESEARCH Timeliness at large enrichment and reprocessing plants Proliferation of advanced enrichment technologies Verifying numerical limits on declared nuclear warheads New START Monitoring nuclear warheads in storage Reconstructing historic fissile material production Establishing confidence in the absence of undeclared stocks, production, or other clandestine activities Confirming the authenticity of nuclear warheads Revision 4

June 6 9, 2016 Alexander Glaser Princeton University. CVT Consortium for Verification Technology. Revision 2

June 6 9, 2016 Alexander Glaser Princeton University. CVT Consortium for Verification Technology. Revision 2 Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development University and Industry Technical Interchange (UITI 2016) Review Meeting Treaty Verification: Characterizing Gaps and Emerging Challenges