International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Study Guide

Transcription

1 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Study Guide

2 Table of Contents Introduction letter... 3 Topic A: Verification of uranium enrichment processes... 4 Introduction... 4 History... 4 NPT... 5 Additional Protocols... 7 Current Situation... 7 Challenges... 9 NWS-NNWS gap Conclusions Questions Bibliography Topic B: International regulations for the safe disposal of nuclear waste Introduction Legal framework IAEA Work and Initiatives Country Positions and Debate Challenges Conclusion Questions Bibliography Suggested Readings CONFERENCE INFORMATION POSITION PAPERS CONTACT DETAILS

3 Introduction letter Hello Delegates, It is with great honour that I welcome you all to the IAEA committee of LIMUN I'm a 4 th year International Relations and French Honours student in the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada. My main academic interests lie in the politics of the Internet and political communications. For this semester I am on an exchange term in Sciences Po Paris; needless to say the chance to explore the MUN circuit in Europe was too great of an opportunity to resist. I have two years worth of experience in Model UN, starting off as a delegate in my university's home conference which I would later serve as Secretary-General. I like to think that my experience is balanced: I have been a delegate, on the dais, and in the Secretariat. Becoming a member of the dais for any conference I always find to be a bit more rewarding. Though I may come off as strict with the gavel I aim to provide an educational experience for my delegates, where they are challenged and are pushed to motivate in the diplomatic realm. I always found the IAEA to be an incredibly interesting committee, one in which an interdisciplinary approach is a crucial one to not only understand the topics at hand, but to conceptualize improvements and innovations. This is quite a unique trait in a MUN committee, one which I encourage all of you to take advantage of. I have high expectations for delegates as a Director, and believe that coming into committee session with a interdisciplinary, comprehensive framework in mind is the key to success in the IAEA. I look forward to welcoming you to LIMUN soon, Jennine Punzalan Director 3

4 Topic A: Verification of uranium enrichment processes Introduction The process of verifying uranium enrichment processes is a vital one for nuclear nonproliferation, ensuring that new weapons of mass destruction are not created despite the global increase in nuclear energy. The Security Council itself has made the commitment to work towards preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, further emphasizing the integral role of the IAEA and the effective implementation on its safeguards in order to achieve this goal. 1 Safeguards and the subsequent verification of uranium enrichment process is a vital one in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. As the IAEA s primary tool in fulfilling its role through the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the process is not without controversy. Each Review Conference puts forward similar issues regarding the matter, many of which LIMUN delegates are highly encouraged to consider as well coming into the committee. History The statute of the IAEA, created and signed in 1956 gives it responsibility to overlook safeguards, but only in the role of an administrator as requested by Member States. 2 As found in the IAEA statute in Article 3, clause 5: 1 United Nations. S/23500 Note by the President of the Security Council. January 31, Ben Sanders, "A Short History of Nuclear Non-Proliferation," International Atomic Energy Agency Articles and Studies: p. 5. 4

5 To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy 3 Therefore the IAEA s status did not provide it room to manage the issue of nuclear proliferation as a policeman, for submission to safeguards was not mandatory and done on a bilateral basis between donor and recipient states for nuclear installations. Enforcement was only possible with an agreement present between two states. 4 After the Cuban Missile Crisis, concerns grew of more states acquiring nuclear technology and the capability to create weapons. Through the creation of treaties such as the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the 1968 NPT, safeguards for the purpose of nuclear security became an assigned duty to the IAEA, especially as the NPT found strong support and subsequently became a permanent treaty in NPT In 1961, the General Assembly adopts Resolution 1665 and Resolution 1576, both of which spearheaded the global movement towards the creation of a nuclear non-proliferation regime. Resolution 1665, in particular, called upon nuclear-weapon states to work together towards a multilateral agreement for the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. Resolution 1576 further expands this to both nuclear and non-weapon states to prevent further proliferation. 6 3 International Atomic Energy Agency, "IAEA Statue." Accessed January 6, Sanders, "A Short History of Nuclear Non-Proliferation," p Imrana Gull, "History of Nuclear non-proliferation,"pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 53, no. 2/3 (2000): 95, 6 IAEA "Factsheets: Nuclear Non-proliferation Chronology of Key Events." Accessed January 7,

6 The two aforementioned resolutions paved the way for the creation of the NPT, which was opened for signing by UN Member States in July Safeguards are mentioned specifically in Article 3, Paragraph 1: Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. [ ] The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. 8 The NPT creates a stronger role for the IAEA in non-proliferation, as well as stronger safeguards. Unlike before, safeguards under the NPT are implemented for all uses of nuclear energy years after official enforcement began in 1970, the treaty and the regime were extended indefinitely after the 1995 Review Conference. A Review Conference takes place every 5 years, serving as a multilateral forum for discussions on the non-proliferation regime, including successes and possible improvements. The last Review Conference was in Sanders, "A Short History of Nuclear Non-Proliferation," p IAEA. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 9 Ibid. 10 IAEA "Past Review Conferences." Accessed January 7,

7 Additional Protocols The introduction of the NPT is said to have led to the rise of clandestine weapons programs, such as the one discovered in Iraq during the Gulf War. This is further ameliorated by the fact that safeguards were only applied to a state's declared nuclear program. After the findings in Iraq, a model of Additional Protocols (APs) was added to further strengthen the safeguards regime and the verification process. With Additional Protocols, the IAEA is able to perform inspections for possible undeclared nuclear operations, including ones that may not have been reported under the general safeguards regime. 11 However, as a universalagreement was not established, states are responsible for bilaterally negotiating a AP agreement with the IAEA, and further integrating it on a national level states have signed AP agreements with the IAEA, but only 122 have made the final step to put it in force.an important note is that APs are designed for non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS); most nuclear weapon states (NWS) have corresponding agreements with the IAEA, but they do not necessarily follow the AP model. 13 Current Situation Safeguards, first and foremost, are tools that track if nuclear material such as enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium-223 is being diverted to the creation of weapons. 14 The safeguards regime has 3 types : Traditional safeguards the traditional measures set up with the NPT, these safeguards are ones implemented on open and declared nuclear programs in reported facilities. 11 IAEA. The IAEA Additional Protocol After the 2010 Review: Status and Prospects, p George Bunn. Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems." Accessed January 7, IAEA. The IAEA Additional Protocol, p IAEA. IAEA Safeguards: Staying Ahead of the Game, p. 8. 7

8 Strengthening measures this includes Additional Protocols and other measures that involve the IAEA's ability to inspect outside of openly declared areas. Integrated safeguards an optimum combination of the above two. 15 Furthermore, states can have the following types of agreements with the IAEA, all of which have different variations of the above three safeguards implemented : Comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) all NNWS party to the NPT are required to conclude CSAs with the IAEA; Article 3 of the treaty applies to this agreement. In concluding this agreement, states agree to subject to safeguards all activities related to the production of nuclear energy. Voluntary offer agreements (VOAs) the term for agreements concluded between the five NPT nuclear states: United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China, and the IAEA. It attempts to even the field by having these states subject to safeguards as well. Item-specific safeguards agreements these are the agreements the IAEA has concluded with the 3 states not party to the NPT; with these agreements only specific facilities and material are placed under safeguards. Additional protocols As of 2012, 179 states have applied safeguards, both nuclear or non-nuclear weapon states. Of these 179 states, 114 states have both CSAs and APs implemented. Additionally, 119 states have APs in force IAEA, "How We Implement Safeguards." Accessed January 7, IAEA. Safeguards Statement for 2012., p. 2. 8

9 Challenges Adherence and enforcement Though the IAEA is given the ability to inspect undeclared areas and facilities, it is still unable to do this without the consent of the host state, as the conclusion of the AP that makes such surprise inspections possible must be an initiative of the state. Considering that APs is one of few tools that strengthen safeguards, this creates a dilemma between state sovereignty and nuclear security. With not all states enforcing both CSAs and APs, the safeguards regime is not able to reach its full potential as a policing mechanism. Review Conferences continue to recommend and encourage states to conclude the appropriate agreements, but progress remains slow. 17 Furthermore, there is the issue of enforcement, and what can be done by the IAEA if a state party to the NPT is found to be non-compliant. Ultimately, the power to enforce lies with the Security Council, as seen with Iraq. As with most matters with the Security Council, however, stronger enforcement and punishment for a non-complying state can be difficult to achieve by consensus, as seen with the Demoratic People's Republic of Korea. 18 Peaceful use Article 4 of the NPT emphasizes the inalienable right of all states to be able to use nuclear power for peaxeful purposes : Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty. 17 Lewis A. Dunn, "The NPT," The Nonproliferation Review, 16, no. 3 (2009): Sanders, "A Short History of Nuclear Non-Proliferation," p. 9. 9

10 This has led to differences in interpretation, some stating that production of materials to the brink of developing a weapon should be accepted, as it simply means that large nuclear energy programs are being implemented. As long as the materials are not outright used for a weapon, and that the potential for civilian use can be seen, it should not be a problem. However, this raises concerns of how much is too much how much enriched uranium can be produced and still be regarded as use? A way to measure this that all states can agree upon is yet to be seen. 19 NWS-NNWS gap The discrepancy between the requirements of NWS and NNWS, especially the voluntary nature of safeguards for the former, has led to disagreements between both parties, one which is constantly debated upon in Review Conferences. Various NNWS have been less compelled to conclude AP agreements, citing that it is unfair treatment for states with no nuclear capacity. Many have expressed the need for the 5 NWS to adopt stricter safeguards for their possession of weapons, even to work towards complete disarmament, both of which NWS has not shown express interest in doing. It is said that this gap between the two kinds of states in the NPT is linked to problem of adherence and enforcement. 20 Conclusions It may seem that arguments about the NPT is a seemingly fruitless one, however it proves to be important as the global community continuously faces the threat of proliferation. Delegates are encouraged to find innovative ways in addressing the issue and its varied challenges in order to strengthen the existing safeguards regime. A multilateral, interdisciplinary approach is key to all solutions, as well as an awareness of the nuances and interpretations of the NPT. 19 Henry Sokolski, "Reviewing the Nuclear Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty," Strategic Studies Institute: p Ibid. 10

11 Questions. 1. Most safeguards arrangements are made on a bilateral basis; besides the Conferences of the Parties, how can a multilateral approach be further integrated in the verification system? 2. Can there be a quantifiable marker for what constitutes peaceful use of nuclear power? 3. How can regional organizations improve the verification process? 4. What is the future role of the NPT in maintaining the safeguards system? Should it be strengthened? Should key articles be interpreted differently to ensure a stronger role for the treaty? 5. There has been a distinct gap between the nuclear and non-nuclear states regarding the structure of the regime. Is compromise likely, and if so, in which areas? Bibliography Bunn, George. Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems." Accessed January 7, Dunn, Lewis A. "The NPT." The Nonproliferation Review. no. 3 (2009): Gull, Imrana. "History of Nuclear non-proliferation." Pakistan Institute of International Affairs. no. 2/3 (2000):

12 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Factsheets: Nuclear Non-proliferation Chronology of Key Events." Accessed January 7, Factsheets/English/npt_chrono.html International Atomic Energy Agency, "How We Implement Safeguards." Accessed January 7, International Atomic Energy Agency. IAEA Safeguards: Staying Ahead of the Game, pp International Atomic Energy Agency, "IAEA Statute." Accessed January 6, International Atomic Energy Agency, "Past Review Conferences." Accessed January 7, International Atomic Energy Agency. Safeguards Statement for 2012, pp International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA Additional Protocol After the 2010 Review: Status and Prospects, pp International Atomic Energy Agency. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 12

13 Sanders, Ben. "A Short History of Nuclear Non-Proliferation."International Atomic Energy Agency Articles and Studies. : Sokolski, Henry. "Reviewing the Nuclear Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty." Strategic Studies Institute. : United Nations. S/23500 Note by the President of the Security Council. January 31,

14 Topic B: International regulations for the safe disposal of nuclear waste Introduction Nuclear energy is increasingly becoming a more desirable alternative energy source, especially within the context climate change. With increased use of nuclear power, and therefore more nuclear waste, the issue of waste management more important than ever before. The IAEA, as the world's authority on nuclear energy, has the opportunity to play an important role in nuclear waste management, especially on a global scale. Legal framework Several conventions have been signed and ratified with a UN framework before the development of nuclear waste management initiatives. These documents outline and serve as precedents for nuclear safety as well. This includes the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter passed in 1972 served as precedent for nuclear waste management initiative at the time. It outlined a need for environmental protection in the disposal of waste before the development of a nuclear waste-specific document. 21 In 1994, a more focused document was signed, the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which [affirmed] the need to begin promptly the development of an international convention on the safety of radioactive waste management. 22 However, it was not until the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management that a global legal framework for the issue was fully implemented, completed in 1997 and came into force in The Joint Convention aims to create norms and a safety standard in spent fuel and nuclear waste management, including 21 IAEA. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter IAEA. Convention on Nuclear Safety. 14

15 ideas on the implementation of new safety provisions. 23 IAEA Work and Initiatives Within the IAEA, two departments work on issues of nuclear waste management, the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, as well as the Department of Nuclear Energy. Under the former is the Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management programme, which aims to assist Member States in the implementation of safe and standardized disposal programmes and the development of facilities that meet all safety standards. 24 The IAEA also has emergency initiatives such as the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES), similar to the Richter scale 25, and the Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) where states can call on the IAEA for quick assistance during emergency situations. 26 The aftermath of Fukushima has also brought the importance of emergency procedures among nuclear facilities. The IAEA has corresponded with the creation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which it has encouraged all Member States to adopt. The plan is divided into 12 actions : 1. Safety assessments in light of the Fukushima accident 2. IAEA peer reviews 3. Emergency preparedness and response 4. National regulatory bodies 5. Operating organizations 6. IAEA Safety Standards 23 IAEA, "The Joint Convention." Accessed January 7, IAEA, "Safety of Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management." Accessed January 7, IAEA. Factsheets: INES, The International Radiological and Nuclear Event Scale. p IAEA. Factsheets: The Incident and Emergency Centre, Answering the Request for Emergency Assistance Worldwide. p.1. 15

16 7. International legal framework 8. Member states planning to embark on a nuclear power programme 9. Capacity building 10. Protection of people and the environment from ionizing radiation 11. Communication and information dissemination 12. Research and development Country Positions and Debate In terms of this topic, the debate emerges from the different waste management practices of various Member States. Direct disposal states direct disposal, which means immediately storing waste on the surface level to allow it to decompose, is a common practice among states like Canada, South Korea, Finland and Sweden Long-term disposal / geological repository states - Finland and Sweden are both in the process of establishing long-term waste storage through deep geological placement. This is the most agreed upon method in waste management, but one that requires long-term ressources. Reprocessing states a practice often frowned upon, for it increases radioactive material to be disposed and that may be diverted to create weapons. However, states like China, India, Russia and the UK continue with the practice. 27 Pangea talks of a multinational geological repository have been appeared, including a statement from previous IAEA Director-General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei. In a statement to the General Assembly, he emphasized that such a project will have great advantages in environmental protection, nuclear safety and security and non- 27 World Nuclear Association, "Radioactive Waste Management." Last modified November Accessed January 7,

17 proliferation. 28 Challenges The primary challenge facing the IAEA in regards to nuclear waste management is bringing the topic to a multilateral forum and strengthening the reach of the Joint Convention. Waste management has largely been a matter on the national level, and bilaterally with the IAEA during emergencies and information-sharing. With nuclear energy becoming a more global source, involving countries with different resources and capabilities, cooperation could very well be vital. Conclusion The topic, in a multilateral forum, is a dimension of the overall field that is rarely explored, and delegates in the IAEA committee are highly encouraged to make the most of this. There are various aspects that can be covered, from emergency preparedness to establishing norms for waste disposal, but the ability to come to a consensus on a comprehensive document would be highly recommended. Questions 1. In what ways can the scientific and social science epistemic communities be more involved in the discussions of nuclear waste disposal, especially in the policy realm? 2. Is an international repository really viable? How can it best be implemented, and what role can the IAEA play in this development? 3. How can emerging nuclear states best be supported in regards to nuclear waste 28 World Nuclear Association, "International Nuclear Waste Disposal Concepts." Last modified April Accessed January 7, Disposal-Concepts/. 17

18 management? 4. Should nuclear waste management remain a strictly national matter? How can states work together on a bilateral and multilateral basis in terms of technology-sharing and policy? 5. How can the global community today implement waste management initiatives that will last in the long term? 6. Are there ways of strengthening waste management and nuclear security initiatives in an emergency? Bibliography International Atomic Energy Agency. Factsheets: The Incident and Emergency Centre, Answering the Request for Emergency Assistance Worldwide. Factsheets/English/iec.pdf, pp International Atomic Energy Agency. Factsheets: INES, The International Radiological and Nuclear Event Scale. pp International Atomic Energy Agency, "Safety of Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management." Accessed January 7, International Atomic Energy Agency, "The Joint Convention." Accessed January 7,

19 ns.iaea.org/conventions/waste-jointconvention.asp?s=6&l=40. International Atomic Energy Agency. Convention on Nuclear Safety. International Atomic Energy Agency Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter. World Nuclear Association, "International Nuclear Waste Disposal Concepts." Last modified April Accessed January 7, Cycle/Nuclear-Wastes/International-Nuclear-Waste-Disposal-Concepts/. World Nuclear Association, "Radioactive Waste Management." Last modified November Accessed January 7, Cycle/Nuclear-Wastes/Radioactive-Waste-Management/. Suggested Readings IAEA Publications Nuclear Safety and Security, Safeguards - Conference reviews NPT Review Conferenceshttp:// on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

20 IAEA General Conference Resolutions

21 CONFERENCE INFORMATION When looking for information regarding LIMUN 2014 (and subsequent editions) your first step should be to visit our website: LIMUN in social media Please follow updates from us through our social media channels: London International Model United Nations When tweeting about this year s conference (your preparations, journey to/from London or when live-tweeting the events during the conference itself) - please use hashtag #LIMUN2014 Agenda & Rules of Procedure The agenda for the 2014 conference is available online at Since its 14 th session last year, LIMUN has introduced changes to its Rules of Procedure. The revised Rules can be accessed here: 21

22 POSITION PAPERS What is a position paper? A position paper is a statement of policy, which is intended to communicate an overall position of a country on a particular topic debated in the committee. Position papers should be brief and outline the general policies rather than specific measures. Each delegate should submit one position paper per topic to be debated by the committee (note: most of the committees have two proposed topics). Each paper should be approximately one page per topic. LIMUN offers a short guide on how to write a position paper. It is available on our website: Deadlines There are two deadlines for submission of delegates position papers: February 18 th (Tuesday) position papers submitted before this deadline will be reviewed by the Directors and the delegates will receive feedback and will be given a chance to submit a corrected version of their policy papers (if necessary). Submitted position papers will be circulated by the Directors among the committee members. Please note: LIMUN 2014 Awards Policy revision has introduced a Best Position Paper award. 22

23 CONTACT DETAILS For any enquiries relating to your committee proceedings or if you want to get in touch with your committee s Directors, or for submission of position papers - - please iaea@limun.org.uk Other enquiries regarding the Conference should be made to enquiries@limun.org.uk Before contacting LIMUN please make sure you have read FAQ section on our website: 23