PSC/IR 106: Nuclear Weapons. William Spaniel williamspaniel.com/classes/pscir

Transcription

1 PSC/IR 106: Nuclear Weapons William Spaniel williamspaniel.com/classes/pscir

2 Outline The Nuclear Club Mutually Assured Destruction Obsolescence Of Major War Nuclear Pessimism Leveraging Nuclear Strength Mixed Strategies The Iraq War

3 Outline The Nuclear Club Mutually Assured Destruction Obsolescence Of Major War Nuclear Pessimism Leveraging Nuclear Strength Mixed Strategies The Iraq War

4 United States (1945) Manhattan Project Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings Would have been a lot worse if the Nazi scientists beat us to it Nazi brain drain

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6 Soviet Union (1949) Manhattan Project spies US knew the Soviets were developing a bomb but chose not to launch preventive war Immediately after WWII No intelligence Cold War starts in earnest

7 United Kingdom (1952) Tube Alloys Agreement with the United States

8 France (1960) France and the United States do not have as intimate a relationship as the U.S. and the U.K. France sought strategic independence Therefore, nukes

9 Sino-Soviet split China (1964)

10 India (1974) India does not like Pakistan very much Tested the Smiling Buddha, a peaceful nuclear explosion, in 1974 Remained mostly dormant until (Hold that thought.)

11 Israel (1979) Israel does not have nuclear weapons.

12 South Africa (1979) The Vela Incident A US satellite (Vela Hotel) detected a flash in the Atlantic Ocean between South Africa and Antarctica Built due to concerns of civil war spillover from Angola Dismantled at the end of Apartheid

13 Soviet Successor States Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus had nuclear weapons on their soil during the Soviet Union s breakup Moscow still had command control Countries accepted cash to dismantle the weapons and forgo native nuclear development

14 Pakistan (1998) Five weeks after India s nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan tested six bombs Pakistan is now too nuclear to fail A.Q. Khan network

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16 North Korea (2006) Conducted a (relatively crummy) explosion in 2006, 2009, and 2013

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19 North Korea (2006) Conducted a (relatively crummy) explosion in 2006, 2009, and 2013 But a crummy bomb on Seoul At one point agreed to trade us their bombs for a billion pounds of food (seriously)

20 ? Iran (2015)

21 Questions Macro How do nuclear weapons affect the world system? Do nuclear weapons promote peace? Would the Cold War been a hot war without nuclear weapons? Micro Why do states choose to proliferate? What can we do to stop it? How do we best handle North Korea and Iran today?

22 Outline The Nuclear Club Mutually Assured Destruction Obsolescence Of Major War Nuclear Pessimism Leveraging Nuclear Strength Mixed Strategies The Iraq War

23 Mutually Assured Destruction States live in a world of mutually assured destruction if: 1. Both states are self-preserving 2. Both states have large stockpiles of nuclear weapons 3. Each state has a secure second strike; no state achieve a splendid first strike

24 The Strategic Triad The United States had three methods of nuclear retaliation Strategic bombers Intercontinental ballistic missiles Submarine-launched ballistic missiles

25 Everyone, Calm Down Under these conditions, no side would want to start a large-scale war If I start a war, I face enormous nuclear retaliation Worse than a disadvantageous peace If my opponent starts a war, he faces enormous nuclear retaliation Worse than a disadvantageous peace

26 Bargaining Model of War Larger costs: easier to reach bargained settlement

27 Bargaining Range p USA c USA p USA p USA + c USSR

28 Bargaining Range p USA c USA p USA p USA + c USSR

29 Policy Implication Promoting nonproliferation may be a waste of time If we really just want to stabilize the world and minimize the number of wars, spreading nuclear weapons might be the way to do it

30 Outline The Nuclear Club Mutually Assured Destruction Obsolescence Of Major War Nuclear Pessimism Leveraging Nuclear Strength Mixed Strategies The Iraq War

31 Alternate Hypothesis War between major powers is obsolete Two major powers cannot fight wars with one another because the costs will outweigh whatever possible benefit there is

32 Alternate Hypothesis Nuclear weapons do not change this Mueller: A jump from a fiftieth-floor window is probably quite a bit more horrible to think about than a jump from a fifth-floor one, but anyone who finds life even minimally satisfying is extremely unlikely to do either.

33 Most Deadly Wars 1. World War II: 16.6 million dead 2. World War I: 8.5 million dead 3. Iran-Iraq: 1.3 million dead 4. Vietnam: 1 million dead

34 Bargaining Range Before Modern Era p USA c USA p USA p USA + c USSR

35 Bargaining Range p USA c USA p USA p USA + c USSR

36 Bargaining Range with Nukes p USA c USA p USA p USA + c USSR

37 Policy Prescription Suppose mutually assured destruction is not necessary to maintain peace Should we have nukes? Accidents? Costs?

38 Outline The Nuclear Club Mutually Assured Destruction Obsolescence Of Major War Nuclear Pessimism Leveraging Nuclear Strength Mixed Strategies The Iraq War

39 If nuclear weapons aren t very useful, should we have them?

40 Nuclear Downsides 1. Costs of nuclear weapons 2. Accidental nuclear warfare 3. Rogue nuclear weapons

41 Costs of a Nuclear Program Nukes are not cheap Costs of development Costs of delivery Costs of maintenance Total cost of US program ( ): $7 trillion (2012 dollars) Still spend around $16 billion per year

42 Risky Business Unlike conventional weapons, it is easy to accidentally destroy the world with nuclear weapons Dr. Strangelove and fluoride Stanislav Petrov and the 1983 Soviet false alarm

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44 Missing Weapons? During the height of the Cold War, 68,000 nuclear weapons were active in the world Now down to 4,100 Less concern about having massive retaliation capability More concern about losing a weapon

45 Nuclear Realities No one in Washington is seriously interested in dismantling all American warheads The talk about doing so is just that talk

46 Outline The Nuclear Club Mutually Assured Destruction Obsolescence Of Major War Nuclear Pessimism Leveraging Nuclear Strength Mixed Strategies The Iraq War

47 Do nuclear weapons provide coercive benefits?

48 Well, Duh Nuclear weapons provide power Bargaining model of war: more power yields more concessions Thus, nuclear weapons provide benefits

49 Credibility? But can states credibly threaten to nuke another state? Can North Korea say Give us this island, or we ll nuke Seoul? Of course! But no one will believe them

50 Credibility? Unlike conventional weapons, nuclear weapons have a discontinuous jump in destructive power Is it possible to use their nuclear leverage to extract concessions outside of total war?

51 Statistical Findings Winning with the Bomb (Beardsley and Asal 2009) States with nuclear weapons are more likely to prevail in interstate crises Crises involving nuclear weapons states are shorter than those without

52 Why? Nuclear threats may not compel opponents to give up territory, but they can deter invasion Nuclear weapons as an insurance policy Shifts the bargaining range

53 Game Before: p was probability of victory But really: p is the average distribution of the good after war

54 B victory 1/2 Stalemate 1/3 A victory 1/6 0 1/2 1

55 B victory 1/2 Stalemate 1/3 A victory 1/6 0 1/2 1 A s Expected Share (1/2)(0) + (1/3)(1/2) + (1/6)(1) = 1/3

56 With nukes: if B wins, A might nuke. B settles for a smaller stake. Stalemate 1/2 + 1/3 A victory 1/6 1/2 1

57 With nukes: if B wins, A might nuke. B settles for a smaller stake. Stalemate 1/2 + 1/3 A victory 1/6 1/2 1 A s Expected Share (5/6)(1/2) + (1/6)(1) = 7/12

58 What Do Nukes Do? Nuclear weapons limit the amount an opponent can capture Credible to defend homeland with nukes but not outlying regions Increases A s expected share from war Reduces cost of war for both sides

59 Bargaining Model of War Smaller costs = more fighting!

60 Stability-Instability Paradox Stability: States with nuclear weapons do not engage in high-stakes war Instability: States with nuclear weapons start low-stakes conflicts more frequently

61 Outline The Nuclear Club Mutually Assured Destruction Obsolescence Of Major War Stability/Instability Paradox Nuclear Pessimism Leveraging Nuclear Strength Mixed Strategies The Iraq War

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77 Simple Soccer Penalty Kicks The striker aims left or aims right The goalie dives left or dives right Assume the striker and goalie are superhuman. How should they play?

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89 Guessing Games! Penalty kicks are a guessing game Makes players act randomly (but intelligently) Is preventive war also?

90 Outline The Nuclear Club Mutually Assured Destruction Obsolescence Of Major War Stability/Instability Paradox Nuclear Pessimism Leveraging Nuclear Strength Mixed Strategies The Iraq War

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92 Status Quo

93 War Payoffs Status Quo

94 War Payoffs & Wasted Costs War Payoffs Status Quo

95 War Payoffs & Wasted Costs Successful Power Shift War Payoffs Status Quo

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97 War Payoffs & Wasted Costs Successful Power Shift War Payoffs Status Quo

98 War Payoffs & Wasted Costs Successful Power Shift War Payoffs Status Quo

99 War Payoffs & Wasted Costs Successful Power Shift War Payoffs Status Quo

100 War Payoffs & Wasted Costs Successful Power Shift War Payoffs Status Quo

101 War Payoffs & Wasted Costs Successful Power Shift War Payoffs Status Quo

102 War Payoffs & Wasted Costs Successful Power Shift War Payoffs Status Quo

103 War Payoffs & Wasted Costs Successful Power Shift War Payoffs Status Quo

104 War Payoffs & Wasted Costs Successful Power Shift War Payoffs Status Quo

105 War Payoffs & Wasted Costs Successful Power Shift War Payoffs Status Quo

106 War Payoffs

107 Mistaken Preventive War

108 What Are You Buying? Do you accept that the U.S. should have invaded Iraq if Iraq had a WMD program? Do you accept that the U.S. could not adequately monitor Iraqi activity?

109 What Are You Buying? Do you accept that the U.S. should have invaded Iraq if Iraq had a WMD program? Do you accept that the U.S. could not adequately monitor Iraqi activity? If yes, you accept that mistaken preventive war is rational It just looks silly after the fact!

110 What Are You Buying? Do you accept that the U.S. should have invaded Iraq if Iraq had a WMD program? Do you accept that the U.S. could not adequately monitor Iraqi activity? If yes, you accept that mistaken preventive war is rational It just looks silly after the fact!