NFC Communications-based Mutual Authentication Scheme for the Internet of Things

Transcription

1 Internatonal Journal of Network Securty, Vol.19, No.4, PP , July 2017 (DOI: /IJNS (4).17) 631 NFC Communcatons-based Mutual uthentcaton Scheme for the Internet of Thngs Yanna Ma (Correspondng author: Yanna Ma) Zheang Unversty of Water Resources and Electrc Power, Zheang , Chna (Emal: (Receved May 10, 2016; revsed and accepted Sept. 3 & Sept. 25, 2016) bstract The ntegraton of Near Feld Communcaton (NFC) nto consumer electroncs devces has opened up opportuntes for the nternet of thngs applcatons such as electronc payment, electronc tcketng and sharng contacts, etc.. Meanwhle, varous securty rsks should not be gnored. Therefore, all knds of dfferent protocols have been released wth the purposng of securng NFC communcatons. Lately, a pseudonym-based NFC protocol for the consumer Internet of thngs was presented. They clamed that ther scheme could wthstand man-n-the mddle attack headed from ther scheme could provde mutual authentcaton. Ths study presents a securty analyss on ther scheme and fnds that ther scheme s not really secure aganst man-n-the-mddle attack. Subsequently, ths paper proposes an enhancement for purpose of thwartng ths securty attack. The securty and performance analyses show that the enhancement s secure and effcent whle keepng prvacy preservng. Keywords: uthentcaton; Key Establshment; Smart Cards; Wreless Communcatons 1 Introducton Several wreless communcatons technques and protocols are avalable n the market, such as luetooth, Zgee, RF, W-F and Infrared, whch have dfferent workng frequences and ranges. more recent technology for short-range wreless (up to 10 cm) s the Near Feld Communcaton (NFC) [16] that enables an easy, fast and secure communcaton between two devces n proxmty. Its communcaton occurs wth MHz operatng frequency whle provdng a hgh-level safety than other wellknown wreless technologes, e.g. luetooth [3, 6]. The prmary characterstc of NFC, leadng to ts wdespread use and popularty s the advent of touch-less transactons, whch leads to no cards, no cons and no laborous connectons and network setup [2]. NFC thus enables the long awated Internet-of-Thngs (IoT) [13], changng the nteractons wth the world n subtle but pervasve ways whle provdng dgtally mmersve experence. lthough the communcaton range of NFC s lmted to a few centmeters, NFC alone does not ensure secure communcatons, especally authentcaton between the sender and the recpent. One of the most mportant propertes for data communcaton s mutual authentcaton whch s defned as the ablty that both communcatng partes can authentcate wth each other, thus preventng mann-the-mddle attack and replay attack [11, 14, 17]. In order to be secure NFC, the NFC securty standards have been proposed n order to defne data exchange format, tag types, and securty protocols, e.g., a key agreement protocol [8, 9, 10]. In the process of key agreement, Certfcate uthorty (C) as the Trusted Thrd Party (TTP) s n charge of generatng the publc key of the correspondents. Recently, Eun et al. [5] proposed an authentcaton scheme for NFC communcatons to prevent replay and man-n-the-mddle attack by provdng mutual authentcaton based on a trusted servce manager. The scheme was based on asymmetrc cryptography and hash functons. y usng an asymmetrc cryptographc system, t was possble to address several securty threats such as an evl twn attack, hotspot or captve portal eavesdroppng, and even man-n-the-mddle attacks [15]. However, He et al. [7] found that the scheme of Eun et al. could not resst mpersonaton attack. s a counter measure to these sufferngs, He et al. presented a modfed authentcaton NFC protocol to amend aforementoned securty weaknesses. Unfortunately, ths study showed that He et al. s modfcaton was not secure aganst the man-n-themddle attack. s a result, a secure NFC mutual authentcaton scheme wth prvacy preservaton for the Internet of thngs was desgned n ths paper. The remander of the paper s arranged as follows. In Secton 2, a bref revew of He et al. s securty protocol. In Secton 3, man-n-the-mddle attack s developed to analyze Eun et al. s protocol. In Secton 4, the proposed NFC communcaton-based protocol. Securty and performance analyses results are gven n Sectons 5 and 6, respectvely. Secton 7 concludes ths paper.

2 Internatonal Journal of Network Securty, Vol.19, No.4, PP , July 2017 (DOI: /IJNS (4).17) Revew of He et al. s Scheme Ths part concsely revew the NFC mutual authentcaton scheme by He et al. n For ease of presentaton, Table I shows some ntutve abbrevatons and notatons. X T SM G KDF d X X SK E K(m) h( ), f( ) Sg K(m) Table 1: Notatons the dentty of the user X a trusted servce manager the base pont of the ellptc curve a key dervaton functon the prvate key of the user X the publc key of the user X, where X = d XG exclusve-or operaton symmetrc encrypton of usng the key K hash functons sgnature of m usng the key K Once recevng the user s request, the T SM generates n pseudonyms and delvers them to va a prvate channel. The T SM also stores the user s dentty and pseudonyms nto ts database. Next, the T SM computes P N = {, E d T SM (, ), T SM, S T SM } and S T SM = Sg d T SM (, E d T SM (, ), T SM ), where = q G s the publc key of, d = q + h( T SM, P N )d T SM s s prvate key, and S T SM s the T SM s sgnature on the th message. The users and execute the establshment of the sesson key n the followng manner: Step 1: computes = r G and sends the message {P N,, N } to, where r and N are the random numbers generated by, P N s a pseudonym selected by. Step 2: computes = r G and sends back the message {P N,, N } to, where r and N are the random numbers generated by and P N s a pseudonym selected by. Step 3: fter recevng the message, computes Z 1 = r, Z2 = d ( + h( T SM, P N ) T SM ), SK = KDF (N, N,,, Z 1, Z2 ) and MacT ag = f(sk,,,, 2 ). Subsequently, sends the message {MacT ag } to. Step 4: When recevng the message, computes Z 1 = r, Z2 = d ( + h( T SM, P N ) T SM ), SK = KDF (N, N,,, Z 1, Z2 ) and verfes f(sk,,,, ) = MacT ag. If t holds, computes MacT ag = f(sk,,,, ) and sets SK as the sesson key. Fnally, transmts the message {MacT ag } to. Step 5: Once recevng the message, computes: Z 1 = r = r r G = r r G = r, Z 2 = d ( + h( T SM, P N ) T SM ) = (q + h( T SM, P N )d T SM ) (q + h( T SM, P N )d T SM )G = (q + h( T SM, P N )d T SM ) (q + h( T SM, P N )d T SM )G = (q + h( T SM, P N )d T SM ) (q G + h( T SM, P N )d T SM G) = d ( + h( T SM, P N ) T SM ). computes SK and f(sk,,,, ), then, checks the correctness of the value MacT ag. If t does not hold, stops the sesson; Otherwse, agrees on the sesson key SK wth. 3 Weaknesses of He et al. s Scheme He et al. declared that ther mprovements could resst the man-n-the-mddle-attack due to ther proposed scheme could provde the mutual authentcaton between and. ctually, a notable queston s that and are unable to confrm the real dentty of the other entty because of the absence of T SM durng the executon of ther scheme, thus gvng a perfect opportunty for an adversary to launch the man-n-the-mddle attack. The man-n-the-mddle attack s a form of actve eavesdroppng n whch makes ndependent connectons wth the vctms and relays messages between them, makng them beleve that they are talkng drectly to each other over a prvate connecton, whle n fact the entre conversaton s controlled by. Let s descrbe the detals of the attack as follows. Step 1: When the message M 1 = {, P N, N } s sent from to, ntercepts the message and computes = r1 G, and sends the forged message M 1 = {, P N, N 1} to, where r1 and N 1 are the random numbers of. Step 2: When recevng the message, computes = r G and sends the message M 2 = {, P N, N } to. Step 3: ntercepts the message M 2 and computes = r2 G and sends the forged message M 2 = {, P N, N 2} to, where r2 and N 2 are the random numbers of. Step 4: fter recevng the message, computes Z 2 = d1 ( + h( T SM, P N ) T SM ), Z 1 = r, and the sesson key SK = KDF (N, N 2,,, Z 1, Z2 ) and MacT ag =

3 Internatonal Journal of Network Securty, Vol.19, No.4, PP , July 2017 (DOI: /IJNS (4).17) 633 f(sk,,,, ). Next, sends the message M 3 = {MacT ag } to. Step 5: eavesdrops ths message and computes Z 2 = d1 ( + h( T SM, P N ) T SM ), Z 1 = r 1, and the sesson key SK = KDF (N, N 1,,, Z 1, Z2 ) and MacT ag = f(sk,,,, ). fter that, sends the forged message M 3 = {MacT ag } to. Step 6: When recevng the message M 3, computes Z 1 = r, Z2 = d1 ( +h( T SM, P N ) T SM ) and SK = KDF (N, N 1,,, Z 1, Z2 ). verfes whether f(sk,,,, ) = MacT ag and t s obvous that the equaton s true, because: Z 1 = r = r r 1 G = r 1 = Z 1, Z 2 = d 1 ( + h( T SM, P N ) T SM ) = (q + h( T SM, P N )d T SM ) (q G + h( T SM, P N )d T SM )G) = (q + h( T SM, P N )d T SM ) (q + h( T SM, P N )d T SM )G = d 1 ( + h( T SM, P N ) T SM ) = Z 2. computes MacT ag = f(sk,,,, ) and sends the message M 4 = {MacT ag } to. Step 7: receves the message M 4 from to, computes Z 2 = d ( + h( T SM, P N ) T SM ), Z 1 = r 2 and the sesson key SK = KDF (N, N 2,,, Z 1, Z2 ) and MacT ag = f(sk,,,, ). fter that, sends the forged message M 4 = {MacT ag } to. Step 8: When recevng the message, checks the valdness of MacT ag and t s sure that the equaton wll be equal to f(sk,,,, ). Therefore, agrees on the sesson key SK as the common key amng at encryptng the communcaton messages. In ths way, s successfully authentcated by and, respectvely. That s, shares a sesson key SK = KDF (N, N 2,,, Z 1, Z2 ) wth, at the same tme, he shares a sesson key SK = KDF (N, N 1,,, Z 1, Z2 ) wth. However, both of and do not know that they are communcatng wth an attacker at all. They beleve they successfully have fnshed the handshake agreement wth each other. 4 The Proposed Scheme Ths secton wll present the proposed scheme as Fgure 1. fter recevng the user s request for pseudonyms, the T SM generates n pseudonyms and sends them to va a secret channel. The T SM also stores the user s dentty and pseudonyms nto ts database. There are four partes n a pseudonym P N : the s publc key, s prvate key, the T SM s dentty and the T SM s sgnature. P N = {, Enc({, }, d T SM ), T SM, S T SM }, S T SM = Sg(d T SM,, Enc(, d T SM ), T SM ), d = d T SM + h(, r S )h(, P N ). s the same method, the user could get ts pseudonyms and correspondng prvate key d = d T SM + h(, r S )h(, P N ) and publc key d G. 4.1 Establshment of the Sesson Key When and attempts to establsh the handshake, they perform as follows: Step 1: computes = r G, = r d G, where r s a nonce generated by. Then, sends {, } to. Step 2: When recevng the message, computes (d ) 1 =, = r G, and = r d G, where d G s the publc key of. Fnally, returns {, } to. Step 3: Once recevng the message, computes (d ) 1 =, Z = r,z = d ( T SM + h(, P N ) ), SK = KDF (,, Z, Z ) and MacT ag = f(,, SK, ). t last, sends back the message {MacT ag } to. Step 4: When recevng the messages, computes Z = r,z = d ( T SM + h(, P N ) ), SK = KDF (,, Z, Z ) and verfes whether f(,, SK, ) = MacT ag. If t s equal, sets SK as the sesson key and computes MacT ag = f(,, SK, ). fter that, delvers back the message {MacT ag } to. Step 5: When recevng the message, checks whether f(,, SK, ) = MacT ag. If t holds, successfully negotates the sesson key SK wth. 5 Securty nalyss Ths secton analyze the securty of the proposed scheme, whch ncludes achevng users anonymty, mutual authentcaton, perfect forward sesson key securty, and wthstandng relay attack, mpersonaton attack. The detals descrbe below. 5.1 Users nonymty In the proposed scheme, the users denttes and are respectvely mpled n MacT ag () =

4 Internatonal Journal of Network Securty, Vol.19, No.4, PP , July 2017 (DOI: /IJNS (4).17) 634 Key agreement (1)Select r, PN (5)( d Z Z ) 1 r SK KDF( MacTag, d ( (9) f( TSM f(, r G, r d G., h(,, SK,, Z,, PN, Z ) ),, SK, ). ) MacTag ),. (2),, PN (4),, PN (6)MacTag (8)MacTag (7) Z Z (3)Select f( ( d d ), 1 r r d r G, ( SK KDF( MacTag r TSM, f( G.,, SK, h(,, Z ) MacTag,, PN, Z ) ),, SK, ). ), Fgure 1: Mutual authentcaton and key agreement of our scheme f(,, SK, () ), where SK s the sesson key, () = r ()d () () G, r () and d () () are the random numbers and the prvate keys. Therefore, s not able to be derved from Z wthout knowng the users prvate key, owng to the one-way property of the hash functon. Therefore, the proposed scheme preserves dentty prvacy. 5.2 Mutual uthentcaton In the proposed scheme, authentcates by checkng = (d ) 1 and MacT ag = f(,, SK, ), where SK = KDF (,, r, d d G). ddtonally, authentcates by verfyng whether = (d ) 1 and MacT ag = f(,, SK, ), where SK = KDF (,, r, d d G). 5.3 Perfect Forward Securty of the Sesson Key Gven,,, and d d, the sesson key SK = KDF (,, r, d d G) cannot be calculated wthout the knowledge of r and r, owng to the Dffe-Hellman problem. ddtonally, gven MacT ag = f(,, SK, ) and MacT ag = f(,, SK, ). SK cannot be determned due to the one-way property of the hash functon and no knowledge of users denttes. Therefore, the sesson key cannot be derved from the revealed messages n the proposed scheme. 5.4 Known Sesson Key Securty In the proposed scheme, the sesson key s computed as SK = KDF (,, r r G, d d G), whch does not gve any useful nformaton for computng the next sesson keys because r and r are randomly generated n dfferent runs and are ndependent of each other among scheme executons. Therefore, the proposed scheme has the property of known-key securty. 5.5 Resstance to relay attack Relay ttack s also popularly known as man n the mddle attack n network securty. n attacker acts as a mddleman between two NFC devces to ntercept the data

5 Internatonal Journal of Network Securty, Vol.19, No.4, PP , July 2017 (DOI: /IJNS (4).17) 635 Table 2: Computatonal cost comparson Eun et al. [5] He et al. [7] The Proposal 3T ecm + 1T eca + 2T h + 2T mm + 1T kdf 4T ecm + 1T eca + 2T h + 1T kdf 4T ecm + 1T m + 2T h + 1T kdf T ecm + 1T eca + 2T h + 2T mm + 1T kdf 4T ecm + 1T eca + 3T h + 1T kdf 4T ecm + 1T m + 2T h + 1T kdf Total 6T ecm + 2T eca + 4T h + 4T mm + 2T kdf 8T ecm + 2T eca + 5T h + 2T kdf 8T ecm + 2T m + 4T h + 2T kdf wthout the knowledge of the two NFC devces. The attacker ether reads and records or manpulates the data before relayng t to the recevng devce [18]. If an adversary ntends to mpersonate as a legal user to cheat and, he cannot accomplsh hs well as he wshed. ecause and each hold the data whch s only verfed by the other sde, any forgery data wll be detected by the recever. Specfcally, sends Z = d d G whch s concealed n the sesson key and = r d G to, where d G s a secret value of. fter verfyng the correctness of the two values, udges whether the sender s the real. Smlarly, can also authentcate the valdty of by checkng Z = d d G and = r d G. 5.6 Resstance to Impersonaton ttack In the establshment of the sesson key, transmts = r d G to, where d s the secret key of, only knows d. Others are mpossble to know the value of d G and cannot compute Z. Wthout the value of Z, an adversary cannot pass the authentcaton of. Meanwhle, also sends back the value d G whch s hdden n = r d G, where d G s the secret nformaton only known by of and, and only knows d. That s, any unauthorzed user cannot compute the correct Z and hence cannot be verfed by wthout the value of d G. In ths way, the proposed scheme can wthstand the mpersonaton attack. 5.7 No Key Control In the proposed scheme, both and ontly compute the sesson key SK = KDF (,, r r G, d d G) and therefore, fals to predetermne a sesson key snce SK contans r and d, where r and d are the secret values of and ndependent among scheme executons. In other word, or cannot determne a sesson key alone and hence, the proposed scheme provdes the no key control property. 5.8 Verfcaton Usng Scyther Tool Scyther s a tool for the automatc verfcaton of securty protocols. In ths part, we use Scyther-w32-v1.1.3 [4] to analyze the proposed scheme. Fgure 1 shows a summary of the clams n the proposed scheme. The verfcaton result (Fguer 2) shows our scheme s correct. 6 Performance Comparsons Ths secton wll evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme, and compare t wth other related schemes [5, 7] for performance and functonalty aspects. In order to facltate the analyss of the performance, some notatons was defned as below: T ecm : the tme consumpton for an ellptc curve pont multplcaton operaton; T h : the tme consumpton for a hash functon operaton; T eca : the tme consumpton for an ellptc curve pont addton operaton; T kdf : the tme consumpton for a key dervaton functon operaton; T mm : the tme consumpton for a modular multplcaton operaton; T m : The tme consumpton for a modular nverson operaton. Generally, T mm s far greater than T ecm, T eca and T h. ccordng to [1], under the envronment of 2.2 GHz CPU and 2.0G RM, T ecm and T eca are and ms, T m, T mm and T h are 5.565, and 2.3 µs, respectvely. Table 2 demonstrates that the proposed scheme has less computatonal effcency as compared wth He et al. [7] but a slghter hgher than Eun et al. [5] schemes, where the computatonal cost for executng the scheme once s only half of the tme needed for other related scheme due to the proposed scheme needs more ellptc curve pont multplcaton computaton than Eun et al. s scheme, and employ modular nverson computaton nstead of ellptc curve pont addton computaton. Table 3 shows the functonalty analyss of the proposed scheme wth Eun et al. s [5] and He et al. s [7] schemes. It s observed that the proposed scheme outperforms as compared to He et al. s and Eun et al. s schemes as the proposed scheme supports extra features lsted n

6 Internatonal Journal of Network Securty, Vol.19, No.4, PP , July 2017 (DOI: /IJNS (4).17) 636 hashfuncton H;hashfuncton KDF; const dd: Functon;const Mul: Functon; usertype Strng;const a,b: Strng; protocol lu(,) { role { fresh Ra, G, PNa, PNb, tsm: Nonce; var a1, a2, b1, b2, Za1, Za2: Nonce; var SK, MacTaga, MacTagb: Nonce; match(a1,mul(ra, G));match(a2,Mul(Ra,pk())); send_!1(,,a1,a2,pna);recv_!2(,,b1,b2,pnb); match(za1,mul(ra,b1));match(za2,{dd(mul(h(b,pnb),a1),tsm)}sk()); match(sk,kdf(a, b, Za1, Za2)); match(mactaga,h(a, b, SK, b1));send_!3(,,mactaga); recv_!4(,,mactagb);clam_1(,secret,mactaga);clam_2(,secret,a1); clam_3(,secret,a2);clam_4(,secret,b1); clam_5(,secret,b1);clam_6(,lve); clam_7(,weakagree);clam_8(,nagree); clam_9(,nsynch);} role { fresh Rb, G, PNa, PNb, tsm: Nonce; var a1, a2, b1, b2, Zb1, Zb2: Nonce; var SK, MacTaga, MacTagb: Nonce; recv_!1(,,a1,a2,pna);match(b1,mul(rb, G)); match(b2,mul(rb,pk()));send_!2(,,b1,b2,pnb); recv_!3(,,mactaga);match(zb1,mul(rb,a1)); match(zb2,{dd(mul(h(a,pnb),b1),tsm)}sk()); match(sk,kdf(a, b, Zb1, Zb2)); match(mactagb,h(a, b, SK, a1)); send_!4(,,mactagb);clam_1(,secret,mactagb); clam_2(,secret,a1);clam_3(,secret,a2); clam_4(,secret,b1);clam_5(,secret,b1); clam_6(,lve);clam_7(,weakagree); clam_8(,nagree);clam_9(,nsynch);}} Fgure 2: The scheme descrpton Table 3: Comparson of functonalty features Eun et al. [5] He et al. [7] The Proposal Mutual authentcaton Yes Yes Yes User anonymty Yes Yes Yes No key control Yes Yes Yes Known sesson key securty Yes Yes Yes Impersonaton attack No Yes Yes Perfect forward securty of the sesson key - - Yes Relay attack - No Yes

7 Internatonal Journal of Network Securty, Vol.19, No.4, PP , July 2017 (DOI: /IJNS (4).17) 637 Fgure 3: Test result. ths table and s also more secure than He et al. s scheme. s a result, the proposed scheme s much sutable for practcal applcatons as compared to the recently proposed He et al. s scheme. 7 Concluson Ths paper have nvestgated the NFC communcatonsbased mutual authentcaton scheme presented by He et al.. y cryptanalyzng studes, a fatal securty weakness n He et al. s scheme have been found. In order to remedy ths flaw, an enhancement based on He et al. s scheme have been presented. ased on the securty analyss, the proposed scheme has been demonstrated to be satsfed both the verfablty and prvacy of attrbutes. ccordng to the performance comparson results, the effcency and feasblty of the proposed scheme under dfferent prvacy requrements for the IOT have been shown. References [1] H. rshad, and M. Nkooghadam, n effcent and secure authentcaton and key agreement scheme for ses-

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