EconS Competitive Markets Part 2
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1 EconS Cometitive Markets Part 2 Eric Dunaway Washington State University eric.dunaway@wsu.edu October 13, 2015 Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
2 Introduction Today, we are going to nish u our study of cometitive markets by seeing what haens in the long run. Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
3 Long Run Perfect Cometition Again, the big di erence between the short run and the long run is that nothing is xed in the long run. Firms are able to adjust their xed inuts and reotimize to where they will reach the highest level of economic ro t. Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
4 Long Run Perfect Cometition One of the major focuses of long run cometition is the assumtion of free entry and exit. Remember that this says that rms face no barriers in their decision to enter into or exit a market. Firms will want to enter into a market if there are ro ts to be had. Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
5 Long Run Perfect Cometition C/q MC AC AVC q * q Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
6 Long Run Perfect Cometition C/q Profit MC AC AVC q * q Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
7 Long Run Perfect Cometition In this market, there exist ositive economic ro ts. This will induce the entry of new rms. Now, since there are a large number of rms already in the market, each individual rm cannot actually imact the market rice. A lot of rms can, however. Let s look at this short run equilibrium next to the market suly and demand curves. Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
8 Long Run Perfect Cometition C/q MC AC AVC D S q * q Q * Q Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
9 Long Run Perfect Cometition Note that we are using a market suly curve. It is the aggregated suly curve for all of the rms. Q = nq where n is the number of rms in the market. We are also using a market demand curve. As new rms enter the market to take advantage of the ositive economic ro ts, the market suly curve shifts to the right. Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
10 Long Run Perfect Cometition C/q MC AC AVC D S q * q Q * Q Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
11 Long Run Perfect Cometition C/q MC AC AVC D S q * q Q * Q Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
12 Long Run Perfect Cometition As we can see, rms will continue to enter the market until there are no more economic ro ts to be had. This entails the rice being equal to the minimum value of the average cost curve. An interesting result is that each individual rm lowers its outut, but the market outut actually increases due to the increased number of rms. What about when ro ts are negative (losses)? In this case, the suly curve will shift to the left as rms exit the market until the rice gets back u to the minimum of the average cost curve. Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
13 Long Run Perfect Cometition C/q MC AC AVC D S q * q Q * Q Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
14 Long Run Perfect Cometition C/q MC AC AVC D S q * q Q * Q Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
15 Long Run Perfect Cometition Just like before when ro ts are ositive, the rice adjusts through rms exiting the market until rice once again reaches the minimum of the average cost curve. The individual outut of each rm increases while the total market outut decreases. This bring us to a central result of long run erfect cometition. In long run equilibrium, the rice is equal the the minimum of the average cost curve. In long run equilibrium, economic ro ts equals zero. Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
16 Long Run Perfect Cometition How would we nd the minimum of the average cost curve? Well, we could use calculus, but there s an easier way. Remember that the marginal cost curve intersects the average cost curve at its minimum. We could set the two curves equal to one another and solve for quantity. Note: Even the non-calculus involved in this gets retty comlicated. I won t ask you to do this on an exam. It would be a great intuition question, though. Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
17 Examles Let s look at two more examles before we move on. What haens when market demand increases (shifts right)? Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
18 Examles C/q MC AC AVC D S q * q Q * Q Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
19 Examles C/q MC AC AVC D S q * q Q * Q Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
20 Examles In the short run, the increase in demand will cause both the market rice and the market quantity to increase. Individual rms will resond to the higher rices by increasing their outut. They will also enjoy some nice economic ro ts. Let s look at the long run. Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
21 Examles C/q MC AC AVC D S q * q Q * Q Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
22 Examles In the long run, since there are economic ro ts, more rms enter the market. This is modelled by the market suly curve shifting to the right. Firms will enter until the rice is back to its original level. Firms return to their original outut levels, but the market quantity is higher due to the resence of more rms. Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
23 Examles Let s look at one more examle. What haens when the costs change? This could be from an outside shock causing wages to increase or decrease. We need to draw new average cost, average variable cost, and marginal cost curves. Let s look at a cost increase. Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
24 Examles C/q MC AC AVC D S q * q Q * Q Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
25 Examles C/q MC AC AVC D S q * q Q * Q Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
26 Examles In this case, with the new costs, the equilibrium rice is now below the average cost curve, but above the average variable cost curve. This imlies that the rm will still oerate, but take short term losses. Since there are negative ro ts, rms will exit the market, shifting the suly curve to the left. Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
27 Examles C/q MC AC AVC D S q * q Q * Q Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
28 Examles Firms will exit until the rice rises to the new bottom of the average cost curve. The market quantity will decrease, while the individual quantities will increase (this doesn t show u on my gure because the di erence is so small). A similar analysis will occur when costs decrease. Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
29 Summary These are the key oints to take away from our study of cometitive markets. Marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Price equals marginal cost in erfect cometition. Economic ro ts or losses can only exist in the short run in erfect cometition. Firms will enter or leave the market when there exist ro ts or losses, resectively, shifting the market suly curve. Long run economic ro ts equal zero in erfect cometition. Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
30 Preview of Friday Our last core theory toic is General Equilibrium. It s time to make rices endogenous too, giving us an entire market! Perlo, Chater 10 Homework due. Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
31 Assignment 4-5 (1 of 1) Handout on the website. Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS Lecture 20 October 13, / 31
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