FIDES: Lightweight Authentication Cipher with Side-Channel Resistance for Constrained Hardware
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1 FIDES: Lightweight Authentication Cipher with Side-Channel Resistance for Constrained Hardware Begül Bilgin, Andrey Bogdanov, Miroslav Knežević, Florian Mendel, and Qingju Wang DIAC 2013, Chicago 1
2 Side Channel Resistance 2
3 Side Channel Resistance The Game... 2
4 Side Channel Resistance The Game... Mathematically secure crypto algorithms 2
5 Side Channel Resistance The Game... Mathematically secure crypto algorithms AES, RSA, Keccak, OCB, 2
6 Side Channel Resistance The Game... Mathematically secure crypto algorithms AES, RSA, Keccak, OCB, Weak implementation 2
7 Side Channel Resistance The Game... Mathematically secure crypto algorithms AES, RSA, Keccak, OCB, Weak implementation 2
8 Side Channel Resistance The Game... Mathematically secure crypto algorithms AES, RSA, Keccak, OCB, Weak implementation Dependency between power consumption and intermediate value (depends on the key) 2
9 Side Channel Resistance 3
10 Side Channel Resistance x Change the key frequently 3
11 Side Channel Resistance x Change the key frequently x Equalize power consumption 3
12 Side Channel Resistance x Change the key frequently x Equalize power consumption Randomize power consumption 3
13 Side Channel Resistance x Change the key frequently x Equalize power consumption Randomize power consumption - Boolean masking 3
14 Side Channel Resistance x Change the key frequently inp^m0 L out^m1 x Equalize power consumption m0 L m1 Randomize power consumption - Boolean masking 3
15 Side Channel Resistance x Change the key frequently x Equalize power consumption Randomize power consumption - Boolean masking 3
16 Side Channel Resistance x Change the key frequently inp^m0 S out^m1 x Equalize power consumption m0 S m1 Randomize power consumption - Boolean masking 3
17 Side Channel Resistance x Change the key frequently inp^m0 S out^m1 x Equalize power consumption m0 S m1 Randomize power consumption - Boolean masking - Multiplicative masking 3
18 Side Channel Resistance x Change the key frequently x Equalize power consumption Randomize power consumption - Boolean masking - Multiplicative masking 3
19 Side Channel Resistance x Change the key frequently x Equalize power consumption Randomize power consumption - Boolean masking - Multiplicative masking - Secret sharing e.g. Threshold Implementations [Nikova 11] 3
20 Side Channel Resistance x Change the key frequently inp^m0^m1 S out^m2^m3 x Equalize power consumption m0 S m2 Randomize power consumption - Boolean masking - Multiplicative masking m1 S m3 - Secret sharing e.g. Threshold Implementations [Nikova 11] 3
21 Side Channel Resistance 4
22 Side Channel Resistance Have the design 4
23 Side Channel Resistance Need efficient impl. Have the design 4
24 Side Channel Resistance Need efficient impl. Have the design Need secure impl. 4
25 Side Channel Resistance Need efficient impl. Have the design Need secure impl. 1 st Order Boolean Mask Multipl. Mask TI 2 nd Order SW?? Still efficient?? HW 4
26 Side Channel Resistance Need efficient impl. Have the design Need secure impl. 1 st Order Boolean Mask Multipl. Mask TI 2 nd Order SW Still efficient HW 5
27 Design - Structure a A 1 A 2 A v C 1 M 1 C u M u K N 16R R T K 0 6
28 Design - Structure a A 1 A 2 A v C 1 M 1 C u M u K N 16R R T K 0 - Similar to duplex sponge 6
29 Design - Structure a A 1 A 2 A v C 1 M 1 C u M u K N 16R R T K 0 - Similar to duplex sponge - Rounds are not keyed 6
30 Design - Structure a A 1 A 2 A v C 1 M 1 C u M u K N 16R R T K 0 - Similar to duplex sponge - Rounds are not keyed Online 6
31 Design - Structure a A 1 A 2 A v C 1 M 1 C u M u K N 16R R T K 0 - Similar to duplex sponge - Rounds are not keyed Online Single pass 6
32 Design - Structure a A 1 A 2 A v C 1 M 1 C u M u K N 16R R T K 0 - Similar to duplex sponge - Rounds are not keyed Online Single pass b k/n/t r FIDES FIDES
33 Design - Structure a A 1 A 2 A v C 1 M 1 C u M u K N 16R R T K 0 - Similar to duplex sponge - Rounds are not keyed Online Single pass b k/n/t r FIDES FIDES
34 Design - Structure a A 1 A 2 A v C 1 M 1 C u M u K N 16R R T K 0 - Similar to duplex sponge - Rounds are not keyed Online Single pass b k/n/t r FIDES FIDES
35 Design - Structure a A 1 A 2 A v C 1 M 1 C u M u K N 16R R T K 0 - Similar to duplex sponge - Rounds are not keyed Online Single pass b k/n/t r FIDES FIDES
36 Design - Structure State SubBytes ShiftRows MixColumns ConstantAddition 10
37 Design - Structure State SubBytes ShiftRows MixColumns ConstantAddition 11
38 Design - Structure State SubBytes ShiftRows MixColumns ConstantAddition 12
39 Design - Structure State SubBytes ShiftRows MixColumns ConstantAddition Almost MDS branch number is 4 13
40 Design - Structure State SubBytes ShiftRows MixColumns ConstantAddition 14
41 Design - S-boxes FIDES-80: 5-bit Almost Bent (AB) - - optimal resistance against differential & linear cryptanalysis degree 2 (two), 3(one), 4(one) FIDES-96: 6-bit Almost Perfect Nonlinear (APN) - optimal resistance against differential cryptanalysis - degree 4 15
42 Design - S-boxes FIDES-80: 5-bit Almost Bent (AB) - - optimal resistance against differential & linear cryptanalysis degree 2 (two), 3(one), 4(one) FIDES-96: 6-bit Almost Perfect Nonlinear (APN) - optimal resistance against differential cryptanalysis - degree 4 ++Low latency++ 15
43 Design - S-boxes FIDES-80: 5-bit Almost Bent (AB) - - optimal resistance against differential & linear cryptanalysis degree 2 (two), 3(one), 4(one) FIDES-96: 6-bit Almost Perfect Nonlinear (APN) - optimal resistance against differential cryptanalysis - degree 4 ++Low latency++ 15
44 Design - S-boxes FIDES-80: 5-bit Almost Bent (AB) - - optimal resistance against differential & linear cryptanalysis degree 2 (two), 3(one), 4(one) FIDES-96: 6-bit Almost Perfect Nonlinear (APN) - optimal resistance against differential cryptanalysis - degree 4 ++Low latency++ 16
45 Design - S-boxes 17
46 Design - S-boxes Affine Equivalent to AB permutation with degree 2 17
47 Design - S-boxes Affine Equivalent to AB permutation with degree 2 Unshared S-box Shared S-box # of S-boxes # of GE (UMC 180nm)
48 Design - S-boxes Affine Equivalent to AB permutation with degree 2 Unshared S-box Shared S-box # of S-boxes # of GE (UMC 180nm)
49 Design - S-boxes Affine Equivalent to AB permutation with degree 2 Unshared S-box Shared S-box # of S-boxes # of GE (UMC 180nm) Similar for APN 18
50 Security Analysis # # Active S-box rnd. any diff. zero diff
51 Security Analysis # # Active S-box rnd. any diff. zero diff Differential & Linear Cryptanalysis 19
52 Security Analysis # # Active S-box rnd. any diff. zero diff Differential & Linear Cryptanalysis 16 rounds: 2-4x48x2 =
53 Security Analysis # # Active S-box rnd. any diff. zero diff Differential & Linear Cryptanalysis 16 rounds: 2-4x48x2 = Collision Trails 19
54 Security Analysis # # Active S-box rnd. any diff. zero diff Differential & Linear Cryptanalysis 16 rounds: 2-4x48x2 = Collision Trails 16 rounds: 2-4x(48+48) =
55 Security Analysis # # Active S-box rnd. any diff. zero diff Differential & Linear Cryptanalysis 16 rounds: 2-4x48x2 = Collision Trails 16 rounds: 2-4x(48+48) = Impossible Differential 19
56 Security Analysis # # Active S-box rnd. any diff. zero diff Differential & Linear Cryptanalysis 16 rounds: 2-4x48x2 = Collision Trails 16 rounds: 2-4x(48+48) = Impossible Differential 9 rounds 19
57 Implementation - FIDES-S - FIDES-4S - FIDES-R - FIDES-T 20
58 Implementation - FIDES-S - FIDES-4S - FIDES-R - FIDES-T 21
59 Implementation - FIDES-S - FIDES-4S - FIDES-R - FIDES-T 21
60 Implementation - FIDES-S - FIDES-4S - FIDES-R - FIDES-T 21
61 Implementation - FIDES-S - FIDES-4S - FIDES-R - FIDES-T 21
62 Implementation - FIDES-S - FIDES-4S - FIDES-R - FIDES-T 21
63 Implementation - FIDES-S - FIDES-4S - FIDES-R - FIDES-T 22
64 Implementation - FIDES-S - FIDES-4S - FIDES-R - FIDES-T 23
65 Implementation - FIDES-S - FIDES-4S - FIDES-R - FIDES-T 23
66 Implementation - FIDES-S - FIDES-4S - FIDES-R - FIDES-T 23
67 Implementation - FIDES-S - FIDES-4S - FIDES-R - FIDES-T 23
68 Implementation - FIDES-S - FIDES-4S - FIDES-R - FIDES-T 23
69 Implementation - FIDES-S - FIDES-4S - FIDES-R - FIDES-T 24
70 Performance FIDES on Different Technologies Area in GE NXP 90nm NANGATE 45nm UMC 130nm FIDES-80-S FIDES-80-4S FIDES-80-R FIDES-80-T FIDES-96-S FIDES-96-4S FIDES-96-R FIDES-96-T 25
71 Performance FIDES-80 FIDES-96 ALE AES-CCM ASC-1 A ASC-1 B c-quark KECCAK-200-MD Hummingbird2 Throughput (kb/s) Area (GE) 26
72 Conclusion FIDES 27
73 Conclusion Lightweight AE - - less than 1500GE online, single-pass FIDES 27
74 Conclusion Lightweight AE - - less than 1500GE online, single-pass with Side Channel Resistance - TI less than 5000 GE FIDES 27
75 Conclusion Lightweight AE - - less than 1500GE online, single-pass with Side Channel Resistance - TI less than 5000 GE and 80-bit or 90-bit security FIDES - - AB and APN permutations almost MDS 27
76 THANK YOU! 28
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