Introduction to Game Theory Preliminary Reading List Jörgen W. Weibull Stockholm School of Economics and Ecole Polytechnique.

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1 Introduction to Game Theory Preliminary Reading List Jörgen W. Weibull Stockholm School of Economics and Ecole Polytechnique January 27, 2010 References [1] Aumann R. (1990): Nash equilibria are not self-enforcing, in J. Gabszewicz, J.-F.RichardandL.Wolsey,Economic Decision Making: Games, Econometrics, and Optimization. Elsevier, The Netherlands. [2] Aumann R. and A. Brandenburger (1995): Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium, Econometrica 63, [3] Austen-Smith D. and J. Banks (1996): Information aggregation, rationality, and the Condorcet jury theorem, American Political Science Review 90, [4] Balkenborg D., J. Hofbauer and C. Kuzmics (2009): Refined best-response correspondence and dynamics, mimeo., Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. [5] Basu K. and J. Weibull (1991): Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior, Economics Letters 36, [6] Benaïm M. and J. Weibull (2003): Deterministic approximation of stochastic evolution in games, Econometrica 71, [7] Benoit J.-P. and V. Krishna (1993): Renegotiation in finitely repeated games, Econometrica 61, [8] Bernheim D. (1984): Rationalizable strategic behavior, Econometrica 52, [9] Binmore K., J. McCarthy, G. Ponti, L. Samuelson and A. Shaked (2002): A backward induction experiment, Journal of Economic Theory 104, [10] Brown G. and J. von Neumann (1950): Solutions of games by differential equations, Annals of Mathematical Studies 24,

2 Introduction to Game Theory Preliminary Reading List 2 [11] Charness G. and M. Rabin (2002): Understanding social preferences with simple tests, Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, [12] Cho I.-K. and D. Kreps (1987): Signaling games and stable equilibria, Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, [13] van Damme E. (1987): Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, Springer Verlag, Berlin (2nd ed. 1991). [14] Dal Bó P. (2005): Cooperation under the shadow of the future: Experimental evidence from infinitely repeated games, American Economic Review 95, [15] Dawkins R. (1976): The Selfish Gene, Oxford University Press, Oxford. [16] Demichelis S. and K. Ritzberger (2003): From evolutionary to strategic stability, Journal of Economic Theory 113, [17] Demichelis S. and J. Weibull (2008): Language, meaning and games; a model of communication, coordination and evolution, American Economic Review 98, [18] Falk A., E. Fehr and U. Fischbacher (2003): On the nature of fair behavior, Economic Inquiry 41, [19] Fehr E. and K. Schmidt (1999): A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, [20] Fehr E. and S. Gächter (2000): Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments, American Economic Review 90, [21] Fehr E. and S. Gächter (2003): Altruistic punishment in humans, Nature 415, [22] Fort M. (1950): Essential and non-essential fixed points, American Journal of Mathematics 72, [23] Friedman M. (1953): Essays in Positive Economics. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. [24] Fudenberg D. and E. Maskin (1990): Evolution and cooperation in noisy repeated games, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 80,

3 Introduction to Game Theory Preliminary Reading List 3 [25] Fudenberg D. and J. Tirole (1991): Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, USA. [26] Goeree J. and C. Holt (2001): Ten little treasures of game theory and ten intuitive contradictions, American Economic Review 91, [27] Harsanyi J. and R. Selten (1988): A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. MIT Press, Cambridge, USA. [28] Hart S. (2002): Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction, Games and Economic Behavior 41, [29] Hart S. and A. Mas-Colell (2003): Uncoupled dynamics do not lead to Nash equilibrium, American Economic Review [30] Hauk E. and S. Hurkens (2002): On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability, Journal of Economic Theory 106, [31] Heifetz A., C. Shannon and Y. Spiegel (2007): What to maximize if you must, Journal of Economic Theory 133, [32] Hillas J. (1990): On the definition of strategic stability of equilibria, Econometrica 58, [33] Hofbauer J. and K. Sigmund (1988): The Theory of Evolution and Dynamical Systems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. [34] Hofbauer J. and J. Weibull (1996): Evolutionary selection against dominated strategies, Journal of Economic Theory 71, [35] Hurkens S. (1995): Learning by forgetful players, Games and Economic Behavior 11, [36] Jiang J.-H. (1963a): Essential equilibrium points of n-person non-cooperative games, Science Sinica 12, [37] Jiang J.-H. (1963b): Essential components of the set of fixed points in the multivalued mappings and its appliacation to the theory of games, Science Sinica 12, [38] Josephson J. and A. Matros (2003): Stochastic imitation in finite games, Games and Economic Behavior 49, [39] Josephson J. (2008): Stochastic better-reply dynamics in finite games, Economic Theory 35,

4 Introduction to Game Theory Preliminary Reading List 4 [40] Kohlberg E. and J.-F. Mertens (1986): On the strategic stability of equilibria, Econometrica 54, [41] Kreps D. and R. Wilson (1982): Sequential equilibria, Econometrica 50, [42] Laibson D. (1997): Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, [43] Levine D. (1998): Modelling altruism and spitefulness in experiments, Review of Economic Dynamics 1, [44] Maynard Smith J. and G.R. Price (1973): The logic of animal conflict, Nature 246, [45] Maynard Smith J. (1982): Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK. [46] McKelvey R. and T. Palfrey (1992): An experimental study of the centipede game, Econometrica 60, [47] Myerson R.B. (1978): Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept, International Journal of Game Theory 7, [48] Nagel R. (1995): Unravelling in guessing games: An experimental study, American Economic Review 85, [49] Nash J. (1950a): Non-cooperative games, Ph D thesis, Department of Mathematics, Princeton University. [50] Nash J. (1950b): Equilibrium points in n-person games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (USA) 36, [51] Nash J. (1950c): The bargaining problem, Econometrica 18, [52] Nash J. (1951), Non-cooperative games, Annals of Mathematics 54, [53] Norde H., J. Potters, H. Reijnierse and D. Vermeulen (1996): Equilibrium selection and consistency, Games and Economic Behavior 12, [54] Osborne M. and A. Rubinstein (1994): A Course in Game Theory, MITPress. [55] Pearce D. (1984): Rationalizable strategic behavior, Econometrica 52,

5 Introduction to Game Theory Preliminary Reading List 5 [56] Phelps E. and R. Pollak (1968): On second-best national savings and gameequilibrium growth, Review of Economic Studies 35, [57] Ritzberger K. and J. Weibull (1995): Evolutionary selection in normal-form games, Econometrica 63, [58] Ritzberger K. (2002): Foundations of Non-Cooperative Game Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford. [59] Robson A. (1990): Efficiency in evolutionary games: Darwin, Nash and the secret handshake, Journal of Theoretical Biology 144, [60] Robson A. (2001a): The biological basis of economic behavior, Journal of Economic Literature 29, [61] Robson A. (2001b): Why would nature give individuals utility functions?, Journal of Political Economy 109, [62] Rosenthal R. (1981): Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox, Journal of Economic Theory 25, [63] Sandholm W. (2007): Evolutionary game theory, in Encyclopedia of Complexity and System Science. [64] Sandholm W. (2008): Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics. Forthcoming, MIT Press, Cambridge USA. [65] Savage L. (1954): The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley, New York. [66] Selten R. (1975): Re-examination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games, International Journal of Game Theory 4, [67] Selten R. (1978): The chain-store paradox, Theory and Decision 9, [68] Selten R. (1980): A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal conflicts, Journal of Theoretical Biology 84, [69] Selten R. (1991): Evolution, learning, and economic behavior, Games and Economic Behavior 3, [70] Sethi R. and E. Somanathan (2001): Preference evolution and reciprocity, Journal of Economic Theory 97,

6 Introduction to Game Theory Preliminary Reading List 6 [71] Sobel J. (2005): Interdependent preferences and reciprocity, Journal of Economic Literature 43, [72] Stahl D. (1993): Evolution of smart n players, Games and Economic Behavior 5, [73] Swinkels J. (1992a): Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants, Journal of Economic Theory 57, [74] Swinkels J. (1992b): Evolution and Strategic Stability: from Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens, Journal of Economic Theory 57, [75] Taylor P. and L. Jonker (1978): Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics, Mathematical Biosicences 40, [76] Taylor P. (1979): Evolutionaily stable strategies with two types of player, Journal of Applied Probability 16, [77] Thomas B. (1985): On evolutionarily stable sets, Journal of Mathematical Biology 22, [78] Vega-Redondo F. (1997): The evolution of Walrasian behavior, Econometrica 65, [79] Voorneveld M., W. Kets and H. Norde (2005): An axiomatization of minimal curb sets, International Journal of Game Theory 33, (Erratum in the same journal, vol. 34, p. 153.) [80] Weibull J. (1995): Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, USA. [81] Weibull J. (2004): Testing game theory, in S. Huck (ed.), Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour: Game Theory, Experiments, and Bounded Rationality: Essays in Honour of Werner Guth, Palgrave. [82] Winter S. (1971): Satisficing, selection, and the innovating remnant, Quarterly Journal of Economics 85, [83] Wu W. and J. Jian (1962): Essential equilibrium points of n-person noncooperative games, Science Sinica 11, [84] Young P. (1993a): Evolution of conventions, Econometrica 61, [85] Young P. (1993b): An evolutionary model of bargaining, Journal of Economic Theory 59,

7 Introduction to Game Theory Preliminary Reading List 7 [86] Young P. (1998): Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Princeton University Press, Princeton.