Publications of R.W. Rosenthal

Transcription

1 5/10/2004 Publications of R.W. Rosenthal Computation of equilibria of extensive games, (with K. Boudwin and R. Wilson), Tech. report #69-12, Operations Research Department, Stanford University, Computing equilibrium behavioral strategies for n-person extensive games, (with K. Boudwin and R. Wilson), Working Paper #175, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stability analysis of cooperative games in effectiveness form, Ph.D. thesis, Tech report #70-11, Operations Research Dept., Stanford University, External economies and cores, J. Econ. Theory 3 (1971), Review of Parthasarathy and Raghavan, Some topics in two-person games, Siam Review 14 (1972), Cooperative games in effectiveness form, J. Econ. Theory 5 (1972), Voting and economic externalities: a game-theoretic approach, Tech. report, presented at Econometric Society Meetings, Budapest, The network equilibrium problem in integers, Networks 3 (1973), A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria, Int. J. Game Theory 2 (1973), Taxation vs. prohibition of an external diseconomy by direct vote: a game-theoretic approach, Int. Econ. Rev. 14 (1973), Bayesian equilibria of finite two-person games with incomplete information, (with J.T. Howson, Jr.), Management Science 21 (1974), Disadvantageous syndicates, (with A. Postlewaite), J. Econ. Theory 9 (1974), Correlated equilibria in some classes of two-person games, Int. J. Game Theory 3 (1974), On Lindahl equilibria in economies with public goods, (with P. Champsaur), CORE Discussion Paper No. 7413, Voting majority sizes, Econometrica 43 (1975), Induced outcomes in cooperative normal-form games, Discussion Paper No. 178, Center for Math. Studies, Northwestern University, 1975.

2 2 On cores in economics with public goods, (with P. Champsaur and D.J. Roberts), Int. Econ. Rev. 16 (1975), Market games with production and public commodities, Discussion Paper No. 156, Center for Math. Studies, Northwestern University, revised An arbitration model for normal-form games, Mathematics of Operations Research 1 (1976), Lindahl's solution and values for a public-goods example, J. Math. Econ. 3 (1976), Discussion of Lloyd S. Shapley's 'noncooperative general exchange', in: S. Lin (Ed.), Theory and Management of Economic Externalities, Academic Press, New York, 1976, pp Sufficient conditions for insensitivity in linear models, Operations Research 24 (1976), Core and value for a public-goods economy: an example, (with R. Aumann and R. Gardner), J. Econ. Theory 15 (1977), Arbitration of two-party disputes under ignorance, (with E. Kalai), Int. J. Game Theory 7 (1978), Arbitration of two-party disputes under uncertainty, Rev. Econ. Stud. 45 (1978), A model of cooperative games with binding commitments, in: P. Ordeshook (Ed.), Game Theory and Political Science, NYU Press, New York, 1978, pp Sequences of games with varying opponents, Econometrica 47 (1979), A game-theoretic analysis of bargaining with reputations, (with H. Landau), J. Mathematical Psychology 20 (1979), Congestion tolls: equilibrium and optimality, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 27 (1980), New equilibria for noncooperative two-person games, J. Mathematical Sociology 7 (1980), A model in which an increase in the number of sellers leads to a higher price, Econometrica 48 (1980), Repeated bargaining with opportunities for learning, (with H. Landau), J. Mathematical Sociology 8 (1981),

3 3 Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox, J. Econ. Theory 25 (1981), Reprinted in: A. Rubinstein (Ed.), Game Theory in Economics, Elgar Pub. Ltd., Brookfield, VT, 1990, pp A note on exact purification, (with R. Radner), Working Paper, A dynamic model of duopoly with customer loyalties, J. Econ. Theory 27 (1982), Private information and pure-strategy equilibria, (with R. Radner), Mathematics of Operations Research 7 (1982), A model of far-sighted electoral competition, Math. Soc. Sci. 2 (1982), A dynamic oligopoly game with lags in demand: more on the monotonicity of price in the number of sellers, Int. Econ. Rev. 23 (1982), Mixed-strategy equilibria in markets with asymmetric information, (with A. Weiss), Working Paper, Approximate purification of mixed strategies, (with R. Aumann, et al.), Mathematics of Operations Research 8 (1983), Repeated two-player games with ruin, (with A. Rubinstein), Int. J. Game Theory 13 (1984), Strategic analysis of the competitive exercise of certain financial options, (with G.M. Constantinides), J. Econ. Theory 34 (1984), Discussion of: Anderson and Sundaresan, 'futures markets and monopoly', in: R. Anderson (Ed.), The Industrial Organization of Futures Markets, D.C. Heath and Co., Lexington, MA, 1984, pp Mixed-strategy equilibrium in a market with asymmetric information, (with A. Weiss), Rev. Econ. Stud. 51 (1984), An approach to some noncooperative game situations with special attention to bargaining, in: A. Roth (Ed.), Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1985, pp A dynamic screening example, Working Paper, Dynamic duopoly with incomplete customer loyalties, Int. Econ. Rev. 27 (1986), Noncooperative games and nontransitive preferences, (with P. Fishburn), Math. Soc. Sci. 12 (1986), 1-7.

4 4 A positive approach to noncooperative games, (with J. Friedman), J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 7 (1986), Anonymous sequential games, (with B. Jovanovic), J. Math. Econ. 17 (1988), Sovereign-debt renegotiations: a strategic analysis, (with R. Fernandez), Working Paper, Sovereign-debt renegotiations revisited, (with R. Fernandez), Working Paper, More on the 'anti-folk theorem', (with J. Masso), J. Math. Econ. 18 (1989), A bounded-rationality approach to the study of noncooperative games, Int. J. Game Theory 18 (1989), Duopoly with both ruin and entry, (with R. Spady), Can. J. Econ. 22 (1989), Testing the Minimax hypothesis: a re-examination of O'Neill's game experiment, (with J. Brown), Econometrica 58 (1990), A strategic altruism model in which Ricardian equivalence does not hold, (with L. Kotlikoff and A. Razin), Econ. J. 100 (1990), Strategic models of sovereign-debt renegotiations, (with R. Fernandez), Rev. Econ. Stud. 57 (1990), On the incentives associated with sovereign debt, J. Int. Econ. 30 (1991), A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities, Games Econ. Behav. 3 (1991), The contractors' game, (with K. Lang), RAND J. Econ. 22 (1991), A note on Abreu-Matsushima mechanisms, (with J. Glazer), Econometrica 60 (1992), Some inefficiency implications of generational politics and exchange, (with L. Kotlikoff), Econ. Politics 5 (1993), Suicide attempts and signalling games, Math. Soc. Sci. 26 (1993), An explanation of inefficiency in markets and a justification for buy-and-hold strategies, (with R. Wang), Can. J. Econ. 26 (1993), Rules of thumb in games, J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 22 (1993), Bargaining rules of thumb, J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 22 (1993),

5 5 Price and quality cycles for experience goods, (with D. Gale), RAND J. Econ. 25 (1994), Dynamic duopoly with slowly changing customer loyalties, (with Y. Chen), Int. J. Ind. Organ. 14 (1996), Asking prices as commitment devices, (with Y. Chen), Int. Econ. Rev. 37 (1996), On the use of ceiling-price commitments by monopolists, (with Y. Chen), RAND J. Econ. 27 (1996), Simultaneous auctions with synergies, (with V. Krishna), Games Econ. Behav. 17 (1996), Simultaneous auctions with synergies and common values, (with R. Wang), Games Econ. Behav. 17 (1996), On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions, (with M.A. defrutos), Games Econ. Behav. 23 (1998), Multi-issue bargaining with perfect information, (with K. Lang), Working Paper, Experimentation, imitation, and stochastic stability, (with D. Gale), J. Econ. Theory 84 (1999), Experimentation, imitation, and stochastic stability: addendum, (with D. Gale), J. Econ. Theory, 97 (2001), Trust and social efficiencies, Rev. Econ. Design, 6 (2001), Coordination through reputations: a laboratory experiment, (with D. Dale and J. Morgan), Games Econ. Behav., 38 (2002) Bargaining piecemeal or all at once?, (with K. Lang), Econ. J. 111 (2001), Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: chopsticks and tetrahedra, (with B. Szentes), Games Econ. Behav. 44 (2003), Hide and seek in Arizona, (with J. Shachat and M. Walker), International Journal of Game Theory, forthcoming. Beyond chopsticks: symmetric equilibria in majority auction games, (with B. Szentes), Games Econ. Behav. 45 (2003),