Introduction to Game Theory Reading List Jörgen W. Weibull Stockholm School of Economics and Ecole Polytechnique. April 7, 2010
|
|
- Felix Weaver
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Introduction to Game Theory Reading List Jörgen W. Weibull Stockholm School of Economics and Ecole Polytechnique April 7, 2010 References [1] Abreu D. (1988): On the theory of infinitely repeated games with discounting, Econometrica 56, [2] Abreu D., P. Dutta and L. Smith (1994): The Folk theorem for repeated games: a NEU condition, Econometrica 62, [3] Alos-Ferrer C. and N. Netzer (2010): The logit response dynamic, Games and Economic Behavior 68, [4] Aumann R. (1990): Nash equilibria are not self-enforcing, in J. Gabszewicz, J.-F.RichardandL.Wolsey,Economic Decision Making: Games, Econometrics, and Optimization. Elsevier, The Netherlands. [5] Aumann R. and A. Brandenburger (1995): Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium, Econometrica 63, [6] Austen-Smith D. and J. Banks (1996): Information aggregation, rationality, and the Condorcet jury theorem, American Political Science Review 90, [7] Balkenborg D., J. Hofbauer and C. Kuzmics (2009): Refined best-response correspondence and dynamics, mimeo., Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. [8] Basu K. and J. Weibull (1991): Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior, Economics Letters 36, [9] Benaïm M. and J. Weibull (2003): Deterministic approximation of stochastic evolution in games, Econometrica 71, [10] Benoit J.-P. and V. Krishna (1993): Renegotiation in finitely repeated games, Econometrica 61,
2 Introduction to Game Theory Reading List 2 [11] Bergin J. and B. Lipman (1996): Evolution with state-dependent mutations, Econometrica 64, [12] Bernheim D. (1984): Rationalizable strategic behavior, Econometrica 52, [13] Binmore K., J. McCarthy, G. Ponti, L. Samuelson and A. Shaked (2002): A backward induction experiment, Journal of Economic Theory 104, [14] Brown G. and J. von Neumann (1950): Solutions of games by differential equations, Annals of Mathematical Studies 24, [15] Charness G. and M. Rabin (2002): Understanding social preferences with simple tests, Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, [16] Cho I.-K. and D. Kreps (1987): Signaling games and stable equilibria, Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, [17] van Damme E. (1987): Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, Springer Verlag, Berlin (2nd ed. 1991). [18] van Damme E. and J. Weibull (2002): Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities, Journal of Economic Theory 106, [19] Dal Bó P. (2005): Cooperation under the shadow of the future: Experimental evidence from infinitely repeated games, American Economic Review 95, [20] Dawkins R. (1976): The Selfish Gene, Oxford University Press, Oxford. [21] Demichelis S. and K. Ritzberger (2003): From evolutionary to strategic stability, Journal of Economic Theory 113, [22] Demichelis S. and J. Weibull (2008): Language, meaning and games; a model of communication, coordination and evolution, American Economic Review 98, [23] Falk A., E. Fehr and U. Fischbacher (2003): On the nature of fair behavior, Economic Inquiry 41, [24] Fehr E. and K. Schmidt (1999): A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114,
3 Introduction to Game Theory Reading List 3 [25] Fehr E. and S. Gächter (2000): Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments, American Economic Review 90, [26] Fehr E. and S. Gächter (2003): Altruistic punishment in humans, Nature 415, [27] Fort M. (1950): Essential and non-essential fixed points, American Journal of Mathematics 72, [28] Freidlin M. and A. Wentzell (1984): Random Perturbations of Dynamical Systems. Springer Verlag. [29] Friedman M. (1953): Essays in Positive Economics. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. [30] Fudenberg D. and E. Maskin (1986): Folk theorems for repeated games with discounting and incomplete information, Econometrica 54, [31] Fudenberg D. and E. Maskin (1990): Evolution and cooperation in noisy repeated games, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 80, [32] Fudenberg D. and J. Tirole (1991): Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, USA. [33] Goeree J. and C. Holt (2001): Ten little treasures of game theory and ten intuitive contradictions, American Economic Review 91, [34] Harsanyi J. and R. Selten (1988): A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. MIT Press, Cambridge, USA. [35] Hart S. and A. Mas-Collel (2000): A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibria, Econometrica 68, [36] Hart S. (2002): Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction, Games and Economic Behavior 41, [37] Hart S. and A. Mas-Colell (2003): Uncoupled dynamics do not lead to Nash equilibrium, American Economic Review [38] Hart S. (2005): Adaptive heuristics, Econometrica 73, [39] Hauk E. and S. Hurkens (2002): On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability, Journal of Economic Theory 106,
4 Introduction to Game Theory Reading List 4 [40] Heifetz A., C. Shannon and Y. Spiegel (2007): What to maximize if you must, Journal of Economic Theory 133, [41] Hillas J. (1990): On the definition of strategic stability of equilibria, Econometrica 58, [42] Hofbauer J. and K. Sigmund (1988): The Theory of Evolution and Dynamical Systems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. [43] Hofbauer J. and J. Weibull (1996): Evolutionary selection against dominated strategies, Journal of Economic Theory 71, [44] Hurkens S. (1995): Learning by forgetful players, Games and Economic Behavior 11, [45] Jiang J.-H. (1963a): Essential equilibrium points of n-person non-cooperative games, Science Sinica 12, [46] Jiang J.-H. (1963b): Essential components of the set of fixed points in the multivalued mappings and its appliacation to the theory of games, Science Sinica 12, [47] Josephson J. and A. Matros (2003): Stochastic imitation in finite games, Games and Economic Behavior 49, [48] Josephson J. (2008): Stochastic better-reply dynamics in finite games, Economic Theory 35, [49] Kohlberg E. and J.-F. Mertens (1986): On the strategic stability of equilibria, Econometrica 54, [50] Kreps D. and R. Wilson (1982): Sequential equilibria, Econometrica 50, [51] Laibson D. (1997): Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, [52] Levine D. (1998): Modelling altruism and spitefulness in experiments, Review of Economic Dynamics 1, [53] Mailath G. and L. Samuelson (2006): Repeated Games and Reputations, Oxford University Press.
5 Introduction to Game Theory Reading List 5 [54] Maynard Smith J. and G.R. Price (1973): The logic of animal conflict, Nature 246, [55] Maynard Smith J. (1982): Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press. [56] McKelvey R. and T. Palfrey (1992): An experimental study of the centipede game, Econometrica 60, [57] Mertikopoulos P. and A. Moustakas (2009): Rational behavior in the presence of stochastic perturbations, WP, Department of physics, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. [58] Myerson R.B. (1978): Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept, International Journal of Game Theory 7, [59] Nagel R. (1995): Unravelling in guessing games: An experimental study, American Economic Review 85, [60] Nash J. (1950a): Non-cooperative games, Ph D thesis, Department of Mathematics, Princeton University. [61] Nash J. (1950b): Equilibrium points in n-person games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (USA) 36, [62] Nash J. (1950c): The bargaining problem, Econometrica 18, [63] Nash J. (1951), Non-cooperative games, Annals of Mathematics 54, [64] Norde H., J. Potters, H. Reijnierse and D. Vermeulen (1996): Equilibrium selection and consistency, Games and Economic Behavior 12, [65] Osborne M. and A. Rubinstein (1994): A Course in Game Theory, MITPress. [66] Pearce D. (1984): Rationalizable strategic behavior, Econometrica 52, [67] Phelps E. and R. Pollak (1968): On second-best national savings and gameequilibrium growth, Review of Economic Studies 35, [68] Ritzberger K. and J. Weibull (1995): Evolutionary selection in normal-form games, Econometrica 63,
6 Introduction to Game Theory Reading List 6 [69] Ritzberger K. (2002): Foundations of Non-Cooperative Game Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford. [70] Robson A. (1990): Efficiency in evolutionary games: Darwin, Nash and the secret handshake, Journal of Theoretical Biology 144, [71] Robson A. (2001a): The biological basis of economic behavior, Journal of Economic Literature 29, [72] Robson A. (2001b): Why would nature give individuals utility functions?, Journal of Political Economy 109, [73] Rosenthal R. (1981): Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox, Journal of Economic Theory 25, [74] Sandholm W. (2007): Evolutionary game theory, in Encyclopedia of Complexity and System Science. [75] Sandholm W. (2008): Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics. Forthcoming, MIT Press, Cambridge USA. [76] Savage L. (1954): The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley, New York. [77] Selten R. (1975): Re-examination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games, International Journal of Game Theory 4, [78] Selten R. (1978): The chain-store paradox, Theory and Decision 9, [79] Selten R. (1980): A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal conflicts, Journal of Theoretical Biology 84, [80] Selten R. (1991): Evolution, learning, and economic behavior, Games and Economic Behavior 3, [81] Sethi R. and E. Somanathan (2001): Preference evolution and reciprocity, Journal of Economic Theory 97, [82] Sobel J. (2005): Interdependent preferences and reciprocity, Journal of Economic Literature 43, [83] Stahl D. (1993): Evolution of smart n players, Games and Economic Behavior 5,
7 Introduction to Game Theory Reading List 7 [84] Swinkels J. (1992a): Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants, Journal of Economic Theory 57, [85] Swinkels J. (1992b): Evolution and Strategic Stability: from Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens, Journal of Economic Theory 57, [86] Taylor P. and L. Jonker (1978): Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics, Mathematical Biosicences 40, [87] Taylor P. (1979): Evolutionaily stable strategies with two types of player, Journal of Applied Probability 16, [88] Thomas B. (1985): On evolutionarily stable sets, Journal of Mathematical Biology 22, [89] Vega-Redondo F. (1997): The evolution of Walrasian behavior, Econometrica 65, [90] Voorneveld M., W. Kets and H. Norde (2005): An axiomatization of minimal curb sets, International Journal of Game Theory 33, (Erratum in the same journal, vol. 34, p. 153.) [91] Weibull J. (1995): Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, USA. [92] Weibull J. (2004): Testing game theory, in S. Huck (ed.), Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour: Game Theory, Experiments, and Bounded Rationality: Essays in Honour of Werner Guth, Palgrave. [93] Winter S. (1971): Satisficing, selection, and the innovating remnant, Quarterly Journal of Economics 85, [94] Wu W. and J. Jian (1962): Essential equilibrium points of n-person noncooperative games, Science Sinica 11, [95] Young P. (1993a): The evolution of conventions, Econometrica 61, [96] Young P. (1993b): An evolutionary model of bargaining, Journal of Economic Theory 59, [97] Young P. (1998): Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Introduction to Game Theory Preliminary Reading List Jörgen W. Weibull Stockholm School of Economics and Ecole Polytechnique.
Introduction to Game Theory Preliminary Reading List Jörgen W. Weibull Stockholm School of Economics and Ecole Polytechnique January 27, 2010 References [1] Aumann R. (1990): Nash equilibria are not self-enforcing,
More informationPublications of R.W. Rosenthal
5/10/2004 Publications of R.W. Rosenthal Computation of equilibria of extensive games, (with K. Boudwin and R. Wilson), Tech. report #69-12, Operations Research Department, Stanford University, 1969. Computing
More informationAppendix A A Primer in Game Theory
Appendix A A Primer in Game Theory This presentation of the main ideas and concepts of game theory required to understand the discussion in this book is intended for readers without previous exposure to
More informationSimple Decision Heuristics in Perfec Games. The original publication is availabl. Press
JAIST Reposi https://dspace.j Title Simple Decision Heuristics in Perfec Games Author(s)Konno, Naoki; Kijima, Kyoichi Citation Issue Date 2005-11 Type Conference Paper Text version publisher URL Rights
More informationDistributed Optimization and Games
Distributed Optimization and Games Introduction to Game Theory Giovanni Neglia INRIA EPI Maestro 18 January 2017 What is Game Theory About? Mathematical/Logical analysis of situations of conflict and cooperation
More informationGame theory Computational Models of Cognition
Game theory Taxonomy Rational behavior Definitions Common games Nash equilibria Mixed strategies Properties of Nash equilibria What do NE mean? Mutually Assured Destruction 6 rik@cogsci.ucsd.edu Taxonomy
More informationGame Theory. Martin Dufwenberg August 7, 2010 For Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science
Game Theory Martin Dufwenberg August 7, 2010 For Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science Abstract: Game theory is a toolkit for examining situations where decision makers influence each other.
More informationRobert Aumann s Game and Economic Theory
Robert Aumann s Game and Economic Theory Sergiu Hart December 9, 2005 Stockholm School of Economics July 2006 - Short Version SERGIU HART c 2006 p. 1 Robert Aumann s Game and Economic Theory Sergiu Hart
More informationEvolutionary Game Theory and Linguistics
Gerhard.Jaeger@uni-bielefeld.de February 21, 2007 University of Tübingen Conceptualization of language evolution prerequisites for evolutionary dynamics replication variation selection Linguemes any piece
More informationCHAPTER LEARNING OUTCOMES. By the end of this section, students will be able to:
CHAPTER 4 4.1 LEARNING OUTCOMES By the end of this section, students will be able to: Understand what is meant by a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) Calculate the BNE in a Cournot game with incomplete information
More informationComputational Methods for Non-Cooperative Game Theory
Computational Methods for Non-Cooperative Game Theory What is a game? Introduction A game is a decision problem in which there a multiple decision makers, each with pay-off interdependence Each decisions
More informationInstructor. Description. Grading. Preliminary List of Readings. Annie Liang Office: 462 McNeil Building
Instructor Annie Liang Office: 462 McNeil Building Email: anliang@upenn.edu Description This is a topics course, designed for economics Ph.D. students in their second or third year who are interested in
More informationGame Theory: introduction and applications to computer networks
Game Theory: introduction and applications to computer networks Lecture 1: introduction Giovanni Neglia INRIA EPI Maestro 30 January 2012 Part of the slides are based on a previous course with D. Figueiredo
More informationApplied Game Theory And Strategic Behavior Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. Author: Siim Adamson TTÜ 2010
Applied Game Theory And Strategic Behavior Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 review Author: Siim Adamson TTÜ 2010 Introduction The book Applied Game Theory And Strategic Behavior is written by Ilhan Kubilay Geēkil
More informationDistributed Optimization and Games
Distributed Optimization and Games Introduction to Game Theory Giovanni Neglia INRIA EPI Maestro 18 January 2017 What is Game Theory About? Mathematical/Logical analysis of situations of conflict and cooperation
More informationEvolving games and the social contract
Forthcoming in Modeling Complexity in the Humanities and Social Sciences, Ed. Paul Youngman, Pan Stanford Press. Evolving games and the social contract Rory Smead Department of Philosophy & Religion, Northeastern
More informationD. Bergemann and J. Välimäki (2002), Information and Efficient Mechanism Design, Econometrica, 70,
References for Recent Contributions to Mechanism Design E. Maskin 1. Auctions with Interdependent Values D. Bergemann and J. Välimäki (2002), Information and Efficient Mechanism Design, Econometrica, 70,
More informationNON-COOPERATIVE GAMES ERIC VAN DAMME CENTER TILBURG UNIVERSITY MARCH, 2000.
3.4.5 NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES ERIC VAN DAMME CENTER TILBURG UNIVERSITY MARCH, 2000. Entry prepared for the International Encyclopedia of the Social and the Behavioral Sciences, edited by Neil J. Smelser
More informationIntroduction: What is Game Theory?
Microeconomics I: Game Theory Introduction: What is Game Theory? (see Osborne, 2009, Sect 1.1) Dr. Michael Trost Department of Applied Microeconomics October 25, 2013 Dr. Michael Trost Microeconomics I:
More informationMicroeconomics II Lecture 2: Backward induction and subgame perfection Karl Wärneryd Stockholm School of Economics November 2016
Microeconomics II Lecture 2: Backward induction and subgame perfection Karl Wärneryd Stockholm School of Economics November 2016 1 Games in extensive form So far, we have only considered games where players
More informationGame Theory. Department of Electronics EL-766 Spring Hasan Mahmood
Game Theory Department of Electronics EL-766 Spring 2011 Hasan Mahmood Email: hasannj@yahoo.com Course Information Part I: Introduction to Game Theory Introduction to game theory, games with perfect information,
More informationINTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY
1 / 45 INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY Heinrich H. Nax hnax@ethz.ch & Bary S. R. Pradelski bpradelski@ethz.ch February 20, 2017: Lecture 1 2 / 45 A game Rules: 1 Players: All of you: https://scienceexperiment.online/beautygame/vote
More informationApplied Game Theory And Strategic Behavior Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 review
Applied Game Theory And Strategic Behavior Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 review Author: Siim Adamson Introduction The book Applied Game Theory And Strategic Behavior is written by Ilhan Kubilay Geēkil and Patrick
More informationSF2972 GAME THEORY Normal-form analysis II
SF2972 GAME THEORY Normal-form analysis II Jörgen Weibull January 2017 1 Nash equilibrium Domain of analysis: finite NF games = h i with mixed-strategy extension = h ( ) i Definition 1.1 Astrategyprofile
More informationIntroduction to Game Theory
Introduction to Game Theory Review for the Final Exam Dana Nau University of Maryland Nau: Game Theory 1 Basic concepts: 1. Introduction normal form, utilities/payoffs, pure strategies, mixed strategies
More information8.F The Possibility of Mistakes: Trembling Hand Perfection
February 4, 2015 8.F The Possibility of Mistakes: Trembling Hand Perfection back to games of complete information, for the moment refinement: a set of principles that allow one to select among equilibria.
More informationDominance-Solvable Games
s Joseph Tao-yi Wang 3/21/2014 (Lecture 4, Micro Theory I) Dominance Dominance Strategy A gives you better payoffs than Strategy B regardless of opponent strategy Dominance Solvable A game that can be
More informationGame Theory: The Basics. Theory of Games and Economics Behavior John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1943)
Game Theory: The Basics The following is based on Games of Strategy, Dixit and Skeath, 1999. Topic 8 Game Theory Page 1 Theory of Games and Economics Behavior John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1943)
More informationG5212: Game Theory. Mark Dean. Spring 2017
G5212: Game Theory Mark Dean Spring 2017 The Story So Far... Last week we Introduced the concept of a dynamic (or extensive form) game The strategic (or normal) form of that game In terms of solution concepts
More informationInternational Economics B 2. Basics in noncooperative game theory
International Economics B 2 Basics in noncooperative game theory Akihiko Yanase (Graduate School of Economics) October 11, 2016 1 / 34 What is game theory? Basic concepts in noncooperative game theory
More informationAn Application of Game Theory to Electronic Communications Markets *
An Application of Game Theory to Electronic Communications Markets * Bernhard von Stengel London School of Economics November 2011 This article gives an introductory survey of non-cooperative game theory.
More informationSOCIAL GAMES: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games
SOCIAL GAMES: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games Matthew O. Jackson and Alison Watts Revised: January 29, 2008 Abstract: We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, such
More informationComputational Aspects of Game Theory Bertinoro Spring School Lecture 2: Examples
Computational Aspects of Game Theory Bertinoro Spring School 2011 Lecturer: Bruno Codenotti Lecture 2: Examples We will present some examples of games with a few players and a few strategies. Each example
More informationANoteonthe Game - Bounded Rationality and Induction
ANoteontheE-mailGame - Bounded Rationality and Induction Uwe Dulleck y Comments welcome Abstract In Rubinstein s (1989) E-mail game there exists no Nash equilibrium where players use strategies that condition
More informationGOLDEN AND SILVER RATIOS IN BARGAINING
GOLDEN AND SILVER RATIOS IN BARGAINING KIMMO BERG, JÁNOS FLESCH, AND FRANK THUIJSMAN Abstract. We examine a specific class of bargaining problems where the golden and silver ratios appear in a natural
More informationGame Theory and MANETs: A Brief Tutorial
Game Theory and MANETs: A Brief Tutorial Luiz A. DaSilva and Allen B. MacKenzie Slides available at http://www.ece.vt.edu/mackenab/presentations/ GameTheoryTutorial.pdf 1 Agenda Fundamentals of Game Theory
More informationModern Game Theory. By Nicola Giocoli. Cheltenham, UK, and. Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, pp. $
Modeling Rational Agents. From Interwar Economics to Early Modern Game Theory. By Nicola Giocoli. Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 2003. 464 pp. $125.00. This book is an extended
More information6. Bargaining. Ryan Oprea. Economics 176. University of California, Santa Barbara. 6. Bargaining. Economics 176. Extensive Form Games
6. 6. Ryan Oprea University of California, Santa Barbara 6. Individual choice experiments Test assumptions about Homo Economicus Strategic interaction experiments Test game theory Market experiments Test
More informationEach copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.
An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game Author(s): Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey Source: Econometrica, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Jul., 1992), pp. 803-836 Published by: The Econometric Society Stable
More informationThe extensive form representation of a game
The extensive form representation of a game Nodes, information sets Perfect and imperfect information Addition of random moves of nature (to model uncertainty not related with decisions of other players).
More informationRefinements of Nash Equilibrium 1
John Nachbar Washington University September 23, 2015 1 Overview Refinements of Nash Equilibrium 1 In game theory, refinement refers to the selection of a subset of equilibria, typically on the grounds
More informationPerfect versus Imperfect Observability An Experimental Test of Bagwell s Result*
Games and Economic Behavior 31, 174 190 (2000) doi:10.1006/game.1999.0746, available online at http://www.idealibrary.com on Perfect versus Imperfect Observability An Experimental Test of Bagwell s Result*
More informationA Chronology of Game Theory
Home UC Home Econ. Department Chronology of Game Theory Nobel Prize A Chronology of Game Theory by Paul Walker September 2012 Ancient 1700 1800 1900 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 Nobel Prize 2nd Nobel Prize
More informationResource Allocation and Decision Analysis (ECON 8010) Spring 2014 Foundations of Game Theory
Resource Allocation and Decision Analysis (ECON 8) Spring 4 Foundations of Game Theory Reading: Game Theory (ECON 8 Coursepak, Page 95) Definitions and Concepts: Game Theory study of decision making settings
More informationStrategies and Game Theory
Strategies and Game Theory Prof. Hongbin Cai Department of Applied Economics Guanghua School of Management Peking University March 31, 2009 Lecture 7: Repeated Game 1 Introduction 2 Finite Repeated Game
More informationState Trading Companies, Time Inconsistency, Imperfect Enforceability and Reputation
State Trading Companies, Time Inconsistency, Imperfect Enforceability and Reputation Tigran A. Melkonian and S.R. Johnson Working Paper 98-WP 192 April 1998 Center for Agricultural and Rural Development
More informationTopic 1: defining games and strategies. SF2972: Game theory. Not allowed: Extensive form game: formal definition
SF2972: Game theory Mark Voorneveld, mark.voorneveld@hhs.se Topic 1: defining games and strategies Drawing a game tree is usually the most informative way to represent an extensive form game. Here is one
More informationMulti-Agent Bilateral Bargaining and the Nash Bargaining Solution
Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining and the Nash Bargaining Solution Sang-Chul Suh University of Windsor Quan Wen Vanderbilt University December 2003 Abstract This paper studies a bargaining model where n
More informationBEEM057 Experimental Economics and Finance. Behavioural Game Theory
BEEM057 Experimental Economics and Finance Behavioural Game Theory Game Theory Game Theory: How rational agents should behave. Behavioural Game theory: How actual people behave. Behavioural Game Theory
More informationUltimatum Bargaining. James Andreoni Econ 182
1 Ultimatum Bargaining James Andreoni Econ 182 3 1 Demonstration: The Proposer-Responder Game 4 2 Background: Nash Equilibrium Example Let's think about how we make a prediction in this game: Each Player
More informationAn Evolutionary Approach to Tacit Communication. in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Game Experiments
1 An Evolutionary Approach to Tacit Communication in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Game Experiments Yong-Gwan Kim * Department of Economics University of Iowa Iowa City, IA 52242 March 1994 * I am grateful
More informationPopulation Games and Evolutionary Dynamics
Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics William H. Sandholm September 9, 2009 1 3 Chaos under the replicator dynamic 4 ii CONTENTS IN BRIEF Preface xv 1 Introduction 1 I Population Games 19 2 Population
More informationDAVID M. KREPS. Ph.D. in Operations Research and M.A. in Economics from Stanford University, 1975.
DAVID M. KREPS Business: Graduate School of Business, Stanford, CA 94305, 650-723-2936 Home: 807 Allardice Way, Stanford, CA 94305, 650-493-5969 Email: kreps@stanford.edu Cell: 650-796-0392 EDUCATION A.B.
More informationGame Theory ( nd term) Dr. S. Farshad Fatemi. Graduate School of Management and Economics Sharif University of Technology.
Game Theory 44812 (1393-94 2 nd term) Dr. S. Farshad Fatemi Graduate School of Management and Economics Sharif University of Technology Spring 2015 Dr. S. Farshad Fatemi (GSME) Game Theory Spring 2015
More informationDECISION MAKING GAME THEORY
DECISION MAKING GAME THEORY THE PROBLEM Two suspected felons are caught by the police and interrogated in separate rooms. Three cases were presented to them. THE PROBLEM CASE A: If only one of you confesses,
More informationFebruary 11, 2015 :1 +0 (1 ) = :2 + 1 (1 ) =3 1. is preferred to R iff
February 11, 2015 Example 60 Here s a problem that was on the 2014 midterm: Determine all weak perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibria of the following game. Let denote the probability that I assigns to being
More informationBackward induction is a widely accepted principle for predicting behavior in sequential games. In the classic
Published online ahead of print November 9, 212 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE Articles in Advance, pp. 1 18 ISSN 25-199 (print) ISSN 1526-551 (online) http://dx.doi.org/1.1287/mnsc.112.1645 212 INFORMS A Dynamic
More informationNon-Cooperative Game Theory
Notes on Microeconomic Theory IV 3º - LE-: 008-009 Iñaki Aguirre epartamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I Universidad del País Vasco An introduction to. Introduction.. asic notions.. Extensive
More informationGame Theory. Lecture Notes By Y. Narahari. Department of Computer Science and Automation Indian Institute of Science Bangalore, India August 2012
Game Theory Lecture Notes By Y. Narahari Department of Computer Science and Automation Indian Institute of Science Bangalore, India August 01 Rationalizable Strategies Note: This is a only a draft version,
More informationGame Theory. Lecture Notes By Y. Narahari. Department of Computer Science and Automation Indian Institute of Science Bangalore, India July 2012
Game Theory Lecture Notes By Y. Narahari Department of Computer Science and Automation Indian Institute of Science Bangalore, India July 2012 The Mechanism Design Environment Note: This is a only a draft
More informationExperimental Economics A EXPLORATIONS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY A FINANCE AND STOCHASTICS A FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT (el.
A+ Journals ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 0001-4273 A+ ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW 0363-7425 A+ ACCOUNTING ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIETY 0361-3682 A+ ACCOUNTING REVIEW 0001-4826 A+ ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE
More informationFinite games: finite number of players, finite number of possible actions, finite number of moves. Canusegametreetodepicttheextensiveform.
A game is a formal representation of a situation in which individuals interact in a setting of strategic interdependence. Strategic interdependence each individual s utility depends not only on his own
More informationAn Introductory Course on Mathematical Game Theory
An Introductory Course on Mathematical Game Theory Julio González-Díaz Ignacio García-Jurado M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro Graduate Studies in Mathematics Volume 115 American Mathematical Society Real Sociedad
More informationDynamic games: Backward induction and subgame perfection
Dynamic games: Backward induction and subgame perfection ectures in Game Theory Fall 04, ecture 3 0.0.04 Daniel Spiro, ECON300/400 ecture 3 Recall the extensive form: It specifies Players: {,..., i,...,
More informationPhilosophy of Social Science Hipps 190/191/195 Academic Year: Time/Place: To be Arranged Instructor: Kjell Hausken
1 Philosophy of Social Science Hipps 190/191/195 Academic Year: 1994-1995 Time/Place: To be Arranged Instructor: Kjell Hausken Course Objectives The purpose of the course is to expose you to a broad range
More informationReading Robert Gibbons, A Primer in Game Theory, Harvester Wheatsheaf 1992.
Reading Robert Gibbons, A Primer in Game Theory, Harvester Wheatsheaf 1992. Additional readings could be assigned from time to time. They are an integral part of the class and you are expected to read
More informationA Backward Induction Experiment 1
Journal of Economic Theory 104, 48 88 (2002) doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2910, available online at http://www.idealibrary.com on A Backward Induction Experiment 1 Ken Binmore Department of Economics, University
More informationLECTURE 26: GAME THEORY 1
15-382 COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE S18 LECTURE 26: GAME THEORY 1 INSTRUCTOR: GIANNI A. DI CARO ICE-CREAM WARS http://youtu.be/jilgxenbk_8 2 GAME THEORY Game theory is the formal study of conflict and cooperation
More informationGame Theory: introduction and applications to computer networks
Game Theory: introduction and applications to computer networks Lecture 3: two-person non zero-sum games Giovanni Neglia INRIA EPI Maestro 6 January 2010 Slides are based on a previous course with D. Figueiredo
More informationCMU Lecture 22: Game Theory I. Teachers: Gianni A. Di Caro
CMU 15-781 Lecture 22: Game Theory I Teachers: Gianni A. Di Caro GAME THEORY Game theory is the formal study of conflict and cooperation in (rational) multi-agent systems Decision-making where several
More informationAsynchronous Best-Reply Dynamics
Asynchronous Best-Reply Dynamics Noam Nisan 1, Michael Schapira 2, and Aviv Zohar 2 1 Google Tel-Aviv and The School of Computer Science and Engineering, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. 2 The
More informationRepeated Games. Economics Microeconomic Theory II: Strategic Behavior. Shih En Lu. Simon Fraser University (with thanks to Anke Kessler)
Repeated Games Economics 302 - Microeconomic Theory II: Strategic Behavior Shih En Lu Simon Fraser University (with thanks to Anke Kessler) ECON 302 (SFU) Repeated Games 1 / 25 Topics 1 Information Sets
More informationCME GROUP-MSRI FEB 2. PRIZE in INNOVATIVE QUANTITATIVE APPLICATIONS. MODERATED SEMINAR and AWARD LUNCHEON CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
CME GROUP-MSRI PRIZE in INNOVATIVE QUANTITATIVE APPLICATIONS MODERATED SEMINAR and AWARD LUNCHEON FEB 2 2017 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS CME GROUP-MSRI PRIZE IN INNOVATIVE QUANTITATIVE APPLICATIONS 2016 PRIZE RECIPIENT
More informationSyllabus, Fall 2002 for: Agents, Games & Evolution OPIM 325 (Simulation)
Syllabus, Fall 2002 for: Agents, Games & Evolution OPIM 325 (Simulation) http://opim-sun.wharton.upenn.edu/ sok/teaching/age/f02/ Steven O. Kimbrough August 1, 2002 1 Brief Description Agents, Games &
More informationIntroduction to Game Theory
Introduction to Game Theory Managing with Game Theory Hongying FEI Feihy@i.shu.edu.cn Poker Game ( 2 players) Each player is dealt randomly 3 cards Both of them order their cards as they want Cards at
More informationBoston Library Consortium Member Libraries
Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from Boston Library Consortium Member Libraries http://www.archive.org/details/reputationequilioofude working paper department of economics REPUTATION
More informationSelecting Robust Strategies Based on Abstracted Game Models
Chapter 1 Selecting Robust Strategies Based on Abstracted Game Models Oscar Veliz and Christopher Kiekintveld Abstract Game theory is a tool for modeling multi-agent decision problems and has been used
More informationMinimal Inclusive Sets in Special Classes of Games. by Chris W. Sanchirico, Columbia University. November 1994 (August 1996)
Minimal Inclusive Sets in Special Classes of Games by Chris W. Sanchirico, Columbia University November 1994 (August 1996) Discussion Paper Series No. 9596-23 MINIMAL INCLUSIVE SETS IN SPECIAL CLASSES
More informationCMU-Q Lecture 20:
CMU-Q 15-381 Lecture 20: Game Theory I Teacher: Gianni A. Di Caro ICE-CREAM WARS http://youtu.be/jilgxenbk_8 2 GAME THEORY Game theory is the formal study of conflict and cooperation in (rational) multi-agent
More informationAgenda. Intro to Game Theory. Why Game Theory. Examples. The Contractor. Games of Strategy vs other kinds
Agenda Intro to Game Theory AUECO 220 Why game theory Games of Strategy Examples Terminology Why Game Theory Provides a method of solving problems where each agent takes into account how others will react
More information3 Game Theory II: Sequential-Move and Repeated Games
3 Game Theory II: Sequential-Move and Repeated Games Recognizing that the contributions you make to a shared computer cluster today will be known to other participants tomorrow, you wonder how that affects
More informationCopyright 2008, Yan Chen
Unless otherwise noted, the content of this course material is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial 3.0 License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/ Copyright 2008, Yan
More informationcemmap / ELSE masterclass: Vincent P. Crawford, UCSD (5-6 March 2009) Readings
cemmap / ELSE masterclass: Vincent P. Crawford, UCSD (5-6 March 2009) Readings (the readings don t strictly follow the same order as the lectures, and I have listed many, many more topics and readings
More information3-2 Lecture 3: January Repeated Games A repeated game is a standard game which isplayed repeatedly. The utility of each player is the sum of
S294-1 Algorithmic Aspects of Game Theory Spring 2001 Lecturer: hristos Papadimitriou Lecture 3: January 30 Scribes: Kris Hildrum, ror Weitz 3.1 Overview This lecture expands the concept of a game by introducing
More informationLeandro Chaves Rêgo. Unawareness in Extensive Form Games. Joint work with: Joseph Halpern (Cornell) Statistics Department, UFPE, Brazil.
Unawareness in Extensive Form Games Leandro Chaves Rêgo Statistics Department, UFPE, Brazil Joint work with: Joseph Halpern (Cornell) January 2014 Motivation Problem: Most work on game theory assumes that:
More informationGAME THEORY Edition by G. David Garson and Statistical Associates Publishing Page 1
Copyright @c 2012 by G. David Garson and Statistical Associates Publishing Page 1 @c 2012 by G. David Garson and Statistical Associates Publishing. All rights reserved worldwide in all media. No permission
More informationWeeks 3-4: Intro to Game Theory
Prof. Bryan Caplan bcaplan@gmu.edu http://www.bcaplan.com Econ 82 Weeks 3-4: Intro to Game Theory I. The Hard Case: When Strategy Matters A. You can go surprisingly far with general equilibrium theory,
More informationON THE EVOLUTION OF TRUTH. 1. Introduction
ON THE EVOLUTION OF TRUTH JEFFREY A. BARRETT Abstract. This paper is concerned with how a simple metalanguage might coevolve with a simple descriptive base language in the context of interacting Skyrms-Lewis
More informationRational decisions in non-probabilistic setting
Computational Logic Seminar, Graduate Center CUNY Rational decisions in non-probabilistic setting Sergei Artemov October 20, 2009 1 In this talk The knowledge-based rational decision model (KBR-model)
More informationNORMAL FORM GAMES: invariance and refinements DYNAMIC GAMES: extensive form
1 / 47 NORMAL FORM GAMES: invariance and refinements DYNAMIC GAMES: extensive form Heinrich H. Nax hnax@ethz.ch & Bary S. R. Pradelski bpradelski@ethz.ch March 19, 2018: Lecture 5 2 / 47 Plan Normal form
More informationAdvanced Microeconomics: Game Theory
Advanced Microeconomics: Game Theory P. v. Mouche Wageningen University 2018 Outline 1 Motivation 2 Games in strategic form 3 Games in extensive form What is game theory? Traditional game theory deals
More informationA Brief Introduction to the Basics of Game Theory Matthew O. Jackson, Stanford University
A Brief Introduction to the Basics of Game Theory Matthew O. Jackson, Stanford University I provide a (very) brief introduction to game theory. I have developed these notes to provide quick access to some
More informationSOCIAL GAMES: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games
SOCIAL GAMES: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games Matthew O. Jackson and Alison Watts Draft: January 31, 2005 Abstract: We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players
More informationECON 312: Games and Strategy 1. Industrial Organization Games and Strategy
ECON 312: Games and Strategy 1 Industrial Organization Games and Strategy A Game is a stylized model that depicts situation of strategic behavior, where the payoff for one agent depends on its own actions
More informationAdvanced Macroeconomics Course: Social learning and Intelligent Design Ramon Marimon
European University Institute Department of Economics Winter and Spring 2008 Advanced Macroeconomics Course: Social learning and Intelligent Design Ramon Marimon This is a course for second and more advanced
More informationSequential Games When there is a sufficient lag between strategy choices our previous assumption of simultaneous moves may not be realistic. In these
When there is a sufficient lag between strategy choices our previous assumption of simultaneous moves may not be realistic. In these settings, the assumption of sequential decision making is more realistic.
More informationGame Theory and Randomized Algorithms
Game Theory and Randomized Algorithms Guy Aridor Game theory is a set of tools that allow us to understand how decisionmakers interact with each other. It has practical applications in economics, international
More informationIntroduction to (Networked) Game Theory. Networked Life NETS 112 Fall 2016 Prof. Michael Kearns
Introduction to (Networked) Game Theory Networked Life NETS 112 Fall 2016 Prof. Michael Kearns Game Theory for Fun and Profit The Beauty Contest Game Write your name and an integer between 0 and 100 Let
More informationDynamic Games: Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection
Dynamic Games: Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection Carlos Hurtado Department of Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign hrtdmrt2@illinois.edu Jun 22th, 2017 C. Hurtado (UIUC - Economics)
More informationCristina Bicchieri. Carnegie-Mellon University
Backward Induction without Common Knowledge Author(s): Cristina Bicchieri Reviewed work(s): Source: PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1988, Volume
More information