RASMUSSEN: bibliography 2006/9/20 19:51 page 493 #1

Transcription

1 The page numbers where a reference is mentioned in the text are listed after the reference. The date of first publication, which may differ from the date of the printing cited, follows the author s name. Some publications (e.g., The Wall Street Journal) are cited in footnotes in the main text but are not in the bibliography. In the case of newspapers, I provide page numbers, but the exact page may differ among regional and time-of-day editions. Abreu, Dilip, David Pearce, & Ennio Stacchetti (1986) Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring, The Journal of Economic Theory, 39(1): (June 1986). 120 Abreu, Dilip, David Pearce, & Ennio Stacchetti (1990) Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring, Econometrica, 58(5): (September 1990). 149 Akerlof, George (1970) The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3): (August 1970). Reprinted in Rasmusen (2001). 249, 269, 270 Akerlof, George (1980) A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May Be One Consequence, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94(4): (June 1980). 266 Akerlof, George (1983) Loyalty Filters, The American Economic Review, 73(1): (March 1983). 216, 266 Akerlof, George & Janet Yellen, eds., (1986) Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1986). 236 Alchian, Armen. See Klein et al. (1978). Alchian, Armen & Harold Demsetz (1972) Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization, The American Economic Review, 62(5): (December 1972). 201 Alexeev, Michael & James Leitzel (1996) Rent-Shrinking, The Southern Economic Journal, 62(3): Aliprantis, Charalambos & Subir Chakrabarti (1999) Games and Decisionmaking, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1999). xxvi Anderson Lisa R. See Holt & Anderson (1996). Antle, Rick & Abbie Smith (1986) An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Executives, The Journal of Accounting Research, 24(1):1 39 (Spring 1986). 236 Arrow, Kenneth (1979) The Property Rights Doctrine and Demand Revelation under Incomplete Information, in Economics and Human Welfare, ed. Michael Boskin, New York: Academic Press (1979). 381 RASMUSSEN: bibliography 2006/9/20 19:51 page 493 #1

2 494 References and Name Index Arrow, Kenneth (1985) The Economics of Agency, in Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, pp , John Pratt & Richard Zeckhauser, eds., Boston: Harvard Business School Press (1985). 183 Athey, Susan & Philip A. Haile (2005) Nonparametric Approaches to Auctions, The Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 6, pdf. Elsevier: forthcoming. 428 Aumann, Robert (1964a) Markets with a Continuum of Traders, Econometrica, 32: (January/April 1964). 99 Aumann, Robert (1964b) Mixed and Behavior Strategies in Infinite Extensive Games, in Annals of Mathematics Studies, No. 52, M. Dresher, L. S. Shapley, and A. W. Tucker, eds., pp , Princeton: Princeton University Press (1964). 99 Aumann, Robert (1974) Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies, The Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1(1): (March 1974). 80 Aumann, Robert (1976) Agreeing to Disagree, Annals of Statistics, 4(6): (November 1976). 64 Aumann, Robert (1981) Survey of Repeated Games, in Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oscar Morgenstern, ed. Robert Aumann, Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut (1981). 149 Aumann, Robert (1987) Correlated Equilibrium As an Expression of Bayesian Rationality, Econometrica, 55(1): 1 18 (January 1987). 80 Aumann, Robert (1997) On the State of the Art in Game Theory, in Understanding Strategic Interaction, Wulf Albers, Werner Guth, Peter Hammerstein, Benny Moldovanu, & Eric van Damme, eds., Berlin: Springer-Verlag (1997). 22 Aumann, Robert. See Hart (2005). Aumann, Robert & Sergiu Hart (1992) Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, New York: North-Holland (1992). xxv, xxv, xxvii Axelrod, Robert (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Basic Books (1984). 169, 175 Axelrod, Robert & William Hamilton (1981) The Evolution of Cooperation, Science, 211(4489): 96 (March 1981). Reprinted in Rasmusen (2001a). 151 Ayres, Ian (1990) Playing Games with the Law, Stanford Law Review, 42(5): (May 1990). 113 Ayres, Ian (1991) Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, Harvard Law Review, 104(4): (February 1991). 369 Ayres, Ian & Peter Cramton (1996) Deficit Reduction through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition, Stanford Law Review, 48: (April 1996). 428 Ayres, Ian. See Brown & Ayres (1994). Bagchi, Arunabha (1984) Stackelberg Differential Games in Economic Models, Berlin: Springer- Verlag (1984). 99 Bagehot, Walter (1971) The Only Game in Town, Financial Analysts Journal, 27(2): (March/April 1971). Reprinted in Rasmusen (2001). 259 Bagnoli, Mark & Theodore Bergstrom (1994) Log-Concave Probability and Its Applications, working paper, (1994). 490 Baird, Douglas, Gertner Robert, & Randal Picker (1994) Strategic Behavior and the Law: The Role of Game Theory and Information Economics in Legal Analysis, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1994). xxv Bajari, Patrick & Ali Hortacsu (2004) Economic Insights from Internet Auctions, The Journal of Economic Literature, 42(2): (2004). 428 Bajari, Patrick, Han Hong, & Stephen Ryan (2004) Identification and Estimation of Discrete Games of Complete Information, NBER Working Paper No. T0301, = (October 2004). 99 RASMUSSEN: bibliography 2006/9/20 19:51 page 494 #2

3 References and Name Index 495 Bajari, Patrick & Stephen Tadelis (2001) Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts, The RAND Journal of Economics, 32(3): (Autumn 2001). 316 Baker, George, Michael Jensen, & Kevin J. Murphy (1988) Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory, The Journal of Finance, 43(3): (July 1988). 216 Baldwin, B. & G. Meese (1979) Social Behavior in Pigs Studied by Means of Operant Conditioning, Animal Behavior, 27: (August 1979). 26, 35 Baliga, Sandeep (2002) Research Summary, htm/resumm.pdf (undated: 2002?). 281 Banks, Jeffrey (1991) Signalling Games in Political Science, Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Publishers (1991). 348 Bannerjee, A. V. (1992) A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(3): (August 1992). 61 Baron, David (1989) Design of Regulatory Mechanisms and Institutions, in Schmalensee & Willig (1989). 314, 315 Baron, David & David Besanko (1984) Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing, The RAND Journal of Economics, 15(4): (Winter 1984). 100 Baron, David & Robert Myerson (1982) Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs, Econometrica, 50(4): (July 1982). 306 Basar, Tamar & Geert Olsder (1999) Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, 2nd edition, revised, Philadelphia: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (1st edition 1982, 2nd edition 1995). xxvi Basu, Kaushik (1993) Lectures in Industrial Organization Theory, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers (1993). xxv Baumol, William & Stephen Goldfeld (1968) Precursors in Mathematical Economics: An Anthology, London: London School of Economics and Political Science (1968). 6 Baye, Michael R. & Heidrun H. Hoppe (2003) The Strategic Equivalence of Rent- Seeking, Innovation, and Patent-Race Games, Games and Economic Behavior, 44(2): Baye, Michael. See Kovenock, Baye & de Vries (1996). Becker, Gary (1968) Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political Economy, 76(2): (March/April 1968). 198 Becker, Gary & George Stigler (1974) Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Compensation of Enforcers, The Journal of Legal Studies, 3(1): 1 18 (January 1974). 213 Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Vijay Krishna (1985) Finitely Repeated Games, Econometrica, 17(4): (July 1985). 147, 152 Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Vijay Krishna (2000) The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis, Pennsylvania State University working paper, vkrishna/papers/synth34.pdf (March 10, 2000). Bernanke, Benjamin (1983) Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression, The American Economic Review, 73(3): (June 1983). 265 Bernheim, B. Douglas (1984a) Rationalizable Strategic Behavior, Econometrica, 52(4): (July 1984). 35 Bernheim, B. Douglas (1984b) Strategic Deterrence of Sequential Entry into an Industry, The RAND Journal of Economics, 15(1): 1 11 (Spring 1984). 230 Bernheim, B. Douglas, Bezalel Peleg, & Michael Whinston (1987) Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I: Concepts, The Journal of Economic Theory, 42(1): 1 12 (June 1987). 120 Bernheim, B. Douglas & Michael Whinston (1987) Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria II: Applications, The Journal of Economic Theory, 42(1): (June 1987). 120 Bertrand, Joseph (1883) Rechercher sur la theorie mathematique de la richesse, Journal des Savants, 48: (September 1883). 90 RASMUSSEN: bibliography 2006/9/20 19:51 page 495 #3

4 496 References and Name Index Besanko, David, David Dranove, & Mark Shanley (1996) Economics of Strategy, New York: John Wiley and Sons (1996). xxvi Besanko, David. See Baron & Besanko (1984). Bierman, H. Scott & Fernandez, Luis (1998) Game Theory with Economic Applications, 2nd edition, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley (1st edition 1993). xxvi Bikhchandani, Sushil (1988) Reputations in Repeated Second Price Auctions, The Journal of Economic Theory, 46(1): (October 1988). 425 Bikhchandani, Sushil, David Hirshleifer, & Ivo Welch (1992) A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change As Informational Cascades, The Journal of Political Economy, 100(5): (October 1992). 61 Binmore, Ken (1990) Essays on the Foundations of Game Theory, Oxford: Basil Blackwell (1990). 173 Bond, Eric (1982) A Direct Test of the Lemons Model: The Market for Used Pickup Trucks, The American Economic Review, 72(4): (September 1982). Binmore, Ken (1992) Fun and Games: A Text on Game Theory, Lexington: D. C. Heath (1992). xxv Binmore, Ken & Partha Dasgupta, eds., (1986) Economic Organizations as Games, Oxford: Basil Blackwell (1986). 6 Binmore, Ken, Ariel Rubinstein, & Asher Wolinsky (1986) The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling, The RAND Journal of Economics, 17(2): (Summer 1986). 380 Blanchard, Olivier (1979) Speculative Bubbles, Crashes, and Rational Expectations, Economics Letters, 3(4): (1979). 149 Bognanno, Michael L. See Ehrenberg & Bognanno (1990). Bolton, Patrick & Mathias Dewatripont (2005) Contract Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2005). xxviii, 201 Bond, Eric (1982) A Direct Test of the Lemons Model: The Market for Used Pickup Trucks, The American Economic Review, 72(4): (September 1982). Border, Kim (1985) Fixed Point Theorems with Applications to Economics and Game Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1985). 473 Border, Kim & Joel Sobel (1987) Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder, The Review of Economic Studies, 54(4): (October 1987). 100 Bowersock, G. (1985) The Art of the Footnote, The American Scholar, 52: (Winter 1983/84). 7 Boyd, Robert & Jeffrey Lorberbaum (1987) No Pure Strategy Is Evolutionarily Stable in the Repeated Prisoner s Dilemma Game, Nature, 327(6117): (May 1987). 149 Boyd, Robert & Peter Richerson (1985) Culture and the Evolutionary Process, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1985). 151 Boyes, William J. & Stephen K. Happel, Auctions As an Allocation Mechanism in Academia: The Case of Faculty Offices, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3(3): (Summer 1989). 385 Brams, Steven (1980) Biblical Games: A Strategic Analysis of Stories in the Old Testament, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1980). 34 Brams, Steven (1983) Superior Beings: If They Exist, How Would We Know? New York: Springer- Verlag (1983). 34 Brams, Steven & D. Marc Kilgour (1988) Game Theory and National Security, Oxford: Basil Blackwell (1988). 35 Brandenburger, Adam (1992) Knowledge and Equilibrium in Games, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6(4): (Fall 1992). 49, 64 Bresnahan, Timothy & Peter Reiss (1990) Entry in Monopoly Markets, The Review of Economic Studies, 57(4): Bresnahan, Timothy & Peter Reiss (1991a) Empirical Models of Discrete Games, The Journal of Econometrics, 48(1 2): , 467 RASMUSSEN: bibliography 2006/9/20 19:51 page 496 #4

5 References and Name Index 497 Bresnahan, Timothy & Peter Reiss (1991b) Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets, The Journal of Political Economy, 99(5): (October 1991). 467 Brown, Jennifer & Ian Ayres (1994) Economic Rationales for Mediation, Virginia Law Review, 80(2): (March 1994). 314 Bulow, Jeremy (1982) Durable-Goods Monopolists, The Journal of Political Economy, 90(2): (April 1982). 463 Bulow, Jeremy, John Geanakoplos, & Paul Klemperer (1985) Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements, The Journal of Political Economy, 93(3): (June 1985). 94, 102 Bulow, Jeremy & Paul Klemperer (1996) Auctions versus Negotiations, The American Economic Review, 86(1): (March 1996). 380, 385, 409 Bulow, Jeremy & John Roberts (1989) The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions, The Journal of Political Economy, 97(5): (October 1989). 409, 413 Calfee, John. See Craswell & Calfee (1986). Calomiris, Charles & Joseph Mason (1997) Contagion and Bank Failures During the Great Depression: The June 1932 Chicago Banking Panic, American Economic Review, 87(5): (December 1997). Campbell, Richmond & Lanning Sowden (1985) Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner s Dilemma and Newcomb s Problem, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press (1985). 34 Campbell, W. See Capen et al. (1971). Canzoneri, Matthew & Dale Henderson (1991) Monetary Policy in Interdependent Economies, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1991). 35 Capen, E., R. Clapp, & W. Campbell (1971) Competitive Bidding in High-Risk Situations, The Journal of Petroleum Technology, 23(1): (June 1971). 415, 416, 429 Cass, David & Karl Shell (1983) Do Sunspots Matter? The Journal of Political Economy, 91(2): (April 1983). 80 Cassady, Ralph (1967) Auctions and Auctioneering, Berkeley: California University Press (1967). 399, 428 Chakrabarti, Subir. See Aliprantis & Chakrabarti (1999). Chammah, Albert. See Rapoport & Chammah (1965). Chatterjee, Kalyan and William Samuelson (1983) Bargaining Under Incomplete Information, Operations Research, 31(5): (September/October 1983). 381 Che Yeon-Koo & Ian Gale (1998) Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders, The Review of Economic Studies, 65(1): 1 21 (January 1998). 429 Che Yeon-Koo. See Polinsky & Che (1991). Chiang, Alpha (1984) Fundamental Methods of Mathematical Economics, 3rd edition, New York: McGraw-Hill (1984, 1st edition 1967). 473 Chiappori, P. A., Steven Levitt, & T. Groseclose (2002) Testing Mixed Strategy Equilibria when Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer, The American Economic Review, 92(4): (September 2002). 98 Chiappori, P. A. & B. Salanie (2003) Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work, in Advances in Economics and Econometrics Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress, pp , M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen, & P. Turnovsky, eds., Econometric Society Monographs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2003). 201 Cho, In-Koo & David Kreps (1987) Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(2): (May 1987). 324, 173 Chung, Tai-Yeong (1996) Rent-Seeking Contest when the Prize Increases with Aggregate Efforts, Public Choice, 87(1 2): (1996). 403 Clapp, R. See Capen et al. (1971). RASMUSSEN: bibliography 2006/9/20 19:51 page 497 #5

6 498 References and Name Index Coase, Ronald (1960) The Problem of Social Cost, The Journal of Law and Economics, 3: 1 44 (October 1960). 192, 217 Coase, Ronald (1972) Durability and Monopoly, The Journal of Law and Economics, 15(1): (April 1972). 463, 469 Cooper, Russell (1999) Coordination Games: Complementarities and Macroeconomics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1999). 35 Cooter, Robert & Peter Rappoport (1984) Were the Ordinalists Wrong about Welfare Economics? The Journal of Economic Literature, 22(2): (June 1984). 33 Cooter, Robert & Daniel Rubinfeld (1989) Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, The Journal of Economic Literature, 27(3): (September 1989). 115 Copeland, Thomas & J. Fred Weston (1988) Financial Theory and Corporate Policy, 3rd edition, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley (1st edition, 1983). 338, 487 Cosmides, Leda & John Tooby (1993) Cognitive Adaptions for Social Change, in The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture, pp , J. H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, & John Tooby, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press (1993). 68 Cournot, Augustin (1838) Recherches sur les Principes Mathematiques de la Theorie des Richesses, Paris: M. Riviere & C. (1838). Translated in Researches into the Mathematical Principles of Wealth, New York: A. M. Kelly (1960). 88 Cox, David & David Hinkley (1974) Theoretical Statistics, London: Chapman and Hall (1974). 203 Cramton, Peter (1984) Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty, The Review of Economic Studies, 51(4): (October 1984). 381 Cramton, Peter (undated) Economics 703: Lecture Note 6: Auctions, Reputations, and Bargaining, Cramton, Peter. See Ayres & Cramton (1996). Crawford, Robert. See Klein et al. (1978). Crawford, Vincent & Hans Haller (1990) Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games, Econometrica, 58(3): (May 1990). 36 Crawford, Vincent & Joel Sobel (1982) Strategic Information Transmission, Econometrica, 50(6): (November 1982). 80 Dalkey, Norman (1953) Equivalence of Information Patterns and Essentially Determinate Games, pp of Kuhn & Tucker (1953). Dasgupta, Partha. See Binmore & Dasgupta (1986). Dasgupta, Partha & Eric Maskin (1986b) The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications, The Review of Economic Studies, 53(1): (January 1986). 258, 444, 448 D Aspremont, Claude, J. Gabszewicz, & Jacques Thisse (1979) On Hotelling s Stability of Competition, Econometrica, 47(5): (September 1979). Reprinted in Rasmusen (2001). 381, 444, 468 D Aspremont, Claude & L. Gerard-Varet (1979) Incentives and Incomplete Information, The Journal of Public Economics, 11(1): (February 1979). 444 David, Paul (1985) CLIO and the Economics of QWERTY, AEA Papers and Proceedings, 75(2): (May 1985). 30 Davis, Philip, Reuben Hersh, & Elena Marchisotto (1981) The Mathematical Experience, Boston: Birkhauser (1981). 6 Dawes, Robyn (1988) Rational Choice in an Uncertain World, Fort Worth, Texas: Harcourt Brace (1988). 65, 236 Dawkins, Richard (1989) The Selfish Gene, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1st edition 1976). 151 RASMUSSEN: bibliography 2006/9/20 19:51 page 498 #6

7 References and Name Index 499 Debreu, Gerard (1959) Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium, New Haven: Yale University Press (1959). 473 Debreu, Gerard. See Arrow & Debreu (1954). Debreu, Gerard & Herbert Scarf (1963) A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy, The International Economic Review, 4(3): (September 1963). 2 Demsetz, Harold. See Alchian & Demsetz (1972). Deneckere, Raymond J. & R. Preston McAfee (1996) Damaged Goods, The Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 5(2): (Summer 1996). 457 de Vries, Casper G. See Kovenock, Baye & de Vries (1996). Dewatripont, Mathias (1989) Renegotiation and Information Revelation over Time in Optimal Labor Contracts, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(3): (August 1989). 219 Dewatripont, Mathias. See Bolton & Dewatripont (2005). Diamond, Douglas W. (1984) Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, The Review of Economic Studies, 51(3): (July 1984). 100 Diamond, Douglas W. (1989) Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets, The Journal of Political Economy, 97(4): (August 1989). 170, 265 Diamond, Douglas W. & P. Dybvig (1983) Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, The Journal of Political Economy, 91(3): (June 1983). 102 Diamond, Peter (1982) Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium, The Journal of Political Economy, 90(5): (October 1982). 102 Diamond, Peter & Michael Rothschild, eds., (1978) Uncertainty in Economics: Readings and Exercises, New York: Academic Press (1978). 6 Dimand, Mary Ann & Robert Dimand (1996) A History of Game Theory, London: Routledge (1996). 6, 35 Dimand, Mary Ann & Robert Dimand (1997) The Foundations of Game Theory, 3 Vol., Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar Publishing (1997). 6 Dimand, Robert & Mohammed Dore (1999) Cournot, Bertrand, and Game Theory: A Further Note, Atlantic Economic Journal, 27: (September 1999). 468 Dixit, Avinash & Barry Nalebuff (1991) Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life, New York: Norton (1991). xxiv, 115 Dixit, Avinash & Susan Skeath (1998) Games of Strategy, New York: Norton (1998). xxvi Dixit, Avinash & Joseph Stiglitz (1977) Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, The American Economic Review, 67(3): (June 1977). 468 Dore, Mohammed. See Dimand & Dore (1999). Dranove, David. See Besanko, Dranove, & Shanley (1996). Dubey, Pradeep, Ori Haimanko & Andriy Zapechelnyuk (2006) Strategic Substitutes and Potential Games, forthcoming, Games and Economic Behavior, html (2005). 102 Duggan, Mark & Steven D. Levitt (2002) Winning Isn t Everything: Corruption in Sumo Wrestling, The American Economic Review, 92(5): (December 2002). 237 Dugatkin, Lee & Hudson Reeve, eds., (1998) Game Theory & Animal Behavior, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1998). xxvi, 151 Dunbar, Robin (1995) The Trouble with Science, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1995). 68 Dutta, Prajit (1999) Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1999). xxvi Dybvig, P. See Diamond & Dybvig (1983). Eaton, C. & Richard Lipsey (1975) The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition, The Review of Economic Studies, 42(1): (January 1975). 448 RASMUSSEN: bibliography 2006/9/20 19:51 page 499 #7

8 500 References and Name Index Eatwell, John, Murray Milgate, & Peter Newman (1989) The New Palgrave: Game Theory, New York: W.W. Norton & Co. (1989). xxiv Edgeworth, Francis (1897) La Teoria Pura del Monopolio, Giornale Degli Economisti, 40: (1925). Translated in pp of Edgeworth, Francis, Papers Relating to Political Economy, Vol. I, London: Macmillan (1925). 440 Edgeworth, Francis (1922) The Mathematical Economics of ProfessorAmoroso, Economic Journal, 32(127): (September 1922). Reprinted in Rasmusen (2001). 440 Ehrenberg, Ronald G. & Michael L. Bognanno (1990) Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects? The Journal of Political Economy, 98(6): (December 1990). 237 Eichberger, Jurgen (1993) Game Theory for Economists, San Diego: Academic Press (1993). xxv Engers, Maxim (1987) Signalling with Many Signals, Econometrica, 55(3): (May 1987). 338 Fama, Eugene (1980) Banking in the Theory of Finance, The Journal of Monetary Economics, 6(1): (January 1980). 201 Farrell, Joseph (2001) Monopoly Slack and Competitive Rigor: A Simple Model, MIT mimeo (February 1983). Published in Rasmusen (2001). 214 Farrell, Joseph (1987) Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry, The RAND Journal of Economics, 18(1): (Spring 1987). Reprinted in Rasmusen (2001). 80 Farrell, Joseph & Matthew Rabin (1996) Cheap Talk, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(3): (Summer 1996). 317 Farrell, Joseph & Garth Saloner (1985) Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, The RAND Journal of Economics, 16(1): (Spring 1985). 30 Farrell, Joseph & Carl Shapiro (1988) Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs, The RAND Journal of Economics, 19(1): (Spring 1988). 141 Feltovich, Nick, Richmond Harbaugh, & Ted To (2002) Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling, The RAND Journal of Economics, 33(4): (Winter 2002). xxi, 345, 347 Fisher, D. C. & J. Ryan (1992) Optimal Strategies for a Generalized Scissors, Paper, and Stone Game, The American Mathematical Monthly, 99(10): (1992). 98 Fisher, Franklin (1989) Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, The RAND Journal of Economics, 20(1): (Spring 1989). 2 Flanagan, Thomas (1998) Game Theory and Canadian Politics, Toronto: University of Toronto Press (1998). 35 Fowler, Henry (1926) A Dictionary of Modern English Usage, Herefordshire: Wordsworth Editions reprint, (1997). 7 Fowler, Henry & Frank Fowler (1931) The King s English, 3rd edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1949). 7 Frank, Robert (1988) Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions, New York: Norton (1988). 361 Freixas, Xavier, Roger Guesnerie, & Jean Tirole (1985) Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect, The Review of Economic Studies, 52(2): (April 1985). 315 Friedman, James (1990) Game Theory with Applications to Economics, New York: Oxford University Press (2nd edition, 1986). xxiv Friedman, Milton (1953) Essays in Positive Economics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1953). 6 Fudenberg, Drew & David Levine (1986) Limit Games and Limit Equilibria, The Journal of Economic Theory, 38(2): (April 1986). 100, 148, 148 Fudenberg, Drew & David K. Levine (1989) Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player, Econometrica, 57(4): (July 1989). RASMUSSEN: bibliography 2006/9/20 19:51 page 500 #8

9 References and Name Index 501 Fudenberg, Drew & Eric Maskin (1986) The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information, Econometrica, 54(3): (May 1986). 149, 169 Fudenberg, Drew & Jean Tirole (1983) Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information, The Review of Economic Studies, 50(2): (April 1983). 365 Fudenberg, Drew & Jean Tirole (1986b) A Theory of Exit in Duopoly, Econometrica, 54(4): (July 1986). 148 Fudenberg, Drew & Jean Tirole (1986c) ASignal-Jamming Theory of Predation, The RAND Journal of Economics, 17(3): (Autumn 1986). 341 Fudenberg, Drew & Jean Tirole (1991a) Game Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1991). xix, xxiv, 65, 77, 120, 149, 195, 306, 381, 454, 473, 484 Fudenberg, Drew & Jean Tirole (1991b) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium, The Journal of Economic Theory, 53(2): (April 1991). 173 Gabszewicz, J. See d Aspremont et al. (1979). Galbraith, John Kenneth (1954) The Great Crash, Boston: Houghton Mifflin (1954). 238 Gale, Ian. See Che & Gale (1998). Gal-Or, Esther (1985) First Mover and Second Mover Advantages, International Economic Review, 26(3): (October 1985). 94 Gardner, Roy, Games for Business and Economics, New York: John Wiley and Sons (2nd edition 2003). xxv Gaskins, Darius (1974) Alcoa Revisited: The Welfare Implications of a Second-Hand Market, The Journal of Economic Theory, 7(3): (March 1974). 469 Gates, Scott & Brian Humes (1997) Games, Information, and Politics: Applying Game Theoretic Models to Political Science, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1997). xxvi Gaudet, Gerard & Stephen Salant (1991) Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium: New Results from Old Methods, The Review of Economic Studies, 58: (April 1991). 467 Gaver, Kenneth & Jerold Zimmerman (1977) An Analysis of Competitive Bidding on BART Contracts, The Journal of Business, 50(3): (July 1977). 213 Geanakoplos, John (1992) Common Knowledge, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6(4): (Fall 1992). 64 Geanakoplos, John. See Bulow et al. (1985). Geanakoplos, John & Heraklis Polemarchakis (1982) We Can t Disagree Forever, The Journal of Economic Theory, 28(1): (October 1982). 65 Gerard-Varet, L. See D Aspremont & Gerard-Varet (1979). Gertner, Robert. See Baird, Gertner, & Picker (1994). Ghemawat, Pankaj (1997) Games Businesses Play: Cases and Models, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1997). xxvi Ghemawat, Pankaj & Barry Nalebuff (1985) Exit, The RAND Journal of Economics, 16(2): (Summer 1985). 76 Gibbard, Allan (1973) Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, Econometrica, 41(4): (July 1973). 314 Gibbons, Robert (1992) Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1992). xxv, 284, 381 Gillies, Donald (1953) Locations of Solutions, in Report of an Informal Conference on the Theory of n-person Games, pp , Princeton Mathematics mimeo (1953). 1 Gintis, Herbert (2000) Game Theory Evolving, Princeton: Princeton University Press (2000). xxvii, 144, 351 Gjesdal, Froystein (1982) Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem, The Review of Economic Studies, 49(3): (July 1982). 203 RASMUSSEN: bibliography 2006/9/20 19:51 page 501 #9

10 502 References and Name Index Glazer, Jacob & Albert Ma (1989) Efficient Allocation of a Prize : King Solomon s Dilemma, Games and Economic Behavior, 1(3): (1989). 281 Glosten, Lawrence & Paul Milgrom (1985) Bid, Ask, and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Model with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, The Journal of Financial Economics, 14(1): (March 1985). 259 Goldfeld, Stephen. See Baumol & Goldfeld (1968). Gonik, Jacob (1978) Tie Salesmen s Bonuses to Their Forecasts, Harvard Business Review, 56: (May/June 1978). Reprinted in Rasmusen (2001). 292 Gordon, David. See Rapaport, Guyer, & Gordon (1976). Graham, Daniel & Robert Marshall (1987) Collusive Bidding Behavior at Single-Object Second- Price and English Auctions, The Journal of Political Economy, 95(6): Green, Jerry. See Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green (1994). Greenhut, Melvin & Hiroshi Ohta (1975) Theory of Spatial Pricing and Market Areas, Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press (1975). 468 Grinblatt, Mark & Chuan-Yang Hwang (1989) Signalling and the Pricing of New Issues, The Journal of Finance, 44(2): (June 1989). 339 Groseclose, T. See Chiappori, Levitt, & Groseclose (2002). Grossman, Gene & Michael Katz (1983) Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare, The American Economic Review, 73(4): (September 1983). 348 Grossman, Sanford & Oliver Hart (1980) Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, The Bell Journal of Economics, 11(1): (Spring 1980). 230 Grossman, Sanford & Oliver Hart (1983) An Analysis of the Principal Agent Problem, Econometrica, 51(1): 7 45 (January 1983). 195 Groves, Theodore (1973) Incentives in Teams, Econometrica, 41(4): (July 1973). 296 Guasch, J. Luis & Andrew Weiss (1980) Wages as Sorting Mechanisms in Competitive Markets with Asymmetric Information: A Theory of Testing, The Review of Economic Studies, 47(4): (July 1980). 272 Guesnerie, Roger. See Freixas et al. (1985). Guth, Werner, Rold Schmittberger, & Bernd Schwarze (1982) An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3(4): (December 1982). 118 Guyer, Melvin. See Rapaport, Guyer & Gordon (1976). Haile, Philip A. See Athey & Haile (2005). Haimanko, Ori. See Dubey, Haimanko, & Zapechelnyuk (2002). Haller, Hans (1986) Noncooperative Bargaining of N 3 Players, Economics Letters, 22: (1986). 364 Haller, Hans. See Crawford & Haller(1990). Halmos, Paul (1970) How to Write Mathematics, L Enseignement Mathematique, 16(2): (May/June 1970). 7 Haltiwanger, John & Michael Waldman (1991) Responders versus Nonresponders: A New Perspective of Heterogeneity, Economic Journal, 101(408): (September 1991). 468 Hamilton, William. See Axelrod & Hamilton (1981). Han Fei Tzu (c. 250 B.C.) Basic Writings, translated by Burton Watson, New York: Columbia University Press (1964). 216, 217 Happel, Stephen K. See Boyes & Happel (1989). Harbaugh, Richmond. See Feltovich, Harbaugh, & To (2002). Harper, David. See Maynard-Smith & Harper (2004). Harrington, Joseph (1987) Collusion in Multiproduct Oligopoly Games under a Finite Horizon, The International Economic Review, 28(1): 1 14 (February 1987). 147 RASMUSSEN: bibliography 2006/9/20 19:51 page 502 #10

11 References and Name Index 503 Harris, Milton & Bengt Holmstrom (1982) A Theory of Wage Dynamics, The Review of Economic Studies, 49(3): (July 1982). 52 Harris, Milton & Arthur Raviv (1992) Financial Contracting Theory, in Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress, ed. Jean-Jacques Laffont, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1992). Harris, Milton & Arthur Raviv (1995) The Role of Games in Security Design, The Review of Financial Studies, 8(2): (Summer 1995). 263 Harris, Robert. See Franks et al. (1988). Harsanyi, John (1967) Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players, I: The Basic Model, Management Science, 14(3): (November 1967). 2, 53 Harsanyi, John (1968a) Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players, II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points, Management Science, 14(5): (January 1968). Harsanyi, John (1968b) Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players, III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game, Management Science, 14(7): (March 1968). Harsanyi, John (1973) Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed Strategy Equilibrium Points, The International Journal of Game Theory, 2(1): 1 23 (1973). 73 Harsanyi, John (1977) Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations, New York: Cambridge University Press (1977). 380 Harsanyi, John & Reinhard Selten (1988) A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1988). 31 Hart, Oliver & Bengt Holmstrom (1987) The Theory of Contracts, in Advances in Economic Theory, ed. T. F. Bewley, pp , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1987). 183 Hart, Oliver & John Moore (1990), Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, The Journal of Political Economy, 98(6): (December 1990). 218, 219 Hart, Oliver. See Grossman & Hart (1980, 1983). Hart, Sergiu (2005) An Interview with Robert Aumann, hart/abs/ aumann.html (January 2005; updated April 2005). 35 Hart, Sergiu. See Aumann & Hart (1992). Hausman, Jerry & James Poterba (1987) Household Behavior and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1(1): (Summer 1987). 305 Haywood, O. (1954) Military Decisions and Game Theory, Journal of the Operations Research Society of America, 2(4): (November 1954). 22 Henderson, Dale. See Canzoneri & Henderson (1991). Hendricks, Ken, Andrew Weiss, & Charles A. Wilson (1988) The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information, International Economic Review, 29(4): (November 1988). Hendricks, Ken & Robert Porter (1988) An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information, The American Economic Review, 78(5): (December 1988). 428 Hendricks, Ken & Robert Porter (forthcoming), Lectures on Auctions: An Empirical Perspective, in The Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. III, M. Armstrong and R. Porter, eds., Elsevier, forthcoming. 428 Herodotus (c. 429 B.C.) The Persian Wars, George Rawlinson, translator, New York: Modern Library (1947). 34 Hersh, Reuben. See Davis & Hersh (1981). Hines, W. (1987) Evolutionary Stable Strategies: AReview of Basic Theory, Theoretical Population Biology, 31(2): (April 1987). 151 Hinkley, David. See Cox & Hinkley (1974). Hirshleifer, David (1995) The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational Cascades, in The New Economics of Human Behavior, Mariano Tommasi and Kathryn Ierulli, eds., pp (chapter 12), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995). 61 RASMUSSEN: bibliography 2006/9/20 19:51 page 503 #11

12 504 References and Name Index Hirshleifer, David & Eric Rasmusen (1989) Cooperation in a Repeated Prisoner s Dilemma with Ostracism, The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 12(1): (August 1989). 147 Hirshleifer, David. See Png & Hirshleifer (1987), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch (1992). Hirshleifer, Jack (1982) Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation versus Conflict Strategies, Research in Law and Economics, 4: 1 60 (1982). 35, 151 Hirshleifer, Jack (1987) On the Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and Promises, in The Latest on the Best: Essays on Evolution and Optimality, ed. John Dupre, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1987). 150 Hirshleifer, Jack (1989) Conflict and Rent-Seeking Success Functions: Ratio and Difference Models of Relative Success, Public Choice, 63(2): Hirshleifer, Jack & Juan Martinez-Coll (1988) What Strategies Can Support the Evolutionary Emergence of Cooperation? The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32(2): (June 1988). 149 Hirshleifer, Jack & Eric Rasmusen (1992) Are Equilibrium Strategies Unaffected by Incentives? The Journal of Theoretical Politics, 4: (July 1992). 100 Hirshleifer, Jack & John Riley (1979) The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information: An Expository Survey, The Journal of Economic Literature, 17(4): (December 1979). Hirshleifer, Jack & John Riley (1992) The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1992). xxv, 49 Hoffman, Elizabeth & Matthew Spitzer (1985) Entitlements, Rights and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects Concepts of Distributive Justice, The Journal of Legal Studies, 14(2): (June 1985). 360 Hofstadter, Douglas (1983) Computer Tournaments of the Prisoner s Dilemma Suggest How Cooperation Evolves, Scientific American, 248(5): (May 1983). 175 Holmes, Oliver (1881) The Common Law, Boston: Little, Brown and Co. (1923). 217, 217 Holmstrom, Bengt (1979) Moral Hazard and Observability, The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1): (Spring 1979). 197, 202 Holmstrom, Bengt (1982) Moral Hazard in Teams, The Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2): (Autumn 1982). 227, 230, 238 Holmstrom, Bengt & Paul Milgrom (1987) Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives, Econometrica, 55(2): (March 1987). xx Holmstrom, Bengt & Paul Milgrom (1991) Multitask Principal-AgentAnalyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7: (Special Issue, 1991). xx, xx, 230 Holmstrom, Bengt & Roger Myerson (1983) Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information, Econometrica, 51(6): (November 1983). Holmstrom, Bengt. See Harris & Holmstrom (1982), Hart & Holmstrom (1987). Holt Charles A. & Lisa R. Anderson (1996) Classroom Games: Understanding Bayes Rule, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(2): (Spring 1996). 68 Holt, Charles & David Scheffman (1987) Facilitating Practices: The Effects of Advance Notice and Best-Price Policies, The RAND Journal of Economics, 18(2): (Summer 1987). 469 Hong, Han. See Bajari, Hong, & Ryan (2004). Hoppe, Heidrun H. See Baye & Hoppe (2003). Hortacsu, Ali. See Bajari & Hortacsu (2004). Hotelling, Harold (1929) Stability in Competition, Economic Journal, 39: (March 1929). Reprinted in Rasmusen (2001). 441, 446 Hughes, Patricia (1986) Signalling by Direct Disclosure under Asymmetric Information, The Journal of Accounting and Economics, 8(2): (June 1986). 338 Humes, Brian. See Gates & Humes (1996). RASMUSSEN: bibliography 2006/9/20 19:51 page 504 #12

13 References and Name Index 505 Hwang, Chuan-Yang. See Grinblatt & Hwang (1989). Intriligator, Michael (1971) Mathematical Optimization and Economic Theory, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall (1971). 473 Isoda, Kazuo. See Nikaido & Isoda (1955). Jarrell, Gregg & Sam Peltzman (1985) The Impact of Product Recalls on the Wealth of Sellers, The Journal of Political Economy, 93(3): (June 1985). 150 Jensen, Michael C. (2003) Paying People to Lie: The Truth about the Budgeting Process, European Financial Management, 9(3): (September 2003). 201 Jensen, Michael C. See Baker et al. (1988). Jin, Ginger & Philip Leslie (2003) The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(2): (2003). 348 Johnson, Norman & Samuel Kotz (1970) Distributions in Statistics, 3 vol., New York: John Wiley and Sons (1970). 481 Kahneman, Daniel, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky, eds., (1982) Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1982). 65, 236 Kakutani, Shizuo (1941) A Generalization of Brouwer s Fixed Point Theorem, Duke Mathematical Journal, 8(3): (September 1941). 485 Kalai, Ehud, Dov Samet, & William Stanford (1988) Note on Reactive Equilibria in the Discounted Prisoner s Dilemma and Associated Games, The International Journal of Game Theory, 17: (1988). 131 Kamien, Morton & Nancy Schwartz (1982) Market Structure and Innovation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1982). Kamien, Morton & Nancy Schwartz (1991) Dynamic Optimization: The Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control in Economics and Management, 2nd edition, New York: North Holland (1991, 1st edition 1981). 473 Kandori, Michihiro (2002) Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring, The Journal of Economic Theory, 102(1): 1 15 (January 2002). 149 Kandori, Michihiro & H. Matsushima (1998) Private Observation, Communication, and Collusion, Econometrica, 66(3): Kaplow, Louis & Steven Shavell (1996) Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, Harvard Law Review, 109(4): (February 1996). 429 Karlin, Samuel (1959) Mathematical Methods and Theory in Games, Programming and Economics, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley (1959). 77 Katz, Lawrence (1986) Efficiency Wage Theory: A Partial Evaluation, in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1986, ed. Stanley Fischer, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1986). 236 Katz, Michael & Carl Shapiro (1985) Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, The American Economic Review, 75(3): (June 1985). 30 Katz, Michael. See Grossman & Katz (1983). Katz, Michael. See Moskowitz et al. (1980). Kennan, John & Robert Wilson (1993) Bargaining with Private Information, The Journal of Economic Literature, 31(1): (March 1993). 115, 381, 469 Kennedy, Peter (1979) A Guide to Econometrics, 1st edition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1979, 5th edition 2003). Keynes, John Maynard (1933) Essays in Biography, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company (1933). 6 Keynes, John Maynard (1936) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, London: Macmillan (1947). 35 RASMUSSEN: bibliography 2006/9/20 19:51 page 505 #13

14 506 References and Name Index Kierkegaard, Soren (1938) The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard, translated by Alexander-Dru, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1938). 129 Kihlstrom, Richard & Michael Riordan (1984) Advertising as a Signal, The Journal of Political Economy, 92(3): (June 1984). 348 Kilgour, D. Marc. See Brams & Kilgour (1988). Kindleberger, Charles (1983) Standards as Public, Collective and Private Goods, Kyklos, 36: (1983). 30 Klein, Benjamin, Robert Crawford, & Armen Alchian (1978) Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, The Journal of Law and Economics, 21(2): (October 1978). 201, 218 Klein, Benjamin & Keith Leffler (1981) The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, The Journal of Political Economy, 89(4): (August 1981). 138, 140, 150, 236 Klein, Benjamin & Lester Saft (1985) The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, The Journal of Law and Economics, 28(2): (May 1985). 203 Klemperer, Paul (1987) The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs, The RAND Journal of Economics, 18(1): (Spring 1987). 141 Klemperer, Paul (1998) Auctions with Almost Common Values: The Wallet Game and Its Applications, European Economic Review, 42(3 5): (May 1998). 424 Klemperer, Paul, ed. (2000) The Economic Theory of Auctions. Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar (2000). 6, 419, 428 Klemperer, Paul (2004) Auctions: Theory and Practice, Princeton: Princeton University Press (2004) , 425, 427, 428 Klemperer, Paul. See Bulow, Geanakoplos, & Klemperer (1985), Bulow & Klemperer (1996). Kohlberg, Elon & Jean-Francois Mertens (1986) On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria, Econometrica, 54(5): (September 1986). 101 Kotz, Samuel. See Johnson & Kotz (1970). Kovenock, Dan, Michael R. Baye, & Casper G. de Vries (1996) The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information, Economic Theory, 8(2): Kreps, David (1990a) A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1990). xxiv, 65 Kreps, David (1990b) Game Theory and Economic Modeling, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1990). xxiv, 173 Kreps, David, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, & Robert Wilson (1982) Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma, The Journal of Economic Theory, 27: (August 1982). Reprinted in Rasmusen (2001). 2, 167 Kreps, David & Jose Scheinkman (1983) Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes, The Bell Journal of Economics, 14(2): (Autumn 1983). 468 Kreps, David & A. Michael Spence (1985) Modelling the Role of History in Industrial Organization and Competition, in Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare, ed. George Feiwel, London: Macmillan (1985). 3 Kreps, David & Robert Wilson (1982a) Reputation and Imperfect Information, Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2): (August 1982). Kreps, David & Robert Wilson (1982b) Sequential Equilibria, Econometrica, 50(4): (July 1982). 2 Krishna, Vijay (2002) Auction Theory, San Diego: Academic Press (2002). xxvii, 387, 400, 404, 428 Krishna, Vijay. See Benoit & Krishna (1985, 2000). Krouse, Clement (1990) Theory of Industrial Economics, Oxford: Blackwell (1990). xxiv Kuhn, Harold (1953) Extensive Games and the Problem of Information, in Kuhn & Tucker (1953). 98 Kuhn, Harold, ed. (1997) Classics in Game Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1997). 6 RASMUSSEN: bibliography 2006/9/20 19:51 page 506 #14

15 References and Name Index 507 Kuhn, Harold & Albert Tucker, eds., (1953) Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume II, Annals of Mathematics Studies, No. 28, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1953). Kuhn, Thomas (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1970). 446 Kydland, Finn & Edward Prescott (1977) Rules rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, The Journal of Political Economy, 85(3): (June 1977). 122 Kyle, Albert (1985) Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, Econometrica, 53(6): (November 1985). 261 Laffont, Jean-Jacques & David Martimort (2001) The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model, Princeton: Princeton University Press (2001). xxv Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Jean Tirole (1986) Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms, Journal of Political Economy, 94(3): (June 1986). Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Jean Tirole (1993) A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1993). 120, 305, 314 Lakatos, Imre (1976) Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1976). 3 Lane, W. (1980) Product Differentiation in a Market with Endogenous Sequential Entry, The Bell Journal of Economics, 11(1): (Spring 1980). 469 Layard, Richard & George Psacharopoulos (1974) The Screening Hypothesis and the Returns to Education, The Journal of Political Economy, 82(5): (September/October 1974). 330, 348 Lazear, Edward & Sherwin Rosen (1981) Rank-Order Tournaments As Optimum Labor Contracts, The Journal of Political Economy, 89(5): (October 1981). 236 Leffler, Keith. See Klein & Leffler (1981). Leibenstein, Harvey (1950) Bandwagon, Snob and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers Demand, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 64(2): (May 1950). 270 Leitzel, James. See Alexeev & Leitzel (1996). Leland, Hayne & David Pyle (1977) Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation, The Journal of Finance, 32(2): (May 1977). 339 Leonard, Robert J. (1995) From Parlor Games to Social Science: Von Neumann, Morgenstern, and the Creation of Game Theory , The Journal of Economic Literature, 33(2): (June 1995). 35 Leshno, Moshe, Haim Levy, & Yishay Spector (1997) A Comment on Rothschild and Stiglitz s Increasing Risk I: A Definition, The Journal of Economic Theory, 77(1): (November 1997). 489 Leslie, Philip. See Jin & Leslie (2003). Levering, Robert. See Moskowitz et al. (1980). Levine, David. See Fudenberg & Levine (1986, 1989). Levitan, Richard & Martin Shubik (1972) Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints, The International Economic Review, 13(1): (February 1972). 440 Levitt, Steven. See Chiappori, Levitt, & Groseclose (2002), Duggan & Levitt (2002). Levmore, Saul (1982) Self-Assessed Valuation for Tort and Other Law, Virginia Law Review, 68(4): (April 1982). 314 Levy, Haim. See Leshno, Levy, & Spector (1997). Lewis, David (1969) Convention: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1969). 64 Liebowitz, S. & Stephen Margolis (1990) The Fable of the Keys, The Journal of Political Economy, 33(1): 1 25 (April 1990). Reprinted in Famous Fables of Economics: Myths of Market Failures, ed. Daniel F. Spulber, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers (2001). 30 Lipsey, Richard. See Eaton & Lipsey (1975). Lively, C. M. See Sinervo & Lively (1996). RASMUSSEN: bibliography 2006/9/20 19:51 page 507 #15