ITEA Cybersecurity Workshop

Transcription

1 ITEA Cybersecurity Workshop Hardware Assurance Lifecycle Ecosystem Distributed Transition Environment 7 MAR 18 Integrity Service Excellence Matthew Casto, PhD Chief, Trusted Electronics Branch AF JFAC HwA Technical Lead Sensor s Directorate Air Force Research Labs 1

2 Globalization of Microelectronics Needs DoD systems require Trusted and Assured Electronics Availability Access Assurance Commercial vs. Military Requirements COTS risk > reward?? Off-Shore design & production of ICs provides adversary malicious & monetary opportunity Dcma.mil T H A A D 2

3 Strategic Response Strategy Policy Joint Federated Assurance Center Trusted & Assured Microelectronics DSB Microelectronics 05 Cybervision 2025 Foundations of T&A NDAA 14 SEC 937 JFAC DoD Long Term Strategy for TF NDAA 17 SEC 231 PB 17 T&AM DSB Cyber Supply Chain 17 Microelectronics Innovation for National Security FY19 OMB Executive R&D Priorities DoD Instruction (DoDI) Cyber DTMs Trusted Systems and Networks, Program Protection Plan (PPP) International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) update (in work) 2017 EO- Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure Software assurance knowledge & tools Hardware assurance knowledge & tools Advanced verification & validation capabilities Core Hardware Labs across service and agencies Program Pilots Access to state-of-the-art foundries Trust and assurance methods and demonstration New Trust Approach Industrial best practices for assurance Alternative sources of advanced microelectronics COTs and FPGA Assurance Disruptive devices and architectures..the budget invests $454 million over the FYDP to ensure DoD will continue to have access to the trusted microelectronic components needed in our weapon systems. By developing alternative sources for advanced microchips and trusted designs, this funding will help ensure the long-term security of our systems and capabilities. SECDEF Carter, FY17 PBR, 25 FEB 16 Image sources ODASD, DIST A - Assuring MINSEC TAME Forum NOV

4 Hardware Assurance New Challenges Sensors becoming more integrated Autonomy relies more on sensors Can t trust / question all information provided Technology marching on. Stacked die 2.5 D FOWLP, 3DIC 2µm trace space bump connectablility Garage Fab More, Faster Connectivity Asc.army.mil NIST.gov 5G communication taking over the last mile Automated systems communicating autonomously (and anonymously???) Anl.gov 4

5 Counterfeit Chips Plague US Missile Defense WIRED 2011 The Good News US Military Fake Chips Question: How do we handle Battle security in these AUG16 The new environments? Register Huawei, Chinese Technology Giant, Is Focus of Widening U.S. Investigation NY Times APR17 A Chip Flaw Strips Away Hacking Protections for Answer: Millions of Devices WIRED FEB17 Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors - IEEE ISCA 2014 ProjectZero Google 2015 NAE RowHammer Member The Software takes care of that. Source: cyber.nj.gov U.S. Fines ZTE of China $1.19 Billion for Breaching Sanctions NY Times MAR17 5

6 Source: Spectre / Meltdown However, Intel has already pulled its Spectre variant 2 patch because it was causing rebooting errors for some Intel-based computer owners, so everyone will remain vulnerable to this flaw for the time being. Tom s Hardware 6

7 System Vulnerabilities: A Race to the Hardware Complex Hardware Systems have a large, persistent vulnerability surface 7

8 Practical Boundary Conditions: Tractable Scope Source: crd.lbl.gov 8

9 How? Quantitative Analytics Quantitative reduction in likelihood Trust Source: DoD Trusted Systems and Networks (TSN) FEB 13 Requires Data!. Data is the new oil Clive Humbly UK Mathematician Near Mid Far Measurement, Analysis, & Verification Taxonomy of Vulnerability Quantitative Methods for Vulnerability Assessment and Security 9

10 META DATA Where does the data come from? Integrated Circuit Supply Chain Microelectronics Lifecycle Design FAB Test Insert Sustain Design Tools Mask Data Function Package Authenticate PDKs & IP PCM Reliability Harden Monitor Model & Sim Test Articles Integrity Integration Disposal Log Trusted Data Repository 10

11 Integrated Circuit Supply Chain Microelectronics Lifecycle Design FAB Test Insert Sustain Authenticate Monitor Disposal Log 11

12 Putting Tools in Users Hands Distributed Transition Environment Design FAB Test Insert Sustain 12

13 Multi-Domain Access Distributed Transition Environment Design FAB Test Insert Sustain Spatial Location Tracking Physical IP Implement Architecture Electrical 2 nd Order Analysis Function Confidence Tools Vetted IP Counterfeit Malicious Content Temporal Supply/ BlockChain Longevity 13

14 Multi-Domain Access Distributed Transition Environment Design FAB Test Insert Sustain Spatial Location Tracking Physical IP Implement Architecture Electrical 2 nd Order Analysis Function Confidence Tools Vetted IP Counterfeit Malicious Content Temporal Supply/ BlockChain Longevity 14

15 Verification and Validation Distributed Transition Environment Design FAB Test Insert Sustain 15

16 Verification and Validation Distributed Transition Environment Design FAB Test Insert Sustain Verification & Validation Tools 16

17 Identify and Transition Distributed Transition Environment Design FAB Test Insert Sustain Verification & Validation Tools JFAC DARPA/ IARPA 17

18 Identify and Transition Distributed Transition Environment Design FAB Test Insert Sustain Verification & Validation Tools JFAC DARPA/ IARPA Quantitative Risk Assessment Metrics PF = E(f(X Design, X FAB, X Test, X Insert, X Sustain ) S&T / R&D Game Theory SBIR 18

19 Collaborative and Distributed Distributed Transition Environment Design FAB Test Insert Sustain Verification & Validation Tools 19

20 Collaborative and Distributed Analyst Designer Tester Depot Threat Vectors Design Tools IP Model & Sim Sim Data Characterization Reliability Malicious Content Tools Counterfeit Detection Insertion Log Reliability Info Location Shelf Life Traceability Logistics Design FAB Test Insert Sustain Verification & Validation Tools 20

21 Multi-Dimensional Perceptivity Design FAB Test Insert Sustain Verification & Validation Tools 21

22 Multi-Dimensional Perceptivity 22

23 Case Example Legacy Component Legacy Chip 23

24 Case Example Legacy Component Legacy Chip 24

25 Case Example Legacy Component Legacy Chip 25

26 Case Example Legacy Component Legacy Chip 26

27 Case Example Legacy Component Legacy Chip 27

28 National Vision Distributed Transition Environment Test Intelligence Reports TRUST & SCRM Intellectual Property Protection Distributed Transition Environment Analysis Engine Design Reliability Virtual Instruments 28

29 Environment Vision PUBLIC PUBLIC SITE PUBLIC ITAR ATO ITAR RESTRICTED ITAR RESTRICTED SITE PUBLIC ITAR ATO ATO CERTIFIED ATO CERTIFIED SITE PUBLIC ITAR ATO.org Non-US Persons OK Two-Factor Optional Target Users Academia Commercial.com US Persons Only (ITAR) Two-Factor Required Target Users Contractors Commercial USER accounts valid OUTWARDS. DATA repositories can be taken INWARDS. TOOLS can be taken INWARDS..us US Persons Only (CUI) CAC Card or Equivalent Target Users Government Contractors 29

30 Distributed Transition Environment Key Enablers Scalable lifecycle environment User access to tools and techniques Time and version control Address State of the Art, State of Practice, and Legacy and Boutique Risk mitigation and assurance through quantitative analytics and tractable best practice 30

31 African Proverb Every morning in Africa, a gazelle wakes up. It knows it must run faster than the fastest lion or it will be killed Every morning the lion wakes up. It knows it must outrun the slowest gazelle or it will starve to death. It doesn t matter whether you are a lion of a gazelle. When the sun comes up, you d better start running! 31

32 Revolutionary-Relevant-Responsive Ready! 32