Interfaces with MPS/PSS

Transcription

1 Interfaces with / European Spallation Source Accelerator Division TB, 16 November 2016, Lund, Sweden / interfaces 1/21

2 Outline 1 Introduction Conclusions / interfaces 2/21

3 Outline 1 Introduction Conclusions / interfaces 3/21

4 Introduction Interactions between systems ACCSYS TSS The accelerator has interfaces with 3 independent systems: the Machine Protection System () the Personnel Safety System () the Target Safety System (TSS) There is one contact person in the Accelerator Division whose role is to: give expertise (when possible) on the linac systems coordinate the tasks relative to the protection and safety systems put in contact the stakeholders with the protection and safety system teams The presentation will for and : give an overview of the design choices of the 2 systems give the status of the interfaces summarize the accelerator tasks relative to the 2 systems / interfaces 4/21

5 Outline 1 Introduction Conclusions / interfaces 5/21

6 MP system-of-systems and capability objectives SoS Local MP-related systems MP-related proton beam monitoring systems MP-Beam off systems Beam Interlock System MP capability objectives (from ESS ) 1 Machine protection shall prevent and mitigate damage to the machine, be it beam-induced or from any other source, in any operating condition and lifecycle phase, in accordance with beam and facility related availability requirements 2 Machine protection shall protect the machine from unnecessary beam-induced activation having a potential to cause long-term damage to the machine or increase maintenance times, in any operating condition ans lifecycle phase, in accordance with beam and facility related availability requirements. / interfaces 6/21

7 Interfaces with accelerator MP-related systems BIS beam permit 5 time reference MI LPS 4 1 TS beam configuration (mode, destination) Local MP-related system status local permit 2 3 EUC (single or multiple) Acc. systems: Vacuum, water cooling,, instrumentation, interceptive devices, magnet PS, etc Local MP-related systems: concept exists and communicated but not formally approved by AD and ICS Beam monitoring systems: signal thresholds/pattern not yet determined MP-beam-off systems: high level requirements captured (rise time, on dump) but more detailed design is needed Even if the physical interfaces are known, a global risk and availability study should be performed to determine the integrity of the beam permits and beam aborts Beam loss calculations should also be performed besides the hazard analysis to identify the reaction times (BIS) and abort thresholds (BCMs and BLMs) / interfaces 7/21

8 Interfaces with accelerator MP-related systems BIS beam permit 2 Local acquisition system 4 time reference TS Beam monitoring system data 1 beam configuration (mode, destination) Acc. systems: BCM, BLM and BPM EUC (single or multiple) Local MP-related systems: concept exists and communicated but not formally approved by AD and ICS Beam monitoring systems: signal thresholds/pattern not yet determined MP-beam-off systems: high level requirements captured (rise time, on dump) but more detailed design is needed Even if the physical interfaces are known, a global risk and availability study should be performed to determine the integrity of the beam permits and beam aborts Beam loss calculations should also be performed besides the hazard analysis to identify the reaction times (BIS) and abort thresholds (BCMs and BLMs) / interfaces 7/21

9 Interfaces with accelerator MP-related systems BIS beam abort signal 1 Local beam abort system MP-beam off system Action 2 EUC (single or multiple) Acc. systems: Ion source magnetron, LEBT chopper and MEBT chopper Local MP-related systems: concept exists and communicated but not formally approved by AD and ICS Beam monitoring systems: signal thresholds/pattern not yet determined MP-beam-off systems: high level requirements captured (rise time, on dump) but more detailed design is needed Even if the physical interfaces are known, a global risk and availability study should be performed to determine the integrity of the beam permits and beam aborts Beam loss calculations should also be performed besides the hazard analysis to identify the reaction times (BIS) and abort thresholds (BCMs and BLMs) / interfaces 7/21

10 Interfaces with accelerator MP-related systems BIS beam abort signal 1 Local beam abort system MP-beam off system Action 2 EUC (single or multiple) Acc. systems: Ion source magnetron, LEBT chopper and MEBT chopper Local MP-related systems: concept exists and communicated but not formally approved by AD and ICS Beam monitoring systems: signal thresholds/pattern not yet determined MP-beam-off systems: high level requirements captured (rise time, on dump) but more detailed design is needed Even if the physical interfaces are known, a global risk and availability study should be performed to determine the integrity of the beam permits and beam aborts Beam loss calculations should also be performed besides the hazard analysis to identify the reaction times (BIS) and abort thresholds (BCMs and BLMs) / interfaces 7/21

11 Example: Magnet protection against over-heating Magnet protection BIS beam permit 5 TS FS Magnet Protection system 1 ACC ICS PLC 4 time reference TS status ing permit beam configuration (mode, destination) 2 3 Power supply ICS proposal: PLC based solution ESS for more details Using PLC technology: safety and/or standard, used at CERN One core PLC deployed for all magnets Mission critical functions are implemented using hardwired connections (current loops) ICS is taking care of the cabling including the connexion box Magnets shall be equipped individually with TS and FS Decision on scope and responsibilities is critical and urgent / interfaces 8/21

12 Risk matrix slide from E. Bargalló / interfaces 9/21

13 MP and RAMI risk management Work lead by E. Bargalló Risk tracker tool Risk management Series of "Beam induced hazards" workshops in 2015/2016 to identify and collect hazards in the linac Machine risks are going to be tracked Work in line with the ESS availability strategy Objectives: Definition of the protection functions, associated PIL, mitigations, beam permits requirements / interfaces 10/21

14 Risk tracker tool example Work lead by E. Bargalló Magnet in the LWU / interfaces 11/21

15 Beam loss calculations Performed by M. Eshraqi, R. Myamoto, R. de Prisco and I. Dolenc Review on overall strategy (December 2015) Recommendation: "The most stringent requirements should be challenged, in particular the sub 10 µs response time for damage." Melting time in MEBT and DTL (from I. Dolenc s calculations) Reaction time was based on the melting time due to a uniform beam hitting a block of copper or stainless steel (L. Tchelidze, Feb. 2012) Updated calculations from I. Dolenc (August 2016): Confirmation of the response time for perpendicular impacts 2 orders of magnitude difference between very shallow and perpendicular incidences Beam impact worst case scenarios studied by the Beam Physics Section (angle, density, energy): bad combination of steering values can lead to hit perpendicularly the blade of the scrapers in the MEBT (while unlikely in the DTL), the DTL entrance and anywhere where there is an abrupt reduction in aperture (buncher cavities for example) Future actions Requirements Document for the BIS response time Threshold definition for Beam Monitoring systems Long term effects of micro-losses in SC cavities / interfaces 12/21

16 ACC- working group Weekly meeting with permanent members and relevant actors when required A. Nordt (Group Leader, ICS/Protection and Safety Systems), E. Bargalló (Accelerator reliability expert), R. Andersson (PhD student, MP/Reliability analysis), A. Ponton (Accelerator Physicist) Mission is to develop the requirements relating to and determine the operational strategies Short-term plans Preparation of the templates for the ICDs Completion of the ICDs for beam off systems and BCTs in the warm linac Completion of the risk analysis for the front-end It is a global collaborative effort that can not be achieved by one team: we need help and support from WPs / interfaces 13/21

17 ACC- working group Weekly meeting with permanent members and relevant actors when required A. Nordt (Group Leader, ICS/Protection and Safety Systems), E. Bargalló (Accelerator reliability expert), R. Andersson (PhD student, MP/Reliability analysis), A. Ponton (Accelerator Physicist) Mission is to develop the requirements relating to and determine the operational strategies Short-term plans Preparation of the templates for the ICDs Completion of the ICDs for beam off systems and BCTs in the warm linac Completion of the risk analysis for the front-end It is a global collaborative effort that can not be achieved by one team: we need help and support from WPs / interfaces 13/21

18 Outline 1 Introduction Conclusions / interfaces 14/21

19 Main modes CF Tunnel closed AC AC AC AC AC in substation (CF) Gallery closed Mod. in KG El. Pre Amp. HVPS IT Drive LL Pre Amp. Klystron Amp. LL LL Drive LL Coax. Amp. SSA Drive WG closed El. El. LL Mod. in KG Modulator Modulator closed closed AC in substation (CF) Conv. el. Conv. el. LL Klystron, tetrode WG PS Int. with Gamma blocker Tunnel Target Dipole 75 KV PS Coils Magn. CTR HV platform Ion source Int. with Gamma blocker Input: Continuus ~3 ms pulse at 75 kev Q Output: Train of bunches at 3.6 MeV Dipole MEBT bunchers DTLs and SC cavities Tuning dump Dipoles and Gamma blockers 15/21 / interfaces

20 Main modes CF Tunnel closed: zoom on the linac AC AC AC AC AC in substation (CF) Gallery closed Mod. in KG El. Pre Amp. HVPS IT Drive LL Pre Amp. Klystron Amp. LL LL Drive LL Coax. Amp. SSA Drive WG El. El. LL Mod. in KG Modulator Modulator closed closed in substation (CF) Conv. el. Conv. el. LL Klystron, tetrode WG Tunnel 75 KV PS Coils Magn. CTR HV platform Ion source Input: Continuus ~3 ms pulse at 75 kev Output: Train of bunches at 3.6 MeV Q MEBT bunchers DTLs and SC cavities 15/21 / interfaces

21 Main modes CF Alarm Ac Ac AC AC AC in substation (CF) Gallery opened Mod. in KG opened IT HVPS El. Pre Amp. Drive LL LL Pre Amp. Klystron Amp. LL WG Klystron Amp. SSA Drive Mod. in KG El. El. Drive LL LL Coax. opened Modulator Modulator opened AC in substation (CF) Conv. el. Conv. el. LL WG PS Int. with Gamma blocker Tunnel Target Dipole HV OFF PS Coils Magn. OFF CTR HV platform Ion source Int. with Gamma blocker Without all the beam is dumped in the first segment of the Q Q Dipole MEBT bunchers DTLs and SC cavities Tuning dump Dipoles and Gamma blockers 15/21 / interfaces

22 Main modes CF Alarm: zoom on the linac Ac Ac AC AC AC in substation (CF) Gallery opened Mod. in KG El. Pre Amp. HVPS IT Drive LL Pre Amp. Klystron Amp. SSA Drive LL WG LL Drive LL Coax. El. El. LL Mod. in KG Modulator Modulator opened opened in substation (CF) Conv. el. Conv. el. LL Klystron Amp. WG Tunnel HV OFF PS Coils Magn. OFF CTR HV platform Ion source Without all the beam is dumped in the first segment of the Q Q MEBT bunchers DTLs and SC cavities 15/21 / interfaces

23 Main modes CF Access to tunnel authorized AC AC AC AC AC in substation (CF) Gallery opened Mod. in KG opened IT HVPS El. Pre Amp. Amp. Drive LL LL Klystron, tetrode Pre Amp. LL WG Klystron Amp. SSA Drive Mod. in KG El. El. Drive LL LL Coax. opened Modulator Modulator closed AC in substation (CF) Conv. el. Conv. el. LL WG PS Int. with Gamma blocker Tunnel Target Dipole HV OFF PS Coils Magn. Int. with Gamma blocker CTR Dipole Tuning dump HV platform Ion source Q MEBT bunchers DTLs and SC cavities Dipoles and Gamma blockers 15/21 / interfaces

24 Main modes CF Access to tunnel authorized: zoom on the linac AC AC AC AC AC in substation (CF) Gallery opened Mod. in KG El. Pre Amp. Amp. HVPS IT Drive LL Klystron, tetrode Pre Amp. SSA Drive LL WG LL Drive LL Coax. El. El. LL Mod. in KG Modulator Modulator opened closed in substation (CF) Conv. el. Conv. el. LL Klystron Amp. WG Tunnel HV OFF PS Coils Magn. CTR HV platform Ion source Q MEBT bunchers DTLs and SC cavities 15/21 / interfaces

25 Sub-modes for tests and linac tuning test AC in substation (CF) Conv. el. Mod. in KG Beam to tuning dump AC Modulator El. opened Pre Amp. Klystron, tetrode Amp. Drive LL LL WG PS Dipole Int. with Gamma blocker Target Output: Train of bunches at 3.6 MeV Dipole Int. with Gamma blocker Tuning dump / interfaces 16/21

26 Interfaces Hazard/Mitigation Status Actions required Ion Source 2 actuator systems to stop the beam ICD in preparation Baseline documents for Q 1 actuator system to stop the beam ICD in preparation Baseline documents for MEBT bunchers Prevent X-rays in the tunnel ICD in preparation Baseline documents Design choice for coax switch systems Prevent X-rays in the tunnel ICD in preparation Baseline documents Dipoles Electrical Discussion started Radiation in the target area Only conceptual ideas Detailed design Gamma blockers Radiation Discussion started Detailed design Only conceptual ideas Radiation calculations Table: Status of the interfaces with Interfaces between and the accelerator seem to be in general well identified However a global effort from AD to produce a "formal" detailed hardware baseline is mandatory / interfaces 17/21

27 Interfaces Hazard/Mitigation Status Actions required Ion Source 2 actuator systems to stop the beam ICD in preparation Baseline documents for Q 1 actuator system to stop the beam ICD in preparation Baseline documents for MEBT bunchers Prevent X-rays in the tunnel ICD in preparation Baseline documents Design choice for coax switch systems Prevent X-rays in the tunnel ICD in preparation Baseline documents Dipoles Electrical Discussion started Radiation in the target area Only conceptual ideas Detailed design Gamma blockers Radiation Discussion started Detailed design Only conceptual ideas Radiation calculations Table: Status of the interfaces with Interfaces between and the accelerator seem to be in general well identified However a global effort from AD to produce a "formal" detailed hardware baseline is mandatory / interfaces 17/21

28 review in July 2016 The review committee has addressed a messages to the AD: "Current Accelerator design does not contain sufficient detail for to perform the required Hazards Analysis and support detailed design; in particular interfaces are not well enough known to support design" Linac detailed technical baseline for The information exists in most cases (not always!) but at different levels of completion, in different formats and not always approved formally The support of the ACCSYS WPs is mandatory to document our linac technical baseline: Among other documents: design specifications, cable list, interfaces, racks, etc. Track of changes, formal chain of approval In other words a CHESSification of the info is mandatory Weekly meeting: team with stakeholders Main objective is to have a "minimal baseline configuration" to allow the team to proceed and finalize the design of 1 thus to be ready for the start of the beam commissioning in November 2017 / interfaces 18/21

29 Outline 1 Introduction Conclusions / interfaces 19/21

30 Conclusions Lots of "work in progress" A long way to go Very good dynamic in place with talented teams Support from AD is mandatory Collaboration spirit beyond the divisional aspects is a key towards success Many thanks to: ACC- WG: R. Andersson, E. Bargalló, A. Nordt team: S. Birch, Y. Kian Sin, M. Mansouri, D. Paulic M. Zaera Sanz for developing the PLC-based systems and all AD and ICS members who are making this work possible / interfaces 20/21

31 Back-up slide: What is urgent for 1? / interfaces 21/21