Blitzkrieg as a Strategic Tactic

Transcription

1 Blitzkrieg as a Strategic Tactic Written by: Tyler Gibson November 2014

2 Blitzkrieg, which means Lightening Warfare in German, was the name given to the tactic of an attacking force utilising powerful spearheads of concentrated armour and mechanized forces, backed up by close air support 1, to rapidly break through an enemy s defensive line at several places, to create confusion in the enemy s territory and to encircle and destroy enemy forces. The origins of Blitzkrieg lay in the static deadlock prevalent on the Western Front during the years In the Spring of 1918, the German Army in an attempt to defeat the Western Allies before the troops and equipment from the United States could arrive in Europe, attempted an ambitious offensive which would involve elite troops using infiltration tactics. They planned to use the elite storm trooper units to infiltrate and bypass the enemy frontline units and leave them to be engaged by the follow up forces. This would leave the storm troopers free to disrupt the enemy supply lines, headquarters and artillery emplacements, as well as to quickly take territory 3. The use of this tactic meant that by the end of the First World War the essential ingredients of blitzkrieg were already present on the battlefield with the Germans contributing the art of infiltration and shock and the allies introduced the tank 4. During the post war years, many countries experimented on how to best employ the tank. The main proponent of armoured warfare in these years was John Fuller, who influenced the works of Heinz Guderian, Percy Hobart, Charles de Gaulle and 1 Clark, L. Kursk: The Greatest Battle: Eastern Front 1943 p.22 2 Messenger, C. The Art of Blitzkrieg (Ian Allan Ltd, London, 1991) p.10 3 Simpson, A. The Evolution of Victory: British Battles of the Western Front, (Tom Donovan, 1995) p Messenger, C. Blitzkrieg p.31

3 Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Basil Liddell Hart among others. But it was the work of Heinz Guderian which had the greatest effect, convincing Adolf Hitler of the merits of separate armoured forces and led to the adoption of armoured warfare by Germany, whereas other Western Armies still saw the tank as a support for the infantry. During the early years of the Second World War, the German Armed Forces repeatedly achieved great success when employing Blitzkrieg against first Poland, then the low countries and then even against the British and French Armies in France. They achieved these stunning successes even though the German Armed Forces enjoyed no significant superiority in numbers of Divisions and were actually inferior in numbers of tanks 5. But crucially, the allied tanks were scattered by battalions for World War One style infantry support German armour was gathered together 6. By grouping their armoured forces into specialised forces, it gave the German armies the power to break through the allied lines, and cause confusion amongst the allied armies. Which would then allow the following up infantry the time to consolidate the gains before the allied armies could launch effective counter attacks. However, towards the end of the Second World War, the Germans found that Blitzkrieg was becoming less and less effective. This is in part due to Blitzkrieg losing its surprise effect, to the Allies employing different tactics against the Blitzkrieg, as well as developing more and more efficient anti tank guns and more heavily armoured and armed tanks to counter the German panzers. 5 Gabel, C.R. Seek, Strike, and Destroy: US Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in WW2 p.8 6 Gabel, C.R. Seek, Strike and Destroy p.8

4 The Blitzkrieg tactic was designed to pierce a deep system of defence at several points by armoured columns covered by dive bombers and supported by motor-borne infantry 7. And once through the defences one column would converge upon the other, to envelope a section of the defence, which would then be mopped up by infantry 8. For this to be achieved, the spearheads needed to be powerful enough to achieve the initial breakthrough, but also quick enough to exploit the advantage that they had gained before the enemy had a chance to react. Heinz Guderian, who was very influential in the creation of the Blitzkrieg tactic had impressed upon Hitler for the need of a separate armoured force, and had even convinced General Beck of the need for a separate tank force, with Beck stating that if tanks are too closely tied to the infantry, they lose the advantage of their speed and are liable to be knocked by the defence 9. The surprise and speed of the Blitzkrieg was the vital factor which made it so appealing to Adolf Hitler and his generals, with the horrors of trench warfare still fresh in their minds. But another factor also made Blitzkrieg appeal to the Germans. This factor, was the logistical problem. Hitler doubted that any state, Germany included, could stockpile enough raw materials and munitions for more than a years worth of modern war 10, because of this, Blitzkrieg became not just an attraction, but a necessity 11. Due to this, the Germans placed the mailed fist of the Panzer Corps and the thunderbolt of the Luftwaffe in development and had been given priority over the remainder of the wehrmacht 12. This meant that when the German Army invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 it was 7 Falls, C. The Second World War: A Short History (Methuen and Co Ltd, London, 1948) p.51 8 Falls, C. The Second World War. p.51 9 Messenger, C. Blitzkrieg p Messenger, C. Blitzkrieg p Messenger, C. Blitzkrieg p Messenger. C. Blitzkrieg p.84

5 essentially two armies, one small modernised army based on tanks and trucks and a vast old fashioned army reliant on rail and horse 13. The German forces did manage to assemble 600,000 vehicles many of them for the Panzer Armies the rest of the Army had to make do with 700,000 horses 14. The priority given to the panzer armies in terms of trucks and other supply vehicles over the rest of the army, had the effect of allowing the panzers to break through defences and keep moving. But at the same time, by relegating the rest of the army, which was needed just as much as the panzer forces, to mainly horse drawn supplies meant that when the panzers did achieve the breakthrough, its supporting forces were usually too far behind the panzers to allow the panzers to carry on the momentum. Thus, while it helped achieve the success of the Blitzkrieg at the beginning of the war, it would have a detrimental effect on the effectiveness of Blitzkrieg in the later years of World War 2. When blitzkrieg was first used against the Western Allies, the Germans achieved stunning successes with it. The differences in the way that the Allies and the Germans used the tank, as well as the fact that the British and French believed that static defence, similar to the trenches used in the First World War, would be prevalent in this war as well. However, when the British and American armies landed in Western Europe on D-Day, the tables had turned on the Germans. What the Germans had enjoyed in France 1940, overwhelming air superiority, now resided with the allies. This meant that German attacks in daylight were futile in view of the overwhelming allied air superiority 15.The allied aircraft paralysed all movements by day and Overy, R. Why the Allies Won p.264 Overy, R. Why the Allies Won p Mellenthin F.W.V. Panzer Battles (University of Oklahoma Press, 1982) p.384

6 very difficult at night 16 As tanks are large and extremely noisy and difficult to conceal from the air 17, any German counter offensive in the West had to be conducted when the allied aircraft were grounded. An example of this is the Battle of Arracourt and the Battle of Chateau Salins. The Germans had planned these offensives at times that the allied aircraft would be grounded due to fog. But even though the German tanks were superior to the American Sherman tanks the enemy had very strong artillery and anti tank support 18. This held the Germans up until the fogs cleared and the fighter bombers swarmed down on the panzers 11 th panzer brigade was virtually destroyed 19. By the time of Hitler s last gamble on the Western Front, Germany had lacked two essential elements for blitzkrieg air superiority and sufficient fuel stocks 20. This meant that, when Hitler launched the Ardennes Offensive in 1944, even though it was in the same place were he launched the invasion of France in 1940, the results would be very different. In 1940, the Germans faced the weak French armies in a sector that was thought to be impassable by tanks. But by 1944, even though the sector was the same and only defended by four American infantry divisions, the situation had changed. Model s forces had fewer troops lacked air superiority and was up against an experienced and strong enemy 21. When the panzers did break through, unlike the French armies in 1940, the Americans instead of panicking fought on in isolated pockets 22. This meant that as the panzer divisions began to run out of fuel the following up 16 Liddel Hart. B.H. The Other Side of the Hill (Cassell and Company) p Rottman G.L. World War II- Infantry Anti Tank Tactics p Mellenthin F.W.V Panzer Battles p Mellenthin F.W.V. Panzer Battles p Messenger. C. Blitzkrieg p Messenger. C. Blitzkrieg p Messenger. C. Blitzkrieg p.240

7 infantry became involved in reducing the American pockets unable to support the panzers 23. Thus, this meant that the panzers had lost, first their air superiority, which was vital for blitzkrieg to be successful and secondly, they had lost their supporting infantry, so they could not defend the territory that they had captured. Another reason why the blitzkrieg failed in the latter years against the Western Armies, is because the Western Allies were better equipped to deal with blitzkrieg, and, as a result, make blitzkrieg less effective than it had been at the beginning of the war. At the beginning of World War Two, allied tanks had been designed to support infantry, and as a result, were lightly armed and armoured, and often equipped with little more than a machine gun or light cannon. By the time the allied forces had invaded France, the British and American main tank was now the M-4 Sherman tank. The Sherman s combination of firepower, protection and mobility outmatched the German tanks in Africa 24. This meant that the German s now had to play catch up, and any tanks that they developed had to be bigger and more expensive. Added to the fact that the Germans preferred technical sophistication to turning out large quantities of standard weapons 25 meant that the new German tanks, the Panthers and Tigers included, were were very good, but very expensive in terms of manpower, time and materials 26. This meant that, while the German tanks outmatched the early western allied tanks, the new allied tanks, along with tank-busting planes, were more than a match for the German tanks, even the heavily armoured tanks, and as a result, the Western Allies had neutralised a large portion of blitzkrieg rendering the tactic obsolete on the Western Front. And, as a result of the lack of numbers of German tanks, the numerical superiority of the arguably inferior allied tanks and the 23 Messenger. C. Blitzkrieg p Stone. J. The Tank Debate (Kings College, London 2000) p Overy, R. Why the Allies Won p.249

8 overwhelming allied air forces. Even the heavily armoured and armed Tigers, Panthers and even King Tigers became tools of defence mobile anti tank platforms to blunt enemy armoured attacks 27 As Guderian concluded German superiority in the field of armour had been overturned 28. Though on the western front this was not because of allied superiority in tanks quality, but rather German deficiencies in opting against an easy to maintain and produce 29 tank and deciding to produce large, technically complex tanks of very great weight 30. On the Eastern Front however, the Soviets used these factors, as well as a more traditional tactic, one which the French had tried against blitzkrieg, but managed to achieve a result and crushed the German blitzkrieg. At the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, like on the Western Front, the Germans achieved stunning successes when using blitzkrieg, managing to capture millions of Soviet soldiers, and blitzkrieg looked like it would carry everything before it 31. However, when the Germans attempted blitzkrieg at a key turning point in the war, the Soviets were ready and had plenty of time to prepare. By the time of the Battle of Kursk in 1943, the Germans had lost the initiative on the Eastern Front. Hitler had decided to concentrate his offensive on a great city resorting to siege warfare where the Germans forfeited their advantages in mobile warfare 32. By 1943, Hitler had decided that a new offensive in the East 26 Overy, R. Why the Allies Won p Overy, R. Why the Allies Won p Stone. J. The Tank Debate p Overy, R Why the Allies Won p Overy, R. Why the Allies Won p Mellenthin F.W.V. Panzer Battles p Mellenthim F.W.V. Panzer Battles p.193

9 should be attempted and had selected the Kursk salient as the location. However, the Soviet command had anticipated the German offensive and had fortified likely sectors built several lines of resistance studded with minefields 33. The Soviets also built large amounts of tanks and infantry reserves around the Kursk salient in case of a German breakthrough. However, Hitler waited and waited to launch the Kursk offensive, wanting to build up the German forces, but he refused to recognise that the longer he waited, the more armour the Soviets would have particularly as their tank output exceeded that of Germany 34. Around the Kursk Salient, the Soviets relied on the defence in depth concept. This revolved around building defences any miles deep, to allow them to contain an attack on the defences, rather than trying to stop the attack after it breaches the defence. As a result, the Soviet defenders constructed extensive fortifications, including anti tank strong points and minefields 35. Soviet troops dug more than 3000 miles of trenches, laid 400,000 mines used ditches fitted with dragons teeth and flooded the ground in front of the panzers 36, and if these failed to stop the panzers the Soviets had the famous Llyushin ll-2 Sturmovik dive bomber with 37mm tank busting cannon and new PTAB anti tank bomb 37, as well as possessing the T-34, a tank considered to be the finest tank in the world 38. As a result, Kursk was the very negation of blitzkrieg Russian defences lack of surprise had given the panzer formations no chance to work up momentum to achieve their objective 39. This meant 33 Mellenthin F.W.V Panzer Battles p Manstein E.V. Lost Victories (Methuen and Colder 1948) p Messenger, C. The Art of Blitzkrieg p Overy. R. Why the Allies Won p Overy, R. Why the Allies Won p Liddell Hart. B.H. The Other Side of the Hill (Cassell and Company Ltd, 1948) p Messenger. C. The Art of Blitzkrieg p.209

10 that Kursk became a battle for attrition, which Hitler had hoped that by using blitzkrieg would be avoided. But it was the minefields which caused the most confusion. The minefields at Kursk achieved densities of 1700 anti personnel and 1500 anti tank mines per kilometre of front 40, and on one front, the 1000 anti tank mines accounted for the destruction or disabling of 17 out of 40 German tanks which took part in the initial assault 41. The German command were committing the same mistake as the previous year first Stalingrad now the fortress of Kursk 42. The German High Command could think of nothing better than to fling our magnificent panzer divisions against Kursk 43 denying the panzers the advantages which made them so deadly in the first place, their speed and mobility. This, along with the Soviet defensive tactics, limited the effectiveness of the German blitzkrieg. The blitzkrieg relied on having wide, open spaces, where they could bring their mobility into play and bypass enemy units and defensive line to get into the enemy heartlands, but on the vast open space of Soviet Russia, the open space actually helped the Soviets to the determent of the Germans. It allowed the Soviets to simply fall back and regroup, or even allowed them to form new armies and also rebuild their factories in territory where the German armoured columns simply could not reach. To put simply, the German blitzkrieg could triumph against weakened countries such as France but Stalin s Russia was quite different 44. The Soviet Union, was just too big in size, the terrain too difficult and Russian 40 Glantz D.M. Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943 (1986) P Glantz, D.M. Soviet Defensive Tactics p Mellenthin. F.W.V Panzer Battles p Mellenthin. F.W.V Panzer Battles p Fugate, B.I. Operation Barbarossa- Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front 1941 p.305

11 countermeasures too effective 45 for blitzkrieg to succeed in Russia. The German blitzkrieg, when used correctly promised very much, as it proved at the beginning of the war. However, as the Allies faced blitzkrieg on multiple occasions, the surprise factor was lost. This allowed the Allies to develop counters, such as defence in depth or overwhelming air superiority to use against blitzkrieg. As the Germans found out in Kursk, extensive use of mines and minefields are to be regarded as an enemy of an extremely dangerous order 46 for tank warfare. And when blitzkrieg was used on the Western Front in the later stages, it was found to be an hopelessly obsolete tactic in the face of overwhelming Anglo-American airpower. It even got to the stage that late in the war, infantry carrying anti tank weapons, such as a bazooka or PIAT (projector infantry anti tank) rifle had turned the infantry versus tank balance in favour of the infantryman 47. An infantryman, when armed with a panzerfaust, PIAT or bazooka could at close range, defeat any tank 48. The counter measures to armoured warfare, and indirectly, to stop blitzkrieg, fortified lines, anti tank mines the bazooka were designed to spell the end of armoured forces 49, actually limited the effectiveness of blitzkrieg, but as the Ardennes Offensive of 1944, otherwise known as the Battle of the Bulge showed, the German blitzkrieg, when the correct parameters were present, was still an effective tactic and one that could still achieve some success, but due to the inferiority of the German position, it could not fully be exploited. 45 Fugate, B.I. Operation Barbarossa p Guderian H. Achtung- Panzer! (Cassell and Company, London 1999) p World War II- Infantry Tactics (2), Company and Battalion p Knight. C. Running the Gauntlet - Force Protection for Tactical Penetration in MOUT p.8

12 Blitzkrieg started out as a tactic whereby protracted battles, massive troop movements and other difficulties encountered by the Germans in World War One 50 could be avoided, and, until the war turned into a true world war, with the involvement of America, Japan, the Soviet Union and others, it largely succeeded in this aim, and if it wasn t for Hitler losing the strategic sense and the military losing the initiative 51,it might have given the Germans more of a hope in winning the Second World War. 49 Kent. B.D. The Future of the Tank p.8 50 Gukeisen. T.B. The Operational Art of Blitzkrieg: Its Strengths and Weaknesses in system perspective p Gukeisen. T.B. The Operational Art of Blitzkrieg p. 34