WEEK 1: MODAL DEFINITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE

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1 Knowledge & Reality Tutor: James Openshaw 1 WEEK 1: MODAL DEFINITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE Edmund Gettier (1963), Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, Analysis 23: Robert Nozick (1981), Knowledge and Skepticism, in his Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press): Reprinted in Epistemology: An Anthology, 1st edition, ed. Sosa and Kim (2000); or 2nd edition, ed. Sosa, Kim, Fantl, and McGrath (2008); and also in Bernecker and Dretske (2000). Ernest Sosa (1999), How to Defeat Opposition to Moore, Philosophical Perspectives 13: Essay question: Is there a satisfactory modal analysis of knowledge which can help to defuse sceptical arguments? Duncan Pritchard (2008), Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology, in Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, (Oxford: OUP). Christopher Peacocke (1986), Thoughts: An Essay on Content (Oxford: Blackwell), Ch. 9. Gail Stine (1976), Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure, Philosophical Studies 29: Linda Zagzebski (1994), The Inescapability of Gettier Problems, Philosophical Quarterly 44, Duncan Pritchard (2005), Epistemic Luck (Oxford: OUP), Ch. 6. Timothy Williamson (2000), Knowledge and its Limits, (Oxford: OUP), Chs. 7 8.

2 Knowledge & Reality Tutor: James Openshaw 2 WEEK 2: SCEPTICISM AND CONTEXTUALISM ABOUT KNOWS David Lewis (1996), Elusive Knowledge, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: Reprinted in Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology, ed. Bernecker and Dretske (2000). Keith DeRose (1999), Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense, in Greco and Sosa, The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, (Oxford: Blackwell). Timothy Williamson (2005), Knowledge, Context, and the Agent s Point of View, in Preyer and Peter, Contextualism in Philosophy: Essay question: Can a contextualist treatment of the expression knows provide a fully satisfying response to the sceptic? James Pryor (2001), Highlights of Recent Epistemology, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52: Section 1. Keith DeRose (1995), Solving the Skeptical Problem, Philosophical Review 104(1): Reprinted in DeRose and Warfield, Skepticism. Stewart Cohen (1999), Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons, Philosophical Perspectives 13: Jason Stanley (2004), On the Linguistic Basis for Contextualism, Philosophical Studies 119: Keith DeRose (2005), The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism, and the New Invariantism, Philosophical Quarterly 55: John Hawthorne (2004), Knowledge and Lotteries, (Oxford: OUP), Ch. 2.

3 Knowledge & Reality Tutor: James Openshaw 3 WEEK 3: JUSTIFICATION INTERNALISM VS. EXTERNALISM James Pryor (2001), Highlights of Recent Epistemology, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52: Read sections 2 3. Earl Conee and Richard Feldman (2001), Internalism Defended, American Philosophical Quarterly 38: Timothy Williamson (2007), On Being Justified in One s Head, in Timmons, Greco, and Mele, (eds.), Rationality and the Good (Oxford: OUP): Essay question: Can a subject have a justified belief that p if there is another subject with reflective access to exactly the same evidence whose belief that p is not justified? Laurence Bonjour (1980), Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge, Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Reprinted in Bernecker and Dretske (2000). Alvin Goldman (1999), Internalism Exposed, Journal of Philosophy 96: Roderick Chisholm (1988), The Indispensability of Internal Justification, Synthese 74: Kent Bach (1985), A Rationale for Reliabilism, The Monist 68(2): Ernest Sosa (1999), Skepticism and the Internalism/Externalism Divide in Greco and Sosa, The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell). Reprinted in Sosa and BonJour, (eds.), Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003). Ralph Wedgwood (2002), Internalism Explained, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65:

4 Knowledge & Reality Tutor: James Openshaw 4 WEEK 4: PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE P. F. Strawson (1979), Perception and its Objects, in G. F. Macdonald, ed., Perception and Identity (London: Macmillan). Reprinted in Bernecker and Dretske (2000). Jonathan Dancy (1995), Arguments from Illusion, Philosophical Quarterly 45: Essay question: Veridical perception and hallucination have nothing in common. Do you agree? Tim Crane (2006), Is There a Perceptual Relation?, in Gendler and Hawthorne, (eds.), Perceptual Experience, (Oxford: OUP). Read 3 5. H. P. Grice (1961), The Causal Theory of Perception, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 35: Read pp and Alex Byrne and Heather Logue (2009), Introduction, Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). John Hawthorne and Tamar Gendler (2006), Introduction, Perceptual Experience, (Oxford: OUP). Mark Johnston (2004), The Obscure Object of Hallucination, Philosophical Studies 120: T. W. Child (1994), Causality, Interpretation and the Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press), Ch. 5. John Hawthorne and Karson Kovakovich (2006), Disjunctivism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80: Adam Pautz (2011), Can Disjunctivists Explain our Access to the Sensible World?, Philosophical Issues 21:

5 Knowledge & Reality Tutor: James Openshaw 5 WEEK 5: POSSIBILITY AND NECESSITY David Lewis (1986), On the Plurality of Worlds, (Oxford: Blackwell), Ch. 1. William Lycan, (1979), The Trouble with Possible Worlds, in Loux (ed.), The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality (Cornell University Press): Essay question: What is a possible world and why should we (if indeed we should) believe in them? R. C. Stalnaker (1976), Possible Worlds, Noûs, 10(1): David Lewis (1973), Counterfactuals, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). Ch. 4, 1 ( Possible Worlds ): David Lewis (1986), On the Plurality of Worlds, (Oxford: Blackwell), Chs John Perry (1998), Semantics, Possible Worlds, in Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 8: John Divers (2002), Possible Worlds, (London: Routledge). Chs Theodore Sider (2003), Reductive Theories of Modality, in Loux and Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (Oxford: OUP): Michael J. Loux (2006), Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction, (Oxford: Blackwell), Ch. 5. Alvin Plantinga (1974), The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: OUP), Chs Reprinted as Modalities: Basic Concepts and Distinctions in Kim, Sosa, and Korman (eds.), Metaphysics: an Anthology, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011). Phillip Bricker and Joseph Melia (2008), Modality and Possible Worlds, in Sider, Hawthorne, and Zimmerman, (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics (Oxford: Blackwell), Ch. 3. Gideon Rosen (1990), Modal Fictionalism, Mind 99:

6 Knowledge & Reality Tutor: James Openshaw 6 WEEK 6: COMPOSITION David Lewis (1991), Parts of Classes (Oxford: Blackwell). Read sections 1.3 and Daniel Korman (2010), The Argument from Vagueness, Philosophy Compass 5/10: Essay question: When do a plurality of objects compose a further object? Always? Never? Sometimes? Peter van Inwagen (1987), When are Objects Parts?, Philosophical Perspectives Vol. 1, Metaphysics: Theodore Sider (2007), Parthood, Philosophical Review 116: Peter Unger (1979), There are no Ordinary Things, Synthese 41(2): Ned Markosian (2008), Restricted Composition, in Sider, Hawthorne, and Zimmerman, (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, (Oxford: Blackwell): Theodore Sider (2013), Against Parthood, in Bennett and Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 8 (Oxford: OUP): Peter van Inwagen (1990), Material Beings (Cornell University Press), Chs. 1 2 and Kit Fine (1999), Things and Their Parts, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23: Gideon Rosen and Cian Dorr (2002), Composition as a Fiction, in Gale (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics (Oxford: Blackwell):

7 Knowledge & Reality Tutor: James Openshaw 7 WEEK 7: PERSISTENCE David Lewis (1986), On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell), pp Ted Sider (2008), Temporal Parts, in Sider, T., Hawthorne, J. and Zimmerman, D. (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, pp John Hawthorne (2008), Three-Dimensionalism vs. Four-Dimensionalism, in Sider, Hawthorne, and Zimmerman, Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, Ch. 6. Essay question: How, if at all, do ordinary physical objects persist? Katherine Hawley, Temporal Parts, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: Ted Sider (1996), All the World s a Stage, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, pp Ofra Magidor (2016), Endurantism vs. Perdurantism?: A Debate Reconsidered, Nous 50: Judith Thomson (1983), Parthood and Identity across Time, Journal of Philosophy 80, pp Roderick Chisholm (1976), Identity through Time, Persons and Objects (Open Court), ch. 3. Reprinted in Kim, Sosa, and Korman (eds.), Metaphysics: an Anthology, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011), ch. 40. Mark Heller (1984) Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensional Objects, Philosophical Studies 46(3), pp David Lewis (1983), Survival and Identity, in his Philosophical Papers vol. 1, inc. Postscript B. Michael Rea (1998), Temporal Parts Unmotivated, Philosophical Review 107, pp Mark Johnston (1987), Is There a Problem About Persistence?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 61: Ted Sider (2001), Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time (OUP).

8 Knowledge & Reality Tutor: James Openshaw 8 WEEK 8: PERSONAL IDENTITY Derek Parfit (1984), Reasons and Persons (Oxford: OUP), Ch. 12: Reprinted as Why our identity is not what matters, in Martin and Barresi (eds.), Personal Identity (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003). David Lewis (1983), Survival and Identity in his Philosophical Papers (Oxford: OUP). Reprinted in Kim, Sosa, and Korman (eds.), Metaphysics: an Anthology, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011). Essay question: What, if anything, does the possibility of fission tell us about personal identity? Eric Olson, Personal Identity, The Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy. Judith Jarvis Thomson (2008), People and their Bodies, in Sider, Hawthorne & Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008). Bernard Williams (1970), The Self and the Future, Philosophical Review 79: pp Reprinted in Kim, Sosa, and Korman (eds.), Metaphysics: an Anthology, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011). Eric Olson (2003), An Argument for Animalism, in Martin and Barresi (eds.), Personal Identity (Oxford: Blackwell). Reprinted in Kim, Sosa, and Korman (eds.), Metaphysics: an Anthology, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011). John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter XXVII. Bernard Williams (1956-7), Personal Identity and Individuation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57: Reprinted in B. Williams, Problems of the Self (Cambridge: CUP, 1973). John Perry (1976), The Importance of Being Identical, in Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons, (University of California Press). Reprinted in Perry, Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self (Hackett Publishing Company, 2002). Sydney Shoemaker (1970), Persons and their Pasts, American Philosophical Quarterly, 7(4): Reprinted in Kim, Sosa, and Korman (eds.), Metaphysics: an Anthology, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011). Sydney Shoemaker (2008), Persons, Animals, and Identity, Synthese 163: