The Challenge of Exploration: From Apollo to Pluto. Andrew Chaikin

Transcription

1 The Challenge of Exploration: From Apollo to Pluto Andrew Chaikin

2 What does history have to teach us? NASA s history yields a new and revealing lens on the human behavior side of spaceflight: Clear modes of behavior that either invite success or lead us down the slippery slope to failure. It s all about our attitudes, beliefs and assumptions. And the stories we tell ourselves about the work, and about ourselves.

3 Assumptions

4 Apollo: A lesson in success

5 The Apollo Pyramid of Success 13. LUCK 12. LEARN FROM MISTAKES 11. VISIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 10. PAINSTAKING ATTENTION TO DETAIL 9. WHAT-IF THINKING 8. EXHAUSTIVE, REALISTIC TESTING 7. RISK REDUCTION BY DESIGN 6. OUTSIDE-THE-BOX IDEAS CAN WIN 5. UNDERSTAND THE ENVIRONMENT 4. SYSTEMS THINKING Andrew Chaikin SUPERB LEADERS AND THE CULTURE THEY CREATE 2. SUFFICIENT RESOURCES 1. CLEAR GOAL

6 The blindfolds of our human nature

7 REALITY DISTORTION FIELD Negative Tribal Behaviors Closed-mindedness False Perception of Risk Failure Ingredients Groupthink Cookbook Thinking Andrew Chaikin 2017 Hubris LUCK

8 Superb leaders We were in awe of what our leadership team allowed us to do. -- Glynn Lunney Chris Kraft, Bob Gilruth, George Low

9 Flawed processes and a flawed spacecraft Fires in the spacecraft must be avoided at all costs. Apollo 1 command module -- Apollo contingency plan, 1963

10 January 27, 1967: Fire in the cockpit! Apollo 1 astronauts Gus Grissom, Ed White and Roger Chaffee

11 False Perception of Risk Standards of design, manufacture, test, and operations, which have been developed over the years, had demonstrated that the possibility of a fire in the spacecraft cabin was remote. -- George Mueller, one month after the Apollo 1 fire Flammability test in high-pressure pure oxygen conducted after the fire

12 A kind of blindness Given the sophistication of NASA, given the intelligence of its engineers, given the keen, in-depth analysis that they applied to various problems, it's just amazing that the most simple, elementary things in the world are what bit them. I mean, 16 psi of pure oxygen on the pad, and just not considering that to be a tinderbox. Putting a hatch on with about 28 goddamn bolts, where you couldn t get it off!... And all of this just, somehow, I don't know why, we re blind to them. I mean, it makes us think that the quality of our engineering across the board was juvenile, yet it wasn t! It was very good engineering. -- Apollo 11 astronaut Mike Collins, 1988

13 A kind of blindness The thing we never did, and obviously should have done, is to have had a boilerplate capsule and put in materials inside of it similar to what we were going to have in the cabin, and start a fire, and see if you could put it out... and so help me, I don t know why we didn t. I guess it s a case where we had a blind spot. -- Bob Seamans, NASA Associate Administrator during Apollo (1988 oral history)

14 Perceptual blindness: The Door Study (c) Daniel Simons and Daniel Levin

15 One tribe = "We were all saddened by what happened, and it wasn't North American Aviation anymore; it was, 'We're a member of a team to get the job done to get to the Moon.' And badges became academic; there were not any badges anymore, as far as I was concerned." -- Joe Cuzzopoli, North American Aviation engineer

16 Recovery Apollo spacecraft program manager George Low (L) and the redesigned command module (right)

17 July 20, 1969: Man, moon, decade

18 Apollo 13 s rescue: Real-tme ingenuity...

19 ... on a foundation of what-if thinking Analytical Grapics Inc. Apollo 13 docked LM descent engine firing (tested on Apollo 9) CO2 scrubber (partly inspired by Apollo 8 simulation) Horns of Earth alginment (Apollo 8 contingency procedure)

20 Beyond the mission statement

21 The story we tell ourselves about our work, and about ourselves, really does matter. What stories are we telling ourselves today?

22 Three accidents, three lessons APOLLO 1 Even in a near-perfect program, human behavior can make us fail CHALLENGER We must pay attention to the stories we tell ourselves COLUMBIA Awareness has a shelf life Andrew Chaikin 2018

23 History repeats -- because awareness has a shelf life The inherent risk of fire in the spacecraft is low Repeats of conditions that had already been accepted for flight or within their experience base. In-family Foam is not a safety of flight issue

24 On the spaceflight high-wire, it s all about BALANCE: -- between ego and humility, confidence and doubt -- between your belief system and conflicting real-world information -- between team spirit and us vs. them -- between the desire for consensus and openness to dissent

25 Alan Stern: A child of Apollo

26 1991 stamp series honoring robotic solar system missions

27 PERSISTENCE WAS ESSENTIAL Pluto scientists, 1993

28 This is our Everest

29 We broke down the stovepipes

30 January 19, 2006: New Horizons heads for Pluto New Horizons left Earth at 36,000 miles per hour so that it could reach Pluto in 9.5 years. Scientists calculated that the atmosphere might freeze onto the surface by 2020.

31 Closing in on Pluto and Charon

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33 Pluto greets us with a heart diameter: 1,473 miles Charon

34 July 15, 2015

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36 The Frozen Plains of Pluto

37 Pluto s oldest terrains: red and pockmarcked

38 Pluto s snakeskin terrain

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40 Farewell, Pluto

41 NEW HORIZONS FLIGHT PATH

42 The Lesson of Apollo In the huge, complex group endeavor that is spaceflight, human nature is as critical as engineering principles. Neither can be ignored without inviting failure.