Counterspace Capabilities

Transcription

1 Counterspace Capabilities XavierPasco Director, FRS - Paris 20 April 2017, UNIDIR, Geneva Xavier Pasco 1

2 Background: change of strategic landscape Originally, counterspace systems used to be regulated during the Cold War by the need to make space a sanctuary - Management of the bi-lateral nuclear relationship - National Technical Means to be preserved But recent «downgrading» of the nuclear order and corellated «unbolting» of the debate on an increasing vulnerability of national spatial means - Space systems have become part of operational military systems and can be considered as military (but also as political, economic, etc) targets 20 April 2017, UNIDIR, Geneva Xavier Pasco 2

3 (2) Background: change of strategic landscape Succession of disturbing events: - 11 January 2007 China ASAT test - 21 February 2008 U.S. satellite destruction - Subsequent technical tests in orbit or from the ground (jamming) In addition, general feeling that the space environment has become less predictable due to the increase of risks created by a more intensive use of space (increasing number of satellites, debris, manoeuvers, etc.) - Contested, Congested and Competitive catching phrase 20 April 2017, UNIDIR, Geneva Xavier Pasco 3

4 Existing counterspace capabilities (CC) Classical distinction between two classes of space-based CC: Kinetic Energy Weapons (as based in space) : - Series of KEW experiments in the 60 s, 70 s and early 80 s by the USSR (Co-orbital ASAT) - Multiplication of «Rendez-Vous» capable systems for 30 years not even weapons per se: U.S. XSS/MITEx, China SJ12/SJ-06F, Europe ATV techniques, German DEOS, Sweden PRISMA, other onorbit servicing projects Debris removal techniques? Such techniques are not CC but can pave the way for CC use Directed Energy Weapons (as based in space): - Different possible sources with different classes of effects (jamming, disrupting, destruction) - Possibilities of Laser/HPM types of ASAT (also linked to BMD Research) PS: additional high-altitude nuclear weapon with ionization/electromagnetic effects on objets in the considered zone 20 April 2017, UNIDIR, Geneva Xavier Pasco 4

5 (2) Existing counterspace capabilities (CC) Same distinction between the two classes of ground-based CC : Ground-based Kinetic Energy Weapons: - China and US satellite destructions were based on the use of ground-based missiles Ground-based Directed Energy Weapons: - Many laser sources on the ground. Such techniques will disseminate - Satcom jamming has become a common technique 20 April 2017, UNIDIR, Geneva Xavier Pasco 5

6 (3) Existing counterspace capabilities (CC) The case of Satcom jamming activities: Intentional content jamming/pirating activities have risen between 2009 and % from 2011 to 2012 for Eutelsat In 2012, Equiv. 15h/1 transponder/day all year (about 340 geolocalized events in 2012; vs. 54 in 2010, 109 in 2011) at the time 30% of jamming events (35% of jamming duration) geolocalized New ITU tools and regulations with possible effects on jamming 20 April 2017, UNIDIR, Geneva Xavier Pasco 6

7 And newer ones Emergence of cyber threats as a key development in the counterspace context: - ROSAT allegedly subject of cyber attack in 1998 via vulnerable NASA computer networks - Indian INSAT 4B-S satellite also supposedly been affected by a cyber attack NASA Source: pdfOIG audit report 28 March Possibilities of affecting the space systems as well as the information chain itself - Cyber attacks may account for the preferred offensive strategies 20 April 2017, UNIDIR, Geneva Xavier Pasco 7

8 What effects of CCs on collective space security? Effective increase of space systems vulnerability - Gradual development of CCs over the world - Discrimination between CCs and usual space systems rendered more difficult as satellites and space actors will multiply How attributing, and even interpreting possible events? How qualifying moves/systems as hostile without any knowledge about their intent and uses? Naming and shaming more difficult Must lead towards better SSA and extended cooperation 20 April 2017, UNIDIR, Geneva Xavier Pasco 8

9 What effects of CCs on collective space security? a. Given the diversity of direct/indirect techniques, security of space remains an element of a larger collective security issue b. It creates a necessity for better definitions and better verification means (cooperative SSA, etc) Ill-identified orbital moves/actions Ill-identified space vehicles c. Common need for a combination of tools that will help: Confirm the intent Consider the whole capability (space and ground based) Assess the effects 3 elements as a starting point for a common understanding of space security related issue, cyberthreat not offering the least challenging case 20 April 2017, UNIDIR, Geneva Xavier Pasco 9

10 Thank you for your attention 20 April 2017, UNIDIR, Geneva Xavier Pasco 10