Advanced Theory in Science and Technology Studies (PGSP11371) MSc. Course Handbook and Readings

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1 Advanced Theory in Science and Technology Studies (PGSP11371) MSc. Course Handbook and Readings 2017/2018 Semester 2 (20 credits) Course Organiser: Course Secretary: External Examiner: Dr. Pablo Schyfter Science, Technology and Innovation Studies Chisholm House A2 High School Yards Tel: (0131 6) p.schyfter@ed.ac.uk Guidance and Feedback Hours: Th., 14:00-16:00 (or by appointment) Ms. Morag Wilson Graduate School of Social and Political Sciences Chrystal Macmillan Building George Square Tel: (0131 6) pgtaught.sps@ed.ac.uk Vicky Singleton, Lancaster University Class Time and Location: Thursdays, 11:10-13:00 Appleton Tower, Room 2.06 George Square

2 Course Description This course gives postgraduate students the opportunity to pursue a more sophisticated understanding of key theoretical perspectives in science and technology studies (STS). Focusing on a wide range of thinkers and writings, Advanced Theory in STS challenges students to master the details of some vital STS theories and to consider ways of making use of other theoretical perspectives of interest. Broadly, Advanced Theory in STS is designed for students interested in unpacking the ideas and arguments that underlie STS s understanding of science and technology. It is also of benefit to students who hope to further hone their critical thinking skills and expand their range of theoretical tools. Although focused on theoretical topics, the class draws attention to how theory can follow from, and is applied to, empirical work. Thus the class is also of relevance to those who hope to produce sophisticated, empirically-grounded research. This course can be taken as a standalone by students outside of STIS, but it is designed to examine ideas introduced in semester one courses in greater detail. As such, attendance of Science, Knowledge and Expertise and Understanding Technology is recommended (but not required). Learning Outcomes By the end of the course, student should be able to: Students will have a comprehensive understanding of the Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge, including key concepts such as underdetermination, symmetry, and finitism. Students will also understand how Actor-Network Theory criticises these ideas and posits alternative theoretical tools. Students will comprehend the Performative Theory of Social Institutions, and most importantly, Barry Barnes' notion of 'bootstrapped induction. Students will be competent in parallel theories of ontology and subjectivity, based on work by Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, and Ian Hacking. As part of this, students will understand how these ideas relate to the Performative Theory of Social Institutions. Students will consider theories and methodologies currently underemployed in science and technology studies but of possible use. These include historiography and certain varieties of ethics. Students will have developed their abilities to convey complex ideas through written and oral means (particularly through weekly written responses, seminar discussions, and essay-writing). Classes and Timetable This course will be delivered through a 10-week lecture and seminar discussion format. Each class will involve a one-hour lecture and a one-hour discussion session, separated by a short recess. The lectures will introduce the material, examine the readings and draw key lessons about that week. The discussion session will involve a group exploration of the readings.

3 Discussion is a key element of this class. It is expected that students will prepare a few comments and questions to pose to the rest of the group. Timetable Week Date Topic 1 18/01/18 Experience and underdetermination: Hume and Quine 2 25/01/18 The Strong Programme 3 01/02/18 The Performative Theory of Social Institutions 4 08/02/18 Finitism 5 15/02/18 An introduction to ANT ontologies and methods (Dr. Cate Heeney) 6 No class: Festival of Creative Learning Week 7 01/03/18 Post-ANT and the question of ethics (Dr. Cate Heeney) 8 08/03/18 Historiography and STS (Dr. Miguel García-Sancho) 9 15/03/18 Democratic Models in STS (Dr. Debbie Scott) 10 22/03/18 Heidegger and The Question Concerning Technology 11 29/03/18 Pragmatism and knowledge-in-use Contacting the Course Organiser Generally, is the best method for contacting the course organiser. However, students can use guidance and feedback hours to have face-to-face meetings. (Meetings outside of these hours should be arranged with the organiser first.) If you have any problems with the course administration, questions about the material, queries about essays and/or presentation, or other issues with the course, please get in touch with the organiser. Assessment Assessment will be on the basis of a 3,500-4,500 word essay on a topic to be agreed between the student and the course organiser. Students should contact the organiser to discuss potential assessment topics at the earliest opportunity. The deadline for submission of the essay is 12:00 on 12/04/18. A late penalty will take effect immediately after 12:00 on this day, following standard School regulations, unless an extension has been approved by the course organiser before the deadline, excepting extraordinary circumstances. Feedback for coursework will be returned online via ELMA on 03/05/18. Students are also required to submit a 1,000 word piece outlining a key concept or perspective from the first weeks. This essay ought to outline a key concept or perspective from this first half, and then engage with this in an original, critical way. This assignment is assessed by the organiser, but it does not count for the final mark. Rather, it is meant to serve as useful feedback before the final essay. The deadline for submission of this assignment is 12:00 on 15/02/18. Feedback for coursework will be returned online via ELMA on 08/03/18.

4 For Assessment requirements you should consult the Taught MSc Student Handbook This is available on Learn. Requirements included are: Coursework submissions Extension request Penalties Readings and Discussion The required readings are directly tied to each week s key objectives and learning outcomes. Students must read all of the required readings closely. The additional readings listed provide further material (sometimes in the form of entire books) for those students with a particular interest in the theoretical issue or framework covered each week. All of the required readings will be made available electronically or via the University Main Library in George Square. Students are expected to come to class ready to talk about the readings and the material. Discussion and argumentation are key components of postgraduate education, and are necessary when developing a sophisticated understanding of STS theory. Vivid, passionate discussion is the goal, but students are expected to behave in a civil manner. Disagreement is expected and encouraged, but no manner of disrespect for fellow students will be tolerated.

5 Advanced Theory in Science and Technology Studies Lecture Schedule and Reading List Week 1: Experience and underdetermination: Hume and Quine David Hume is in many ways the intellectual grandfather of the sociology of knowledge, and certainly a crucial intellectual figure for the Science Studies Unit s Strong Programme. W.V.O. Quine, another vitally important philosopher, gave to the study of scientific knowledge one of its most important concepts: underdetermination. Together, Hume and Quine provide a strong foundation for examining the sociology of knowledge. In this first lecture, we will consider the relationship between experience and knowledge a topic that will appear in many different ways throughout this class. Thinking about these issues will allow us to pose a crucial question: what does it mean to engage with a world in order to make knowledge about it? Readings: Hume, D. (1999 [1772]). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Oxford UP, Section 4, Section 5, and Section 7 Part 2 (pp , , ). Quine, W.V.O. (1964). Two dogmas of empiricism. In From a Logical Point of View, 2nd edition (pp ). Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP. Quine, W.V.O. (1975). On empirically equivalent systems of the world. Erkenntnis, 9: Further Readings: Ariew, R. (1984). The Duhem thesis. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 35: Duhem, P. (1954). The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Princeton: Princeton UP. Hume, D. (2000 [ ]). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford UP. Stanford, K. (2009). Underdetermination of scientific theory. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Available at: Week 2: The Strong Programme The Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge, also known as the Edinburgh School, played a fundamental role in laying the foundation for science studies. The ideas developed by the Science Studies Unit in the 1970s, and further developed in the

6 decades since, now serve as basic and necessary premises for the sociological study of science and scientific knowledge. In this lecture, we will revisit some key texts, make sense of the Strong Programme s core arguments, and look at how it has been defended against its critics. Readings: Bloor, D. (1976). Knowledge and Social Imagery. Chicago: Chicago UP, chapters 1 and 2 (pp. 3-45). Barnes, B. & D. Bloor. (1989). Relativism, rationalism, and the sociology of knowledge. In M. Hollis & S. Lukes (Eds.), Rationality and Relativism (pp ). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Bloor, D. (1996). Idealism and the sociology of knowledge. Social Studies of Science, 26(4): Recommended: Bloor, D. (1981). The strengths of the Strong Programme. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 11: Further Readings: Barnes, B. (1974). Scientific Knowledge and Social Theory. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Barnes, B. (1977). Interests and the Growth of Knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Barnes, B. (1985). About Science. Oxford: Blackwell. Bloor, D. (1989). Rationalism, supernaturalism, and the sociology of knowledge. In I. Hronszky, M. Fehér & B. Dajka (Eds.), Scientific Knowledge Socialized (pp ). New York: Springer. Bloor, D. (1994). What can the sociologist of science say about 2+2=4? In P. Ernest (Ed.), Mathematics, Education, and Philosophy (pp ). London: Falmer. Bloor, D. (2007). Ideals and monisms: Recent criticisms of the Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A, 38: Bloor, D. (2008). Relativism at 30,000 feet. In M. Mazzotti (Ed.), Knowledge as Social Order (pp ). Aldershot: Ashgate. Henry, J. (2008). Historical and other studies of science, technology and medicine in the University of Edinburgh. Notes and Records of the Royal Society, 62:

7 Kemp, D. (2005). Saving the Strong Programme? A critique of David Bloor s recent work. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A, 36: Kusch, M. (2012). "Sociology of science: Bloor, Collins, Latour." In J.R. Brown (Ed.), Philosophy of Science: The Key Thinkers (pp ). London: Continuum. Laudan, L. (1981). The pseudo-science of science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 11: Mulkay, M. (1979). Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. London: George Allen & Unwin. Week 3: The Performative Theory of Social Institutions In current STS pedagogy, the Strong Programme is often reduced to a single word: symmetry. Nonetheless, the intellectual tradition centred on Edinburgh s Science Studies Unit developed a wide range of theoretical frameworks beyond those most often identified with the Edinburgh School. The performative theory of social institutions (PTSI) is one of these. PTSI is essentially the Strong Programme s social theory: important to the study of scientific knowledge but broader in its applicability. In this lecture, we examine the basics of PTSI, including the notion of social institutions, the performative character of knowledge, and the manner in which collectives and individual practices relate. Readings: Barnes, B. (1981). On the conventional character of knowledge and cognition. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 11: Barnes, B. (1983). Social life as bootstrapped induction. Sociology, 17(4): Barnes, B. (2001a). Practices as collective action. In T.R. Schatzki, K.K. Cetina & E. von Savigny (Eds.), The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (pp ). London: Routledge. Recommended: Kusch, M. (1999). Psychological knowledge. London: Routledge, Interlude (pp ). Further Readings: Barnes, B. (1988). The Nature of Power. Oxford: Polity. Barnes, B. (1992). Status groups and collective action. Sociology, 26(2): Barnes, B. (1995). The Elements of Social Theory. London: UCL Press. Barnes, B. (2000). Understanding Agency. London: Sage.

8 Barnes, B. (2001). The macro/micro problem and the problem of structure and agency. In G. Ritzer & B. Smart (Eds.), Handbook of Social Theory (pp ). London: Sage. Barnes, B. (2001). Tolerance as a primary virtue. Res Publica, 7(3): Barnes, B. (2002). Searle on social reality: Process is prior to product. In G. Grewendorf & G. Meggle (Eds.), Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality (pp ). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Barnes, B. (2004). Between the real and the reified: Elias on time. In S. Loyal & S. Quilley (Eds.), The Sociology of Norbert Elias (pp ). Cambridge: Cambridge UP. Collins, H.M. & M. Kusch (1998). The Shape of Actions. Cambridge. MA: The MIT Press. Kusch, M. (1997). The sociophilosophy of folk psychology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A, 28: Mazzotti, M. (Ed.) (2008). Knowledge as Social Order: Rethinking the Sociology of Barry Barnes. Aldershot: Ashgate. Searle, J.R. (1995). The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Penguin. Week 4: Finitism One of the key intellectual bases of the Strong Programme and its performative theory of social institutions is Ludwig Wittgenstein s philosophy of language (and particularly Kripke s interpretation of that philosophy). The Strong Programme s conceptualisation of knowledge claims and PTSI s view of term usage are based on an analytic framework known as finitism. In this lecture, we examine the basics of finitism, think about its use in understanding term usage in language, and consider its applicability to the cases of rules and rule-following, and knowledge claims and truth. Readings: Barnes, B., D. Bloor & J. Henry. (1996). Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis. London: Athlone, chapter 3 (pp ). Bloor, D. (1997b). Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions. London: Routledge, chapters 3 (pp ). Kusch, M. (2002). Knowledge by Agreement. Oxford: Oxford UP, chapters 15 and 16 (pp ).

9 Recommended: Bloor, D. (1997b). Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions. London: Routledge, chapter 2 (pp. 9-26). Further Readings: Bloor, D. (1982). Durkheim and Mauss revisited: Classification and the sociology of knowledge. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A, 13(4): Bloor, D. (1983). Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge. New York: Columbia UP. Bloor, D. (1992). Left and right Wittgensteinians. In A. Pickering (Ed.), Science as Practice and Culture (pp ). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Bloor, D. (2004). Institutions and rule-following: A reply to Martin Kusch. Social Studies of Science, 34: Kusch, M. (2004). Rule-scepticism and the sociology of scientific knowledge. Social Studies of Science, 34: Kusch, M. (2006). A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules. Montreal & Kingston: McGill- Queen s UP. Lynch, M. (1992a). Extending Wittgenstein: The pivotal move from epistemology to the sociology of science. In A. Pickering (Ed.), Science as Practice and Culture (pp ). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Lynch, M. (1992b). From the will to theory to the discursive collage: A reply to Bloor s Left and right Wittgensteinians. In A. Pickering (Ed.), Science as Practice and Culture (pp ). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Week 5: An introduction to Actor-Network Theory ontologies and methods In this lecture, we look at how ANT is in some ways a reaction to other branches of the study of science. In order to situate ANT s ontological claims we will briefly cover the qualitative turn in sociological methods and discuss how this may relate to the symmetry of objects and people or actors and actants peculiar to ANT. We will discuss two early ANT texts in particular, Latour s We have Never been Modern and Callon s 1996 chapter in which the motivations and ontological foundations of ANT are explicated. Building on these two elements the lecture will then cover the way in which ANT seeks to engage with and extract meaning from the particular contexts of study. The final part of the lecture will focus on how the issue of controversy is dealt with by ANT.

10 Readings: Callon, M. (1986). Some elements of a sociology of translation: Domestication of the scallops and of the fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay. In J. Law (Ed.), Power, Action and Belief (pp ). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Latour, B. (1993). We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, chapter 4 (pp ). Bloor, D. (1999). Anti-Latour. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A, 30: Recommended: Latour, B. (1992). One more turn after the social turn In E. McMullin (Ed.), The Social Dimension of Science (pp ). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Latour, B. (2006). Reassembling the Social. Oxford: Oxford UP, introduction to Part 1 (pp ). Callon, M. & J. Law. (1997). After the individual in society: Lessons on collectivity from science, technology and society. The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie, 22(2): Further Readings: Bloor, D. (1999). Reply to Bruno Latour. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A, 30: Collins, H. & S. Yearley. (1992). Epistemological chicken. In A. Pickering (Ed.), Science as Practice and Culture (pp ). Chicago: Chicago UP. Harmon, G. (2009). Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics. Melbourne, Australia: re.press. Latour, B. (1983). Give me a laboratory and I will raise the world. In K. Knorr-Cetina & M. Mulkay (Eds.), Science Observed (pp ). London: Sage. Latour, B. (1988). The Pasteurization of France. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP. Latour, B. (1990). Postmodern? No, simply amodern! Steps towards an anthropology of science. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 21: Latour, B. (1999). For David Bloor and beyond. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A, 30: Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the Social. Oxford: Oxford UP.

11 Latour, B. (2010). On the Modern Cult of Factish Gods. Durham, NC: Duke UP. Law, J. (2002). Aircraft Stories. Durham, NC: Duke UP. Law, J. (1986). On power and Its tactics: a view from the sociology of science. The Sociological Review, 34 (1): Law, J. & J. Hassard. (1999). Actor-Network Theory and After. Oxford: Blackwell. Schaffer, S. (1991). The eighteenth brumaire of Bruno Latour. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 22: Week 6: Innovative Learning Week (no class) Week 7: Post-ANT and the question of ethics ANT work opens up the processes by which technologies and organisations came to be the way they are (or are not), offering, as Latour puts it, the opportunity to see that things could have been different. Whilst Latour has also argued we must do more than debunk traditionally ANT scholars have shown themselves unwilling to engage in the actual doing of ethics and have indeed been openly critical of bioethical colleagues. These criticisms are often based on the status ascribed to observing practices as opposed to solving controversies. Building on the previous week s discussion of ontologies and methods, the lecture will incorporate the readings to address questions around the status of practices in STS, and how and whether ANT could engage with the ethical. Required: Bruno L. (2004). Why has critique run out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern. Critical Inquiry, 30(2): Bruun Jensen C.B. & C. Gad (2014). The promises of practice. The Sociological Review, 62(4): Fraser, M. (2006). The ethics of reality and virtual reality: Latour, facts and values. History of the Human Sciences 19(45): Recommended: Mol, A. (2008). The Logic of Care. London: Routledge, chapter 6 (pp ). Latour, B. (2006). Reassembling the Social. Oxford: Oxford UP, Fourth Source of Uncertainty (pp ).

12 Law, J. & J. Hassard. (1999). Actor-Network Theory and After. Oxford: Blackwell. Further Readings: DeLanda, M. (2002). Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Deleuze, G. (2013 [1968]). Difference and Repetition. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Fraser, M. (2006). The ethics of reality and virtual reality: Latour, facts and values. History of the Human Sciences 19(45): Hedgecoe, A.M. (2004). Critical bioethics: beyond the social science critique of applied ethics. Bioethics 18(2): Singleton, V. (1996). Feminism, sociology of scientific knowledge and postmodernism: politics, theory and me. Social Studies of Science 26(2): Singleton, V. & J. Law. (2005). Object lessons. Organization 12(3): Week 8: Historiography and STS Over the last twenty years, the historical study of science has become an increasingly overlooked line of inquiry within the broader field of STS. The lecture will address how history of science emerged as a discipline and, during the 1970s and 80s, became increasingly intertwined with STS, to the extent that most of its practitioners did not distinguish between the two. The 1990s witnessed a growing specialisation in which history of science developed a specific methodology and literature, called historiography. This body of knowledge was presented as something substantially different from the more sociologically and contemporary-oriented STS. The lecture will finish with a debate on the convenience and possibility of reintegrating both fields. Readings: Jasanoff S. (2000). Reconstructing the past, constructing the present: Can science studies and the history of science live happily ever after? Social Studies of Science 30(4): Daston L. (2009). Science studies and the history of science. Critical Inquiry 35(3): Jasanoff S. & P. Dear. (2010). Dismantling boundaries in science and technology studies. Isis 101(4): Further readings: Dennis, M.A. (1997). Historiography of science: An American perspective. In J. Krige & D. Pestre (Eds.), Science in the Twentieth Century (pp. 1-26). Amsterdam: Harwood.

13 Biagioli M. (2009). Postdisciplinary liaisons: Science studies and the humanities. Critical Inquiry 35(3): Clarke, A.E. & J.H. Fujimura. (1992). What tools? Which jobs? Why right? In A.E. Clarke & J.H. Fujimura (Eds.), The Right tools for the Job: At Work in Twentieth Century Life Sciences (pp. 3-44). New Haven: Princeton UP. Daston, L. (2001). History of science. In N.J. Smelser & P.B. Baltes (Eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Volume 10 (pp ). Amsterdam: Elsevier. Davidson, K. (2006). Why science writers should forget Carl Sagan and read Thomas Kuhn: on the troubled conscience of a journalist. In R.E. Doel & T. Söderqvist (Eds.), The Historiography of Contemporary Science, Technology, and Medicine (pp ). London: Routledge. Edge, D. (1995). Reinventing the wheel. In S. Jasanoff, G.E. Markle, J.C. Peterson & T. Pinch (Eds.) Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (pp. 2-24). New York, SAGE. Jones, R. (1989). The historiography of science: retrospect and future challenge. In M. Shortland & A. Warwick (Eds.), Teaching the History of Science. London: Blackwell. Secord, J. (Ed). (1993). Special Issue: The Big Picture. British Journal for the History of Science 26(4). Thackray, A. (Ed.) (1995). Special issue: Constructing Knowledge in the History of Science, Osiris 2(10) 10. Week 9: Democratic Models in STS Distinct schools of thought within STS have developed around decision-making on and governance of science and technology. Across these differences, however, many share a basic commitment to deliberative democracy as the ideal model for bringing in publics and varied expertise to decision-making. This week, we ll examine how the deliberative turn in STS has shaped the ways scholars engage with governmental organizations (as in the Felt & Wynne report) and with scientists and publics through Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI). The lecture will explore the implications of this commitment to deliberative democracy and consider how alternative democratic models for decision-making could inform STS scholarship and engagement. Readings: Felt, U. & B. Wynne. (2007). Taking European knowledge society seriously: report of the Expert Group on Science and Governance to the Science, Economy and Society Directorate,

14 Directorate-General for Research, European Commission. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Pp: 9-12; Lövbrand, E., R. Pielke, Jr., & S. Beck. (2011). A democracy paradox in studies of science and technology. Science, Technology & Human Values 36(4): van Oudheusden, M. (2014). Where are the politics in responsible innovation? European gov ernance, technology assessments, and beyond. Journal of Responsible Innovation 1(1): Further Readings: Barnett, C & G. Bridge. (2013). Geographies of radical democracy: Agonistic pragmatism and the formation of affected interests. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 103(4): Bond, S. (2011). Negotiating a democratic ethos : moving beyond the agonisticcommunicative divide. Planning Theory 10(2): Brown, M. (2014). Politicizing science: conceptions of politics in science and technology studies. Social Studies of Science 45(1): De Vries, G. (2007). What is political in sub-politics? How Artistotle might help STS. Social Studies of Science 37(5): Durant, D. (2011). Models of democracy in social studies of science. Social Studies of Science 41(5): Dryzek, J. (2006). Deliberative global politics: Discourse and democracy in a divided world. Malden (MA): Polity Press. Marres, N. (2007). The issues deserve more credit: Pragmatist contributions to the study of public involvement in controversy. Social Studies of Science 37(5): Mouffe, C. (2005). On the political. New York: Routledge. Nahuis, R. & H. van Lente Where are the politics? Perspectives on democracy and technology. Science, Technology & Human Values 33(5): Week 10: Heidegger and The Question Concerning Technology Martin Heidegger is generally considered one of the greatest philosophers of the 20 th century. Among other achievements is his work in the philosophy of technology, of which he is often portrayed as the founding figure. His piece The Question Concerning Technology is a challenging and captivating work that lays out what he considers to be the essence of technology: ge-stell, often translated as enframing. In a different piece, The Thing,

15 Heidegger examines the nature of things around us (as more than just spatiotemporal objects). In both cases, Heidegger s ideas contribute unique and powerful arguments about ontology. As a key figure in the philosophy of technology, Heidegger is worth studying. In this class we will unpick his challenging thoughts, and consider their applicability for work in more social scientific fields, like STS. Readings: Heidegger, M. (1977). The question concerning technology, In The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (pp. 3-35). New York: Harper Perennial Heidegger, M. (1971). The thing. In Poetry, language, thought (pp ). New York: Harper Perennial. Recommended: Lovitt, W. (1973). A Gespräch with Heidegger on technology. Man and World 6(1): Further Readings: Foucault, M. (1972). The Archaeology of Knowledge. New York: Pantheon, Part I, chapter 3 (pp ). Heidegger, M. (1962 [1927]). Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell. Quine, W.V.O. (1964). On what there is. In From a Logical Point of View, 2nd edition (pp. 1-19). Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP. Quine, W.V.O. (1969). Existence and quantification. In Ontological relativity and other essays (pp ). New York: Columbia UP. Star, S.L. (2010). This is not a boundary object: Reflections on the origin of a concept. Science, Technology & Human Values, 35(5): Week 11: Pragmatism and knowledge-in-use Pragmatism is a (mostly) American philosophical tradition of the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. In many ways, its epistemological arguments mirror those of the sociology of knowledge, and contain components central to the Edinburgh School. The defining feature of pragmatist epistemology is its focus on use. For scholars like John Dewey and William James, true knowledge is useful knowledge. Ultimately, all knowledge is employed to do something, be it understanding or artefact-making. As such, all knowledge is situated in the real world. In this lecture, we are going to examine the basic of pragmatist epistemology in order to consider knowledge-in-use, rather than knowledge in-the-making (the traditional perspective in SSK). We will also touch on the study of engineering knowledge, a hereto overlooked kind of knowledge in our field.

16 Readings: Dewey, J. (1988 [1929]). John Dewey, The Later Works Vol. 4: The Quest for Certainty. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, chapters 1 and 2. James, W. (1975). Pragmatism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, lecture VI. Durkheim, P. (1983). Pragmatism and Sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chapter 13. Further Readings: Dewey, J. (1942). How is mind to be known? The Journal of Philosophy 39(2): Dewey, J. & A.F. Bentley. (1989 [1949]) Knowing and the Known. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. James, W. (1904). Does consciousness exist? The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1(18): Mulkay, M. (1979). Knowledge and utility: Implications for the sociology of knowledge. Social Studies of Science 9(1): Peirce, C.S. (1878). How to make our ideas clear. Popular Science Monthly 12 (January): Vincenti, W. (1990). What Engineers Know and How They Know It. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. A postscript on Kuhn T.S. Kuhn is an enormously important figure in the study of science, and without question central to the birth of science studies and the sociology of scientific knowledge. For better or worse, his notion of scientific paradigms and their role in scientific revolutions has influenced scholarship on scientific knowledge massively. Kuhn is also a key figure in the intellectual foundation of Edinburgh s Strong Programme, so he provides the necessary background against which to develop a comprehensive understanding of SSK and specifically, the Edinburgh School. A full understanding of this tradition demands familiarity with Kuhn, and you can begin to achieve this through the readings listed here: By Kuhn: Kuhn, T.S. (1957). The Copernican Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP.

17 Kuhn, T.S. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Kuhn, T.S. (1963). The function of dogma in scientific research. In A.C. Crombie (Ed.), Scientific Change (pp ). London: Heinemann. Kuhn, T.S. (1974). Second thoughts on paradigms. In F. Suppe (Ed.), The Structure of Scientific Theories (pp ). Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. Kuhn, T.S. (1977). The Essential Tension. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Kuhn, T.S. (1978). Black-Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Kuhn, T.S. (2000). The road since Structure. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. On Kuhn: Barnes, B. (1972). Sociological explanation and natural science: A Kuhnian reappraisal. Archives of European Sociology, XIII: Barnes, B. (1982). T.S. Kuhn and Social Science. London: Macmillan. Lakatos, I. & A. Musgrave (Eds.) (1970). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. Pinch, T. (1997). Kuhn the conservative and radical interpretations: Are some Mertonians Kuhnians and some Kuhnians Mertonians? Social Studies of Science, 27: Sankey, H. (1993). Kuhn's changing concept of incommensurability. British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, 44: A postscript on other authors The Edinburgh School drew on a number of ideas from a wide range of authors (too many to list here). The following are a few key texts from six key scholars: Douglas, M. (2002 [1966]). Purity and Danger. London: Routledge. Douglas, M. (2003 [1970]). Natural Symbols. London: Routledge. Durkheim, E. (1938). The Rules of Sociological Method. New York: The Free Press. Durkheim, E. (2008 [1912]). The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Oxford: Oxford UP. Hesse, M. (1974). The Structure of Scientific Inference. London: Macmillan.

18 Kripke, S. (1981). Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell. Kripke, S. (1984). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Oxford: Blackwell. Popper, K. (2002 [1935]). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Routledge. Popper, K. (2002 [1963]). Conjecture and Refutations. London: Routledge. Wittgenstein, L. (2001 [1953]). Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.