Gen Memo 05/15: SDC2 / MAIB Report / African M&T Conference / BIMCO Reflections / Alyarmouk, Alexandra 1 / Vessels for the Future

Gen Memo 05/15: SDC2 / MAIB Report / African M&T Conference / BIMCO Reflections / Alyarmouk, Alexandra 1 / Vessels for the Future Dear Members, PLEASE ENSURE THIS MEMO IS WIDELY DISTRIBUTED WITHIN YOUR INSTITUTION 1 Intermanager Report Intermanager's report on the IMO s Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction, which held its 2 nd session (SDC2) from Monday 16 through Friday 20 February 2015, is attached. It will be recalled that SDC encompasses former IMO Sub-Committees DE, FP and SLF (Design, Equipment; Fire Protection; Safety, Load-Lines and Fishing Vessels). 2 MAIB Report The report - The Importance of ECDIS Training and Familiarisation and Good Watch-Keeping Practice - is accessible at http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/ovitreport.pdf 3 African M&T Please be advised that the 1st African Manning and Training Conference will be held in Capetown on 17-18 March. Director John Lloyd will be representing GlobalMET. 4 BIMCO's Reflections For a copy of BIMCO's interesting publication Reflections 2015, 'An ocean of expertise' please go to www.bimco.org

5 Alyarmouk / Alexandra 1 Libyan registered tanker Alyarmouk was in collision in January with the Singapore-registered bulk carrier Sinar Kapuas about 11 nautical miles North-East of Pedra Branca. Also a photo of the Alexandra 1 after collision with the Ever Smart off Jebel Ali last month, 6 Vessels for the Future A very interesting article from DNV GL is attached. For more information, please visit: https://www.dnvgl.com/maritime/ Kind regards Rod Short Executive Secretary GlobalMET Limited

InterManager IMO Report The IMO s Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction held its 2 nd session (SDC2) from Monday 16 through Friday 20 February 2015 under the Chairmanship of Mrs A Jost (GERMANY) and her Vice-Chair, Captain N Campbell (SOUTH AFRICA). Both subsequently declined re-election for 2016 following which Mr Kevin Hunter (UK) was voted in as Chairman and Mrs Turid Stemre (NORWAY) as Vice-Chair. It will be recalled that SDC encompasses former IMO Sub-Committees DE, FP and SLF (Design, Equipment; Fire Protection; Safety, Load-Lines and Fishing Vessels). In his welcoming speech, the IMO Secretary General voiced his concerns over the unfolding tragedy taking place in the Mediterranean concerning maritime migrants, revealing that more than 300 people had drowned the previous week and in the order of 3,000 people had crossed the sea during the day before. Further startling statistics were that 200,000 people were rescued last year in the Mediterranean, of whom about 3,000 had lost their lives and more than 600 merchant ships had been diverted to assist. The issue of how best to deal with the people smugglers responsible for such migration will therefore be the subject of a United Nations Inter-Agency meeting to be held at IMO on 4 th / 5 th March 2015. On a different subject, the Secretary General spoke of the accidents concerning NORMAN ATLANTIC and BLUE SKY M, reports of which may be available for discussion at MSC in June. He also stressed the importance to SDC2 of addressing the survivability of large passenger ships after damage, given that safety is the most important aspect of IMO s work. Three working groups (WG) and two drafting groups (DG) were formed and chaired as follows: WG1 WG2 WG3 Subdivision and damage stability (SDS), Mr J Person (USA) Intact Stability (IS), Professor A Francescutto (ITALY) Fire Protection (FP), Mr G Szemler (SWEDEN) DG1 Amendments to SOLAS regulation II-1/11 and Guidelines to ensure adequacy of testing arrangements for watertight compartments, Mr K Koiso (JAPAN) DG2 Classification of offshore-industry vessels and review of the need for a non-mandatory code for offshore construction support vessels and Guidelines addressing the carriage of more than 12 industrial personnel on board vessels engaged on international voyages, Mr P Wilkins (UK)

Following is a selection of salient points from the meeting on items of most interest to InterManager members: SUBDIVISION AND DAMAGE STABILITY. The Sub-Committee agreed amendments proposed by WG1 to SOLAS chapter II-1, with a view to approval by MSC95, which meets in early June 2015, and subsequent adoption. In addition, it: 1. Agreed to forward finalised text of Chapter 2 of the draft OSV Chemical Code on ship survival capability and location of cargo tanks to the PPR Sub-Committee; 2. Endorsed continued consideration of Explanatory Notes to SOLAS chapter II-1 by a correspondence group with a view to finalisation at SDC3; 3. Endorsed WG1 s proposal that matters related to the survivability of passenger ships be considered at SDC3; and instructed the FSA (Formal Safety Assessment) Experts Group to meet 10 12 November 2015, primarily to review the report of a directly relevant EMSA3 study currently in progress; 4. Instructed the SDS correspondence group to consider the draft Revised Guidelines on operational information for masters of passenger ships for safe return to port by own power or under tow (MSC.1/Circ.1400) for finalisation at SDC3; and 5. Endorsed WG1 s recommendation that the formula for the required subdivision index R should be based on the total number of persons on board without regard to LSA arrangements. The SSE Sub- Committee will be advised accordingly so that possible consequences to SOLAS regulation III/21 can be examined. INTACT STABILITY (IS). The Sub-Committee approved WG2 s report in general, and in particular, it: 1. Agreed in principle to draft amendments to the 2008 IS Code regarding vulnerability criteria and the standards related to parametric roll, pure loss of stability and surf-riding / broaching; 2. Agreed in principle, to Part B chapter 6 amendments of the 2008 IS Code with regard to ice accretion in timber deck cargo, for approval / adoption by MSC 95; 3. Approved a revised plan of action for matters related to intact stability including a new structure for integrating amendments to the 2008 IS Code; 4. Noted the need to develop explanatory notes regarding application of the criteria in order to ensure uniform implementation of the information provided; 5. Agreed a draft amendment to part B of the 2008 IS Code regarding vessels engaged in anchor handling operations, for MSC95 s approval; and 6. Agreed to re-establish the CG on Intact Stability, reporting to SDC 3.

TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR WATERTIGHT COMPARTMENTS. The Sub-Committee considered the report of the CG established by SDC1 on Amendments to SOLAS regulation II-1/11 and Development of Associated Guidelines to Ensure the Adequacy of Testing Arrangements for Watertight Compartments and, in addition, documents submitted by JAPAN, GREECE and INTERTANKO. Views were widely expressed, and even more widely divided, such as: 1. Hydrostatic testing is outdated and should be complemented by upto-date testing methods; 2. A compelling need to amend SOLAS regulation II-1/11 was demonstrated in the justification of this output; 3. The CG report is inconclusive; 4. Amending SOLAS would lower safety standards; 5. Ships built in very good shipyards can still have structural problems (i.e. quality management systems do not guarantee quality of construction, nor can they replace full scale testing); and 6. Alternative arrangement systems can be considered on a case-bycase basis by Administrations,` therefore guidelines for procedures of testing tanks and tight boundaries should be developed. However, the most telling intervention in the debate was made by INTERTANKO in pointing out that SOLAS regulation II-1/11 is the only one that mandates a full scale test to ensure the water-tightness of tanks intended to carry liquids on ships and should therefore remain. Noting that a clear majority was not in favour of such amendments, the Sub-Committee agreed not to amend SOLAS and instead will recommend to MSC95 that the output should be considered closed. REDUCED GROSS TONNAGE FOR CREW ACCOMMODATION SPACES. A submission by GERMANY proposing a draft resolution to encourage improved living conditions on board ships by means of a reduced gross tonnage parameter for assessing fees was considered. Following an in-depth discussion including concerns that a simplified reduced gross tonnage parameter might lower the safety requirements of ships that are just over 500 tons, and that a recommendatory instrument would not provide an incentive for shipowners to improve seafarers living conditions or to increase training accommodation, the Sub-Committee did not agree the proposed draft Assembly resolution and instead invited MSC to note that work on this output has been completed. FIRE PROTECTION. The Sub-Committee welcomed WG3 s wideranging report, approving it in general, and in particular, it: 1. Agreed draft Interim Guidelines for use of Fibre Reinforced Plastic (FRP) elements within ship structures: Fire Safety Issues and an associated MSC circular, for approval at MSC95;

2. Agreed a draft Unified Interpretation (UI) of the Guidelines for Safe Access to Tanker Bows (resolution MSC.62(87)) and associated draft MSC95 circular; 3. Agreed draft amendments to the Guidelines for the application of plastic pipes in ships for MSC95 approval; 4. Noted WG3 s discussion regarding application and purpose of evacuation analysis to various types of passenger ships, also special purpose ships and agreed relevant draft amendments to SOLAS II-2/13 for taking to MSC95 plus establishment of a CG; 5. Noted that the WG had failed to establish a consensus view on a UI that would not exceed the SOLAS requirement regarding the means of escape from ro-ro spaces but that nevertheless, a draft UI on SOLAS regulation II-2/13.6 had been finalised for consideration at MSC 95 together with its associated draft MSC circular; and 6. Agreed the justification for an unplanned output on clarification of application to SOLAS regulation II-2/9.4.1.3.3 with regard to fire integrity of windows on various sizes of passenger ships, as specified. OPENING OF WATERTIGHT DOORS DURING NAVIGATION. This item was on the agenda of SDC1 but was not raised owing to constrained time. The Sub-Committee noted that any revisions to SOLAS regulation II-1/22 and the related Guidance for watertight doors on passenger ships which may be opened during navigation (MSC.1/Circ.1380) are intended to ensure that requirements governing when such watertight doors may be opened, do not inadvertently provide a weak link in the required damage stability survivability of passenger ships. Of note, proposed revisions to SOLAS regulations II-1/22 approved by the Sub-Committee for approval by MSC will apply to new passenger ships whereas MSC.1/Circ.1380 applies to new and existing ships. Revising the latter would have unintended consequences to existing ships thus it was decided not to amend it, enabling continued application to existing ships. REVIEW OF GENERAL CARGO SHIP SAFETY. No documents were submitted to DE57, SDC1 or SDC2 on this subject so in accordance with IMO s Guidelines on the organisation and method of work, the output was deemed completed. AMENDMENTS TO THE 2011 ESP CODE. Draft amendment to the 2011 ESP Code proposed by IACS were debated, modified where necessary, then adopted by the Sub-Committee for submission to MSC 95 for approval. GUIDELINES ADDRESSING THE CARRIAGE OF MORE THAN 12 INDUSTRIAL PERSONNEL ON BOARD VESSELS ENGAGED ON INTERNATIONAL VOYAGES.The Sub-Committee approved the report by DG2 in general, and in particular:

1. Noted the group s decision to make minor changes to the footnotes and editorial corrections to the text of the definition of industrial personnel as developed by the correspondence group; 2. Noted the discussions and deliberations of the group regarding general interpretation in the draft MSC circular. This includes a brief background introduction and a definition of industrial personnel (short-term solution) to assist Member governments with the evolving offshore energy sector; 3. Agreed to a draft MSC Circular on Definition of industrial personnel for MSC95 s approval; 4. Agreed terms of reference for a CG to finalise the draft Guidelines for offshore service craft (OSC) used in windfarm service and further develop it with a view of finalising the draft Guidelines for offshore construction vessels (OCV) used in windfarm service; and 5. Will offer a written report to SDC3. GUIDELINES FOR USE OF FIBRE-REINFORCED PLASTIC (FRP) WITHIIN SHIP STRUCTURES. Having considered the report of the correspondence group set up at SDC1 and approved it in general, it was noted that the group had reached the consensus view that regulation II-2/17 can be used for approval of FRP composite structures on SOLAS ships. However, many different opinions were expressed as to the extent of applicability of this regulation and following a comprehensive discussion, the Sub-Committee decided that, at this stage, the working group should finalise the draft interim guidelines only, until experience is gained in its application. UNIFIED INTERPRETATION TO PROVISIONS OF IMO SAFETY, SECURITY, AND ENVIRONMENT-RELATED CONVENTIONS. Unified Interpretations as submitted by IACS, were approved as follows: 1. Application of SOLAS regulation II-1/3-6, as amended, and the revised Technical Provisions on means of access for inspections; 2. Continuous hatchways (regulation 36(6)) of the Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966; 3. Clarifications to the Code on Noise Levels on Board Ships; 4. Means of escape from machinery control rooms and main workshops; 5. Means of escape from machinery spaces on passenger ships; 6. Means of escape from machinery spaces on cargo ships; 7. Means of escape from accommodation spaces, service spaces and control stations on cargo ships; 8. Interpretation of SOLAS regulation II-2/9.7.3.2 on ventilation ducts in B class divisions; and 9. Fire integrity of the boundaries of ro-ro / vehicle spaces on passenger and cargo ships. Captain Paddy McKnight

The Importance of ECDIS Training and Familiarisation, and Good Watch Keeping Practice The UK s Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) has recently published the report of its investigation of the circumstances which resulted in the grounding of the m.t. Ovit on the Varne Bank in the English Channel on 18 September 2013. The report is of particular interest because it identifies the watch keeping officers failure to properly use an Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) as a causal factor in the grounding. In view of the increasing use of ECDIS (see Risk Alert RA14 dated March 2010), there are important lessons to be learned from this report in relation to ECDIS training and familiarisation, as well as navigational watch- keeping practice The m.t. Ovit is a 6,444GT oil/chemical tanker registered in Malta. On 18 September 2013 the vessel was on passage from Rotterdam to Brindisi laden with a cargo of vegetable oil. The vessel s primary means of navigation was an ECDIS. The vessel s Master and officers had received typespecific training on the ECDIS equipment fitted to the vessel. The third officer was due to be promoted and as preparation for this new role had been given the task of preparing the passage plan for the voyage to Brindisi. The third officer s preparation of the passage plan was not supervised by a more experienced officer, and the completed plan was not checked by the Master. The Varne Bank is a significant navigational hazard. It is a sand bank almost six nautical miles in length situated approximately nine nautical miles southwest of Dover. It lies centrally in the southwest-bound lane of the traffic separation scheme in the Dover Strait. The passage plan of the Ovit set a course which passed directly over the Varne Bank. The MAIB s investigation found that the function of the ECDIS which enabled the completed plan to be checked for safety identified a number of dangers associated with the passage, including the specific risk of grounding on the Varne Bank. Unfortunately that function was not used in the process of planning the passage, even though the third officer had recently been provided with familiarisation training for the specific ECDIS on the vessel. Instead, the officer simply zoomed in on each leg of the passage to visually check for navigational hazards. This was self evidently a much less reliable means of checking the navigational safety of the intended plan. The MAIB s investigation also established that the audible alarm on the ECDIS was inoperative and that the system had been operated in this condition for a considerable period of time. This deficiency rendered the setting of various safety parameters on the system, such as the guard zone, safety contour and grounding alarm, ineffective. Further, certain system settings had not been utilized and this compromised the quality of the information displayed. The feature which automatically loaded the most appropriate scale of chart available was not selected. The officer of the watch at the time of the grounding had aligned the scale of the ECDIS with the radar display. This resulted in a display on the ECDIS that contained an over-zoom notification, intended to alert the navigator to the fact that important navigational information may be missing because of the s cale in use. In addition the safety contour had not been set in accordance with the requirements of the vessel s Safety Management System. Had that been done, the setting on the ECDIS would have been 20m.

As it was, the safety contour was set to the manufacturer s default setting of 30m. Comparison of the ECDIS displays on both of these settings showed that a much clearer display of safe water was available on the 20m setting. The vessel passed the 30m contour seventeen minutes before grounding. That should have activated an alarm. However, the only alarms that were active were the grounding and cross track distance (XTD) alarms. The safety contour alarm was effectively disabled because an option on the Guard Zone menu page to Display and Highlight Dangers was set to Never. The grounding alarm was determined by the safety depth which was set at 13m. The Ovit passed over that depth seven minutes before grounding. Although this initiated the system s alarm, the watch keeper was unaware of it because the system s audible alarm was inoperative. The XTD limit was set to zero. At the time of grounding the vessel was over 200m to port of the intended track. Whilst this situation also failed to activate an audible alarm, the XTD out of limit alarm would only have been effective if the planned route was inherently safe, which it was not in this instance given that the intended track passed directly over the Varne Bank. Leaving aside the risks arising from the passage plan and the ECDIS settings, there were oth er issues which contributed to the cause of this grounding. On taking over the navigational watch the chief officer did not check the planned route for the next four hours to determine the potential navigational hazards and navigational marks likely to be encountered. This is in contravention of STCW Section A VIII/2, Part 3 which states that: 20. Prior to taking over the watch, the relieving officers shall satisfy themselves as to the ship s estimated or true position and confirm its intended track, course and speed, and UMS controls as appropriate and shall note any dangers to navigation expected to be encountered during their watch. As may be expected, the presence of the Varne Bank as a navigational hazard is identified by navigational marks. The north-eastern extremity of the bank is marked by a Light Float/Vessel with an all-round red flashing light, at a height of 39 feet having a range of 15 nautical miles. The other limits of the bank are marked by east, south and west cardinal marks with lights of the appropriate characteristics. A simulation of the incident undertaken by the MAIB using the prevailing weather conditions established that the Varne Light Float was visible at a range of 10 nautical miles, and the cardinal marks at a range of 5 nautical miles. At the time of the grounding the chief officer was assisted on the bridge by a cadet acting as lookout. Seventeen minutes before the grounding, the vessel passed close by the Varne Light Float. That navigational mark appears not to have been either noted, or its significance appreciated. Whilst the cadet observed the white flashing lights of the cardinal marks as the vessel approached the Varne Bank, he did not identify the lights nor report their sighting to the chief officer. Shortly after the vessel had run aground, an engineering alarm sounded from which the chief officer concluded that the ship had stopped because of a mechanical breakdown. His situational awareness was so impaired that he failed to appreciate the vessel had grounded until 19 minutes after the event.

The MAIB s investigation of this casualty has resulted in a number of recommendations concerning ECDIS systems. The UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency is recommended to forward a submission to the IMO s Navigation, Communication and Search and Rescue Sub-committee promoting the concept of carrying out annual performance checks on all ECDIS systems used on ships as the primary means of navigations. Such a check should have identified the inoperative audible alarm on the Ovit s system. Transport Malta, the vessel s flag state is recommended to propose to the Paris MOU Committee that a Concentrated Inspection Campaign be conducted on ECDIS-fitted ships to establish the standards of system knowledge among navigators using a list of pre- defined questions. The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) are recommended to develop and promulgate, in conjunction with ECDIS experts, a set of focused questions for use by surveyors and auditors when conducting audits and inspections on ECDIS fitted ships. The MAIB s recommendation to the owners of the Ovit, for steps to be taken to monitor the effectiveness of the ECDIS familiarisation provided to its deck officers, is a recommendati on that could equally be well heeded by all Members with vessels fitted with ECDIS. Full information about the casualty can be read in the MAIB s Accident Report which can be found HERE http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/ovitreport.pdf Source: Steamship Mutual

ALYARMOUK

Vessels for the Future Looking ahead to 2020 and beyond, both maritime and inland waterways will be under ever increasing pressure, as we use them for transport, recreation and commercially. At European Shipping week, Dr Pierre C. Sames, Chairman of the European Research Association and Director of Maritime Technology, Research and Development at classification society DNV GL, introduced a new initiative Vessels for the Future which aims to improve shipping s safety record, sustainability and global competitiveness. Launched in November 2014, over 50 companies, research institutes, academic organizations and interested associations have already signed up to take part in the initiative to work towards a more sustainable European transport system. Aiming at a private public partnership is important not only as it allows us to have a coordinated research, development and implementation (RDI) programme which covers both vessels and waterborne operations, but it demonstrates a clear commitment from all stakeholders to meet the ambitious goals of the initiative, said Dr Sames. The initiative focuses on the three key areas for the maritime transport cluster: safe and efficient waterborne transport and competitiveness of the maritime sector in Europe. Vessels for the Future has set ambitious goals in a 2050 perspective: an 80 per cent reduction in CO2 and 100 per cent reduction in SOx and NOx emissions, and a reduction in risk by a factor of 10.Five maritime technologies are seen as vital to unlocking greater efficiencies and improving environmental performance: new materials and processes, fuels and propulsion systems, information and communication technology (incl. e-maritime), hull water interaction, energy management and novel vessel design concepts. In addition, Vessels for the Future aims at creating the first European vessel demonstrator to test new technologies at ship level. Advances in these areas are also capable to strengthen industrial competitiveness and job creation in our sector.by developing energy efficient and safe vessels (or vessels for the future), the initiative will address the societal challenge of moving towards sustainable transport. At the same time it will maintain the cutting edge design, manufacturing and innovative produc-tion capacities, having a positive impact on employment and the global competitive-ness of the European economy. We are now looking forward to taking more action on this initiative, said Dr Sames. The programme has the potential to greatly increase the introduction of innovative enabling waterborne technologies. And the focus on demonstrating the cost vs. performance benefits of the innovations will ensure that they find a place in the market. This will further improve the profitability of industrial research by increasing market share, thereby enabling more investment in long term technological competitiveness. The next step for our initiative is to engage with the EU Commission to move towards a contractual private public partnership. For more information, please visit: https://www.dnvgl.com/maritime/