SPECIFICATIONS FOR GAMMA 1. Scope This Statement of Work (SOW) describes the requirements for a System or subsystems pertaining to gamma imaging. The IAEA is considering acquiring gamma imaging systems to fulfil a wide-variety of possible Contextual Usage Scenarios (CUS) described in Annex 1. The IAEA keeps the right to modify the below requirements and CUS described in Annex 1 further to the Technology Demonstration Workshop s findings and clarifications held in Vienna October 19-23, 2015. Additional information about the TDW and IAEA s attendance requirements is available in Attachment 2.6 Letter of Interest of RFP 26070-OE. 2. Requirements 2.1. LOT1: Gamma Imaging Unit 2.1.1. LOT 1 shall include the unit itself, the sensor(s), the battery and all required accessories to realize a complete system (ex. collimator, display unit, charger, and accessories). 2.2. LOT 2: Processing algorithms 2.2.1. LOT 2 shall comprise the algorithms used to process the data collected by the Gamma Imaging Unit into a set of information such as visual images, and characterization of the gamma sources (ex. Isotopic, spatial, activity characterization). 2.3. LOT 3: User Interface software 2.3.1. LOT 3 shall comprise the software allowing the user to interact with the Gamma Imaging Unit and the Processing Algorithms. 2.4. LOT 4: Customization level of effort 2.4.1. The level of effort will be mutually agreed, based on the Supplier s Labor Rates or lump sum as defined in the relevant Purchase Order. 2.5. System Requirements 2.5.1. The Supplier shall address as many CUS as possible with the proposed technology. 2.5.2. The System shall operate normally in standard operating conditions, indoor and outdoor (0 to 50C, <85% humidity). 2.5.3. The System shall be safe for the transportation by any kind of public transport and shall not require it s declaration as dangerous goods. 2.5.4. The System shall be tolerant of exposure to electrostatic discharges at intensities of up to 6 4 kv for contact and 8 kv for air. Page 1 of 6
2.5.5. The System shall not be affected by radio-frequency fields over a range of 80 MHz 2500 MHz at the intensity of 50 10V/m. 2.5.6. The System shall produce time-stamped electronic records of the raw data collected during the scan and can be saved on hard drives or memory stick. The processing software shall produce electronic records of the model computed using the raw data, that can be saved on hard drives or memory stick. For the purposes of the present document, records are documents providing evidence of an activity having been carried out or documents simply needed to capture work results. 3. Documentation Example of format generated by the instruments: -raw list-mode data format (file dump of the binary stream coming from the camera) -XML N42.42 based format, possibly including image data. The Supplier shall provide with each delivered unit a specifications document in English, containing the following information: 3.4. Technical specifications 3.5. Type of instrument, purpose, types of measurements carried out; 3.6. Complete description of the instrument with general technical data, including optimum configuration, type of detector and its size, accuracy, false alarm rate, background influence, calibration data, reference points, modes of operation, alarm initiation algorithms, kinds of alarm, markings, power supply, mechanical, environmental and electrical characteristics, electromagnetic compatibility, reliability and any other relevant information. 3.7. Complete description of test methods used, or references to international standards used 3.8. The Supplier shall provide user manuals, maintenance manuals, as well as system configuration and administration manuals. 3.9. The Supplier shall provide a short checklist of operating procedures, a list of recommended spare parts, and a trouble-shooting guide. 4. Periodic test procedures The Supplier shall provide a test procedure for the verification of all relevant parameters (exposure and energy ranges, accuracy and stability). It is recommended that these procedures would not require radioactive sources (in addition to natural background) at extent possible, because not all end-users have access to some or any sources. The Supplier shall provide a test report for all factory tests conducted on each individual instrument. 5. Certificates and legalization Page 2 of 6
In order to ensure reliable and safe operation, the Supplier shall provide a valid safety certificate and, preferably, a type test certificate of compliance with the relevant national/international standards. The Supplier is entirely responsible for providing all relevant documentation and certifications necessary to allow legal use of the system in Austria. This may include, for example, type test certification with subsequent entry into a State s register of measuring instruments and initial metrological verification of the instrument s characteristics. Page 3 of 6
Contextual Usage Scenario (CUS) CUS 01 CUS 02 CUS 03 CUS 04 CUS 05 CUS 06 Category CA CA Enrichment Enrichment Fresh Fuel Fresh Fuel Annex 1 Description The inspector enters room/lab full of cupboards, containing several rad sources. While carrying out interviews, he captures a gamma image of the room. He is able to verify the presence of SNM that may be masked by other rad sources before leaving the room, and reorient his inspection accordingly. The inspector enters room/lab full of cupboards. He leaves the camera operating during the rest of the CA and captures a gamma image of the room. He is able to verify the presence of NM before the end of the CA, and reorient his inspection accordingly. A gamma camera is used over a cascade hall, monitoring the centrifuges cylinders from the top, with a wide angle view, and possibly setup on rails so that it can randomly be moved across the warehouse. A gamma picture is taken, possibly with a very long integration time (24h). The visual imaging is optimally removed (to minimize the amount of information captured by the IAEA). The IAEA is able to visually confirm the presence of the absence of the accumulation of NM inside the enrichment process. UF6 tail cylinders are stored in multiple layers. A gamma camera is setup on an automated robot that is able to automatically navigate between the cylinders. A gamma picture is captured for each cylinder while the inspector carries out other activities. An automated, recognition-software analyses the images, confirms the presence of UF6 material in each cylinder and identifies any potential anomaly for further manual verification. An inspector captures a gamma image from the top of a fresh fuel assembly (in air). He is able to pinpoint which assembly contain LEU at a pin level (partial defect, or H+ verification method). An inspector captures a gamma image from the side of a group of fresh fuel assemblies. He is able to pinpoint which assembly contains LEU. Page 4 of 6
CUS 07 Fresh Fuel An inspector captures a gamma image lengthwise of an assembly/of several assemblies. He is able to measure and record in the report the actual active length of the assembly. CUS 08 CUS 09 In-process / Holdup In-process / Holdup Nuclear material is stored in a big difficult to access vessel. A gamma picture is taken, fill level is determined, geometry of different material layers inside the vessel are identified (e.g. sediment vs liquid), or emptiness is verified. Multiple pipes/equipment may contain hold-up or in process nuclear material. A wide-angle gamma measurement is taken. The inspector look at the superimposition of gamma and visual image, and is able to define the key spots where detailed measurement shall be made (ISOCS). CUS 10 Managed Access The inspector captures a gamma image from behind the curtain, in an area where the access has been managed by the operator. Without capturing sensitive visual information, he is still able to verify the presence (or confirm absence) of nuclear material. CUS 11 Managed Access The inspector captures a gamma image from a room containing sensitive equipment that is not safeguards relevant, or from a room that he cannot/ does not necessarily need to enter (clean room). He makes a gamma image, without capture sensitive visual information, or without entering the room. CUS 12 Glovebox A gamma image of a whole glovebox containing multiple small size containers is captured to assess the presence of special nuclear material. CUS 13 Safety During briefing or training, an image of the room along with the gamma sources is shown to inspectors. A map of the gamma radiation is provided to the inspectors. During site activities, inspectors remember more vividly the safe areas and are able to limit their dose rates. CUS 14 Surveillance A gamma camera is setup to monitor SF rods (Fukushima ), or any high activity sources. If one of the gamma sources disappear and alarm is raised. CUS 15 Surveillance A gamma camera is setup to monitor an entry/exit point. In the case of the appearance of a high-activity gamma source (Fukushima), an alarm is raised. CUS 16 Waste Various wastes containing nuclear material have been stored in a pit. A gamma picture is taken; spots with items containing nuclear material are identified, enabling a general verification of nuclear material declarations. Further detailed verifications are then carried out. CUS 17 Waste Wastes containing nuclear material have been stored in a pit. A gamma picture is taken establishing a reference fingerprint used as a containment and surveillance measure; the image is compared to a previous one and documents any significant change that occurred between the inspections. Page 5 of 6
CUS 18 Fresh Fuel An inspector captures a gamma image profile of a transport container of fresh fuel assemblies. He is able to visually confirm the presence (or absence) and number of fresh fuel assemblies. Page 6 of 6