The CTBT and the Ban Treaty Dr. Edward Ifft SnT2017 Vienna June 28, 2017
Existing Treaties NPT does ot e pli itl address testi g or e plosio s bans NNWS from receiving, manufacturing or otherwise acquiring NW LTBT/PTBT bans nuclear explosions in atmosphere, underwater or outer space TTBT limits underground nuclear explosions to 150 KT CTBT prohi its a u lear eapo test e plosio or a other u lear e plosio not defined, but clear from negotiating record
NWS Step-by-Step Approach U.S. (Obama) proposal for bilateral 1/3 redu tio s i SOA elo Ne START; old redu tio s i ta ti al u lear eapo s Russia: links to ABM, long-range precision conventional weapons, third-country forces; next steps should be multilateral Russia/China: Ban weapons in orbit Bring CTBT into force FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament (CD)
NWS Step-by-step Approach INF Treaty: Russia correct alleged violation, or allow some INF missiles, or make Treaty multilateral? CFE Treaty: NATO ratify Adapted Treaty and Russia resume implementation, or give up on CFE and create new European security framework? Role of OSCE? States e : Create Joi t E terprise Trump administration policies not formed Nuclear Posture Review underway Many ideas and proposals, but near-term prospects not good
Enter the Ban Treaty New research showed effects of even limited nuclear war even worse than previously thought Nuclear Winter Part II Lack of progress on fulfilling NPT Art. VI perception that step-by-step approach has stalled Growing concerns about humanitarian consequences NGOs very active 10 creative steps to a treaty
Oslo 2013 Nayarit, Mexico 2014 Vienna 2014 Austrian Pledge 2014 Humanitarian Pledge/Initiative 2015 NPT Revcon 2015
UN General Assembly 2015 Open-Ended Working Group 2016 UN First Committee 2016 UNGA 2016 Negotiations in New York 2017 Ban Treaty
States-Parties to Ban Treaty Will almost certainly be only NNWS also no NATO or umbrella states, at least initially Already prohibited from acquiring NW by NPT Many also are in Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones Early entry into force only 40 states required Curious legal situation
Treaty Definitions Elimination Procedures Elimination Timelines Verification, including OSI Implementation Organization INF X X X X X START X X X X X New START X X X X X CWC X X X X X BWC X Geneva Office CTBT NPT OTTAWA (LANDMINES) For X Verification For X Verification X X Fact-Finding Missions X Review Conferences Review Conferences
Main Ban Treaty Provisions Draft text May 22, 2017; final version expected July 7 Draft goes far beyond NPT prohibitions: bans de elop, produ e, sto kpile, ha e u lear eapo programme No definitions provided in draft text Draft a s use ut ot threat of use Draft follows CTBT wording no obvious conflict
But Other Possibilities Some Ban Treaty advocates have suggested banning su riti al testi g, o puter odeli g or h drod a i trials OEWG proposed a i g testi g, i ludi g su riti al e peri e ts a d super o puter si ulatio s This is close to Indian and Indonesian positions during CTBT negotiations rejected by P5 Very difficult to define and verify such activities A ti ities ot prohi ited Stated intent of Ban Treaty advocates is to support and reinforce existing treaties, especially NPT and CTBT Actual effect to be determined
CTBTO Position We site: Nu lear-weapons-related testing which purposely results in no yield is known as sub-critical testing, referring to the absence of a critical mass of fissile material. Such a test is ot o sidered a u lear test.
P5 POSITION The P e pressed their deep o er ith efforts to pursue approaches to nuclear disarmament that disregard the global strategic context. Such efforts will threaten the consensusbased approach that has served for decades to strengthen the NPT regime and enhance the Treat s o tri utio to i ter atio al se urit a d may negatively affect the prospects for consensus at future NPT Re ie Co fere es. --September 15, 2016
What About Existing Nuclear Weapons? Expected later Nuclear Weapons Convention to deal with these BT not clear suggests NWS work out procedures individually with IAEA or just eliminate on their own (South Africa model) Multiplicity of elimination and verification regimes would pose huge problems Learn from Iraq experience
Friendly Advice to BT Opponents Stop pretending step-by-step process is alive a d ell a d ou ha e set a ourse to zero not true Stop ignoring the will of a majority of states who insist on elimination of nuclear weapons Continue and accelerate P5 process Reinvigorate work on verification of elimination of nuclear weapons Cooperation, not confrontation
Friendly Advice to BT Supporters Stop lai i g that a use of u lear weapons will cause nuclear winter and mass starvation not true Stop claiming that banning weapons and then figuring out later how to eliminate them and ho to erif that is ho e ha e al a s do e it not true Stop saying that anyone who does not support BT is against NPT Art. VI not true
More Friendly Advice Begin to address how deterrence would operate without nuclear weapons Cooperation, not confrontation