COMMITTEE GUIDE. General Assembly 1st Committee Chair: Lilian Basic Deputy: Gloria Ambrosio Luna

Transcription

1 COMMITTEE GUIDE General Assembly 1st Committee Chair: Lilian Basic Deputy: Gloria Ambrosio Luna

2 Honorable Delegates, My name is Gloria Ambrosio Luna and I am 15 year old. I ve lived most of my life in Spain, but I moved to Germany in 2016; I am currently attending 10th Grade at the International School of Stuttgart. I attended my first Model United Nations conference as a delegate when I was in Grade 9. It is my honour and pleasure to be your Deputy Chair in the General Assembly 1st Committee: Disarmament and International Security. I m looking forward to meeting you all at the 2018 installment of the Model United Nations. Until then, I wish you the best of luck for your position papers. Hopefully, this report will serve you well. Forum: The General Assembly 1st Committee: Disarmament and International Security. Issue: The question of militarising outer space. Student Officer: Gloria Ambrosio Luna. Position: Deputy Chair (GA1).

3 Regards to the Issue The militarisation of outer space of outer space can be defined as the deployment and expansion of weaponry and military technology in the cosmos. The question of militarising outer space has been a concern of the United Nations ever since the world s first artificial satellite, Sputnik I, was launched on October 4, 1957, by the Soviet Union; since then outer space has been adopted as a location for military spacecraft 1. In 1959, the General Assembly established the Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). As the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) states: The Committee was instrumental in the creation of the five treaties and five principles of outer space. International cooperation in space exploration and the use of space technology applications to meet global development goals are discussed in the Committee every year. Owing to rapid advances in space technology, the space agenda is constantly evolving. The Committee therefore provides a unique platform at the global level to monitor and discuss these developments. 2 Key Terms Militarization of outer space: Space has been militarized since the earliest communication satellites were launched. Today, militaries all over the world rely on satellites for command and control, communication, monitoring, early warning, and navigation with the Global Positioning System. Therefore, peaceful uses of outer space include military uses, even those which are not at all peaceful such as using satellites to direct bombing raids or to orchestrate a prompt global strike capability, which is the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military operations. Weaponization of outer space: Space weaponization is generally understood to refer to the placement in orbit of space-based devices that have a destructive capacity. Many experts argue that ground-based systems designed or used to attack space-based assets also constitute space weapons, though are not technically part of the weaponization of outer space since they are not placed in orbit. Some also argue that weapons that travel through space in order to reach their targets, such as hypersonic technology vehicles, also contribute to the weaponization of space. Many elements of the US ballistic missile defense system currently being developed or planned could constitute space weapons as well, as many possess dual-use characteristics, allowing them to destroy space assets as well as ballistic missiles. 1 NASA, NASA, history.nasa.gov/sputnik/. 2 robert.wickramatunga. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. COPUOS,

4 Space Debris: Space debris is defined as all non-functional, human-made objects, including fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit or re-entering into Earth's atmosphere. Humanmade space debris dominates over the natural meteoroid environment, except around millimetre sizes. 3 Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS): The overwhelming majority of UN member states are concerned that the weaponization of outer space will lead to an arms race and insist that a multilateral treaty is the only way to prevent such an arms race, emphasizing that this treaty would not limit space access, but would prevent such limitations. In 2006, Russia argued that if all states observe a prohibition on space weaponization, there will be no arms race. Russia and China also support establishing an obligation of no use or threat of use of force against space objects and have submitted a draft treaty to the UN on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space. 4 Issue Explanation 5 The concern over the peaceful use of space arose along with the dawn of the space age. The weaponization of space will destroy strategic balance and stability, undermine international and national security, and disrupt existing arms control instruments, in particular those related to nuclear weapons and missiles. These effects will inevitably lead to a new arms race. Space weaponization would seriously disrupt the arms control and disarmament process. The United States' withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001 and the development of US ground- and sea- based missile defenses have already increased tensions with Russia and have led to increased missile proliferation. The deployment of these technologies or the development of space-based technologies will likely cause Russia, as well as the United States (in response to Russia), to make smaller and smaller reductions of their nuclear arsenals and to reject the development of new treaties to regulate nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. China would likely build more warheads to maintain its nuclear deterrent, which could in turn encourage India and then Pakistan to follow suit. In January 2007, China tested an anti-satellite weapon against one of its own ageing weather satellites. The United States, while condemning the test, forged ahead with several space and missile defense projects with dual-use capabilities. In addition, in February 2008, the United States shot down own of its own failed 3 Esa. FAQ: Frequently asked questions. European Space Agency, 4 Home. Critical issues, 5 Küçükakyüz, Mevsim. Disarmament Committee Chair Report.

5 satellites that was carrying a half-ton of hydrazine rocket fuel (a toxic chemical). The US military shot it down with a Standard Missile-3, whose primary vocation is interceptor for the US Navy s missile defense system. The Status of International Law on Outer Space The 1967 Outer Space Treaty outlines the principles governing outer space: most importantly that the use of outer space should benefit all nations, outer space is not subject to national appropriation, space should be open to all countries for exploration, and all space activities should be carried out for the sole purposes of maintaining international peace and security. The treaty includes the following: In conjunction with the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, Article IV prohibits testing, orbiting, and placement of nuclear weapons in space. Article VI establishes national responsibility for all activities carried out by corporations and any other non-governmental agencies of a given nation, thus providing the legal context in which actions may be challenged. Article VII establishes liability for damage to another country's property in space, now institutionalized by the 1972 Liability Convention, which further establishes procedures for determining the liability of a country that damages or destroys the space objects of another country. Article IX provides for consultations if any signatory to the treaty believes another treaty member's actions or plans would cause "potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space." The glaring omission of the Outer Space Treaty is, of course, the legal status of space weapons. Recognizing immediately this weak spot in the treaty's language, Egypt and Sri Lanka since 1982 have annually taken turns in the First Committee of the General Assembly to present a draft resolution on the Prevention of An Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). With its annual adoption in the General Assembly, the resolution calls on the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a legal, integrated and binding instrument to address the shortages in the legal regime on outer space. Unfortunately, such action has been consistently blocked by the United States. Processes and Possible Solutions Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space In 2007, the UN Secretary-General issued a report compiling the views of member states on the issue of TCMBs in outer space, as requested by a General Assembly resolution. In 2010, the General Assembly agreed to launch a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to explore TCBMs that could be undertaken to enhance space security. This GGE commenced in July 2012.

6 Prevention of an arms race in outer space Due to the structure of the international legal regime and to the objection of a (very) few states, a treaty has not yet been negotiated to comprehensively prevent the deployment of weapons in space or to prevent an arms race in outer space even though a majority of countries have agreed that an outer space arms race should be prevented. The United States systematically argues that an arms race in outer space does not yet exist, and it is therefore unnecessary to take action on the issue. The rest of the international community agrees that, because there is not yet an arms race, now is the time to prevent weaponization of space. Prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space (PPWT) Some delegations and experts have argued that PAROS is not the most relevant term or treaty to pursue. On 12 February 2008, Russia's Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, addressed the Conference and presented a joint Russia-China draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). It is the first and only draft treaty on this issue formally introduced to the CD, though it is based on elements proposed in a working paper to the CD in June 2002 by Russia, China, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Belarus, Zimbabwe, and Syria. Minister Lavrov explained the draft treaty is designed to eliminate existing lacunas in international space law, create conditions for further exploration and use of space, preserve costly space property, and strengthen general security and arms control. Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) The GGE consists of a small group of international space experts from a selection of space faring countries with the main objective to improve international cooperation and reduce the risks of misunderstanding and miscommunication in outer space activities. The final goal for the group is to deliver a consensus report that outlines conclusions and recommendations on transparency and confidence-building measures for space security and sustainability. International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities In 2008, the European Union (EU) initiated a procedure to develop an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (ICoC). The code will not function as a legally binding treaty, but is intended to consist of a set of principles and guidelines agreed to on a voluntary basis amongst states. It is not intended to have any formal enforcement mechanisms. The objective behind the ICoC is to enhance safety and security in outer space through the develop Historical Background of the Issue

7 PAROS 6 During the 1960s and 1970s a number of agreements were adopted to prevent the weaponization of outer space. These include the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), the Outer Space Treaty (1967), the Rescue Agreement (1968), the Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization "Intelsat" (1971), the Liability Convention (1972), the Launch Registration Convention (1975), and the Moon Agreement (1979). In 1985 the Conference on Disarmament (CD) established an ad hoc (created for a particular purpose) committee to identify and examine issues relevant to PAROS such as the legal protection of satellites, nuclear power systems in space, and various confidence-building measures. The committee convened each year through No further committee meeting occurred due to objections made by the United States. In 1990 the United States stated that it has not identified any practical outer space arms control measures that can be dealt within a multilateral environment. With its large missile defense program and technical advantages in potential space weaponry, the United States has consistently refused to negotiate PAROS in the CD. Involved Parties Military Satellites 7 United States - Lacrosse/Onyx - Misty/Zirconic - Samos - Quasar - Vela Soviet Union - Cosmos - Almas (manned) - Yantar - Senit - United Kingdom Sircon (project cancelled) - Skynet France - Helios 1B (destroyed) - Helios 2A 6 Proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS) Treaty. Nuclear Threat Initiative - Ten Years of Building a Safer World, 7 Militarisation of space. Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 4 Dec. 2017, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/militarisation_of_space#military_satellite.

8 - Germany SAR-Lupe Italy - COSMO-SkyMed Japan - Information gathering satellites. People's Republic of China - Fanhui Shi Weixing - India India - RISAT-1 - RISAT-2 - CCI-Sat Israel - Ofeq series of photo reconnaissance and radar satellites USSR; USA. United Nations: Disarmament in the Security Council; Disarmament in the General Assembly; Conference on Disarmament; Disarmament Commission; UNOOSA. Previous Attempts to Resolve the Issue In respect of the banning of weapons from outer space, Art. IV, para 1 OST says: Para 1: States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. This provision is generally regarded as a partial demilitarisation of outer space. It prohibits the deployment of weapons of mass destruction. 9 However, the placement of conventional weapons in outer space is not prohibited. Nor is the use of weapons of mass destruction prohibited, if the weapon is placed on Earth. With regard to the Moon and Celestial Bodies, the demilitarisation is extended further in para 2. It prohibits the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies. Generally, these provisions are regarded as inadequate to prevent the weaponization of outer space. This was the reason why, in 1981, Italy on behalf of the Western European and Other

9 States group introduced a draft resolution to the United Nations entitled Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Against the background of the development of ASAT-Tests of the US and the USSR, the resolution called on the Committee on Disarmament (today the Conference on Disarmament, or CD) to consider as a matter of priority the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. It demanded to negotiate a verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems. The Resolution demanded from all States to prevent an arms race in outer space and to prevent outer space from becoming an area of military confrontation and held that such use would be contrary to the spirit of the [Outer Space Treaty]. This was the beginning of a process called PAROS. It includes annual resolutions of the GA which reiterate the need for a comprehensive agreement to prevent weaponization of outer space. The most recent GA Resolution is from 12 of January In 1985, the CD created an Ad hoc Committee on PAROS. The definition of the mandate, however, turned out to be difficult. Most of the States wanted to start concrete negotiations about a prohibition of space weapons. The US objected such a mandate. It was of the opinion that the UN Charter, existing multilateral treaties in outer space, bilateral and multilateral arms control regimes together with customary international law already provided an equitable, practical and extensive legal system for ensuring the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. In 1995, the negotiations came to a complete standstill, primarily because of the linkage with other disarmament issues (eg China and Pakistan who were against a Fissile Material 10 Cut-Off Treaty without including also existing stocks, and with Transparency in Armaments ). Since then, China and Russia have been trying to advance negotiations on a treaty preventing the weaponization of outer space with a number of proposals. One comprehensive draft was submitted in 2002, the most recent draft is of February 2008, namely the Draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects. This treaty aims not only at banning space weapons but also to prohibit the threat or use of force against space objects which would ban ASAT and ABM weapons, either ground based or mounted on aircraft. So far, however, no consensus in the CD about this issue is foreseeable. The US position is that it is willing to discuss the issue at the CD, but not to negotiate a treaty on it. However, there is a significant interest among scholars and practitioners also within the

10 US who would consider such a prohibition also beneficial to the US and enhancing its national security situation. 8 Further reading Marboe-AM-2010.pdf - E.pdf Marboe, Irmgard. Marboe Militarisation Oral. Irmgard Marboe.