GPS Jamming Quantifying the Threat

Transcription

1 GPS Jamming Quantifying the Threat GNSS Vulnerability Countering the Threat 13 th Feb 2013 Prof. Charles Curry B.Eng, C.Eng, FIET Managing Director Chronos Technology Ltd NPL, Teddington, London

2 Presentation Contents Background What, Who and Why? Latest SENTINEL Jamming Detections Vulnerable Applications Conclusions

3 Presentation Contents Background What, Who and Why? Latest SENTINEL Jamming Detections Vulnerable Applications Conclusions

4 Background GPS Interference & Jamming Royal Academy of Engineering Report Published Space Weather Royal Academy of Engineering Report To be published Feb 2013

5 Interesting Headlines! Feb 2012 GPS jamming: a clear and present reality A secret network of 20 roadside listening stations across the UK has confirmed that criminals are attempting to jam GPS signals on a regular basis. May 2012 GPS Vulnerable To Hacks, Jamming This week, the South Korean government reported that electronic jamming signals from North Korea were affecting communications and GPS signals for passenger aircraft..

6 The SENTINEL Project GNSS SErvices Needing Trust In Navigation, Electronics, Location & timing 2011: UK Government Funded R&D Project, 2 years, ~ 1.5m through Technology Strategy Board Trusted Services Call Research to establish extent to which GNSS and eloran PNT signals can be trusted 11/05/2015 6

7 11/05/2015 The SENTINEL Partners ACPO-ITS Association of Chief Police Officers User Community Law Enforcement Brings other Government agencies into the collaboration GLA General Lighthouse Authorities User Community - Maritime eloran University of Bath - Dept. of Electrical & Electronics GPS & Space Weather Ordnance Survey User Community Land Geolocation NPL National Physical Laboratory Time, UTC Traceability Thatcham Vehicle Security Certification of safety critical services Chronos Technology Ltd GAARDIAN Research SENTINEL Project Leader 7

8 SENTINEL Research Can we detect? Can we prove it s a jammer? Can we locate, identify, seize? Can we determine extent of problem? Can we create actionable intelligence? Can we show that eloran is a viable complement to GNSS for PNT?

9 More Headlines!

10 Presentation Contents Background What, Who and Why? Latest SENTINEL Jamming Detections Vulnerable Applications Conclusions

11 What, Who and Why? Interference to GNSS Unintentional Jamming, e.g. RFI at L1 Serious Multipath Space Weather Poor Workmanship GNSS Jamming Deliberate jamming Unintentional consequence of jammer use Spoofing & Meaconing

12 Example of RFI 15 Storey Building in London 17 Minute Loss of GPS!

13 Example of Serious Multipath Gantry over highway Adjacent to big reflectors 15 Minute compromise

14 Space Weather 11 Year Solar Cycles Aurora Borealis Carrington Event 1859 Solar Flares (8 Minutes) Coronal Mass Ejection CME Up to 2 days Nasa Univ of Bath

15 Example of Space Weather 24 th Sept 2011 Southampton 12 Mins 24 th Sept 2011 Leeds 9 Mins Solar Activity and the Effect on Positioning Systems - The first Examples of Disturbances in Solar Cycle 24 European Navigation Conference London, 29 Nov. 1 Dec Ole Ørpen - Fugro Seastar, Oslo, Norway 24 th Sept 2011 Global Events

16 Poor Workmanship This is what you get if you ask 17 th Edition Electricians to install your GPS Antenna!

17 Presentation Contents Background What, Who and Why? Latest SENTINEL Jamming Detections Vulnerable Applications Conclusions

18 Who does Jamming? Civil, Criminal, Terrorist and State Evasion of GPS tracked car insurance Evasion of Company Vehicle Tracking Systems Evasion of Road User Charging Schemes & tachographs Stealing High Value Assets, Cars, Vans, Loads Evasion of Covert Tracking Securing Off-Site Meetings Evasion of Criminal Tagging Intentional attack by foreign power or non-state

19 GPS Tracked Car Insurance Pay as you drive insurance Young driver insurance Fleet insurance Black box insurance Telematics insurance

20 GPS Company Vehicle Tracking

21 Case Study White Van Man E v e n t s 12 6 Month Bins May 2011 Months Now Can we detect a pattern?

22 A - Hour Bins Through Day 12 E v e n t s 6 Midnight 12:00

23 A - 11am-2pm End June Day Bins Throughout the Week E v e n t s 5 Monday

24 Sit and Wait! Hand Held GPS Jammer Detector Along comes White Van man at 2:15 Investigations lead to police seizing a device!

25 A - 12 Months of Data When was the device confiscated? E v e n t s 12 6 Feb 2011 Now Months

26 GPS Asset Tracking

27 Criminal Tagging

28 GPS State Based Jamming

29 Presentation Contents Background What, Who and Why? Latest SENTINEL Jamming Detections Vulnerable Applications Conclusions

30 Locations Airport Financial district Dual Carriageway Gantry

31 Overview of Analysis Process Probe hosts 2 independent sensor techniques Power in L1 (GPS GHz) Spectrum Susceptibility of our GPS Sensor to increased power Discrimination between serious multipath and RFI Data Analysis Events per day/month Events through the day Events by day of week This indicates non-natural event patterns Available via secure web based GUI

32 x2 Detection Techniques Power in L1 Spectrum using FFT Susceptibility of GPS by measuring C/No

33 Airport Data Analysis By Month

34 Airport Data Analysis By Hour of Day

35 Airport Data Analysis By Day of Week

36 Airport Data Analysis By day

37 Dual Carriageway Data Analysis By Month

38 Dual Carriageway Data Analysis By Hour of Day

39 Dual Carriageway Data Analysis By Day of Week

40 Dual Carriageway Data Analysis By day

41 City Data Analysis By Hour of Day

42 City Data Analysis By Day of Week

43 City Data Analysis By day

44 Presentation Contents Background What, Who and Why? Latest SENTINEL Jamming Detections Vulnerable Applications Conclusions

45 Vulnerability Assessment Application Short Event <60 Seconds Med Event <30 Minutes Long Event Spoofing Attack Positioning Low Low Low Medium Navigation High High High High Timing Medium Medium High Medium Mitigating Technologies Short Event <60 Seconds Med Event <30 Minutes Long Event Spoofing Attack Med-Stab Oscillator Excellent Depends Depends Depends Hi-Stab Oscillator Excellent Excellent Depends Depends eloran Excellent Excellent Excellent Excellent

46 Vulnerable Applications Any user of PNT Transport Telecoms Utilities Finance Broadcasting Tracking Services

47 Vulnerability Trials TSB funded SENTINEL provides Immediate vulnerability trial capability Sensor sensitivity to native GPS signals Quickly, easily, unambiguously Web enabled reporting & analysis With alerts Deployment of small networks of sensors CNI Threat evaluation Delivering actionable intelligence To Counter the Threat

48 Assessing GNSS Vulnerability GNSS Vulnerability & Susceptibility Test Bed 24x7, Alerts, Web Interface, 3G Data Link Start Your GNSS Risk Assessment Now

49 Conclusions We know What, Who and Why We can detect, locate, discriminate We know which applications are vulnerable Hence what industries. We can illustrate vulnerabilities, susceptibilities Access to Jamming trials 24x7 Monitoring to assess local threat Provision of actionable intelligence

50 Questions? Thankyou