UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD. GOOGLE INC. Petitioner v. BETTER FOOD CHOICES LLC Patent Owner

Transcription

1 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD GOOGLE INC. Petitioner v. BETTER FOOD CHOICES LLC Patent Owner CASE: CBM Patent No. 5,841,115 PETITIONER S REPLY TO PATENT OWNER S RESPONSE

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION... 1 II. THE BOARD SHOULD CANCEL ALL CLAIMS UNDER A. The Patent Owner has taken no position on the patentability of method claims 11-20, and thus has waived any argument B. The Patent Owner s arguments about Alice step 1 ignore the law The Board correctly defined the abstract concept recited in the claims Patent Owner s reliance on the mere recitation of a barcode reader and database is misplaced C. The Board correctly found that no claim covers significantly more than the abstract concept III. THE BOARD SHOULD CANCEL CLAIMS 1-10 UNDER A. Claims 1-10 are properly construed under 112, 6, and must be supported by an algorithm B. Claims 1-10 are indefinite because the specification lacks algorithmic support for the correlating function C. The Katz exception does not apply IV. CONCLUSION i-

3 I. INTRODUCTION Petitioner hereby timely files this Petitioner Reply to respond to, and rebut, issues raised in the Patent Owner s Response. The Patent Owner s Response cannot overcome the Board s correct assessment that all claims of the 115 patent should be cancelled. At every turn, the Patent Owner s Response fails to contest key aspects of the Board s findings. Therefore, the Board should uphold those findings and cancel all of the patent s claims. First, all claims are unpatentable under 101. They are directed to the longstanding human activity of providing personalized nutrition information to shoppers, and are unpatentable because they fail to claim anything more than that abstract concept implemented on generic computer components. The Board should first find the method claims to be unpatentable because the Patent Owner failed to offer any argument for them. The Board should also find all claims to be unpatentable under 101 on the merits. Second, claims 1-10 are also invalid under 112, 6. Their claimed processor means must correlat[e] the personal data with prestored nutritional data, but neither the specification nor the Patent Owner identify any algorithm that accomplishes that function. The Patent Owner argues only that the claim is somehow not written in means-plus-function format, and then points to a self- -1-

4 serving declaration from the inventor to compensate for the complete lack algorithmic support in the specification. System claims 1-10 are therefore invalid as indefinite. II. THE BOARD SHOULD CANCEL ALL CLAIMS UNDER 101 As the Board correctly found, and for the reasons outlined below, all claims of the 115 patent should be cancelled because they are not directed to more than the abstract concept of providing personalized nutrition information of food products to shoppers. Paper 10 (hereinafter Institution Decision ) at 20, A. The Patent Owner has taken no position on the patentability of method claims 11-20, and thus has waived any argument. The Board s scheduling order cautioned that any arguments for patentability not raised in the response will be deemed waived. Paper 11 (hereinafter Scheduling Order ) at 4. Nevertheless, the Patent Owner declined to address at all any possible patentability of the method claims. Indeed, the Patent Owner s Response affirmatively ignores the Board s findings regarding Claim 11, and instead invites the Board to focus entirely upon on the system claims. (Paper 14, hereinafter Response ) at 32, n.15. Accordingly, Petitioner s contentions that claim 11 is drawn to the patent ineligible abstract concept of providing personalized nutrition information of food products to shoppers, and that the claim (and its dependent claims) contain no other limitations that render -2-

5 the abstract idea patentable, are unrebutted. For this reason alone, claims should be cancelled under 101. The Patent Owner s arguments about burden of proof do not excuse its failure to respond regarding the method claims. Compliance with 101 is a question of law, not fact. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015). And where a patent deals with easily understandable technology, a petitioner need only refer to the patent itself to establish, as a matter of law, that the claims are drawn to a non-patentable long prevalent practice. See Regions Fin. Corp., CBM , Final Written Decision, 2015 WL , at *12 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 23, 2015) (rejecting Patent Owner s argument that the patent alone cannot be sufficient to find unpatentability) (internal citation omitted) (citing Lee v. Mike's Novelties, Inc., 543 Fed. Appx (Fed. Cir. 2013)). Patent Owner is thus incorrect in arguing (in the Response at 13-16) that patentability under 101 is an issue of fact for which Petitioner bears a burden. The existing record sufficiently supports the Board s conclusion that all claims of the 115 patent are drawn to an abstract idea. The 115 patent is undoubtedly drawn to an easily understandable technology the specification describes the components as conventional and well known, and the Patent Owner affirms that the alleged invention is simple. See Exhibit 1001, 115 patent at Col. 5:60-63; id. at Col. 6:20-25; Response at 33 ( The invention of claim -3-

6 1 is a simple invention.... ). Thus, no extrinsic evidence is necessary to find that the claims are abstract or that they are drawn to a longstanding human practice. And although the Patent Owner argues (in the Response at 16-20) that the file history provides persuasive evidence regarding patentability that must be overcome with proof, this ignores the law. See Regions Fin. Corp., 2015 WL , at *12 (the patent alone is sufficient to sustain a finding of unpatentability). Also, Petitioner cited to the DietGoal case where a court held that nutrition-based meal selection was a long prevalent activity. See Paper 1 at Thus, the existing record and Patent Owner s failure to respond is more than sufficient for the Board to find the method claims are unpatentable. B. The Patent Owner s arguments about Alice step 1 ignore the law. The Board correctly found that all claims were unpatentable on the merits. The Institution Decision found that the claims are directed to a concept that is abstract under Alice. See Institution Decision at 19. It looked first to claim 11 (depicted here), and found that the claim is directed to the concept of providing personalized nutritional -4-

7 information of food products to shoppers based on their nutritional needs. Id. In so doing, the Board rejected Patent Owner s argument in the preliminary response that this claim requires a barcode reader. Id. ( Patent Owner s argument appears to be more properly directed at the second step ). The Board then found that the system claims were directed at the same concept. Id. at 20. In sum, the Board correctly found that method claim 11, its dependent claims, and all system claims are directed at the concept of providing personalized nutritional information of food products to shoppers based on their nutritional needs. Patent Owner makes several arguments regarding the Board s definition of the abstract concept at issue under Alice step 1, particularly with respect to the system claims. But, these arguments ignore the law and should be rejected. 1. The Board correctly defined the abstract concept recited in the claims. Patent Owner first takes issue with the abstract concept the Board identified in step 1 of its Alice analysis. Response at To the Patent Owner, the Board s definition of the concept was subjective and misleading. See generally, id. Not so. The Supreme Court counseled in Alice that the selection of the abstract concept must not be overgeneralized, but must also not be hypersensitive to the existence of generic computer limitations. 134 S.Ct. at , This is precisely what the Board did for all claims, and especially the system claims. See Institution Decision at

8 Patent Owner suggests that the essential and core invention of the system claims must include (1) a barcode entry device, (2) personal data, and (3) prestored nutritional data. Response at 31; see also id. at ( the claimed invention... teaches using a shopper controlled nutritional database, personal data, (and only the product id barcode from the label) to make better food choices (emphasis in original)). To the Patent Owner, the patent s concept was to avoid using food labels at all. Id. But, this argument is wrong for three reasons. First, the concept used in the Alice analysis must be derived from the claims. Accenture Global Svcs. GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2013); AmDocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 59 F.Supp. 3d 813, 822 (E.D. Va. 2014) (unclaimed features cannot affect patent eligibility). None of the claims here require avoiding the food label or considering only the barcode. And in fact, some of the patent s claims do not even require the use of a barcode reader at all. What all claims do have in common, however, is the recitation of data operations that replicate a series of tasks that could be otherwise accomplished with the human mind and a pen and paper. It is well-understood that claims covering nothing more than receiving, storing, processing, and/or transmitting data, are inherently abstract. See, e.g., Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, (Fed. Cir. 2014) (claim for organizing data in its ethereal, non-physical form through mathematical correlations was drawn to -6-

9 an abstract idea). Claims 11-17, which are not tied to any particular tangible medium, fail for this reason alone. Also, claims drawn to method[s] of organizing human activity or longstanding practices are also abstract. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356 (2014). This is particularly true where, as here, the concept is a longstanding human practice that has been done for decades without a computer, see buysafe, Inc. v. Google Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, (Fed. Cir. 2014), and can be accomplished with pen and paper. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978)); OpenTV, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 14- cv-1622, 2015 WL , at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2015) ( the pen and paper test...is an analytical tool to test whether the underlying concept described in the claims is abstract. ). Indeed, the pen and paper test that several courts have endorsed (see id.) confirms that Patent Owner s arguments about the abstract concept at issue here are misplaced. There is no doubt here that providing personalized nutritional information of food products to shoppers based on their nutritional needs can be performed with a pen and paper (and in the human mind, for that matter). Claim 11 is thus abstract. See id. The system claims compel the same conclusion because, even though they include a generic hardware, they are directed at the same abstract concept.. See -7-

10 Bancorp Svcs., LLC v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 687 F.3d 1266, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding equivalence between the method and system claims for the purpose of 101). In Alice itself, the Supreme Court held that system claims requiring only generic hardware are equally abstract and unpatentable as the corresponding method claim. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at These cases confirm that the Board s analysis was correct, and that the claims here are drawn to an abstract idea. 2. Patent Owner s reliance on the mere recitation of a barcode reader and database is misplaced. Next, Patent Owner argues that the certain hardware limitations recited in the system claims (e.g. the barcode reader) must be addressed at step 1of the Alice framework. This ignores Federal Circuit and Board decisions to the contrary. Patent Owner argues that, unlike the claims in DietGoal, its claims incorporate certain limitations i.e., a database and barcode reader that were part of his idea and were not in long prevalent use by grocery shoppers at the time the patent was filed. 1 See Response at 24. But the question at step 1 of the Alice 1 It bears noting that DietGoal s system claims specifically recited a Database of food objects, but were nevertheless found to be drawn to the abstract idea of meal planning. DietGoal Innovations LLC v. Bravo Media LLC, 33 F. Supp. 3d 271, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) aff'd, 599 F. App x 956 (Fed. Cir. 2015). -8-

11 analysis is not whether the claim recites a novel implementation of an abstract idea, because a novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. Carecloud Corp., CBM , Final Written Decision, 2015 WL , at *10 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 18, 2015) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304 (2012)) (emphasis in original). Indeed, any novelty in implementation of the idea is a factor to be considered only in the second step of the Alice analysis, and is irrelevant to step 1 of the Alice framework. Westlake Servs., CBM , Final Written Decision, 2015 WL , at *14 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 24, 2015) (citing Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Indeed, Alice and its progeny reached similar conclusions when faced with other claims reciting hardware limitations. For instance, Alice itself dealt with a system claim that recited hardware limitations, such as a data storage unit and a computer, which the patentee argued rendered the claim patentable because they recite[d] specific hardware configured to perform specific computerized functions. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at Nevertheless, the Court held at step 1 of its analysis that the system claims were directed to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement. Id. at 2357 (emphasis added). The hardware limitations did not appear in the words of the concept the Supreme Court selected. -9-

12 Similarly, in Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Services, Inc., the system claim at issue covered, inter alia, a database, a computer system, a computer network, and various interfaces for entering information, but the Federal Circuit held that the claim recited the abstract idea of nothing more than the collection of information to generate a credit grading and to facilitate anonymous loan shopping. 811 F.3d 1314, 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Likewise, in Accenture, the patent s system claims recited an insurance claim folder, a task library database, a server component, and a task engine, but the Federal Circuit held that these claims were directed to generating tasks [based on] rules... to be completed upon the occurrence of an event. 728 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Notably, in Accenture, the Federal Circuit ascertained the scope of the system claims by reference to unappealed method claims that were undisputedly unpatentable. Id. at 1342, ( Thus, like the unappealed method claims, the system claims of the 284 patent are invalid under 35 U.S.C ). Likewise here, the Board correctly evaluated the 115 patent s system claims reciting hardware limitations with an eye towards its concededly-unpatentable method claims that do not recite those limitations. The Patent Owner also raises misguided objections to the process by which the Board arrived at this concept, calling it subjective and compromised by unfair overbroadening because it failed to focus on the barcode reader as a -10-

13 hardware limitation. Response at Again, not true. The Board s reasoning here looked to the claims general nature, and whether they recite an abstract idea notwithstanding any hardware limitations, just like the courts in Alice, Mortgage Grader, and Accenture. Finally, the Patent Owner s definition of the core aspects of the 115 patent is simply wrong. As the Board correctly found, the core aspects of the 115 patent s claims are identifying information about a food product, its nutritional contents, and the shopper, and then correlating that information to provide personalized nutritional information. These steps are specifically recited in all claims, and thus appropriately define the concept to be used in the Alice evaluation. Accenture, 728 F.3d at At most, the barcode reader merely automates the first aspect, identifying food products. See Exhibit 1001, 115 patent at Col. 7:5-8 (describing means 40, preferably a barcode entry system, that identif[ies] the food products ). In sum, Alice and its progeny demonstrate that the barcode means and database limitations should not be considered in Alice step 1. Rather, the focus at step 1 should be whether the claims are, notwithstanding those hardware limitations, generally directed to an abstract concept. In the 115 patent, they are. -11-

14 C. The Board correctly found that no claim covers significantly more than the abstract concept. As the Board correctly found, step 2 of the Alice framework assesses whether any of the other elements or limitations required by the patent amounts to significantly more than the ineligible concept, i.e., whether they contain an inventive concept to transform the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355; Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294; Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Petitioner argued, and the Board agreed, that the additional hardware limitations in the claims recited wellknown conventional hardware for performing the abstract idea, which is not enough under Alice. Institution Decision at The Patent Owner declines to address these arguments or findings in the Response. Rather, the Patent Owner firmly maintains that Alice, Part 2 analysis [is] inapplicable, insisting that the Board never should have reached this part of the test because the invention is not abstract under Part 1. Response at 56. Patent Owner has therefore waived any rebuttal to the points raised by the Petitioner and Board under Alice step 2. Scheduling Order at 4. Indeed, Patent Owner s only argument as to Alice step 2 is that the system claims must cover significantly more because the Patent Office allowed them, and the patent has been licensed. Id. at But every patent at issue in post-grant review was -12-

15 once allowed by the Patent Office, and many were assuredly licensed before the claims were cancelled. These arguments are irrelevant to the 101 analysis. In any event, and as explained in the Petition, no claim of the 115 patent recites significantly more than the abstract idea. Claim 11 is not tied to any tangible medium whatsoever, except arguably a generic computer which does not purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself or effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2351, Even its claim to prestored data implicates a conventional nutritional database that was notoriously well-known in the art. Exhibit 1002, Office Action, dated June 19, 1996, at 15. Independent claims 1 and 4, meanwhile, merely dress up the patent s abstract idea with means-plus-function limitations drawn to well-known computer input hardware, conventional computer processors, and generic output devices such as a printer or a CRT display. Exhibit 1001, 115 patent at 5:60-64; Col. 6: Col. 6:29-31; Col. 6:60-64; Col. 7:10-14; Col. 7: This type of computer technology, which even the patent specification concedes was wellknown, does not qualify as significantly more under Mayo. See Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (affirming that claim was not directed to patent-eligible subject matter in part because the -13-

16 specification referred to certain claim elements as conventional, well-known and common ). Finally, none of the dependent claims in the 115 patent add any meaningful limitations to independent claims 1, 4 or 11. They recite only that the various steps of the idea should be carried out on well-known hardware (e.g., a CRT monitor, printer, or barcode reader) or that the data should include particular types of information (e.g., age, gender, food purchase pattern, etc.). All of these either recite insignificant post-solution limitations, or repeat the same generic computer components as claims 1 and 4, none of which purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 23 In sum, because no claim adds significantly more than the abstract idea set forth in claim 11, all claims should be cancelled under 101. III. THE BOARD SHOULD CANCEL CLAIMS 1-10 UNDER 112 The Board correctly found that claims 1-10 of the 115 patent should be construed under 35 U.S.C , and that the claims are indefinite because they lack an algorithm required as corresponding structure. So, in addition to being unpatentable, claims 1-10 are also invalid. A. Claims 1-10 are properly construed under 112, 6, and must be supported by an algorithm. The Board correctly found that claims 1-10, and in particular, the processor means... for correlating the personal data limitation, should be construed under -14-

17 112, 6 and must be supported by an algorithm in the specification. The Patent Owner counters that this term is not governed by 112, 6 because the claim s use of means was an unfortunate syntactical choice. Response at This, of course, is not an exception to the presumption created by the use of the word means, nor is it an exception to the requirement to otherwise find structure in the claim itself. Rather, use of the word means triggers a presumption that 112, 6 applies. Personalized Media Communications, LLC v. International Trade Commission, 161 F.3d 696, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Whether they could have been written without the term is beside the point. 2 Patent Owner further suggests that the standard for means-plus-function claiming has changed since Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct (2014), such that the disclosure of a general purpose computer can be sufficient to provide structure for a 112, 6 claim absent proof of an algorithm. But the presumption triggered by the term means was unaffected by Nautilus. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (post-nautilus case holding that the presumption triggered by the use of the term means, as described in Personalized Media, 2 And in any case, the proposed re-written version still covers a general purpose correlator performing a function, which under Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, deserves means-plus-function scrutiny even absent the word means. 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015). -15-

18 remains unaffected. ). Similarly, the Federal Circuit has held that the requirement for algorithmic support, where a patent is drawn to a general purpose computer performing certain functions, was also unchanged. See EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 623 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ( WMS Gaming and Katz are consistent with recent Supreme Court precedent, including Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. ). Accordingly, the Board correctly found that claims 1-10 invoke means-plusfunction analysis, and the Patent Owner s admission that the claims disclose no more than a general-purpose computer effectively concedes that algorithmic support is necessary for any claimed functions under 112, 6. B. Claims 1-10 are indefinite because the specification lacks algorithmic support for the correlating function The Board also correctly found that the 115 patent specification lacks an algorithm explaining how the processor and its program correlat[e] the personal data with prestored nutritional data, including a barcode address. The specification contains no flow chart, mathematical function, or prose describing what steps the processor means should perform to achieve the claimed correlation function. Indeed, the Patent Owner s Response points to nothing in the specification that recites an algorithm for performing this correlation. The few portions of the specification that the Patent Owner does cite describe, at most, what the missing algorithm s input or output might be. For -16-

19 instance, Patent Owner cites language explaining that [t]he processor 18 correlates the personal data input by the individual with prestored nutritional data pertinent to the food product which the individual intends to purchase pursuant to a prestored computer program..., and will inform [a diabetic] whether any of the chosen foods contain sugars or glucose. Response at 66 (citing Exhibit 1001, 115 Patent, Col. 6:21-31). But this describes what is input by the individual and that the individual is thereafter informed of nutritional facts, which are not the claimed function. Nothing in these excerpts explains how the processor means might accomplish the claimed correlation of data, i.e., what happens after the input steps but before the output steps. Put another way, the Patent Owner has identified nothing in the specification explaining how the correlation would differ given different personal data, e.g., if user is lactose-intolerant, or has coeliac disease, or is 25 versus 75 years old, or is male rather than female. Indeed, the specification is silent in this regard. Patent Owner insists it is unnecessary to explain how the correlation occurs because [t]he invention is not so much in the correlation as it is in knowing what to correlate. Response at 67, n.31. As support, the Patent Owner cites to a declaration from the patent s inventor, Kenneth Shepley, who opines that those skilled in the art knew generally about correlations, and that the above-cited passages explain an algorithm for correlating. Exhibit , 31-32,

20 Patent Owner argues that in light of this declaration, and because Petitioner has submitted no declaration of its own, the Board must find the claim definite. But a person of ordinary skill in the art plays no role whatsoever in determining whether an algorithm must be disclosed as structure for a functional claim element. EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 623 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1313, (Fed. Cir. 2012). Moreover, the testimony of one of ordinary skill in the art cannot supplant the total absence of structure from the specification. Default Proof Credit Card Sys., Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (d/b/a The Home Depot), 412 F.3d 1291, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In other words, 112, 6 does not permit Patent Owner to prove that no algorithm is necessary, or compensate for a missing algorithm, with declaration testimony. The Federal Circuit s recent EON Corp. holding is instructive in this regard. In that case, the Court rejected as meritless an argument that a microprocessor can serve as sufficient structure for a software function if a person of ordinary skill in the art could implement the software function. EON Corp., 785 F.3d at 623. That argument, the Court held, conflates definiteness with enablement, insofar as 112, 6 demands proof not of whether a person of skill in the art could devise some means to carry out the recited function, but rather, whether the -18-

21 specification contains a sufficiently precise description of the corresponding structure. Id. (quotation omitted, emphasis added). Patent Owner s argument fails for similar reasons. Rather than identifying portions in the specification explaining how the claimed correlation should operate, Patent Owner contends that the precise manner of correlation is irrelevant because one of ordinary skill in the art could program the general purpose computer to implement the claimed [correlation] functionality upon reading the term correlate. Response at But just as in EON Corp., the question is not whether one of ordinary skill in the art could devise a means for correlating the data, but whether the specification discloses how it should be done. EON Corp., 785 F.3d at 623. Here, the specification indisputably contains no description of how the correlation should occur, and so and the claims requiring a processor means... for correlating are indefinite. C. The Katz exception does not apply. As a backstop, Patent Owner argues that the Katz exception applies, i.e., that the disclosure of a standard microprocessor is sufficient structure because the claims cover functions that can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming. Response at First, this argument effectively concedes that no algorithm is present. But in any case, the Katz exception applies only where the function can be achieved by merely plugging in a general-purpose -19-

22 computer, and not where special programming is required. Ergo Licensing, LLC v. CareFusion 303, Inc., 673 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Here, the claims expressly require processor means under the control of a prestored computer program. Exhibit 1001, 115 patent, Col. 8:55-60 (emphasis added). In other words, the claim language requires a special computer program that is preloaded on the general purpose computer. Katz therefore does not apply. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons provided above, claims 1-20 of U.S. Patent No. 5,841,115 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. 101, because they claim an abstract idea that is not meaningfully limited to any particular technological implementation. Moreover, claims 1-10 are invalid for being indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112, 2, because they lack algorithmic support for a claimed computerized means-plusfunction limitation under 35 U.S.C. 112, 6. Therefore, the Board should cancel all claims. -20-

23 Dated: March 14, 2016 PERKINS COIE LLP P.O. Box 1208 Seattle, WA Tel: (206) Respectfully submitted, /Ryan J. McBrayer/ LEAD COUNSEL Ryan J. McBrayer USPTO Reg. No. 54,299 BACK-UP COUNSEL Bing Ai USPTO Reg. No. 43,312 Attorneys for Petitioner -21-

24 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that a true copy of the foregoing PETITIONERS REPLY TO PATENT OWNER'S RESPONSE has been served in its entirety this 14 th day of March 2016 by electronic mail on the Patent Owner via its attorney of record: Robert A. Huntsman (bobh@huntsmanlg.com) Huntsman Law Group, PLLC W. Overland Road, #174 Boise, ID Dated: March 14, 2016 PERKINS COIE LLP P.O. Box 1208 Seattle, WA Tel: (206) Respectfully submitted, /Ryan J. McBrayer/ LEAD COUNSEL Ryan J. McBrayer USPTO Reg. No. 54,299 BACK-UP COUNSEL Bing Ai USPTO Reg. No. 43,312 Attorneys for Petitioner -1-