WHAT HAPPENED AT LOS ALAMOS? A Perspective by Thomas J. Meyer

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1 Final. 2/7/05 WHAT HAPPENED AT LOS ALAMOS? A Perspective by Thomas J. Meyer On July 12, 2004, all work at the Los Alamos National Laboratory was stopped and the laboratory shut down by the Director. The shut down was said to be in response to a series of security violations involving the mishandling of Classified Recordable Electronic Media (CREM) and a laboratory accident involving an undergraduate student in the Chemistry Division. The shutdown has had a negative effect with its full impact still to be felt, but a satisfactory account of what happened and why remains to be heard. As the former Associate Director for Strategic Research and a former member of the Senior Executive Team reporting to the Director, I have a perspective on the shutdown that I feel obligated to share with the larger Los Alamos community Strategic Research is the core science directorate for the Laboratory and includes research in chemistry, materials, theory, and earth and environmental sciences with broad overlap with other science areas as well. On October 12, 2004, I resigned as Associate Director. Although my resignation was tied to the student accident, the overall safety record of Strategic Research has been excellent, at the head of the class, as documented by internal statistics and evaluations. There was a special focus on safety in Chemistry in response to two high profile accidents. As documented by an external review committee, the measures taken by the Division and its management team were exemplary. At the time of the shut down, Chemistry was actively implementing a Directorate Safety Plan designed with input from internal and external consultants to maximize worker involvement and management oversight. Laboratory financial support for this ambitious undertaking was lacking. Requests to the Director s Office to hire an Operations Deputy for Chemistry, a position that would oversee day-to-day operations and safety, were denied. Mid-year funding cuts delayed the hiring of a safety professional to oversee implementation of the division s safety plan. In shutting down the Laboratory, the Director pointed to a negative culture within the LANL scientific community, at one point even referring to LANL scientists publically as cowboys. If there was a cultural problem, the evidence points elsewhere. The major institutional problems at LANL lie in support and management structures that have not kept pace as the Laboratory has 1

2 grown. Strategic investments of time and resources to meet commonly accepted standards in safety, security, and business systems have not been made. The Laboratory has fallen behind industry and other facilitities in the DOE complex in these areas. As a result, much of the management and support structure at LANL is out-of-date and inefficient even with the hard work and best intentions of many dedicated employees. Their problem is a lack of leadership at the top. Management deficiencies were underscored by the DOE s unsatisfactory performance rating for LANL operations and management for The rating itself was disturbing but it also resulted in a $5.1 million decrease in the management fee for the University of California. This is a blow to science at Los Alamos since much of the fee has historically been invested in funding joint science projects between LANL staff and research collaborators at the individual UC campuses. These collaborations are at the heart of the UC connection. They have led to important scientific discoveries and been invaluable in helping LANL recruit some of its best technical staff members from the UC campuses. By every measure, science at Los Alamos now and in the past has been outstanding. The same DOE evaluation that gave an unsatisfactory rating to operations and management has typically given the highest possible rating to science. Compared to other national laboratories, LANL s record of publication is outstanding. The Laboratory has been a leader in external recognitions such as R&D 100 awards. Three technical staff members were awarded the prestigious E.O. Lawrence Award by the DOE in the past year. The quality of science at LANL is assured by peer review. It shares common values with the international scientific community and it is the basis for making LANL arguably the best applied science laboratory in the world. As the senior manager responsible for the internal science evaluation, I was well aware of the quality of the LANL scientific enterprise. I came to LANL from the University of North Carolina five years ago. As a member of the National Academy of Sciences, with several of my former students on the technical staff, the quality of science was a primary factor in my decision to join the LANL senior management team. I personally believe that the overwhelming majority of the LANL work force, on both the scientific and support staffs, is hard working, recognizes safety and security in the work place, and is a great and 2

3 valuable asset for the nation. They have been inappropriately pilliored and impugned publically by their own Director. The unsatisfactory DOE rating and events of the past two years under the current Director have identified significant weaknesses in LANL s senior management which have begun to erode the science base. Endemic problems in Human Relations and Purchasing remain largely unsolved. After three years of trying and many tens of millions of dollars invested, there is still no operational, computer-based business system (Enterprise Business System) in place. A series of Director-led intiatives created unsustainable cost increases which increased the costs charged to sponsors (overhead). These increases threatened LANL s ability to compete with other national laboratories and universities for funding. This was followed by an unprecedented and significant mid-year decrease in the overhead rate, which was needed. However, with budgets already set for the year, this resulted in decreased funding in the middle of the year which created havoc for support organizations and new business initiatives. These actions and the Director s insistence on a single overhead rate to be paid by all sponsors demonstrated a woeful lack of understanding of laboratory finances and budgetary processes in the competitive environment of a multi-program, multi-sponsor, national laboratory. The same administrative deficiencies surfaced in the CREM and safety incidents. When the current Director assumed his position, a report was waiting on security vulnerabilities, commissioned by former Director John Browne and written by a committee led by Bruce Matthews. Bruce had had 30 thirty years of scientific and engineering experience in nuclear technologies and nuclear materials, and is now a member of the presidentially appointed Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. This document highlighted CREM and provided solutions that, only now after the Laboratory shutdown, are being implemented. Before Director Nanos, Director John Browne initiated and implemented at LANL a series of widely adopted safety best practices. These included the five-step process to safety, Nested Safety Committees for communicating safety issues and best practices through the various levels of Laboratory management, and a Director s Central Safety Committee as a mechanism for high level analysis and management oversight of safety issues. A next logical step in the evolution of a contemporary safety culture at LANL, consistent with current safety best practices, would have been the implementation of worker-oriented division safety plans 3

4 taken to the individual employee level with management oversight and periodic review modeled after the process initiated by Strategic Research. There was no support for this initiative by Director Nanos. Strategic institutional leadership was and remains needed for the management of both safety and security at LANL. By contrast, the Director s approach to the string of CREM incidents was not strategic in nature as one would expect from a senior leader. Instead, he chose to transfer blame and intimidate individuals even with a staff that was often attempting to implement difficult and complex safety processes with inadequate institutional support and limited resources. Last July, after the series of CREM-related incidents, the Director was called to Washington to defend himself and the Laboratory to DOE management and to Congress. Even then, he carried with him no written strategic plan for either CREM or safety. When this and his failure to manage customer expectations led to mounting criticism, an opportunity existed to exert true institutional leadership in a Truman the buck stops here tradition. Instead, he transferred the blame again, this time to the entire LANL scientific community. Problems with management after the shut down continue to this day. At other laboratories staged stand downs are commonly used to focus on areas where there is known concern. This allows limited resources to be brought to bear quickly and effectively on problem areas with the work force sensitized, best practices instilled, and training provided. Why did the LANL Director shut down the entire laboratory at taxpayer expense? Why were limited laboratory resources not focused on known problem areas? In contradiction to currently accepted best practices, why was the restart process tied to a change in culture with abuses in workers rights and creation of an environment of fear and intimidation. Will this be effective with the Laboratory s sophisticated work force on the long term? To the employees and the taxpayer, did it really make sense to impose the severe restart procedures appropriate for nuclear facilities to the library and the cafeteria? Did it also make sense to impose these same procedures to computer science and theory groups where workplace hazards are largely ergonomic? Much of the DOE and LANL missions involve risk and the risk involved needs to be understood, defined, and taken into account through systematic worker involvement and processes for continuous management review and oversight. The safety literature is clear on this point, those who do the work should take charge of their own 4

5 safety environment with management assistance, oversight and review. In the current regime of fear and intimidation, the Laboratory may well be less safe than it was before the shut down. The full consequences of the lab closure are yet to be felt and will continue to cascade through Northern New Mexico and its families for some time to come. Countless hours of productive work and millions of dollars have been lost. This has resulted in a demoralized work force and strained customer relations which threaten future programmatic support. Key retirements have occurred; if the contract renewal is handled inappropriately, many others, sensing a bleak future, will follow. Important scientists are gone or leaving the Laboratory and others seem ready to follow. Important programs have been lost to other laboratories; others are threatened. Recruiting will be negatively impacted for the forseeable future. Current recruiting for postdoctoral fellows, who are key to the science base and a large fraction of future LANL technical employees, is at an all time low. I am concerned that a week after the shut down, the developer of a new $200 million Science Complex, with construction set for next Spring, was to have begun work. This was a project conceived and led by Strategic Research. It promised a new way to replace much of the existing, badly outdated science laboratories at LANL with state-of-the art, 21 st century research space. It was an entrepreneurial project, to be funded by third party financing, and was approved by the DOE. The project is currently on hold. Although the Director must ultimately face blame for the negative consequences of his actions, his personal behavior, and his vindictive and abusive treatment of laboratory employees, there is blame elsewhere. Is it conceivable that the DOE and University of California allowed a $2 billion R&D laboratory, critical to US national security, to be shut down because of two mishandled bar codes? Where was UC and DOE oversight when it was so sorely needed? Why is there not a high level board at LANL as there is at Sandia and other labs, to oversee the Director s activities and provide guidance and oversight? The University of California has expressed concern that there is inadequate representation for science in the current senior management team. Science management demands a high degree of professionalism in an open environment by managers who understand intuitively the scientific process and how to manage, integrate, and 5

6 develop scientific capabilites and funding opportunities. Even so, the University of California appointed an ex-admiral as laboratory director without conducting a search to fill the position. The current Director had no experience in science management, no record of scientific distinction, and no experience at developing and funding science programs. Where was UC when the director forced out of the Senior Executive Team its only two members who were active scientists and members of the National Academy of Sciences? Although the position of Chief Science Officer has been created, there is no one left in the current senior management team with significant scientific credentials. LANL is a core resource at the heart of the nation s national security. It is also a nationally and internationally renowned center for scientific research and is at the heart of the Northern New Mexico community and economy. It is a major player in the supply of jobs and a key to economic development. Members of my staff worked closely with Governor Richardson and his staff on economic development issues by providing strong leadership for statewide initiatives including the Hydrogen Technology Partnership and the ZeroNet partnership with PNM and the Electric Power Research Institute for water management in the electric power industry. In the newly announced New Mexico Technology Corridor Collaborative, two of the five projects are either led or co-led by LANL: medical isotopes with UNM, NMSU and Lovelace and hydrogen and fuel cells with NMSU and NM Tech. Close relations have been forged with other national laboratories: with Sandia in nanotechnology, with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in hydrogen storage and carbon dioxide capture and storage, and with Argonne National Laboratory in genome science. With leadership from Strategic Research, LANL took the lead in forming a multi-lab consortium that helped create the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative at DOE and strong leadership nationally for a nuclear energy future for the US and internationally for nuclear materials management. New research centers have been created in high temperature superconductivity, fuel cells and hydrogen, and in quantum information. New, integrated management structures in energy and environment and materials science and engineering have helped LANL gain national leadership. There have been new initiatives in carbon management, water research, and medical isotopes. 6

7 These efforts and future ones that diversify the R&D base at LANL are critically important since it is becoming increasingly clear that the nuclear weapons mission at LANL is entering an era of declining support. If left unchecked, this decline will negatively impact the Northern New Mexico economy by providing fewer jobs and fewer requests for goods and services. Investing in the future and anticipating a more diverse portfolio are critical to LANL and to the future of the local economy. How many of the new initiatives at LANL will survive the current management turmoil? Will customers have the confidence and patience to work with LANL in the future? The timing of the LANL shutdown could not have been worse for the University of California coming, as it did, in the midst of preparations for competing for the next DOE management contract. It does highlight for the DOE some of the essential requirements for LANL leadership under the next contract. A director and his or her team of senior managers must understand and have knowledge of how to manage and move forward a large R&D organization with a critical component in manufacturing. The new leadership team will need to understand the mission of the Laboratory intuitively, how it relates to its customers, and the central role that science and technology play in accomplishing the mission. The new management team will need to transform the management and support functions of the Laboratory by working with an industrial partner or partners with a proven record of excellence to provide a safe and secure work place and best business practices for its support staff while maintaining an open, creative, and productive environment for its science. Imposing? Perhaps, but LANL is a sleeping giant waiting to reassert itself. The ball is in DOE s court. A path forward must be found quickly to provide leadership and a clear vision for the future. 7