CONCLUSION. "With the vision of applyii^ space technology to the country's developmental

Transcription

1 CONCLUSION

2 CONCLUSION "With the vision of applyii^ space technology to the country's developmental needs, India started its space programme in The triad of Homi Jahangir Bhaba, Vikram Sarabhai, and Jawaharlal Nehru succeeded in this Herculean taskthoi^h both Homi Jahangir Bhaba and Vikram Sarabhai were not in this world to witness the growth of the space programme. The triad, especially Bhaba and Sarabhai, aimed at applying space technology to achieve the technological leapfro^ing in vital areas of development such as communications, meteorology, and natural resource management. The programme comprises the INSAT system for telecommunications, broadcasting, and meteorological services and the IRS system for resources monitoring. It also includes the development of PSLV for laxmching remote sensii^ satellites into polar oibits and GSLV for launching communications and meteorological satellites into GTO. Indeed, there are remarkable achievements in this programme. The successes can be briefly listed, here. The first sounding rocket was laimched in 1963.^ The first Indian satellite Aiyabhata was launched in i^g second experimental launch of ^ Available at ^ Available at

3 261 SLV-3 placed Rohini satellite successfully in orbit in Apple, an experimental geostationary communications satellite, was launched in The INSAT system began in 1983 with the launch of INSAT-IB,'^ a satellite borrowed from abroad. The earth observation system became operational with the launch of IRS-IA in INSAT-2A, the first indigenously built multipurpose satellite, was placed in orbit in The indigenous PSLV placed IRS-P2 successfully in polar sunsynchronoik orbit in The indigenous PSLV placed a test satellite, GSAT-1, in GTO in 2001, making India one of the six space-faring nations in the world with the capability to launch satellite into GTO. There were moments of failures, too. The first SLV launched in 1979 was a failure because the second stage failed to ^pite. The first two launches of ASLV were failure: in the first launch in 1987, the first stage motor failed to ignite though the computer had given the command; in the second launch in 1988, the first stage did ignite but the strap-on motors burned out a second too early, leading to inadequate control for few seconds. The first launch of PSLV in 1993 was a failure because the fourth st^e was not properly ^nited and the vehicle went out of control Though the first launch of GSLV was a success, the fourth launch was a failure. However, ^ Rajesh Daultani, (ed.), Missile Man The New President of India Highlights on all past presidents, (Agra: Sal Enterprises, 1992), p.25. Available at ht^:// ^ Available at ^ Available at science.com/node/569

4 whenever failures occur, they themselves became a source of inspiration to accomplish the goals set. 262 The Indian space programme was mainly driven by supply considerations caterii^ to the needs of government and pioblic sector agencies like AIR, Doodarshan, DoT, IMD, and other government departments. The Indian space programme is highly integrated; this is not so in USA or in Europe, for example. It is integrated with all three major segments: geosatellites, earth observation system, and launch vehicle development, comii^ under ISRO and activities spanning from design, development, and launch of space systems to operations and a few applications.'' The Indian space programme is civilian in nature. However, the proposed Qiandrayan programme has cast an element of doubt about this claim. Better understanding of this programme will eliminate this doubt. Chandrayan-I, which is proposed to be launched in 2008,^ will be operational for two years and would provide space scientists a host of data. It will carry American^ and European payloads intended to conduct ej^erinaents for their own countries as a good will gesture in keeping with the practice of intemational cooperation in science and technology. Till ^ U. Sankar, The Economics of Space programme, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.291. * Hindustan Times, 11 April, ^ Tfie New Indian Express, 08 May, 2006.

5 now, India has not planned any moon landing; nonetheless, a national debate is goii^ on and Chandrayan-II or Qiandrayan-III may achieve this. 263 Liberalisation polices adopted since 2001 has pennitted private entry and competition in broadcasting and telecommunications seaors. Satcom Policy of 2001 permits DoS to supply commimication payloads to private sector. It allows private entry in satellite manufacturing and operation, too.i The Science and Technology Policy 2003 recognises the centrality of science and technology in raising the quality of life of people, creating wealth for all, making India globally competitive, utilisir^ natural resources in a sustainable marmer, protectir^ the envirormient, and ensuring our national security.^^ The fiscal crunch facing the Indian government effects a growir^ pressure that a high-tech programme like space programme, with broadbased goals such as socio-economic development and national prest^e are expected to justify whether the benefits of the programme exceed the cost of the programme. Qaanges in the intemational and external envirormient necessitate a fresh look at the space programme. The govertmient of India incurred a sum of Rs. 13,434 crore, at current prices, on the space programme from its inception till the financial* year ending 31 March The share of central goverrmient e3q)enditure was in In ^ Available at ht^://pip.nic.in/archive/eec/eec2001/dot.html. ^^ Available at

6 , it has increased to i^e space e2q)enditure can be classified imder five categories: geosat, earth observation, laimch vehicle, space science/r8dd, and others. The following table shows the distribution of expenses among these five categories. Geosat 39.2 Earth Observation 14.7 Laiuich Vehicle Development 36.4 Space Science/R8dD 6.2 Others 3.6 "When the visionaries of Indian space programme conceived the idea, nobody would have imagined that the visionaries had a long-term objective and a roadmap to achieve that. Illiteracy, exponentially growing population, uniting svich a vast geographical land were all thought to be hindrances for the long-term goal of being self-reliant in space programme. In order to become self-reliant in space technology and its applications, India began to develop the infrastructure necessary for the indigenous development of space launchers and satellites. In the sixties, the efforts of the Indian space programme were confined to getting familiar with space ^^ U Sankar, Op.cit, p.284.

7 265 technologies and in developing technical and organisational infrastructure for eventual indigenous development and satellites launchir^ vehicles. During the seventies, the space programme primarily geared towards carryir^ out research and development in a variety of scientific and engineering disciplines of relevance to launch vehicles and satellites. Efforts were directed also at conducting selective large-scale experiments in communications and in remote sensing. By the end of the decade an experimental satellite launch vehicle, SLV-3 capable of launchir^ satellites into near earth orbit was also developed. During the eighties, the programme moved closer towards realising its goals. The INSAT-I series of communication satellites and the IRS series of remote sensing satellites were operationalised for well-defined applications, S^nificantiy, all operational satellites of the e^ties are indigenously deseed. The development of Ind^enous Space research in India has been achieved after long and hard work. In 1987, Missile Technology Control Regime (JMTCR) was s^ed between different space-faring nations.^^ The z^eement mainly ensures that no other new country excels in the field of space researcl Under the influence of this regime. United States was able to make Glavkomas, an organisation comparable to ISRO in India, withdrew the agreement between Glavkomas and India. The agreement between the Glavkomas and India made possible the import of cryogenic ^^ Available at ht^.//

8 266 technology to India. This ban was as a resxilt of our successful launch of Agni I in Then in 1994, Glavkomas ^reed to supply cryogenic engines without its underlying technology. With only the engines, the Indian scientists were able to understand the cryogenic technology.i"* This, indeed, was a real success. Thus, India has moved from dependency to being indigenous that too in a short Span of time. However, being indigenious does not mean beiag a recluse. India is benefiting s^nificant from intemational cooperation for launching and application of its scientific, communications and Remote Sensir^ satellites. India is a party to all important space treaties which form the main body of intemational space law:^^ the Space Treaty of 1967,^6 the Rescue Agreement of 1968,17 the Liability Convention of 1972, the Registration Convention of 1975,i8 and the Moon Agreement of 1979.^9 India is also actively participatir^ in various intemational organisations like UN COPUOS, Intemational Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU),20 Intemational Astronautical Federation (laf), etc. in shaping global space law and policy. ^^ Available at / ^ htm. "' andasi Jesentuliyana, Intemational Space law and the United States, (The Hague: Kluwer law Intemational, 1999), p. 11. '^ Available at ^^ Available at ht^:// ^^ Available at '^ Available at ^ Available at

9 267 The goals of Indian Space Programme, namely provision of satellite technologies for communication and meteorology services and natural resource man^ement, and capability to launch satellites into polar oait and GTO have been achieved.the physical performances of the satellites and launch vehicles have been good. Also, there have been systematic upgradation of technologies, development of new/improved payioads and iad^enisation, both in the production of satellites and launch vehicles. The economic costing exercise of INSAT-2 satellites shows that INSAT programme is cost-effective and India has a comparative advantage in the production of communication satellites. Due to lack of data, one could SLUempt only an accounting cost exercise (based on book values) for one IRS satellite, and PSLV and GSLV launches. These preliminary results si^gest that IRS and launch programmes are also cost-effective, but we must carry out economic costii^ exercise in order to estimate the extent of comparative advantagemany indirect benefits and some incommensurable benefits of the space programme to Indian society have also been indentified. Thus one can conclude that at ISRO level, the space programme has achieved its goals in a cost-effective -v^^y. Satellite technologies are only intermediate inputs in the provision of various services. Until 2000, most of the space technologies were made available to public

10 268 sector agencies such as AIR, Doordarshan, IMD, and varioxas government departments. As these services were not priced, there were no financial returns to ISRO from provision of these services. ISRCs revenues were mainly from the lease of eleven INSAT-2E transponders to INTELSAT leases of transponders to private TV companies, and VSAT service providers, and commercial services of ANTRIX Corporation. One justification for giving these technologies free of cost is that they are used to achieve social goals and/or promote economic development. But even in stich a situation there is need for imputing the costs of these services and conveying the imputed costs to the user ^encies to make efficient use of the technologies. There are very empirical studies on the measurement of social benefits of satellite technologies. Further, most of the studies are not based on social costbenefit analysis frameworie Some studies such as impaa of agricultural advisories, economic value of meteorological services of firms, and airlines are anecdotal in nature. Even the inferences about cost savings due to satellite technologies are based on case studies conducted by different authors, using different methodologies and databases. Need rigorous empirical studies to get reliable estimates. The last main problem remains a barrier to inclusive development. Access links to the networks, rather than the networks, are the limiting faaors. For example, in ground water prospecting, development of uiban plans and coastal zone

11 269 management, remote sensing technology along with GIS can provide valuable information for the potential users. But unless the users, such as local bodies and NGOs, have the technical capability and financial resources, the last main problem will remain. Information is a value resource like any other resource, allocation of resources for information goods also must be based on social cost-benefits analysis. In view of the difficulties in quantifyii^ the cost and benefits in the application segments, an overall social rate of return for the Indian space programme could not be estimated.