Chapter1 INTRODUCTION
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- Denis Stokes
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1 Chapter1 Innovationsintheproduction,deployment,andapplicationofmilitarypower are crucial to international politics. Unfortunately, most assessments of the internationalsecurityenvironmentfailtoincorporateeithertherelevanceof military innovations or the importance of their spread. For example, in a thirty yearperiod,from ,theFrenchNavybecamethefirsttodevelop shellguns,andthefirsttodeployasteam poweredwarship,anironcladwarship, a mechanically powered submarine, and a steel hulled warship.th ese developments should have helped the French Navy gain superiority over its bitterrival,thebritishroyalnavy,buttheydidnot.moreover,barelyadecade aftertheintroductionofthesteel hulledwarshipinthe1870s,anewinnovative school of naval theorists in the French Navy argued that the future of navalpowerlaywithemergingtechnologiesliketorpedoboatsandsubmarines, notthebattleship.francewasgoingtojumpaheadonceagain.yetdespitethis foresight and demonstrated initiative, most people generally do not consider Franceagreatnavalinnovatoroftheperiod.Whyisthis?Whatadvantages did it get from its introduction of a series of useful technologies into naval warfare? TherealansweristhattheFrenchNavyreceivednoadvantage.Unlikethe U.S.Navy,whosemasteryofthetechnologyandorganizationalpracticesassociatedwithcarrierwarfareprovideditwithasustainableedgeinnavalpower inthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury,thefrenchcouldnotinstitutionalizetheiradvantage.whilethefrenchexcelledatinventingnewtechnologies, cripplingorganizationaldebatespreventedtheintegrationofthosetechnologies intofrenchnavalstrategy.ineachcase,thefrenchwerethefirsttointroduce anewnavalwarfarecapability,whilethebritishadmiraltyappeared,inpublic, disinterestedinfrenchdevelopments.yetineachcasethebritish,whohad beencarefullystudyingfrenchadvancesinprivate,quicklyadoptedthenew capabilities, improved on them, and used Great Britain s superior industrial production capabilities to eliminate France s ability to gain a relative power advantagefromitsinventions. Aprescientanalysisin1902ofsubmarinewarfarebyHerbertC.Fyfe,the SometimeLibrarianoftheRoyalInstitution,London, includesanappendix onthefrenchnavythatexpressesfrenchfeelingsonthematter: We have seriously believed, says a writer in the Journal de la Marine, thatinallthegreatmodificationsthathavebeenbroughtaboutinthe
2 2 CHAPTER1 constructionofsubmarinesistheresultoftheimportantchangeswhich thelastfiftyyearsofthecenturyhaveproducedintheartofnavalwarfare. Allthesechangeshavebeensoughtout,experimentedupon,studied,and finallyrealizedbyfrance,whohasalsobeenthefirsttoapplythem. Th ese resultshaveestablishedinabrilliantandincontestablemannertheskill ofourengineers;butourrivalshavenotonlyappropriatedtheresultsof our labours, but they have not been slow to place themselves on equal termswithus,andfinallytoexcelusintheapplicationofthesediscoveries...wehavebeenonlythehumbleartisansworkingforthemtoestablishtheirsuperiority. (Fyfe1902,281) WhileFrancewasthetechnologicalfirstmoverinseveralcases,itfailedto harnessitsadvancesintoanactualwar fightinginnovationinawaythatincreasedfrance srelativenavalpower. 1 Instead,itwastheBritishRoyalNavy thatcametoexemplifynavalpowerinthemid tolatenineteenthcenturyasit enteredaneraofnavalsuperiority. Thefailureofthenineteenth centuryfrenchnavytoexploititstechnological inventions in sea power yields two important lessons for a general understanding of military power and international relations. First, inventing technologiesorevenbeingthefirsttousethemdoesnotguaranteeadvantagesin internationalpolitics.thereisabigdifferencebetweentheintroductionofa technology on to the battlefield and the full integration of that technology intonationalstrategy,includingwarfareandcoercivediplomacy.itisthedifferencebetweenthetwo,infact,thatoftendeterminessuccessorfailureininternational politics. It is the employment of technologies by organizations, ratherthanthetechnologiesthemselves,thatmostoftenmakesthedifference. Second,incontrasttomostpriorworkonmilitaryinnovation,whichhas tendedtofocusonwhoinnovatesandwhy,itisthediffusionofamilitaryinnovationthroughouttheinternationalsystemthatmostdeterminesitsinfluence on international politics.the study of military power is incomplete at bestwithoutatheoreticallycoherentunderstandingofhowstatesrespondto majormilitaryinnovations,andhowthepatternoftheirresponseshelpsdrive the rise and decline of nations as well as the patterns of warfare frequently analyzed by other scholars. By developing a theoretical framework that can bringtogetherempiricaltopicslikesuicidebombingandcarrierwarfarethat scholarshavetendedtostudyseparately,thisbookpresentsanew,moreefficient,waytothinkaboutapproachingthediffusionofmilitarypower. The introduction and spread of new means of generating military power, sometimes called major military innovations (MMIs), have played a critical rolethroughouthistoryindeterminingtheglobalbalanceofpoweralongwith 1 ThisintroductorysectionisbasedonbothFyfe sandtheodoreropp sworkonthefrench Navy(Fyfe1902;Ropp1987,8 11,42).
3 3 the timing and intensity of wars. 2 The infamous Mongol armies, with their masteryofthecompositebowandanewformofcavalrystrikes,topplednationsfromchinatothoseintheeasternpartofeuropebecauseoftheirleaps in technology and strategy. Hundreds of years later, the German debut of blitzkriegwarfareattheoutbreakofworldwariihelpedthemroutfrench forcesandconsolidatecontroloverwesterneurope.butdespitetheirsignificanceintermsofdrivingchangeininternationalpolitics,theprocessesthat governthespreadofinnovationsandtheireffectsarelittleunderstoodinthe fieldofinternationalrelations.severalquestionsaboutmilitarypowerremain unanswered:isitbesttobethefirstmover,toborrowatermfromeconomics, and the first to figure out how to effectively employ new types of military power,likethegermanswithblitzkrieg? 3 Orisitbettertobeafollower,learningfromtheleader,andtryingtoextendandimprovetheoriginalideas,like thegermanswithall big gunbattleshipsrespondingtobritishinnovations? Howdononstateactorsfitintothisstory?Insurgentandterroristgroupshave tomakedecisionsaboutmilitarystrategyjustlikenation states.howdothey decide whether or not to adopt new innovations in how they use force like suicidebombing? This book addresses the broad puzzle of why some military innovations spreadandinfluenceinternationalpoliticswhileothersdonot,ordosoinvery differentways.thesepatternsareexplainedwithatheoryofthespreadofmilitarypowercalledadoption capacitytheory. Nation stateshaveanumberofpossiblestrategicchoicesinthefaceofmilitary innovations.these include adoption, offsetting or countering, forming alliances,andshiftingtowardneutrality,asnotedinthepreface.adoptioncapacitytheorypositsthatforanygiveninnovation,itistheinteractionofthe resourcemobilizationchallengesandorganizationalchangesrequiredtoadopt thenewinnovation,andthecapacityofstatestoabsorbthesedemands,that explains both the system level distribution of responses and the choices of individualstates. Asthecostperunitofthetechnologicalcomponentsofamilitaryinnovation increases and fewer commercial applications exist, the level of financial intensity required to adopt the innovation increases. The rate of adoption decreasesandalternativeslikeformingalliancesbecomemoreattractive.similarly, if an innovation involves large scale organizational changes in recruitment,training,andwar fightingdoctrine,theinnovationrequiresahighlevel oforganizationalcapitalforadoption,andfeweractorsarelikelytoadoptit. Somestateswillhavethenecessarycapacityandinterests,whilepoliticswill preventadoptionbyothers.ifcapacityandinterestarelacking,nomatterhow 2 Chapter2discussesdefiningandoperationalizingmilitaryinnovations. 3 Aschapter2describes,intheblitzkriegcase,whiletheBritishwerethefirstmoverswithregard tothetechnology,thegermansdebutedthematureinnovation.
4 4 CHAPTER1 intrinsically compelling a new innovation may seem, it will not diffuse throughoutthesystem.accuratelymeasuringthesevariationsindiffusionalso moreeffectivelyexplainsshiftsinthebalanceofpowerandwarfarethantraditional theories alone can do.while higher financial requirements generally meanthattheadoptionpatternswillbenefitpreexistingwealthyandpowerful states,higherorganizationalchangerequirementscanhandicapthewealthiest statesandupsetthebalanceofpowertowardnewerandmorenimbleactors. Thequestionofhowstatesdealwithperiodsofuncertaintyaboutmilitary powerisofspecialinteresttoday.significantglobaleconomicturmoilnowaccompaniesongoingdebatesaboutthefutureofwarfareintheinformationage. Internationalrelationsscholarshavedemonstratedthatuncertaintyaboutthe current and future security environment can be a primary cause of conflict (Fearon1994a;Powell1999;SmithandStam2004).SharpdebatesexistbetweenthosewhobelievethattheUnitedStatesshouldoptimizeitsmilitaryfor futurecounterinsurgencycampaignslikeafghanistanandiraq,andthosewho believethattheunitedstatesshouldfocusinsteadonitsconventionalcapabilities(gentile2008;mazarr2008;nagl2009).animportantwildcardforboth perspectivesistheroleoftheinformationageininternationalconflict. Theinformationageispopularlydescribedastheapplicationofinformation technologytoenhancetheproductivityofbusinessesandgovernment,increasingtheabilityofsocietiestorapidlycreateanddisseminatelargeamountsof informationanywherearoundtheglobeinrealtime.theinformationage,like theindustrialrevolutionbeforeit,willeventuallyhavealarge scaleimpact onwarfare. Whilesomedegreeofchangeislikelyinevitable,thedetailsofthatchange andtheconsequencesarestillverymuchintheair.inparticular,theunited Statescurrentlyappearstoleadtheglobeindevelopingandintegratinginformationageadvancesintoitsmilitaryforces.Butsoftware heavydevelopments may come to dominate the information age, rather than expensive physical hardware.the declining cost of computing technology, Internet access, and deviceslikepersonalgpsunits,alongwiththedual usenatureofmanyinformationagemilitarytechnologieslikeprecision guidedmunitions,meannew capabilitiesmaybecomeavailabletoanincreasingnumberofcountriesover time.whiletheunitedstateshasledthewayinutilizinginformationtechnologyinitsmilitaryoperations,itsleadisfarfromassured.petersinger (2009) has described the way that the robotics revolution will impact the futureofwarfare,contendingthattherearerisksfortheunitedstatesaswell aspotentialbenefits. Inthathypotheticalcase,theU.S.government sdevotiontoitstanks,bombers,andcarrierscouldbecomeanalbatrossthatdragsdowntheu.s.military, whichmightfaceorganizationalchallengesintransformingitself,infavorof statesthatfigureoutnewandbetterwaystoorganizetheirforcestotakeadvantageofinformationagetechnologies.countrieslikechinaandindiacould
5 5 endupleapfroggingau.s.militarythatisincreasinglyfocusingonirregular formsofwarfarelikethoseinafghanistanandiraq.suchanoutcomeisnot on the immediate horizon and is far from inevitable, but it is a mistake to thinkthattheunitedstatesisguaranteedtohavethestrongestconventional military forces in the world.these changes will also potentially empower nonstate actors attempting to find new ways to mobilize and fight against nation states.terroristgroupsarealreadyshiftingthelocusoftheireducation, recruitment, and training operations to the virtual world of the Internet (Cronin2006,83 84;Hammes2004,198 99).Theempowermentofnonstate actorsmeansthataworldofinformationwarfarecouldsubstantiallyincrease thecapacityofterroristgroupsandinsurgentstodeliverdisruptivestrikeson themajorpowers.potentialexamplesincludetakingdownelectricitygridsor reprogramming satellites, which would further increase security challenges. While adoption capacity theory cannot purport to provide exact answers, it canhelpuspredictfuturetrendsandknowtherightquestionstoask. Insum,differentmilitaryinnovationsspreadthroughouttheinternational systemdifferently,andthewaytheyspreadhasalargeeffectonkeyissuesin internationalpoliticslikethebalanceofpowerandtheprobability,intensity, andlengthofwars.understandingthespreadofmilitarypoweristherefore importantnotjustforinternationalrelationstheorybutalsoforpolicyanalysts interestedinthefutureofglobalpowerandu.s.strategyaswell. WhytheSpreadofMilitaryPowerMatters Military power is the measure of how states use organized violence on the battlefieldortocoerceenemies.itrepresentsthecombinationofthetechnologyusedtofight hardware suchasrifles,artillery,andbombers andthe organizationalprocessesusedtoactuallyemploythehardware software like recruitingandtraining.itistempting,however,toviewthespreadofmilitary powerassimplythespreadofmilitarytechnology,thetoolsanddevicesused topreparefororfightarmedconflicts(zarzecki2002,74). 4 In contrast, in this book I am concerned with the spread and impact of changesinthecharacterandconductofwarfare.whiletechnologicalchange oftenaccompaniestheinnovationswerememberinhistory,technologyalone israrelyenough.instead,buildingonworkbyemilyo.goldmanandothers, itisthewaymilitariestakerawtechnologiesandusethemthatcreatesmilitaryforceandinfluencesdiffusionpatterns(goldmanandeliason2003a). 4 Thisisalsothestartingpointformoststudiesofarmsracesaswellasarmsimportsandexports.Thefocusonquantitativemeasuresoftechnologyperhapsinitiallyoccurredsimplybecause tanksandriflesareeasiertocountthanmethodsofrecruitingandtraining(farrell2005).for moreonothertheoriesofdiffusion,seechapter2.
6 6 CHAPTER1 Myapproachdrawsonevidencefromthebusinessworldthatshowsstudyingtechnologyaloneisnotenoughtocapturetheessenceofhowinnovations matter and what makes successful change more likely. For example, in the 1990s,DellComputerspioneeredamodelofproductionthatreliedonmadeto ordercomputersbasedoncustomerspecifications,leadingtolowerinventories and overhead costs than its major competitors.this innovation in its organizationalstructureimproveddell sabilitytointegrateexogenous,orexternal, changes in personal computer technologies. When a technological change occurred, like the release of a new microprocessor from Intel, Dell couldintegrateitintoitsconsumerproductionlineswithinamatterofdays andwithoutsignificantoutdatedwarehousestock;itgenerallytookweeksfor itscompetitorstodothesame.thisgavedellanenormousadvantageinits ability to deliver top notch products to its customers, leading to more sales (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000, 29 30).While the technology mattered, since newmicroprocessorsproducedchangesincomputersinwaysthatalteredcosts andordersfromcustomers,everycomputercompanyreceivedthesamechips from Intel. It was Dell s ability to integrate the new technology more efficientlythanitscompetitorsthatproduceditsmarketadvantage. Another example of why both technological and organizational resources mattercomesfromsurveydataonbusinessproductivity.in2001,themckinsey CorporationandtheLondonSchoolofEconomicssurveyedoveronehundred businesses that implemented technological changes, changes in managerial practices,orchangesinbothareas. Theresultsshowedthediscontinuousimpact ofcombiningorganizationalandtechnologicalchange.businessesthatimplemented exclusively technological changes experienced a 2 percent increase in productivity,whichpaledincomparisontothe9percentincreasegeneratedby exclusively managerial changes.yet businesses that adopted both managerial andtechnologicalchangesexperienced20percentproductivityincreases,almost double the total from adding together technological and managerial change (DorganandDowdy2004,13 15). 5 Theseresultsexplainwhycompanieslike Dellsucceededinthe1990sandApplehasdonesooverthelastdecade. Manyinternationalsecurityresearchersrelyonmeasuresofnationalpower likeironandsteelproduction,thenumbersoftroopsorthedefensebudgetof leadingstates,andtheirpopulations.thenationalmaterialcapabilitiesdata gatheredbythecorrelatesofwar(cow)projectincludesinformationonthe military,industrial,anddemographiccapabilitiesofeachstate,whichissummed into the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC). 6 CINC based 5 Despitemanydifferences,militaryorganizationssharesomekeyfacetswithfirms,includingthe needtocompetewithotheractors,thethreattosurvivalfromcompetitivefailures,thedevelopment ofbureaucraciestoregulateandmanagetheiroperations,andtheneedtomakestrategicchoicesin responsetochangesintheexternalenvironment(croninandcrawford1999;waltz1979). 6 FormoreonCINCdataandtheCOWProject,seeCorrelatesofWar2Project2006;Singer 1987;Singer,Bremer,andStuckey1972.
7 7 researchhasbecomethestandardwaytomeasurepowerininternationalrelationsscholarship.theuseofcincdatahasproducedanumberofimportant insightsintointernationalpolitics,includingevidencethatmateriallystronger andwealthierstatesaremorelikelytowinwars,allotherthingsbeingequal, andthatsystempowerconcentrationissignificantlyrelatedtomilitarizeddisputes(bennettandstam2004). 7 A growing body of literature in international relations, however, suggests thatmeasuringmilitarypowerandpredictingmilitaryoutcomesinvolvemore than simply assessing the material resources states can bring to bear on the battlefield.studiesinrecentyearsusingmoresophisticatedquantitativemodelshavebuiltonsomeoftheearlyresearchandshownthatsimplermodels only relying on material power indicators do not reveal the full picture. For example,workbydanreiterandallanstam(2002)focusesonthepolitical regimesofstates,andhowtheyinfluencebattlefieldoutcomes. Additionally,researchbyStephenBiddle(2004,21;2007a,218 20)demonstratesthatmaterialmeasuresofinternationalpowerarenotinandofthemselves enough to predict the outcomes of military campaigns. Biddle argues thatforceemployment,orwhatmilitariesdowiththeequipmenttheyhave thedecisionstheymakeabouthowtoorganizeanddeploytheirresources playsanimportantroleindeterminingthemilitarypowerofstates(seealso Stam1996). Materiallystrongstateswithweakforceemploymentconceptssometimes lose, while materially weak states with strong force employment concepts sometimeswin.forinstance,despitehavingmoreships,guns,andpeople,the RussianmilitarylostbadlytoimperialJapanintheRusso JapaneseWar.Anotherexampleofasureloseraccordingtoconventionalmeasuresofmilitary powerisisrael,whichconfoundedmaterialindicatorsinaseriesofwarsagainst numericallyandmateriallysuperiorarabfoesattackingfrommultiplesides. Thesecasesshowthatcoreissuesofinternationalsecuritycannotbeexplained withoutreferencetomuchmorethanthenumberofpeopleandspecifictechnologiesinvolved(brooks2007,228). Still,understandingtheimportanceofbothorganizationsandtechnology inproducingmilitarypowerisonlythefirststepinappreciatingthewaymilitaryinnovationsinfluenceinternationalpolitics.thesecondpartofthepuzzle isthedifferencesinthecapacityofmilitariestosuccessfullyadapttochanges produced by those innovations. New military innovations are not created equalwhenitcomestotheeaseofadoption.forexample,thetechnological 7 Thesesystematictestsoftennavigatedcompetingclaimsinthequalitativeliteraturetohelp moveintractabledebatesforward.themilitarydimensionofboththeorganski DaviestotaloutputmodelandtheSinger Bremer Stuckeynationalpowermodel,forexample,relyonmilitary expendituresandpersonnelasthemostimportantmeasuresofmilitarycapabilities(organskiand Kugler1980,31;Singer,Bremer,andStuckey1972).
8 8 CHAPTER1 components of some innovations, like nuclear weapons, are extraordinarily expensive, especially for first movers and early adopters. In contrast, the unit costsofthetechnologicalcomponentsofsomeotherinnovations,liketherifle ormachinegun,arerelativelyinexpensive.theorganizationalchangerequirementsofinnovationscanalsovarywidely.utilizingchemicalweaponsinworld WarIinvolvedaddingthemintoexistingoperationalplans,notfundamentally changingthewaymilitariesorganizedthemselves.incontrast,adoptingnapoleonicmassmobilizationrequiredanenormousshiftinhowmilitariesrecruited andtrainedaswellastheuseofthedivisionstructureandthecreationofskirmishers.itistheseshiftsinthefinancialandorganizationalrequirementsfor adoptinginnovations giventhedifferentcapacitiesofmilitaryorganizations that produce varying implications for the international security environment (Gilpin1981,63). Diffusionbeginswhenamajormilitaryinnovationreachesacritical debut or demonstration point. Theseterms,drawnfromstudiesofbusinessstrategy, refertothepointwhentherelevantcommunityhassufficientinformationto reasonablyunderstandthesignificanceofaninnovation.whilemuchofthe time innovations debut through a demonstration during warfare, sometimes therevelationofanewcapabilityduringpeacetimeisenoughtotriggeraresponse,aswhenthebritishnavyintroducedthedreadnought. 8 Thiscanvary dependingonavarietyoffactors.themostcriticaloftheseistheextentand successofeffortsbythefirstmovertoshieldknowledgeofhowtheinnovation worksfrompotentialadversariesorotherstatesonceitrecognizesithasdevelopednewmilitarycapabilities.sometimesmilitariesdotrytohidecrucialelementsofadvancesfromtheinternationalcommunity,astheroyalnavydid whenitintroducedthedreadnoughtortheunitedstatesdidwiththemanhattanprojectevenafterdroppingtwoatomicbombs.atothertimes,aninnovationdebutsinarelativelytransparentfashion,asitdidwhentheunited StatesandJapanbothplacedtheaircraftcarrieratthecenteroftheirfleetsin themidstofworldwarii. 9 Thedebutpointwherediffusionstartsvariesfrom innovationtoinnovation. ExplainingtheSpreadofMilitaryPower Adoption capacitytheorycombinesresearchonthewaybothmilitariesand businesses change with new insights into the relative costs of new military 8 Th edifferencesbetweenintroducinginnovationsinwartimeorpeacetimemayberelevantas well. 9 ThequestionofshieldingnewmilitarycapabilitiesisrelatedtoRobertAxelrod sdiscussion (1979,231 32)ofwhentodebutnewweaponsinthefirstplace.Whetherornotthefirstmover cankeeptheinnovationsecretmaybemoreorlesspossibledependingonthedomesticandinternationalpoliticalenvironments.
9 9 systemstoexplainhowmilitaryinnovationsspreadoncetheyhavebeenintroducedintotheinternationalsystem. 10 Thebasisofthetheoryisrecognizing theadoption capacityrequirementsofaninnovationandhowthecapacitiesof individualstatesmeasureup. Approaching the spread of military power from this perspective sidesteps thetraditionaldebateaboutwhetherstrategiccompetition,culturalfactors,or normsbestexplainsemulationandallowsfortheconstructionofamorepowerfulnewtheory.therearemanyreasonswhystatesareinterestedinadopting innovations: strategic necessity, international norms, cultural openness, the needforinteroperabilitywithallies,andmanyothers. Threatsareavitalpartof thematrixoffactorsthatmotivatenation states.itisevenpossiblethatforthe statesthatinitiatemilitaryinnovations,threatsplayanimportantroleintheir driveandcapacitytoinnovate. 11 Priorresearch,though,hasoftenpresumed thatforpotentialadopters,wherethereisawilltoadopt,therewillbeaway (Elman1999;Resende Santos2007).Intherealworld,statesaresometimes overmatchednomatterhowwelltheyoptimize,andsometimesstatesdonot adoptinnovationsevenwhentheyfacelargethreats.ratherthanviewingcapabilitiesastotallyfungibledependingonstatestrategy,atleastintheshort to medium term it might be financial and organizational constraints that shapepossiblestrategiesaswellastheprobabilityofsuccess. Adoption capacitytheoryarguesthat,oncestateshavethenecessaryexposuretoaninnovation,thediffusionofmilitarypowerismostlygovernedbytwo factors:theleveloffinancialintensityrequiredtoadoptamilitaryinnovation, andtheamountoforganizationalcapitalrequiredtoadoptaninnovation.as brieflyintroducedabove,financialintensityreferstotheinvestmentsrequired to purchase the physical hardware associated with an innovation, along with therelativeabilityofstatestomakethoseinvestments.keytodeterminingthe leveloffinancialintensityrequiredforadoptioniswhethertherelevanttechnologyisexclusivelymilitaryorhascommercialapplications,andthecostper unitofthephysicalhardwareassociatedwiththeinnovation,likeabattleship oranaircraftcarrier,incomparisonwithpreviousprocurement.themoremilitaryorientedthetechnologyandthehighertheunitcost,thehigherthefinancialintensityrequiredforadoption Thenotionofrelativecostshereiscomplementarytomeasurementsofmilitarybalancesthat incorporatethewaynewmilitaryadvancescaninfluencetherelativecostofwar(anderton1992; Powell1999,110 12,197 98).JamesFearon(1995a,6 8)inparticularexplicitlyrecognizesthe waythatassumptionsaboutrapidemulationhaveinfluencedoffense defensedebates.instead,in hisview,whatmattersistherelativepacingofadoption. 11 Barry Posen (1984, 1993) argues that threats drive the innovation process by determining whethercivilianinterventionoccurs. 12 Thisisrelatedtoresearchoncapitalintensity,butratherthanfocusingonthetrade offsbetweenlaborandcapital,financialintensityismoreaboutthewaythatcapitalisinvested(gartzke 2001).
10 10 CHAPTER1 The other half of the new theory is organizational capital, the intangible changeassetsneededbyorganizationstotransforminthefaceofmajormilitaryinnovations.thestudyoforganizationsingeneralandmilitaryorganizationsinparticularishamstrungbytheidiosyncrasiesofindividualmilitaries andthedifficultiesinvolvedinparsingoutexactlywhatdeterminestheirpropensitytochange.thoughthiswillalwaysbeanissue,thereareavarietyof differentwaystomeasureandevaluatethecapacityofmilitaryorganizations tochange.organizationalcapitalisanimperfectbutpowerfulwaytoconceptualizethepotentialchangecapacityofamilitaryorganization.th reefactors inparticular,measurableinmilitaryorganizationspriortothedemonstration ofagiveninnovation,appeartobestpredictwhetherornottheorganization willhavethenecessarycapacitytoadopt.first,theamountofresourcesdevotedtoexperimentationisanindicatorofthewillingnessandabilityoforganizations to consider major innovations. Second, as Mancur Olson (1982) contendsineconomics,olderorganizationsoftenbecomebureaucraticallyossifiedassubgroupsofcontrolproliferate,generatinganincreasingnumberof vetopointsthatpreventinnovationsfrombeingadopted. Therefore,thelonger militaryorganizationslastwithoutexperiencingseriousupheavalssuchasregimechangesfromwithinordefeatsininterstatewars,theworsetheyshould beatintegratinginnovations. 13 Finally,thewaythatmilitaryorganizationsdefinetheircriticaltasksplaysa vitalroleindefiningtherangeofthepossibleforthoseorganizations(wilson, 1989).Thebroaderthedefinitionoftheorganizationanditspurpose,thebetteritwillbeatadoptinginnovations.AlQaeda swillingnesstoconsiderany andalloperationalmethodsforattackingtheunitedstatesanditsalliesmade it nimble enough to adopt suicide terrorism. Al Qaeda defined the means it wouldusetoachieveitsgoalsverybroadly.incontrast,whenanorganization narrowlydefinestheoptimalmeanstopursueitsgoals,thechancesgethigher thatpushbackfromeliteswithintheorganizationwillpreventtheadoptionof innovations.atextbookcaseofhowalimitedviewofthemeanstosuccesscan negativelyinfluenceanorganizationistheu.s.armyduringthevietnamwar. TheVietnameraU.S.Armyviewedusingsuperiorfirepowerasnotjustameans toanendbutratheranendinitself;itsabilitytoemploythatfirepowerbled intohowitmeasuredsuccessandfailure.in1965,thearmyevendefinedsuccessbasedonthegenerationofenemycasualties. 14 Thismadeitdifficultforthe army to master counterinsurgency operations requiring a lower emphasis on lethality(krepinevich1986,5).thearmyinsteadpreferredsearch and destroy 13 There is no necessary correlation between organizational age and size. Nevertheless, older organizationsaremorelikelytoproducespecialtypesofbloatedbureaucraticstructuresthatmake changedifficult. 14 Itisevenpossible,basedonScottGartner swork(1997),toarguethatthefocusonoverwhelmingfirepowermighthaveinfluencedthearmy schoiceofbodycountsasitsdominantindicator,ormetricforsuccess,duringthevietnamwar.
11 11 missions where it could apply maximum firepower and generate the largest numberofcasualties(gartner1997,130 31). The speed and extent of an innovation s spread therefore depends on the relative financial and organizational requirements. Those requiring less to adoptwillspreadfasterthanthosethatrequiremore.adoption capacitytheory shows, however, that the levels of financial intensity and organizational capitalrequiredtoadoptaninnovationnotonlysignificantlyinfluencetherate andextentofitsspreadthroughouttheinternationalsystembutalsodriveits affectoninternationalpolitics.sinceitisgenerallyeasiertoadoptthephysical technologiesassociatedwithaninnovationthantheoverallsystemoffighting, innovationsfeaturingespeciallyhighlevelsoffinancialintensityarelikelyto spread,albeitslowly.inparticular,financiallyintenseinnovationsrequiringorganizationalchangesthatsustain,ratherthandisrupt,previouscriticaltasksare likelytospreadgraduallybutconsistently,benefitingthepreexistingstrongest andwealthieststatesintheinternationalsystem.whilepreinnovationmajor powers lacking the financial capacity to adopt are likely to slip and become second ratepowers,theinnovationisunlikelytoreorientsystemwidepower balances.incontrast,innovationsrequiringdisruptiveorganizationaltransformations but relatively reasonable financial investments, like blitzkrieg, the Germancombinationoftheradio,airplane,tank,andothermotorizedvehicles, willspreadhaltingly,withonlyafewstatesadoptingthefullinnovation,and most acquiring some of its technical components but not adopting the new systemofwarfare.innovationsrequiringlargedegreesofdisruptiveorganizationalchangemostclearlycreatestrategicopeningsforpowertransitionsand generatelargerfirst moveradvantages.newpowersthatmasterthenecessary organizational changes can gain an advantage over their potentially bigger thoughlessnimblemajorpoweropponents. Essentially,newmajormilitaryinnovationscancreatediscontinuitiesininternationalpolitics,usheringintheriskysituationsdescribedbyRobertPowell (1999, 85, 199) where the actual balance of power sharply diverges from the distributionofbenefitsintheinternationalsystem,becausethesystemhasnot yetcaughtuptothenewpowerrealities.ifarisingpowerdevelopsanewinnovation,itmaygainanenormousedgeinitsdrivetothetop.inresponse,statusquopowersthatcanquicklymimicandadapttonewmilitaryinnovations orrespondwiththeirownnewinnovationshavethebestchanceoflimitingthe disruptiveimpactoftheinnovationaswellasmaintainingtheirrelativepower levelinthefaceofachallenge(gilpin1981,60 61,161 62).Sometimes,however,newmajormilitaryinnovationsconfrontmajorpowers,butforfinancialor organizationalreasonstheycannotadoptintheshort tomedium term.th is presentsamajorpowerwithafundamentalchoice:continueposturingasifitis a major power, or recognize the writing on the wall and seek an alternative strategy that may involve making its interests subsidiary to those of another likelyadopter.whenstateschoosetheformerpath,liketheaustro Hungarian
12 12 CHAPTER1 EmpiredidbeforeWorldWarI,itcandestabilizetheinternationalsystemby accentuating informational gaps in national analyses of likely war outcomes. Theresultinggapbetweenbeliefsandrealityareacommoncauseofwarbecausetheymakemiscalculationandescalationmorelikelyonallsides. 15 Adoption capacitytheoryisalsousefulforexplainingthebehaviorofnonstateactors,aschapter6highlights.likeconventionalmilitaries,insurgentand terroristgroupsmustmakedecisionsaboutresourceallocationsandtheorganizationoftheirforces.financialintensityandorganizationalcapitalareuseful metrics for understanding the strategic choices of terrorist groups in the suicideterrorismera.thosegroupswithcriticaltasksbasedinparticularoperationalmethodsandthatexistedlongbeforethebeginningofthemodernage of suicide terror faced substantial hurdles to adopting the innovation.th e PIRAandETAneveradopted,forexample,whileittookFatah,akeypartof thepalestinianliberationorganization(plo),nearlytwentyyearstoadopt. Incontrast,groupswithyoungerorganizationalagesandlessdefinedcritical tasks,fromthebroadtacticalsetupofthetamiltigerstothecell basednetworkofalqaeda,weremoreeasilyabletotakeadvantageofsuicidetactics, providingthemwithanewweapon. Just as the tacit knowledge required to effectively operate aircraft carriers createssignificantorganizationalobstaclesforcountriesinterestedinadopting carrierwarfare,theavailabilityofinstructioninsuicidemethodsordirectgeographicproximitytosuicideterroristshasconstitutedatacitbarriertoentry forsometerroristgroups.thisisnottosaythatvariableslikenationalliberationmovements,religion,and/orfightingforpopularinfluencearenotmotivatingfactorsfortheadoptionofsuicideterrorism.rather,adoption capacity theorycanexplainboththegroupsthathaveadoptedandwhyothergroups do not adopt suicide terrorism something prior work has rarely addressed. Prior theorizing on terrorist strategy, like that on military innovation, has tendedtofocusonwhatdrivestheinterestofterroristgroupsinsuicidebombing,implicitlyassumingthatthedesiretoadoptsuicideterrorismisenoughto makeithappen(pape2005).applyingadoption capacitytheorytothecaseof suicidebombingshowsthewebofinterconnectionsbetweengroupsandthe flawsintryingtopredictterroristgroupbehaviorwithoutanunderstandingof thebroaderlinkagesbetweengroups. Itisimportantnottooverstatethescopeofthetheory. Thereareavarietyof reasonswhystatesareinterestedininnovations,whystatesadoptinnovations, andwhystatesbecomemoreorlesspowerful.hopefullythisbookcanmakea contributiontoongoingdebatesintheacademicandpolicyworldsaboutwhat typesofchangesaremoreorlesslikelytooccurinperiodsofuncertaintyabout militarypower. 15 Thisargumentbuildsfromworkonbargaining,information,andwar.Inparticular,seeFearon 1995b.
13 13 ImportancefortheFutureofWarfare While this book is mostly focused on the military innovations of the past, lookingforwardtothefutureisusefulbothasademonstrationofthetheory andtoshowitsrelevancetoongoingpolicydebates.adoption capacitytheory canhelpexplainthewaydifferenttypesofwarfareinthefuturewillprovoke different types of reactions on the part of responding actors, and benefit or disadvantagedifferentstates.thiscanhelpprovideaframeworkfordiscussion byshowinghowthelikelyimplicationsforthesecurityenvironmentdepend onparticularassumptionsaboutthefuture. Atpresent,thereisaspiriteddebateoccurringaroundtheworldaboutthe typesofwarsmostlikelyinthefuture.intheunitedstates,thedebateabout theutilityof network centricwarfare hasgivenwaytooneaboutwhetherthe UnitedStatesshouldfocusitslimitedresourcesoninstitutionalizingthehardearnedcounterinsurgencylessonsofAfghanistanandIraq,orrefocustheU.S. militarybacktowardconventionalwarfare(boot2006,8 9;McMaster2008, 25 28). Biddle maintains that there is not enough evidence to overturn the prominence of the modern system of warfare the use of firepower,cover, andconcealmenttotakeandholdterritoryinconventionallandengagements. Focusingonthedangersofallowingtechnologytodictateforcestructure,he states that the modern system is the orthodox approach to war, and that scholarsandpolicymakersshouldbecarefulbeforeembracing heterodox approaches(biddle2007b,463 64).Healsonotesthatmanyinstancesviewedas counterinsurgencycampaigns,likelebanon,haveactuallyrevolvedaroundthe applicationofconventionalmodernsystemprinciples(biddleandfriedman 2008). Thinkingthattheinformationagewillmakeadifferenceinfuturewarfare doesnotmeanexcludingthehumanelementorskillonthebattlefield.nor shouldbelievinginthehumanelementalongwiththeimportanceoftactical proficiencyorskillmeanignoringthewaythattheinformationrevolutionmay shapetherealmofthepossibleinwarfare(gray2006).onepopularandpersuasiveperspective,promotedmostclearlybyfrankhoffman(2007),argues thatthefutureofwarfarewillbe hybrid, demonstratingfacetsofbothregularandirregularwars,butinanoperatingenvironmentcharacterizedbythe informationage. Iftheinformationage,liketheIndustrialRevolutionbeforeit,islikelyto havewide reachingandcomplicatedeffectsonsociety,determiningitsimpact onthesecurityenvironmentmatterswhetherthemostprobablefuturecombat scenariosarepotentialu.s. ChinascenariosinEastAsia,land heavywars inthemiddleeast,orquasi peaceenforcementoperationsaroundtheglobe. Itispossiblethatthemostlikelywarsofthefutureareirregularcampaigns featuringlandforces,butthattherearealsosignificantpossiblecontingencies involvingtheheavyuseofnavalandairforces.theimpactoftheinformation
14 14 CHAPTER1 ageoneachofthesemightbedifferent,justasitmightbedifferentforstates andnonstateactors. 16 TheU.S.militarystruggledduringtheearlypartofthelastdecadelearning howtofightagainstinsurgentsinafghanistanandiraq.yetmanywhothink aboutthefutureofmilitarypowerarguethatattheveryleast,theu.s.military will indefinitely maintain and deepen its conventional military superiority (BrooksandWohlforth2008,27 35;O Hanlon2000,168 69).Acclamatory statementsthattheu.s.militaryhasalreadymasteredtheinformationageare surelyoverstated;theunitedstatesleadstheworldintheapplicationofinformationtechnologytoitsmilitaryoperations,butu.s.militaryoperationsover thelastdecadesuggestthattheunitedstateshasfarfrommasteredtheinformationage.thereareseveralareaswheredisruptivechangescouldinfluence thetrajectoryofwarfare. Atpresent,theU.S.militaryhasmadegreatstridesinprecisionwarfare theuseofnewcommunicationsandguidancetechnologiestohittargetsmore accuratelyaswellasatgreaterdistancesthaneverbefore.thesecapabilitiesare citedbybothcounterinsurgencyandconventionalwaradvocatesasimportant forthefuture,althoughtherearedisagreementsabouttheirrelativeeffectivenessatpresent.whetherornottheseadvancesareproperlycategorizedasan MMIisamatterofdebate.ButtheinitialdemonstrationofU.S.precisionguidedmunitionsintheGulfWarmayhaverepresentedthestartingpointof the ticking innovation clock, like the debut of aircraft carriers by the Royal Navyand/ortheintroductionofthetankbytheRoyalArmyinWorldWarI, rather than representing a completed, fully functional MMI (Welch 1999, 122).Linearadvancesinprecisionwarfareuptothispointhaveextendedthe edgeoftheu.s.militaryatconventionaloperations.utilizingtheinnovation requiresexpensiveplatformslikebombersandships,meaningthereisahigh level of financial intensity required to adopt. Conducting counterinsurgency operations has proven challenging for the U.S. military, however, due to the large scaleorganizationalchallengeofshiftingthearmedservicesawayfrom focusingonoverwhelmingfirepower. Precisionwarfare,undermostforeseeablecircumstances,willinitiallyremain costlyevenastherelianceonmajorweaponsplatformslikebombersdecreases. Th efinancialintensityrequiredtoimplementanythinglikewhattheu.s.militarydoestodayissohighthatevenasmalldecreaseinunitcostswillnotallow manymorestatestoactivelyseekmilitarydominance.moreover,aslongasthe 16 Whilecriticsofnetwork centricwarfare,likefrederickkagan(2006,389 90),andscholars studyingwarfareintheinformationage,suchaspeterdombrowskiandeugenegholz(2006, 4 6),arecertainlyrightthattheinformationrevolutionwillnotnecessarilyleadtooneparticular optimalforcestructureoutcome,thatdoesn tmeanthechangeswroughtbytheinformationage areirrelevantorthattheinformationageisunlikelytomatteratall.
15 15 coreplatformsforusingprecisionwarfarearelinkedtotheplatformsoftoday, recruiting,training,andorganizingmodernmilitarieswilllooksimilar. Advancesinareaslikeroboticsandinformationtechnologiessuchascomputingcouldshiftthemilitarypowerstatusquo,though.Ifadvancesinmunitionsandespeciallyunmannedvehiclesbegintomaketheexpensivelaunching platformsthatsitatthecoreoftheu.s.militaryirrelevant,itcouldrisklargescalechangesinmilitarypowerbalances.ifacargoshiporcargoplaneissuddenlyjustasgoodforlaunchingamissileatatargetasanf 15,thefinancial intensity requirements for implementation will drop and the organizational capital requirements will increase. 17 In such a situation, militaries may also havetorecruitdifferently recruitingunmannedaerialvehicle(uav)pilots who excel at video games instead of fighter jocks, for example and train peopletoconductdifferenttasks,sincetheywillbeoperatingmostlywithjoysticksratherthaninactualbattlespaceswiththeenemy. IfrisingU.S.militarycapabilitiesillustrateapathawayfromthefinancially intense platforms that currently help ensure U.S. dominance, while also requiringmilitariestoorganizethemselvesdifferentlytobesttakeadvantageof availablecapabilities,countriessuchaschinaandindiacouldfinditincreasinglypossibleandattractivetomilitarilycompetewiththeunitedstates.th is lowleveloffinancialintensityandhighleveloforganizationalcapitalrequired totakeadvantageoftheinformationageintheareaofconventionalwarwould thenlowerthebarrierstoentryforpotentialcompetitorstotheu.s.military. OtherstatesintheinternationalsystemcouldthenacquirethenecessarycapabilitiestobegineffectivelyreducingthemilitaryedgeoftheUnitedStates unlessthecountrycontinuesinnovatingtostayahead.possibleareasfordevelopmentincludenotonlyrobotics,withuavsasthemostobviousmanifestation, but cyberwarfare as well.the resulting situation could cause major shiftsintheglobalbalanceofpowerassomestatesbenefitandothers,unable toimplement,areincreasinglyleftbehind.adoption capacitytheoryprincipleshelpexplainthemicrofoundationsunderlyingtheconcernbyauthorslike MaxBoot(2006)andSinger(2009)aboutthewaytheinformationagecould boomerang,allowingothercountriestocatchuptotheunitedstatesinthe longrun. 18 Justasitwillinfluencewarfarebetweenstates,theinformationageislikely toinfluencethetrajectoryofactionsbynonstateactors. Thecommercialspread 17 ThiscouldoccurbecauseofincreasesinrangeandtheminiaturizationoftaskscurrentlyconductedbysupportplanesliketheAirborneEarlyWarningandControlSystemintonext generation missiles. 18 Thisistruewhetheronewishestocallthissortofdevelopmentthesecondstageofprecision warfareorsomethingasyetundeterminedbutrelatedtothecombinationofmaterials,informationtechnology,andcommunications(kagan2006,395).
16 16 CHAPTER1 of Internet access around the world along with the low unit cost of basic computersandlaptopsmeanthatanynonstategroupwithaminimallevelof financialsupportcanestablishawebpresencethatisusefulforcoordination, communications,andplanning(arquillaandronfeldt2001). Given that information age innovations are likely to feature low required levelsoffinancialintensityforadoption,itmayopenthedoortotheacquisitionofkeycomponentsbynonstateactorsaswell.cheaperandmorewidely availableinformationagetechnologiescouldlowerthebarriersforgroupsseekingtochallengestateauthority,meaningitwillbecomeincreasinglyeasyfor newgroupstospringupinvirtualenvironmentsandtoexchangeinformation acrossborders(hammes2004,207 9,218).Aproliferationofpotentialtarget pointscouldforeshadowmoredangerouscyberattacksagainsteverythingfrom thecontrolsystemsatapowerplanttothedepartmentofdefensemainframe togoogle.groupswillprobablyformfaster,conductoperations,andpotentially disappear, only to pop up again in another guise in another virtual place orevenanotherrealplace. Again,thesepredictionsaretentative. Theinformationagemayendupmatteringquiteabitforsometypesofwarfare,butmuchlessforothers.Th epoint isthatthedebateshouldbeaboutexploringthemultiplicityofwaysthatperiodsliketheinformationagemayshapemanydifferentdimensionsofwarfare. Adoption capacity theory is a useful tool to help explain the different outcomeslikelyindifferentsecurityenvironments. MovingForward Chapter2,whichfollows,laysoutwhat counts asamajormilitaryinnovation andthetheoryofdiffusionbrieflyexplainedabove.th istheoreticalargument concludeswithadiscussionofthecasesselectedforanalysis:britishnaval innovationsinthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcentury,carrierwarfare, theadventofnuclearweapons,andsuicidebombing.chaptersoneachcasefollowthetheoreticalchapter.twoofthechapters theonesonnuclearweapons (chapter4)andsuicideterrorism(chapter6) featurequantitativetests,while two onesoncarrier(chapter3)andbattlefleet(chapter5)warfare include more qualitative analysis featuring the use of both primary and secondary sources.eachempiricalchapterconcludeswithanexaminationofthewaythat thegivenmajormilitaryinnovationunderexaminationinfluencedtheinternational security environment, focusing in particular on power balances, the probability/durationofwars,andalliancepatterns.theimportanceofthevariablesidentifiedbythenewtheoryarecomparedwithexplanatorymechanisms fromalternativesdescribedinchapter2. Itestadoption capacitytheorythroughamultimethodapproachtomake theoverallresultsmorereliable.additionally,byusingrigoroussocialscientific
17 17 methodstostudyatopicofsubstantiveinteresttobothacademicsandpolicymakers,thisstudyattemptstocrossdisciplinarylines,andintegratetheoryand practice(george1993;goldmanandeliason2003b,22 23). Theconclusion(chapter7)discussestheimplicationsforscholarlyanalysesof internationalrelations,andthenevaluatesclaimsabouttheonsetoftheinformationageandthewaysitmayinfluencethefutureofwarfare. Th econclusion describessomecrucialissuesthatareoftenabsentindebatesaboutthefuture ofamericandefensestrategy,andhowadoption capacitytheorysuggeststhat theinformationagemayportendamuchgreaterlevelofriskforu.s.conventionalmilitarysuperioritythansomepreviousauthorshaveenvisioned.
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