The Biological Weapons Convention Richard Lennane BWC Implementation Support Unit United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (Geneva Branch)
BWC Facts and Figures (1) Opened for signature in 1972 Entered into force in 1975 Current membership: 163 States Parties 13 signatories 19 states neither signed nor ratified Depositaries are Russia, UK, USA
BWC Facts and Figures (2) No BWC organisation or implementing body, in contrast to: the Chemical Weapons Convention (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (IAEA) Implementation Support Unit is new development established by Sixth Review Conference in 2006 mandate to help States Parties help themselves
Main Provisions: Overview (1) Article I: do not acquire biological or toxin weapons Article II: get rid of any such weapons you already have Article III: do not help or allow anyone else to acquire such weapons Article IV: take necessary domestic measures to ensure such weapons are prohibited
Main Provisions: Overview (2) Article V: consult and cooperate with other States Parties on problems Article VI: report suspected breaches to the Security Council Article VII: help States Parties which have been attacked or threatened with BW Article X: do all of the above in a way that encourages the peaceful uses of biological science and technology
And just what is a biological weapon? (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. - from Article I of the BWC
Strengthening the BWC Review Conferences every five years (1980, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 next one in 2011) Confidence-building Measures (CBMs) introduced 1986, expanded 1991 Attempt to negotiate protocol from 1991-2001 Failure in 2001 sparks crisis, reorientation 2006 Review Conference consolidates new direction
New direction Focus on improving and coordinating national implementation of BWC Annual work programme deals with specific topics; exchange of technical expertise Range of different actors and organisations involved Implementation Support Unit coordinates activity Renewed focus on CBMs, universalization
So what changed? Bioterrorism becomes major concern after September 11, 2001 Rapid development, growth and spread of biotechnology capabilities Nuclear weapons: 1000 facilities Chemical weapons: 5000 facilities Biological weapons: 100,000+? Recognition of interconnection of BW with other biological risks
Weapons of Mass Destruction Nuclear Weapons Chemical Weapons Biological Weapons Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Chemical Weapons Convention Biological Weapons Convention International Atomic Energy Agency Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons?
The Spectrum of Biological Risk Natural disease outbreak Unintended consequences Accidents Negligence Vandalism, sabotage Deliberate use of BW WHO BWC We must look at [the BWC] as part of an interlinked array of tools, designed to deal with an interlinked array of problems Kofi Annan, 2006
WMD regime: traditional model Treaty Organisation State State State State State
New approach: a network model? INTERPOL BWC WHO OIE SCR 1540 FAO State Work Program ISU State Professional associations Industry Scientific organisations
2007-2010 Work Program Topics 2007: national implementation; regional cooperation. 2008: biosafety/biosecurity; oversight, education, awareness raising, and codes of conduct. 2009: capacity-building in disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and containment. 2010: assistance in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons.
Verification for the BWC? Always a technological challenge, and becoming more so Technological advances may help, but can do little to detect intention Political differences remain stark Seventh RevCon will be first opportunity for major reassessment
The good news The BWC has been successful in establishing a global norm against biological weapons No state, whether party to the BWC or not, would argue that BW can ever have a legitimate place in national defence This is a big change from 1950s-60s And a contrast to the nuclear weapons situation
For more information www.unog.ch/bwc Or contact: BWC Implementation Support Unit United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (Geneva Branch) Room C.115, Palais des Nations Geneva tel: +41 (0)22 917 2230 fax: +41 (0)22 917 0483 e-mail: bwc@unog.ch