The Effect of Radio Frequency Interference on GNSS Signals and Mitigation Techniques Presented by Dr. Tarek Attia

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International Conference and Exhibition Melaha2016 GNSS WAY Ahead 25-27 April2016, Cairo, Egypt The Effect of Radio Frequency Interference on GNSS Signals and Mitigation Techniques Presented by Dr. Tarek Attia Executive Director of Technical Affairs and Technologies National Telecom Regulatory Authority (NTRA) of Egypt

Outlines Motivation and Background Main Important Features of GNSS Main Applications of GNSS Systems GNSS Market and Future Expectations Vulnerabilities of GNSS Services Unintentional Interference Deliberate Interference Strategic Policies & Recommendations Mitigation Techniques Conclusion

Motivations and Background The GNSS are highly effective and a valuable asset to modern society for:- Protecting assets, Enhancing safety; Managing resources more efficiently; Support Strategic Tasks:- Disaster Managements Protecting& Monitoring Environmental Change GNSS applications are becoming more accurate and their precision opens doors to a wide range of applications. GNSS applications are susceptible to disruption in the operation of GNSS RXs when interference, malfunctions or failures occur. Mitigation techniques and strategic policies interventions could reduce risks& increasing resilience of services that rely on GNSS.

Main Important Features of GNSS Availability: Percentage of time the minimum numbers of satellites are in view to users. Accuracy: Difference between true and computed position (absolute positioning). Continuity: Ability to provide required performances during an operation without interruption. Integrity: Additional user information on the reliability of the signal within the operational requirements. Robustness to spoofing: Authentication information provided to users. Indoor penetration: Ability of signal to penetrate inside buildings.

Main Applications of GNSS Systems

Applications of GNSS in Transportation Car Navigation Intelligent Transportation System Road User Charging

Dispatching Incident & Emergency Response

Public Safety Main Collection Area Fence Target Area Exit Entrance Rout Collecting Area Mission Planning Surveillance Viewing

Maritime Applications

Mapping Applications and Mission Planning

Applications of GNSS in Tourism Location Based service Vehicle Tracking

GNSS Market and Future Expectations

Cumulative Core Revenue 2013-2023

Effect of GNSS Applications on Economies EC has estimated that 6-7% of GDP in Western countries is dependent on GNSS. Projected ITS Infrastructure Benefits (1998-2015). Accident Cost Savings (44%) Time Savings (41%) Emissions/Fuel (6%) Operating Cost Savings (5%) Agency Cost Savings (4%)

Vulnerabilities of GNSS Services GNSS signals are very weak ~ several watts TX~ 20,000 km. RX signal strength ~ 160 dbw, with a spectrum spread out effectively below the noise floor in the RXs. GNSS are vulnerable to failure, disruption and interference. Interference might result in degraded navigation accuracy or complete loss of RX tracking. Vulnerabilities of GNSS can be classified into interference related, system related and propagation channel related. Intentional or unintentional interferences, strongly degrade the performance of GNSS RX. There is a direct relationship between the nature, the source and the order of magnitude of interference and the consequential damage to the QoS provided by the interferedwith satellite.

Unintentional Interferences(1) There are Two main types of radio frequency interferences; i.e. unintentional and intentional. Unintentional interference is primarily caused by: Lack of adherence to regulatory requirements and industry standards, etc. Free electrons in the ionosphere act as a problem to the GPS code and carrier phase measurements respectively. Terrestrial in-, near-, and out-of-band interference, as well as harmonic interference from other systems and UW radar can interfere with GNSS signals. TV and telecommunications signals( MSS and PEDs). a 4G LTE wireless broadband(at L-band) communications network integrated with satellite coverage. Human error and Lack of training, Poor equipment and Equipment failure, System design and Bad installation,

Unintentional Interference(2) Each satellite TX in GNSS band increases noise level due to addition of background noise of other GNSS satellites. Interferences near GNSS operating frequencies.

Samples of Nearby GNSS Interferences Aircraft surveillance (978MHz and 1090MHz) DME & Tactical air navigation(tacan) (960MHz- 1215MHz) Airborne Tx (1025MHz- 1150MHz) Amateur radio (1240MHz - 1300MHz) Amateur radio satellite UL (1260MHz- 1270MHz) Surveillance radar (1300MHz-1400MHz) Aeronautical mobile telemetry (AMT) (1435MHz-1525MHz) Digital audio broadcasting (DAB) (1452MHz - 1492MHz) World space satellite radio (1467MHz - 1492MHz) Flight telemetry mobile stations(1444.5, 1453.5, 1501.5, 1515.5, 1524.5, and 1525.5MHz) Inmarsat(Tx(1626.5MHz-1660.5MHz)&RX(1525MHz-1559MHz) Iridium Satellite Network (1610MHz- 1626.5MHz) UAV signal (1557MHz and 1558.1MHz)

Intentional Interference Signal transmissions from such devices are regarded as intentional interference that intentionally send radiofrequency signals with high enough power and specific signal properties to prevent or hinder/complicate signal tracking in a specific geographical area. Jamming Jamming is deliberate interference impact GNSS by raising noise level or overload RX & cause loss of lock. Jamming deteriorates positioning solution accuracy or alternatively totally loses satellite signals and thus impairs the positioning availability. Jamming affects the positioning receiver s. The signal to noise ratio(c/n0) decreases and the GNSS signal to be received gets weaker and weaker.

Spoofing: A Different Type of Interference Spoofing Is a deliberate interference that aims to mislead GNSS receivers into generating false PVT solution. Spoofing signals: Attempts to deceive a GPS receiver by broadcasting a slightly more powerful signal than that received from the GPS satellites, structured to resemble a set of normal GPS signals. Causes the receiver to determine its position to be somewhere other than where it actually is. GNSS receivers are vulnerable Known GNSS signal structure Lack of authentication mechanism Spoofing is a serious threat Not prohibitively costly Significant motivations for spoofing due to wide-spread GNSS applications RX is not aware of being spoofed(it is providing a PVT solution)

Spoofing Concept

Strategic Polices and Recommendations All ITU members States are under obligation to respect ITU regulatory regime and NOT to cause harmful interference. There are a No. of recommendations and some policy interventions that could reduce the risks and increasing resilience of services that rely on GNSS. Space Spectrum Protection Techniques Allows avoiding RFI before their occurrence Needs strong discipline& organization to set up strategies include: Regulations and radio quiet frequencies or zones and observatory modes. RF spectrum management regulatory and standards bodies(itu, ETSI,FCC, etc). Negotiation, Laws and legal measures. Cross-government coordination issues related to national security should recognize importance of PNT, treating it as an integral part of the operation of national infrastructure.

Interference Mitigation Strategies (1) Space Systems Enhancements Techniques Development of augmentation systems, addition of pseudolites, Use of advanced antennas (smart, polarized, etc.), Use of more backup systems, Use of external navigation aids. Space Weather Mitigation Techniques GPS Modernization, Enhancement of GNSS Signal Tracking.

Interference Mitigation Strategies (2) Spectrum Interference Monitoring Techniques Geo-Location Techniques (AOA, TOA, POA, FDOA), Characterization Techniques(FFT, STFT), Receiver Interference Mitigation Techniques RFI Detection, Adaptive Notch Filtering Techniques, Switching Frequencies(multi-GNSS/ multi-frequency) RXs incorporate RAIM can detect and report a problem with satellite or with signal integrity then excludes a faulty signal from its calculations and to continue providing accurate PNT. Signal Processing Techniques, Antenna Enhancement Techniques,

Spoofing & Meaconing Mitigation Techniques Angle-of-Arrival Discrimination RXs could be configured to detect interference through monitoring RSS indicator, flagging up a warning if this is suspected, some checks in SW could be implemented to detect basic signal spoofing. Integrating GNSS with INS(inertial navigation system) Polarization Discrimination(spatial filter) Cryptographic Authentication Navigation Message Authentication, Navigation Message Encryption Antenna Solutions Controlled Radiation Pattern Antenna, Adaptive Beamforming

Conclusion(1) GNSS applications are an asset which has changed our society. Disruption of GNSS services in critical applications has a critical impact in society. GNSS has revolutionized PNT but risks are ever increasing and there is a need urgently to improve detection and mitigation. GNSS failures or interference reduce efficiency of GNSS devices, leading to decrease reliance in GNSS and affecting people s habits. Jamming can make a GPS RX deliver incorrect data signals from GNSS satellites. Accuracy and signal availability is significantly decreased when jamming is present. Some specific mitigation techniques can be applied similarly in different domains and in various combinations.

Conclusion(2) Effectiveness of any mitigation technique depends on RFI characteristics, RFI scenario of occurrence and device or systems impairments. It can harden GNSS by improving RX and antenna design but this will mitigate only some interference not all. It needs resilient PNT based on independent and complementary systems and sensors. Mitigation is still possible via the use of dual frequency GNSS RX and RAIM is a form of fault detection. There are some policy interventions that could reduce risks& increasing resilience of services that rely on GNSS. In the future, the main axes for improving GNSS technology will be driven by GNSS main performance metrics, alongside robustness to interferences and system failures tolerances.

For more information contact Tattia@tra.gov.eg Thank You Very Much for Your Attention! Questions?

Further develop of mitigation techniques are essential to ensure GNSS spectrum immunity against RFI.