Economic Systems as Constructively Rational Games: Oh, the Places We Could Go!

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Economics Presentations, Posters and Proceedings Economics 2016 Economic Systems as Constructively Rational Games: Oh, the Places We Could Go! Leigh Tesfatsion Iowa State University, tesfatsi@iastate.edu Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_conf Part of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons, Growth and Development Commons, Industrial Organization Commons, and the Other Applied Mathematics Commons Recommended Citation Tesfatsion, Leigh, "Economic Systems as Constructively Rational Games: Oh, the Places We Could Go!" (2016). Economics Presentations, Posters and Proceedings. 51. http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_conf/51 This Presentation is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Presentations, Posters and Proceedings by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.

Economic Systems as Constructively Rational Games Oh, the Places We Could Go! Presenter: Leigh Tesfatsion Professor of Economics, Mathematics, and Electrical & Computer Engineering Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011 http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ tesfatsi@iastate.edu Keynote Address, Duke Forest Conference Durham, NC, Nov 11-13, 2016 Latest Revision: 10 December 2016 1

S S Ss s You have brains in your head. You have feet in your shoes. You can steer yourself any direction you choose. You re on your own. And you know what you know. And YOU are the (one) who ll decide where to go Dr. Seuss, 1990, Oh, the Places You ll Go! 2

Presentation Outline What is constructive rationality? What is Agent-based Comp Economics (ACE )? Illustration: ACE macroeconomic modeling The places we could go! Comprehensive empirical validation Standardized policy readiness levels Standardized presentation protocols Edgier explorations for critical real-world systems Spectrum of models from 100% human to 100% agents 3

Concerns All Economists Share Real-world economic systems How do they work? How could they work better? 4

Constructively Rational Systems A system is constructively rational (CR) if: 1) Every decision maker (DM) is locally constructive A DM s current decision process must be entirely expressible as a function of the DM s current state: data (observations, statistical summaries, ) attributes (physical, financial, beliefs, preferences ) methods (information collection, math routines ) 2) The system constitutes an historical process Events proceed through time from cause to effect 5

Examples of CR Systems All real-world systems?? Any modeling of a real-world system via Agent-based Computational Economics! 6

Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm Constructively rational modeling tool Computational modeling of economic processes (including whole economies) as open-ended dynamic systems of interacting agents Goals: Enable modeling of systems for which coordination is a possibility, not a modeler-imposed restriction Let agents be as free to act within their virtual worlds as their empirical counterparts within the real world 7

ACE Modeling Principles (MP1) (MP7) (MP1) Agent Definition: An agent is a software entity within a computationally constructed world capable of acting over time on the basis of its own state, i.e., its own internal data, attributes, and methods (MP2) Agent Scope: Agents can represent individuals, social groupings, institutions, biological entities, &/or physical entities (MP3) Agent Local Constructivity: The decision-making process undertaken by a decision-making agent at any given time must be entirely expressible as a function of the agent's state at that time. 8

ACE Modeling Principles (MP4) Agent Autonomy: Coordination of agent interactions cannot be externally imposed by means of free-floating restrictions, i.e., restrictions not embodied within agent states. (MP5) System Constructivity: The state of the modeled system at any time consists of the collection of agent states (MP6) System Historicity: Given initial agent states, all subsequent events are determined solely by agent interactions. (MP7) Modeler as Culture-Dish Experimenter: The role of the modeler is limited to the setting of initial agent states and to the non-perturbational observation of model outcomes. 9

ACE Modeling Principles Together, (MP1) through (MP7) embody the idea that an ACE model is a computational laboratory. An ACE model permits a user to explore how changes in initial conditions affect outcomes in modeled systems over time. This exploration process is analogous to biological experimentation with cultures in petri dishes. 10

Illustration: ACE Macroeconomic Modeling Partial agent hierarchy for a macroeconomy illustrating is a ( ) and has a ( ) agent relations Base Agents Decision-Makers Durable Goods Institutions Derived Agents 11 11

Illustrative Application: DSG-LA = DSGE + Learning Agents E. Sinitskaya & L. Tesfatsion (2015), Macroeconomies as Constructively Rational Games, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 61, 152-182. Sequence of constructively-rational trading activities during a typical time period t 12

Four Tested Constructively-Rational Decision Methods for Consumers and Firms Reactive Learner: If this has happened, what should I do? RL: Reactive learner that uses a modified version of a Roth-Erev reinforcement learning algorithm (Roth/Erev GEB 1995, AER 1998) Anticipatory Learner: If I do this, what will happen? FL: Forward-learner that uses Q-learning (Watkins, 1989) EO-FH: Explicit optimizer that uses a rolling-horizon learning method EO-ADP: Explicit optimizer that uses an adaptive dynamic programming learning method (value function approximation) 13

Rolling-Horizon Decision Rule EO-FH Does Best (F:E0-FH, C:E0-FH) = Pareto-Optimal Nash Equilibrium Consumer Payoff Matrix: A darker color indicates a higher attained average utility for consumers Note: The Nxy terms, above, are test case designations, not payoffs. 14

Rolling-Horizon Decision Rule EO-FH Does Best Cont d (F:E0-FH, C:E0-FH) = Pareto-Optimal Nash Equilibrium Firm Payoff Matrix: A darker color indicates higher attained average profit for firms Note: The Nxy terms, above, are test case designations, not payoffs. 15

The Places We Could Go! http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm Comprehensive empirical validation Standardized policy readiness levels Standardized presentation protocols Edgier explorations of critical real-world systems Spectrum of models: 100% human 100% agents 16

Comprehensive Empirical Validation: Four Different Aspects (EV1-EV4) EV1. Input Validation: Are the exogenous inputs for the model empirically meaningful and appropriate for the purpose at hand? Examples: Functional forms, shock realizations, data-based parameter estimates, &/or parameter values imported from other studies EV2. Process Validation: How well do modeled physical processes, biological processes, and human behaviors reflect real-world aspects important for the purpose at hand? 17

Comprehensive Empirical Validation Cont d EV3. Descriptive Output Validation: How well are model-generated outputs able to capture the salient features of the sample data used for model identification? (in-sample validation) EV4. Predictive Output Validation: How well are model-generated outputs able to forecast distributions, or distribution moments, for sample data withheld from model identification or for data acquired at a later time? (out-of-sample validation) 18

Standardized Policy Readiness Levels PRL-1: Conceptual policy idea PRL-2: Analytic formulation PRL-3: Low-fidelity model Basic research carried out at universities... PRL-4: Moderate-fidelity small-scale model PRL-5: High-fidelity small-scale model PRL-6: Prototype small-scale model Infamous Valley of Death PRL-7: Prototype large-scale model PRL-8: Field study PRL-9: Real-world deployment Industry, government, regulatory agencies 19

PRLs 4-6: Valley of Death Infrequency of studies within PRLs 4-6 ( Valley of Death ) hinders development of policy from Concept Deployment ACE is well suited for bridging this valley ACE computational platforms permit policy performance testing at PRLs 4-6 Proof-of-Concept: Electricity market research 20

Standardized Presentation Protocols How can ACE policy models & findings be clearly presented to stakeholders, regulators, and other interested parties? Proposal: Develop a nested sequence of standardized presentation protocols tailored to the PRL of a modeling effort. Example: Extend the current one size fits all ODD protocol (Grimm et al.) to a sequence ODD-1, ODD-2, in parallel with PRL-1, PRL-2, 21

Edgier Explorations L. Tesfatsion, Electric Power Markets in Transition: Agent-Based Modeling Tools for Transactive Energy Support, to appear in Hommes/LeBaron (Eds.), Handbook of Computational Economics IV, Elsevier, 2017. ACE models can be used to represent real-world market processes PLUS ACE modeling principles can be used to design markets for real-world implementation 22

Decision-making agents in ACE models can Talk back & forth with each other Choose/refuse whom they interact with Behave strategically with selected partners Evolve their behavioral strategies over time Evolutionary game theory + Search/matching theory Examples: 1) L. Tesfatsion (2001), Structure, Behavior, and Market Power in an Evolutionary Labor Market with Adaptive Search, JEDC 25(1), 419-457 http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/structbehmplabor.jedc01.lt.pdf 2) The Trade Network Game Laboratory: Homepage http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/tnghome.htm 23

ACE Labor Market in JEDC (2001): Worker-Employer Network Formation Game W1 W2 W3... WM E1 E2 E3... EN Job search with choice & refusal of worksite partners. Purple = refused work offers; Black = accepted work offers. Matched traders play worksite PD games. Workers use GA to evolve personalities. Endogenous hiring, quits, and firings 24

AMES = Agent-based Modeling of Electricity Systems AMES Wholesale Power Market Test Bed: Homepage http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/amesmarkethome.htm Can test robustness of market rules to gaming D. Krishnamurthy, W. Li, L. Tesfatsion (2016), An 8-Zone Test System based on ISO New England Data: Dev. and Application, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 31(1), 234-246. http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/8zonetestsystem.preprintjan2015.pdf 25

North American Centrally-Managed Wholesale Electric Power Markets 26

Economic Processes as Key Components of Larger Systems ACE permits modeling of econ processes as critical components of Coupled Natural & Human (CNH) systems CNH systems can be dynamic & spatial Broader ranges of causal factors can be considered (not just economic) 27

Example: ACE Watershed Local Governance Study Squaw Creek Central Iowa L. Tesfatsion, C.R. Rehmann, D.S. Garcia, Y. Jie, W.J. Gutowski (2016), An Agent-Based Platform for the Study of Watersheds as Coupled Natural and Human Systems, Environmental Modelling & Software, to appear. http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/waccshedplatform.revisedwp15022.pdf 28

A Spectrum of Experimental Approaches x 100% human Humans with computer access Mix of humans and computer agents Human-calibrated computer agents Human-controlled computer avatars Tethered Not Tethered Computer agents with real-world data streaming 100% computer agents evolved from initial conditions (ACE) 29

Conclusion ACE/ABM is a useful addition to the toolkits of researchers studying real-world systems ACE modeling principles have been designed to promote clarity and practical applicability But much remains to be done!! Empirical validity, PRLs, presentation protocols, edgier explorations, demonstrate value-added for big-time applications, explore spectrum of models 30

On-Line ACE Resource Sites ACE Website: Homepage http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm ACE Research Areas: Linked Listing http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/aapplic.htm Empirical Validation of Agent-Based Models http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/empvalid.htm Presentation Protocols for Agent-Based Models http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/amodguide.htm 31