Protection Augmentation Toughness and Alternatives of GNSS Melaha 2016 Concord Al-Salam Hotel Cairo, April 25,2016 Refaat Rashad
Road Map of the Presentation 1- How Good are GNSS 2- How Vulnerable are GNSS 3- How we can Protect GNSS
Communication T.V. Broadcast *Weather Remote Sensing Navigation PNT Search & Rescue Special purposes
United States GPS Europe Galileo Russian Federation GLONASS India Irnas China BeiDou Japan Qzss
WIDE AREA AUGMENTATION COVERAGE SBAS BEIDOU COMPASS MSAS QZSS WAAS EGNOS SDSM Russia GAGAN IRNSS
U.S. Space-Based PNT (GPS) Organization Structure Defense Transportation State Interior Agriculture Commerce Homeland Security Joint Chiefs of Staff NASA WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR SPACE-BASED PNT Executive Steering Group Co-Chairs: Defense, Transportation NATIONAL COORDINATION OFFICE Host: Commerce ADVISORY BOARD Sponsor: NASA GPS International Working Group Chair: State Engineering Forum Co-Chairs: Defense, Transportation Ad Hoc Working Groups
GNSS - a Component of the Global Critical Information Infrastructure Precision Agriculture Surveying & Mapping Aviation Communications Disease Control Power Grids Trucking Shipping Oil Exploration Fishing & Boating Personal Navigation
Precise Positioning Applications: Land, Sea, Air Navigation Aviation Marine navigation Intelligent Transport ITS Surveying and Mapping Civil engineering Mining/exploration Precision agriculture GIS Geodetic Datum Communication Time transfer Financial transactions Cellular networks Electrical power grids Scientific Research Sea level change Crustal deformation Environmental studies Lots more applications yet to be conceived
WORLED MARITIME GPS USERS Overseas Ports Approach Channels Narrow Waterways Under water Technology Protection AIN, MELAHA and Alternatives 2016, Concord for PNT Al-Salam Naval Academy hotel Cairo Jan. April 24, 2016 25-27,2016 Alexandria
Why Maritime
MARITIME USER REQUIRIMENTS Availability Accuracy Reliability Continuity Accessibility Integrity This requirements are provided by the GPS and the Augmentation systems Protection AIN, MELAHA and Alternatives 2016, Concord for PNT Al-Salam Naval Academy hotel Cairo Jan. April 24, 2016 25-27,2016 Alexandria
GPS have proven to be very accurate. Very Reliable 99.9% of Availability 100+100 of Applications Millions and millions of Users
So, What is The Problem???
The problem is GPS and all the other GNSS are Vulnerable to Interferences
Risk Considerations Vulnerabilities GNSS System Threats Unintentional Intentional Probability of Loss/Degradation of GNSS Signal Consequences of GNSS Loss: Human Life Environment Economy RISK 15
TYPES OF INTERFERENCES &THRAETS Natural Interferences Unintentional Interferences Intentional Interferences
Intentional Interferences Jamming Spoofing Protection AIN, MELAHA and Alternatives 2016, Concord for PNT Al-Salam Naval Academy hotel Cairo Jan. April 24, 2016 25-27,2016 Alexandria
One web site with 9 PNT jamming devices (They also sell GPS trackers ) Jamming Techniques are Well Known Devices Available, or Can be Built Easily
Equivalent Power Ratio Hi-Power Terrestrial - ¼ mile from GPS On order of a Picowatt (10-12 watt) Hi Power Terrestrial Niagara ~ 1 Billion Watts (167 feet drop with 64,750 cubic feet/ second) Same Power Ratio of 5 Billion to One 5 F e e t GPS - 0.2 Watts (1 Tablespoon of water per second through 5 feet )
Spoofing
AIS ECDIS RADAR GMDSS VDR Auto Pilot EPIRB LRIT Jammer of less than 1 milliwatt: False positions, and speed Autopilot, turn, no alarms! With a little more jammer power: Electronic Chart Displays Autopilot Automatic Identification System Differential GPS Satellite voice and data comms Maritime distress safety system VDR VTS & VTMIS
What if there is no Protection for GNSS
Possible Jamming / Spoofing Attacks on GPS Terrorism groups Alkaeda, ISIS.BOKOHARAM
The Question Is: What should we do to Overcome the Challenges Facing GNSS and PNT? 24
Action Areas: Protect, Toughen, Augment and Alternatives Protect the Clear and Truthful Signal Toughen User s Receivers Augment Alternatives for PNT Sources
Protection Protection involves * Fast Jammer Detection * Geo-location and * Detention of perpetrator Inforce National Laws and Regulations
Toughness Enhanced signals L2c and L1c. Manufacturers agreements over smart and interference resistance receivers
Augmenting Enhancing GNSS Accuracy and Integrity through; Ground Augmentations GBAS, DGPS and Space Augmentation SBAS
Alternatives Backup PNT Sources Inertial Navigation System INS or, eloran
Hi Performance Inertial Navigator (error growth at 0.3 nm/hour) Error growth with time and time squared Errors about 600 meters after 1 hour of operation Optimistic Initial position error 20 meters
Back To The History TO Secure the Future eloran is the Way Ahead to Backup GNSS
eloran Powerful Signal (up to 100kW) 100 khz 2 D In calibrated area ~10m accuracy THE UK HAS TAKING THE INITIATIVE Risk Perspective For GPS Denial
e loran eloran can be implemented by: 1- Updating and/or modifying the existing Loran-c stations 2- Build new eloran beacons
Conclusion GNSS Vulnerability Can be Reduced But Not Fully Eliminated Augmentation is Important for Integrity, But Can Not Eliminate Disruptions GPS Disruptions also Impact Timing Independent Backup Systems are Essential for the Critical Applications 34