Incentive System for Inventors

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Incentive System for Inventors Company Logo @ Hideo Owan Graduate School of International Management Aoyama Gakuin University

Motivation Understanding what motivate inventors is important. Economists predict that production of knowledge is underprovided in the presence of spillovers. This problem might be alleviated if there is an additional mechanism to motivate R&D efforts. Scientific and technical knowledge is the source of economic growth. The optimal incentive system for inventors may vary across different R&D goals and stages and across different inventor characteristics. Firms needs to integrate and build upon its current competencies (exploitation) while simultaneously developing fundamentally new capabilities (exploration). (March 1991, Teece, Pisano, & Shuen 1997, Tushman & O Reilly 1997, Roberts 2004). Is monetary compensation a mere response to the legal requirement by the patent law to pay appropriate compensation to inventors? Project-level data from the inventor survey allows us to investigate how inventors are motivated.

Factors affecting inventor motivation Firm characteristics (size, age, ownership, financial conditions, culture, etc.) R&D strategy (Resource allocation, monetary incentives, M&A, etc.) Inventor Characteristics (age gender education, etc.) Incentive System (value, sources of motivation) Exploit or explore? Project characteristics (field, goal, stage, etc.) Performance

Seven motivation drivers analyzed Survey question: How important was each of the following factors as a source of motivation for your invention? (Measured by 5 point Likert scale: 1=absolutely unimportant 5=very important) SCIENCE: Satisfaction from contributing to the progress of science and technology. CHALLENG: Satisfaction from solving challenging technical problems. ORG_PERFORMANCE: Performance enhancement of your organization CAREER: Career advances. REPUTATION: Reputation and prestige of you and your organization. BUDGET: Improved research conditions such as more budget. MONEY: Monetary rewards.

Average responses by educational level 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 Science Challenge Org. Performance Career Reputation Budget Compensation High School or Lower Technical or 2-year College 4-year College Master PhD

Average responses by organizational type 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 Science Challenge Org. Performance Large Firms Small Firms Self-employed Career Reputation Budget Compensation Medium-sized Firms Universities and Other Research Institutes

Relationship with inventor productivity How are seven motivation drivers associated with inventor productivity? We use both quantitative and qualitative productivity measures: Size_pat : the size of domestic patent grants the research is expected to generate (6 point scale) Dom_pat_value: the inventor s ranking of the economic value of the surveyed patent among other comparable patents in the same technological field concurrently granted in Japan (4 point scale) We find that SCIENCE and CHALLENGE are closely associated with both measures of inventor productivity (See Table 1). The results should not be interpreted as the effect of the motivation drivers because the causality may be opposite (e.g. project with high expected value may attract those with strong tastes for science or challenge ). There is a slight difference between the quantity and quality measures. Inventors whose resources are not secured are likely to produce more patents. Inventors who rate reputation as important are likely to produce more valuable patents.

Table 1: Relationship with patent value Ordered logit model estimation Dependent Variable Size_pat (# of patents expected) Dom_pat_value (Relative economic value) Coefficient z-statistics Coefficient z-statistics Science 0.1855*** 5.65 0.2789*** 7.15 Challenge 0.1083** 2.54 0.2684*** 4.89 Org. Performance 0.0460 1.38 0.0022 0.05 Career 0.0093 0.26 0.0322 0.71 Reputation -0.0049-0.13 0.1201*** 2.67 Budget 0.1115*** 3.14 0.0199 0.48 Money 0.0250 0.73-0.0147-0.36 We control for inventor characteristics (age, gender, tenure, academic degree), patent characteristics (number of inventors/applicants, patent category), organizational characteristics (size, functions), and project characteristics (goal, type, stage). ***, **, and * indicate significant level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Table 2: How are motivators formed? How are motivation drivers associated with individual, project, and firm characteristics? (Results from ordered logit model estimation) Science Challenge Org. Perf. Career Reputat n Budget Money # of inventors 0.006-0.028 0.076*** 0.026 0.022 0.068*** -0.021 Age 0.019* 0.027*** -0.005-0.004 0.006 0.030*** -0.013 High school graduate -0.011-0.191-0.390** 0.386*** -0.036 0.107-0.204 Ph.D 0.282* -0.004 0.079-0.005 0.218 0.072-0.111 R&D division 0.536*** 0.324** 0.008 0.244** 0.233** 0.529*** 0.107 New business line 0.392*** 0.246* -0.010 0.316*** 0.229** 0.367*** 0.130 Core business 0.407*** 0.304*** 0.174* 0.215** 0.279*** -0.017 0.103 New technology base 0.330** -0.039-0.439*** -0.047-0.067 0.176 0.047 Basic research 0.668*** 0.432*** 0.043 0.050-0.034 0.307*** -0.045 Comm. of new seeds 0.467*** 0.044-0.027 0.107 0.162* 0.172* 0.139 Explor. of tech seeds 0.336** 0.242* -0.189 0.035 0.145 0.008 0.017 Firm size (=ln(sale)) 0.084*** 0.029 0.024 0.059** 0.024 0.067** 0.081*** Capital Intensity -0.337-0.251 0.976** 0.376 0.060 0.159-0.681* Other variables that do not have significant coefficients are omitted. ***, **, and * indicate significant level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Implications of Table 2 Inventors in large projects care more about organizational performance and resources they receive. Older inventors, presumably having more decision authority, highly rate challenge and budget as more important than their younger ones. Inventors who work to develop a new business line or to support core businesses more highly rate science, challenge, career advancement, and reputation more important drivers than those working for non-core businesses. Science is a primary motivation driver for those working on exploratory themes (associated with new technology base, basic research, commercialization of new seeds, and exploration of technological seeds). Organizational performance matters more for inventors when firms have large tangible fixed assets hence failure in R&D may result in large adjustment cost (Chan, Nickerson and Owan 2007).

Taste for Science Taste for Science (Stern 1999) Researchers may have intrinsic preference for contributing to the accumulation of scientific knowledge and for receiving recognition from their peers for discoveries. Some firms prefer hiring researchers with taste for science and allow them to pursue individual research agenda. Why? (Productivity) Early access to scientific discoveries raises R&D productivity. (Screening) Taste for science is correlated with the researcher s ability. Researchers with taste for science are willing to trade off wage premium with good research environment.

Productivity vs. Screening Explanations Correlation between science orientation and high R&D productivity confounds these two effects. Rosenberg (1889), Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990), and Arora and Gambardella (1994) If the productivity explanation is true, cooperation with scientific community, reading scientific and technical literature, and publishing in academic journals should help to raise inventor productivity. The analysis indicates that the productivity effect may explain only a portion of overall impact of taste for science on productivity, and especially is limited for the qualitative measure. (see Table 3) Patent value is lower for those with co-inventors from universities, etc. All variables related to activities to learn scientific discoveries except for publish in academic journals become insignificant in explaining patent value. The coefficient for Science does not decline much as we add the above variables in estimation. The screening explanation may be more important.

Table 3 Ordered Probit Estimates of Inventor Productivity Dependent Variable Size_pat Dom_pat_value Number of inventors 0.0737*** 0.0639*** 0.0910*** 0.0745*** (0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0187) (0.0192) Age 0.0217*** 0.0220*** 0.0166*** 0.0152** (0.0056) (0.0058) (0.0063) (0.0066) PhD 0.2962*** 0.1325 0.4319*** 0.2348* (0.1075) (0.1100) (0.1257) (0.1283) Working in a big firm 0.5121*** 0.4858*** -0.1765*** -0.1880* (0.0861) (0.0884) (0.1044) (0.1083) Belong to R&D division 0.4311*** 0.3833*** 0.0036 0.0316 (0.1051) (0.1063) (0.1231) (0.1260) New business line 0.5890*** 0.5454*** 0.2039* 0.2206** (0.0874) (0.0889) (0.1050) (0.1059) Basic research 0.2537*** 0.1762** 0.2064** 0.1395 (0.0774) (0.0800) (0.0921) (0.0930) Applied research 0.2701*** 0.2238*** 0.2136*** 0.1881*** (0.0610) (0.0620) (0.0697) (0.0707) Motivation: Science 0.2548*** 0.1931*** 0.3938*** 0.3696*** (0.0298) (0.0310) (0.0343) (0.0365) Co-inventors from universities, etc. -0.5176*** 0.1453 (0.1936) (0.2522) Cooperation with universities, etc. 0.4519*** 0.0892 (0.1281) (0.1500) Importance of science literature in 0.1084*** -0.0020 getting idea (0.0193) (0.0231) Published the discovery in journals 0.4077*** 0.7693*** (0.0842) (0.0978) Pseudo R-squared 0.0546 0.0616 0.0475 0.0571 # of Observations 4522 4453 3306 3244 Other independent variables include number of applicants, gender, tenure, and other educational background of surveyed inventor, types of employers, and other project characteristics. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

Other findings on Taste for science Taste for science is presumably correlated with inventor ability and firms also allocate resources to raise their reputation to attract more talented researchers. Ptn_goal_rep (importance of the company reputation in registering the patent) and Science ( taste for science ) are highly correlated. Taste for science is more closely associated with inventor productivity in exploration (commercialization of potentially useful scientific or technological discoveries, or exploration of new technical seeds) than in exploitation (solving important technological issues of the business of the firm)

Aren t monetary rewards working? Monetary rewards do not seem to have a great impact on inventor productivity as a motivator nor are much correlated with project or firm characteristics (See Table 1&2). Then, the purposes of monetary rewards for invention are limited to (1) conforming to the patent law (i.e. pay appropriate compensation to inventors); and (2) attracting talented researchers. Be careful! monetary rewards only work when the firm offers them. But, the inventor survey did not ask which firms offered them. Low value of MONEY may result from either no provision of monetary rewards or lack of response to existing ones. We construct the dummy variable INCENTV: =1 if inventor thinks monetary rewards were an important motivator (i.e. MONEY = 4 or 5). Theoretically, INCTV =1 only when the firm offers some form of monetary rewards AND they succeed to motivate the inventor.

Self-selection problem Another serious problem is that a firm s decision to adopt incentives for inventors is likely to be influenced by unobserved factors that affect the value of invention. e.g. competitive market situation, state of product pipeline, quality of researchers, etc. To overcome this difficulty, we estimate the inventor productivity measures and INCENTV simultaneously. Market conditions Nature of products R&D staff quality Culture Firm s decision to offer incentives # of patents Value of patents INCENTV = 0 or 1 Inventor Characteristics

Table 4: Treatment effect model estimation (A) Dependent Variable (1) Size_pat (2) Dom_pat_value Maximum Likelihood Estimation Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. # of investors 0.0279*** 0.0107 0.0442*** 0.0105 Master degree 0.0935** 0.0435 0.0545 0.0439 Ph.D 0.1548** 0.0719 0.1719** 0.0710 ln(sale) 0.0587*** 0.0126-0.0331** 0.0130 Working in R&D division 0.2132*** 0.0547-0.0389 0.0582 New business line 0.3145*** 0.0555 0.0726 0.0572 Reinforcing core business 0.0721 0.0478 0.0765 0.0496 Basic research 0.1016** 0.0498 0.1045** 0.0498 Applied research 0.1362*** 0.0384 0.1307*** 0.0383 Invention type: product -0.0526 0.0466-0.1518*** 0.0464 Invention type: process -0.165*** 0.0494-0.1473*** 0.0505 Science 0.1931*** 0.0203 0.2446*** 0.0210 Incentv 1.4617*** 0.0920 1.2798*** 0.1131 # of observations 3219 2365 Prob > χ 2 0.0000 0.0000 Other independent variables include number of applicants, age, gender, tenure, and other academic background, and other project characteristics. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

Table 5: Treatment effect model estimation (B) Dependent Variable: INCTV (1) (2) Coefficient S.D. Coefficient S.D. Foreign ownership (%) 0.0004 0.0015 0.0005 0.0018 Firm age 0.0045* 0.0027 0.0043 0.0034 ln(sale) 0.0457*** 0.0151 0.0622*** 0.0179 Science (normalized) -0.2601*** 0.0272-0.2922*** 0.0323 Instruments Advertising expense /sale -0.5468 1.7765 2.5025 2.0840 Female employee ratio (%) 0.6793*** 0.2182 0.5360** 0.2727 # of observations 3309 2433 *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

Other findings on monetary rewards The effects of monetary rewards for inventors are not significantly different between exploration and exploitation. A successful introduction of monetary rewards is less likely when inventors have strong taste for science. Either the firm decides not to introduce such incentives or inventors do not respond to monetary rewards. The effect of taste for science on patent value is smaller in the presence of monetary rewards. A similar result cannot be obtained for the effect on the number of patents generated. Inventors who otherwise pursue risky projects aimed at technological leap might shift to safer and predictable themes in the presence of monetary incentives.

Conclusion Under-provision of R&D efforts may not be an issue at the inventor-level because taste for science and taste for challenge are major motivation drivers for inventors. Firms may benefit from hiring those with strong taste for science because (1) they are more motivated, (2) they will increase the absorptive capacity of firms, and (3) taste for science is correlated with ability. Unlike the conventional wisdom, there is some evidence that monetary rewards may be an effective motivation driver where they are introduced.