WMD Events and Other Catastrophes 2012 Joint CBRN Conference National Defense Industrial Association March 13, 2012 Tara O Toole, M.D., M.P.H. Under Secretary for Science and Technology U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Key Points S&T Directorate s roles and responsibilities Preparation for and response to WMD and other catastrophes Associated meta-challenges Biothreats and complex technical accidents 2
DHS Organization 3
S&T Value Proposition S&T s contributions to the Homeland Security Enterprise will come from: Creation of new technological capabilities and process enhancements Cost savings due to technological innovation and analytics Leveraging scientific and engineering expertise to achieve improvements in operational analysis, project management and acquisition management Progressively deeper, broader understanding of homeland security technology priorities and capability gaps 4
S&T Organization 5
WMD and other Catastrophes Deliberate biological attacks human or agriculture targets Natural pandemic influenza or emerging disease Improvised nuclear device scale varies Big earthquake Big hurricane Cyberattack(s) on critical infrastructure Complex technological accidents 6
Bioweapons are a Strategic Threat Massively lethal, proven to work with 1960s technology Essential materials, know-how cheap, widely available, dualuse: hard to track, easily hidden Attribution issue Difficult for states to respond to attacks Reload potential: self-replicating organisms; risk multiple attacks Mitigation requires specific countermeasures quickly and in quantity Contagious disease introduces new dynamic Potency, diversity, and accessibility of biothreats will increase as bioscience advances 7
BioFutures Project Findings Biological manufacturing increasingly important Computer power driving biosciences Bioscience ecosystem changing China, India, Brazil are increasingly peer competitors to US, UK, EU US still leads in patents and IP Economic and defense implications of outsourcing biology pharma pipeline increasingly Asian US losing expertise? Well resourced groups/nations have many options to do harm Entry barriers to bioscience, bioterror are low traditional threat agents and agro attacks most feasible 8
Complex Systems Fail Complexly In complex industrial, space, and military systems, the normal accident generally (not always) means that the interactions are not only unexpected, but are incomprehensible for some critical period of time. Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents, 1984 9
Deepwater Horizon Sources: Reuters, Wikimedia Commons 10
Three Near-Simultaneous Disasters Magnitude 9.0 Sources: AP, Reuters 11
Catastrophic Events: Meta-Challenges in Preparation & Response Prevention/interdiction Reducing vulnerabilities Prediction Real-time detection, situational awareness Maintain public s trust and active support Mobilize and sustain whole-of-government effort 12
More Meta-challenges Engaging non-government actors Experts, industry, operators Protecting, maintaining critical infrastructure and services Caring for sick, injured, homeless Logistics, logistics, logistics Recovering faster Mitigating long-term impacts Health, socio-economic, strategic COMMUNICATIONS! 13
Dimensions of Emergencies Psycho- Social Impact (Fear, Societal Cohesion, Survival) Existential High 2001 Anthrax * * * 2003 SARS 9/11 Katrina 2 Disasters (big emergency) * * State threatening (ability of government to function/survive in doubt) Chernobyl * 3 Catastrophes (really big emergency) * 4 Japanese Earthquake/Tsunami Haitian Earthquake * Spanish Flu Low Minor 1 Emergencies 2009 Flu Pandemic * Low High Extreme Extent of Damage (Life, Property, Economic) Federal Lead 14
Progress since 2001 Planning, preparation more advanced; moving towards modelbased simulations, affordable exercises Significant progress towards interoperable communications among first responders Situational awareness improvements in sensors, data feeds (electronic med records, fusion centers, Virtual USA), potential for social media alerts, reports. Promise of pre-symptomatic and mass diagnostics ( pregnancy tests for anthrax) Response still local. Great variations across US. Limited surge capacity. Regional response capacity is evolving. Recovery still learning. Faster is better. Improved plans for post-bioattack, working on IND recovery.
Long-term Potential for Improved Biosecurity Could reduce time to develop, manufacture new drugs, vaccines, diagnostics Focus diagnosis, treatment on host, not pathogen Earlier diagnosis, generic treatments Need regulatory reform to keep pace with technology improvements e.g. multiplex diagnostics Bioscience practice must incorporate professional sense of social responsibility Engaging public is a must prohibitions on GMO in UK; bans on stem cell research in US 16
The Long Road to Preparedness 17
Reality Check All response is local! Feds will not arrive immediately and at some scales will be overwhelmed US health care system and 90% of critical infrastructure is in private hands What is appropriate investment in preparation for routine hazards vs. high consequence events of indeterminate probability? How can we educate and train responders and the public for rare events? How can we collaborate internationally more effectively? 18
the salvation of this human world lies nowhere else than in the human power to reflect, in human modesty, and in human responsibility. Vaclav Havel, Washington, DC, 1990 19