EFFECT OF PPD TYPE JAMMERS ON AVIATION GPS RECEIVERS

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Transcription:

15/01/2018 EFFECT OF PPD TYPE JAMMERS ON AVIATION GPS RECEIVERS Mitch Jevtovic, P.Eng., PMP Manager, Spectrum Management

CONTENT OF THE PRESENTATION 1) Ground testing: effect of GPS jammers on some GPS receivers used by NAV CANADA 2) Flight testing: effect of a low power GPS jammer on airborne GPS receivers 3) Summary from the Ground and the Flight tests 4) Long term monitoring: presence and effect of PPD type jammers in the vicinity of a busy airport 5) Way forward: what should an ANS provider do about GPS jammers

1) GROUND TESTING GPS Jammers PPD jammers: miliwatts to hundreds of miliwatts to watts; illegal Not considered: Military high power jammers Intentional jamming

GPS Receivers Under Test 1) Ashtech SkyNav GG12W aircraft GPS receiver (TSO-C145/146 compliant); 2) Squid - Vehicle Location ADS-B transponder (GPS receiver built-in), manufactured by ERA (used by Nav Canada for ground vehicle tracking); 3) Hemisphere DGPS Receiver (used by Nav Canada to verify the exact location of the MLAT Sensors/Remote Units).

GPS Jammer 1 (FF-15) Frequency: CDMA, GSM, DCS, 3G and GPS L1 Jamming Range: up to 15 meters radius Output Power: Each band 300mW, total power is 1500mW

GPS Jammer 2 (GJ6) Ant#3: L5 Ant#2: L2 Ant#1: L1 Frequency: GPS L1, L2 and L5 Jamming Range: average 10 m radius Output Power: Each band 300 mw, total power is 450 mw

GPS Jammer 3 (L1/L2 Jammer) Frequency: 1217-1237MHz / 1565-1575 MHz Jamming Range: radius 5-10 meters in car (with antenna) Output Power: not specified, but limited with attenuators to 10 mw during test

GPS Jammer 4 (GP4000) Frequency: 1450-1600 MHz Jamming Range: average 5 m radius Output Power: 7 db (integrated antenna, hard to estimate actual power)

GPS Jammer 5 (GP5000) Frequency: GPS L1 Jamming Range: average 5 m radius Output Power: 200 mw

Comparison of Jammers Spectral Signatures Power was limited to 10 mw with attenuators (except for Jammer 4) Antennas for jammers 1, 2, 3 and 5 were on the roof of a vehicle Entire jammer 4 was on the roof of a vehicle

Relative Position of Jammers vs. Receivers The vehicle with the jammers was moving towards the receivers while logging time and location relative distance to receivers calculated The receivers were stationary, logging time, Number of Satellites Visible (NoSV) (Range 0 to 12) and Fix/No Fix (0 = No fix/invalid, 1 = Standard GPS, 2 = Differential GPS)

Same receiver is affected moderately by one jammer Effect of moving Jammer 2 on Squid/ERA receiver

but quite strongly by another Effect of moving Jammer 4 on Squid/ERA receiver

Same jammer affects different receivers differently Effect of moving Jammer 2 on Hemisphere DGPS receiver

Strongest jamming effect combination Effect of moving Jammer 4 on Hemisphere DGPS receiver

Ashtech SkyNav the only aircraft GPS receiver tested Compliance: RTCA DO-178B Level B ((Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification) RTCA DO-208 (MOPS for Airborne Supplemental Navigation Equipment Using GPS) RTCA DO-229D (MOPS for GPS/WAAS Airborne Equipment) Features extensive anti-jam capabilities : RTCA DO-208 and DO-229D (WAAS MOPS) meets CWI (continuous Wave Interference) specification RE-ACQUISITION < 3 sec if blockage is less than 10 sec, <5 sec if blockage is 10 60 sec

Tested aircraft GPS receiver also found vulnerable Effect of moving Jammer 4 on Ashtech aircraft GPS receiver the longest loss of the LPV

Aircraft GPS receiver s S/N ratio during loss of fix Effect of moving Jammer 4 on Ashtech aircraft GPS receiver s S/N ratio

Other jammers barely affect Aircraft GPS receiver Effect of moving Jammer 3 on Ashtech aircraft GPS receiver s S/N ratio

2) FLIGHT TESTING NAV CANADA Flight Inspection Fleet 10 mw L1 chirp signal jammer on the ground; two GPS receivers in each A/C: cockpit and test receiver Bombardier DHC8 flew at 3500 feet ASL outbound and 3000 feet inbound directly over the jammer Bombardier CRJ2 flew 1500 feet both directions with 900 m offset

Minimum jamming effect on airborne GPS receivers In both cases test receivers logged minor drop in the S/N ratio No observable effects on the cockpit receivers

3) CONCLUSIONS FROM TESTING Exposure to GPS jamming by PPD type jammers is hard to predict: Manufacturers specifications re power and range cannot be trusted Same receiver is affected by the different jammers differently Same jammer affects different receivers differently Receivers on the ground are far more susceptible than airborne receivers: Antenna radiation patterns, shielding by fuselage Alternative ways of landing available where jammers are likely to be present Operations on the ground are at a higher risk: Tracking systems for airport ground vehicles drifting DGPS, GBAS Beware of stationary high-power jammers: $849 at www.jammer-store.com GSM, CDMA, 3G, 4G Wimax, 4G LTE, WIFI, GPS etc. 60 W Range: 60 m

4) LONG TERM MONITORING Objectives Set up RF spectrum monitoring equipment capable of IDM of GPS jammers Learn about capabilities of the equipment Collect data and understand prevalence of jammers at the location (busy airport) Understand repercussions to aeronautical operation Propose operational workarounds, if any are deemed beneficial

Equipment Antenna 10-1000 MHz Intelligent Networkable Spectrum Monitoring Node10MHz to 6GHz Embedded Linux System, Storage Limit: 512GB SSD Antenna 1-6 GHz GPS L1/L2 antenna pointed at the highway Node

Network of 4 Nodes, storing and partially processing data 1) 24L LOC (50 m) 2) 15L LOC (250 m) 3) 15R LOC (1200 m) 4) CASDE (1250 m)

Processing software at remote location Real-time spectrum monitoring Monitors multiple nodes simultaneously TDOA/AOA Geo- Location

Some detected jammers NAV CANADA

Some detected jammers NAV CANADA

Some geolocated jammers NAV CANADA

Some geolocated jammers NAV CANADA

Monthly Events Statistics No significant consequences to airport operation: one complaint from pilot

Monthly Events Statistics (improved node antennas) NAV CANADA

NAV CANADA s shift to Performance Based Navigation NAV CANADA published 1578 PBN approach procedures using chart title 'RNAV (GNSS)' as of December 2017: 1016 with LNAV lines of minima 178 with LNAV/VNAV lines of minima 355 with LPV lines of minima 29 with RNP AR lines of minima GNSS approach often the only instrument assisted approach to remote airports; luckily, there are usually no GPS jammers there Many GPS jammers around major airports; luckily, there are usually alternate ground based facilities to assist landing

RNAV/GNSS approach availability in Canada NAV CANADA

5) WHAT TO DO ABOUT GPS JAMMERS Should ANS providers invest in GPS jammers IDM equipment and training? Should procedures be introduced to address jamming, e.g. jamming events alarms, rapid reaction and location efforts, reporting to authorities? Should dealing with GPS jammers be entirely left to the regulators and/or low enforcement authorities? Should ANS providers lobby regulators and enforcers for preferential treatment in protection against GPS jammers?

QUESTIONS?