Hands-On-Relay School 2015 Distribution Event Analysis. Randy Spacek Protection Engineer Manager

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Transcription:

Hands-On-Relay School 2015 Distribution Event Analysis Randy Spacek Protection Engineer Manager

OVERVIEW Available Tools Fault Type Identification: line and transformer Relay Event Record: Oscillography & Digital Elements Sequence of Events Record Element Pick Up and Logic Approach Distribution Event analysis TRIP to Lockout Sequence SAG 742, fuse operation FAST TRIP BLOCK (FTB) Scheme SPT 4S30 SPU Feeder 121 Operation Homework SAG 741 Failure Analysis Homework Transformer Event Analysis 15kV OPEN PHASE Detection SIP 12F1 Transformer Differential ECL 115/13kV Lolo Autotransformer Operation Homework Transmission Event Analysis DGP Breaker A-538 Directional Elements Boulder Breaker Failure

Tools Records One Line Diagram Relay Manual Relay Settings Data SCADA Log Relay SER Relay Event Software Oscillography Phasor

Tools: Records-One Line

Tools: Records-Settings Trip Equation Logic Enables Elements

Tools: Records-Settings Logic Review:

Tools: Data-SCADA LOG Time, Date and sequence of the event

SER 2/2/2010 Tools: Data-Relay SER 50-51T/R/R-9631/20090128 Date: 02/04/10 Time: 15:46:00.764 STJ/24KV BKR/AUTO XFMR FID=SEL-351R-2-R303-V0-Z005005-D20061016 CID=89C9 BCBFID=R107 # DATE TIME ELEMENT STATE status with time stamp 124 02/02/10 17:52:22.886 59C1 Asserted 123 02/02/10 17:52:22.890 51G1 Asserted 122 02/02/10 17:52:22.890 67G1 Asserted 121 02/02/10 17:52:22.890 59A1 Asserted 120 02/02/10 17:52:22.957 67G1T Asserted 119 02/02/10 17:52:22.957 SV5 Asserted SV5 = TRIP *!3PO 118 02/02/10 17:52:22.957 SV1 Asserted SV1 = TRIP * (51P1+51G1+51Q) 117 02/02/10 17:52:22.957 TMB4A Asserted TMB4A = TRIP 116 02/02/10 17:52:22.977 SV2 Asserted SV2 =!PINBD, Trip Coil Monitor 115 02/02/10 17:52:23.023 51G1 Deasserted 114 02/02/10 17:52:23.023 67G1T Deasserted Element Pick Up/Drop Out 113 02/02/10 17:52:23.023 67G1 Deasserted 112 02/02/10 17:52:23.023 SV1 Deasserted 111 02/02/10 17:52:23.032 SV2 Deasserted 110 02/02/10 17:52:23.044 SV5 Deasserted 109 02/02/10 17:52:23.044 52A Deasserted Internal Logic Equations 110 02/02/10 17:52:23.069 3PO Asserted Configured Logic

Tools: Data-Relay Event =>his 50-51F1/R-9200/20131115 Date: 11/12/14 Time: 09:30:27.945 ODN/731/SUNNYSIDE # DATE TIME EVENT LOCAT CURR FREQ GRP SHOT TARGETS 1 11/12/14 06:45:11.978 BCG 13.28 1036 60.02 1 3 2 11/12/14 05:32:37.809 ABC T 5.19 1564 59.96 1 3 51 3 11/12/14 05:32:35.216 CG 4.86 1279 59.99 1 3 4 11/12/14 05:32:23.158 CG T 5.42 1141 59.99 1 2 51 5 11/12/14 05:32:18.894 CG 4.90 1194 59.99 1 2 6 11/12/14 05:32:06.540 CG T 5.67 1467 59.98 1 1 51 7 11/12/14 05:32:05.982 CG T 5.46 1160 59.98 1 0 51 8 11/12/14 05:32:01.947 CG 5.53 1146 59.98 1 0 9 11/11/14 13:13:44.380 CG 9.07 752 60.03 1 0 10 10/25/14 23:10:50.707 CG 9.59 679 59.98 1 0 11 09/12/14 23:49:30.316 ER $$$$$$$ 598 60.02 1 0 12 09/02/14 13:04:26.175 CG 8.33 800 60.01 1 0 13 08/27/14 01:13:18.167 ER $$$$$$$ 617 59.98 1 0 14 08/20/14 15:42:19.450 CG 4.46 1104 60.01 1 0 15 08/14/14 09:57:21.657 CG 9.08 728 60.02 1 0 History: Quick look at number of operations Sequence overview T/R/T/R/T/R/T-LO Phases involved Event of interest

Tools: Software 1. SEL-5601/SEL Event Viewer 2. Wavewin 3. Free - http://www.powerstandards.com/pqteachingtoyindex.php

Fault Type Identification: Fault#1 Waveforms show 1. Increased balanced current in all 3 phases 2. Corresponding all 3 of the phase voltages are depressed

Fault Type Identification: Fault#1 Phasors show 1. Fault current is balanced and 120 degrees apart. 2. Faulted phase voltages depressed and 120 degrees apart. Fault Type? 3PH Fault

Fault Type Identification: Fault#2 Waveforms show 1. Increased current in 2 of the phases (180 out from one another). 2. Two of the phase voltages are depressed (and approximately in phase).

Fault Type Identification: Fault#2 Phasors Show 1. Fault currents 180 degrees out from one another. 2. Faulted phase voltages are depressed and 30 degrees different in phase angle from one another. Fault Type? LL Fault

Fault Type Identification: Fault#3 Waveforms show 1. Increased current in only one phase. 2. Only 1 phase voltage is depressed.

Fault Type Identification: Fault#3 Phasors Show 1. Fault current seen in only one phase. 2. Faulted phase voltage is depressed. Fault Type? 1LG Fault

Fault Type Identification: Delta-Wye XFMR #1 Phasors Show 1.Fault current is balanced and 120 degrees apart Fault Type? 3PH Fault Phase currents and voltages for the 115kV side.

Fault Type Identification: Delta-Wye XFMR #1 A R R a B b C c Current Distribution 3PH Fault 13.8 kv IA = 619-88 IB = 619 152 IC = 619 32 Ia = 5158-118 Ib = 5158 122 Ic = 5158 2 IA = Ia / 8.33 = 5158A / 8.33 IA = 619A

Fault Type Identification: Delta-Wye XFMR #2 Phasors Show 1.Fault current is 1 phase twice the other two and 180 degrees out from one another Fault Type? LL Fault Phase currents and voltages for the 115kV side.

Fault Type Identification: Delta-Wye XFMR #2 A R R a B b C Current Distribution LL Fault 13.8 kv c IA = 309-28 IB = 619 152 IC = 309-28 Ia = 0 0 Ib = 4467 152 Ic = 4467-28 IA & IC = IB 3LG 13.8kV fault = 5158A Ib = Ic= 4467 A, 4467/5158 = 86.6%= 3/2

Fault Type Identification: Delta-Wye XFMR #3 Phasors Show 1.Fault current is 2 phases and 180 degrees out from one another Fault Type? SLG Fault Phase currents and voltages for the 115kV side.

Fault Type Identification: Delta-Wye XFMR #3 A R R a B b C Current Distribution LL Fault 13.8 kv c IA = 370-118 IB = 0 0 IC = 370 62 Ia=3I0=5346-118 Ib = 0 0 Ic = 0 0 IA = 5346/(8.33* 3) = 370 amps. So the high side phase current is the 3 less as compared to the 3Ø fault.

Fault Type Identification: Examples Handout

Relay Event Records Short Form Relay Event 1. Event report type Compressed/ Date&Time Synchronized? 2. Relay Version 3. Event type Fault type, T-Trip, ER/ Location miles/ Shot Counter number of recloses/ Frequency measured 4. Targets front of relay LEDs 5. Currents - in primary

Relay Event Records - Oscillography 1. Analog quantities of interest provide system response to fault 2. Quantities are after full cycle cosine filter and sampled peak value divide by 2 3. Sample rate dependent upon relay type 1. Quantity magnitudes are sampled peak value divide by 2 then RMS value of two samples in a row 2. Provides indication of analog quantity compared to an element pick up

Relay Event Records - Digitals Add elements of interest Based on fault type 51P1 In trip equation 50P1 Reclosing state 79CY Breaker status Electrical - 52A Mechanical - 3PO Logic Trip Inputs IN104 Configured Logic SV1 State: 1 = Bold Line = Asserted 0 = Thin Line = Non Active

Relay Event Record Example 1 Fault Type? 1LG Expected digitals... 51P 51G 51Q 50P 50G Modify Add Ground digitals Add IGmag

Relay Event Record Example 1 Settings 50G2 = 480Apri 51G1 = 480Apri Why does 51G1 assert after 50G1 (since both set at 480Apri)? Take a look at TCCC Graph

Relay Event Record Example 1 SEL time curves implemented to mathematically mimic EM (electromechanical) relays. Equation is: t p TD tp = Operate Time in Seconds TD = Time Dial Setting M = Multiples of Pickup (M>1) 5.67 0.0352 2 M 1 Since the equation is mathematical at what point does the time overcurrent pick up? CO-11 Time Curves 51 elements will pickup at ~130-150% of actual setting due to energy requirement 50 = Peak Value 51 = RMS

Relay Event Record Example 2 Fault Type? 3LG Expected digitals... 51P 50P Modify Add phase digitals Add IAmag, IBmag, & ICmag.

Relay Event Record Example 2 Settings 51P1 = 600Apri

Relay Event Record Example 3 Fault Type? LL Expected digitals... 51P, and also 51Q Modify Add Q digital. Add I2mag

Relay Event Record Example 3 Settings 51Q = 828Apri I2mag = 1360Apri, so 3I2mag = 4080Apri

Relay Event Record Example 4 Fault Types? LL, then 3LG Expected digitals... 51Q 51P Modify Add P & Q digitals Add IPmags & I2mag

Relay Event Record Example 4 Settings 51Q = 828Apri 51P1 = 600Apri IAmag & IBmag = 2350Apri ICmag = 100Apri (Load) I2mag = 1360Apri, so 3I2mag = 4080Apri I2mag = 1360Apri, so 3I2mag = 4080Apri

Approach 1. Identify where you are going 2. What do we need to know 3. Gather electronic information from sources 4. Build a sequence of events or logical order 5. Make a list of questions 6. Use process of elimination and perform analysis 7. Draw conclusion with supporting data Start Events Logs SER Sort Order? conclude Final

Feeder SAG 742 TRIP to Lockout Sequence Sagle (SAG) 742 Direction? Verify Proper Operation What is Correct Sequence? Temporary Fault: T/R 50P/50G Permanent Fault: T/R/T/R/T-LO 50P/50G & 51P/51G

Feeder SAG 742 TRIP to Lockout Sequence SAG 742 50/51F 351S HISTORY DATE TIME TARGETS MILE AMPS HZ GROUP SH 12/13/08 01:44:56.889 AB T 0.72 2441 60.00 1 0 12/13/08 01:44:57.452 CG 8.23 952 60.00 1 1 12/13/08 01:44:58.493 AB 0.72 2852 60.00 1 1 12/13/08 01:45:11.227 BCG 11.94 1231 60.00 1 2 12/13/08 01:45:40.371 AB 0.73 2794 60.01 1 2 12/13/08 01:45:41.041 ABC T 0.70 2804 60.20 1 2 12/13/08 06:09:34.213 BC 16.53 1013 60.00 1 2 TRIP1 by 50P1 RECLOSE1 (0.5 ) TRIP2 by 51P1T RECLOSE2 (12 ) Fault re-established TRIP3 by 51P1T & LO Restored by 201C

Feeder SAG 742 TRIP to Lockout Sequence TRIP1 by 50P1

Feeder SAG 742 TRIP to Lockout Sequence RECLOSE1 (79OI1=0.5 )

Feeder SAG 742 TRIP to Lockout Sequence Evolving Fault, from SER 1 after reclose TRIP2 by 51P1T occurred at end of event

Feeder SAG 742 TRIP to Lockout Sequence RECLOSE2 (79OI2=12 )

Feeder SAG 742 TRIP to Lockout Sequence Evolving Fault 2, from SER 30 after Reclose 2

Feeder SAG 742 TRIP to Lockout Sequence TRIP3 by 51P1T to LO,~0.7 after fault initiate

Feeder SAG 742 TRIP to Lockout Sequence CAUSE? 1. Line patrolled and nothing found. 2. Closed line in and it held. 3. Suspect new substation s higher fault duties with long spans and narrow spacing (5ft x-arms) between phase conductors is causing Blowout and or Slapping after initial fault. 4. A project was initiated to install 9ft x-arms and increase spacing to 1.0 miles out of the the station.

Fast Trip Block Sandpoint Feeder 4S30

Fast Trip Block Sandpoint Feeder 4S30 Station Layout

Fast Trip Block Sandpoint Feeder 4S30 FAST TRIP BLOCKING 50/51F 4S21 351S OUT104 50/51F 4S23 351S OUT104 50/51F 4S30 351S OUT104 94 BT-1 AR

Fast Trip Block Sandpoint Feeder 4S30? 50/51F - TRIP

Fast Trip Block Sandpoint Feeder 4S30 50/51BT

Fast Trip Block Sandpoint Feeder 4S30? 50/51BT

Fast Trip Block Sandpoint Feeder 4S30 50/51F - Reclose

SPU Feeder 121 Operation Homework Handout

SAG 741 Failure Analysis Homework Handout

High-Side OPEN Phase Protection A a B 0.5 PU 1.0 PU 0.5 PU b D YG Transformers C c SEL Application Guide AG97-11

High-Side OPEN Phase Protection Spokane Industrial Park 115/13.8kV 70 / 63.5 = 110% Vdiff =63.5:1 PTR

High-Side OPEN Phase Protection Calculations: VAB sec = 113.8 0-113.8-120 = 197 30 VBC sec = 113.8-120 -125.5 120 = 207-88 VCA sec = 125.5 120-113.8 0 = 207 148 Vnom = 197 or 208 27PP = 0.4*Vnom = 78.8 or 83.2 59PP = 0.72*Vnom = 141.9 or149.7 Will the setting levels work?

High-Side OPEN Phase Protection

High-Side OPEN Phase Protection SIP 12F1@1.0 cycles

High-Side OPEN Phase Protection SIP 12F1@10.0 cycles

Transformer Differential - ECL 87T/587 2000/5A MR CONN 2000-5

Transformer Differential - ECL 87T/587 87T relay issued TRIP by 87R (restrained differential). Why? MTU1 =50P1H + 51P1T + 50Q1T + 51Q1T + 50N1H + 51N1T + 51P2T + 51Q2T + 51N2T + 87U + 87R OUT1 =TRP1 OUT2 =TRP1 Let s look at Differential Characteristic Graph.

Transformer Differential - ECL 87T/587 1. Show IAW1 & IAW2 on Differential Characteristic Graph. 2. Plot shows we re operating in Restraint region. So, what s going on? Let s look at Phasors

Transformer Differential - ECL 87T/587 1. IAW1 = 0 degrees. 2. IAW2 = 332 degrees. 3. Confirms HLL connection. But, what s wrong with this picture? Phasors show that polarity is backwards on the 587 s Winding 2 inputs thus creating a differential for through-flow current. Let s plot on Differential Characteristic Graph with backwards polarity.

Transformer Differential - ECL 87T/587 1. Show IAW1 & IAW2 on Differential Characteristic Graph, but with Winding 2 as negative (since polarity is backwards). 2. Plot now shows we re crossing just into the Operate region. So, what do phasors show when polarity is wired correctly?

Transformer Differential - ECL 87T/587 Phasors shown after having polarity inputs corrected. 1. IAW1 = 0 degrees. 2. IAW2 = 153 degrees. 3. Confirms HLL connection. W1 & W2 currents now cancel each other, taking into account 30 degree phase shift of D-YG transformer.

Lolo Autotransformer Operation Handout

DGP A-538 Directional Element At my Desk in the morning Identify where you are going

DGP A-538 Directional Element What do we need to know?

DGP A-538 Directional Element Protection System Scheme SEL-121G Settings

DGP A-538 Directional Element DGP SEL-121G Event Fault Type?

DGP A-538 Directional Element LF SEL-121G Event Fault Type?

DGP A-538 Directional Element DGP SEL-2100 (85) SER LF SEL-2100 (85) SER =>SER 50 85/R-11299/20140807 Date: 10/29/2014 Time: 07:23:55.255 DGP/A-538/POTT FID=SEL-2100-R105-V0-Z003003-D20080527 CID=70B3 # DATE TIME ELEMENT STATE 42 10/28/2014 22:37:31.149 R1P1 Asserted 41 10/28/2014 22:37:31.149 SV3 Asserted 40 10/28/2014 22:37:31.149 OUT101 Asserted 39 10/28/2014 22:37:31.185 SV3T Asserted 38 10/28/2014 22:37:31.189 SV6T Asserted 37 10/28/2014 22:37:31.189 SV6 Asserted 36 10/28/2014 22:37:31.189 T1P1 Asserted 35 10/28/2014 22:37:31.193 SV6 Deasserted 34 10/28/2014 22:37:31.241 R2P1 Asserted 33 10/28/2014 22:37:31.241 OUT102 Asserted 32 10/28/2014 22:37:31.261 IN103 Asserted 31 10/28/2014 22:37:31.261 SV6T Deasserted 30 10/28/2014 22:37:31.261 T1P1 Deasserted =>SER 10/29 85/R-11298/20140814 Date: 10/29/2014 Time: 18:58:27.876 LF/A-495/POTT FID=SEL-2100-R105-V0-Z003003-D20080527 CID=70B3 # DATE TIME ELEMENT STATE 44 10/29/2014 06:37:31.133 IN101 Asserted 43 10/29/2014 06:37:31.133 SV2T Asserted 42 10/29/2014 06:37:31.133 SV2 Asserted 41 10/29/2014 06:37:31.133 T1P1 Asserted 40 10/29/2014 06:37:31.201 R1P1 Asserted 39 10/29/2014 06:37:31.201 OUT101 Asserted 38 10/29/2014 06:37:31.221 IN103 Asserted 37 10/29/2014 06:37:31.221 T2P1 Asserted 36 10/29/2014 06:37:31.245 IN101 Deasserted 35 10/29/2014 06:37:31.245 SV2 Deasserted 34 10/29/2014 06:37:31.245 T1P1 Deasserted 33 10/29/2014 06:37:31.277 R2P1 Asserted 32 10/29/2014 06:37:31.277 OUT102 Asserted 31 10/29/2014 06:37:31.281 IN104 Asserted 30 10/29/2014 06:37:31.281 SV4 Asserted

DGP A-538 Directional Element

DGP A-538 Directional Element Build a sequence! Ask Questions Time Device Event Action Comment 31.0492 Fault Inception 31.116 LF SEL-121G 67N2 Pickup LF Sees Fault 31.116 LF SEL-121G OUT A1 Assert Relay PT Send 31.113 LF SEL-2100 IN101 Assert PT input SV2T Assert Block Echo Key T1P1 Assert Xmit Key 31.149 DGP SEL-2100 R1P1 Assert RCV Key SV3 Assert Initiate Echo Key OUT101 Assert Key to Relay 31.133 DGP SEL-121G IN PT Assert PTR 31.189 DGP SEL-2100 SV6T Assert Echo Key T1P1 Assert Xmit Key 31.201 LF SEL-2100 R1P1 Assert Rcv Key OUT101 Assert Key to Relay 31.269 LF SEL-121G INPT Assert PTR OUTA3 Assert Relay DT Send OUTTP Assert Trip Breaker 31.221 LF SEL-2100 IN103 Assert DT Input T2P1 Assert Xmit DT 31.241 DGP SEL-2100 R2P1 Assert Rcv DT OUT102 Assert DT to Relay 31.292 DGP SEL-121G IN DT Assert DTR OUT TP Assert Trip Breaker

DGP A-538 Directional Element DGP A-538 SEL-121G Reverse Element? Perform an analysis: 1. IB is ~ 180 from VB - Reverse 2. 67N3 = 100 A from Event IR = 120 A Polarizing? 1. 32QE Enabled 2. Sensitivity at maximum torque angle (V2)(I2) > (0.29)(51NP) 3.4kV*0.8 > 0.29*180 2560 > 52.2 3. T = V2 * I2 *[COS( -V2 ( I2+MTA))] T = 3.4*0.8*(COS( -123 ( 52+75) T = 2560*COS -250 T = 2560*(-.337) T = -862 Negative Torque! Negative sequence flow towards LF

Boulder Breaker Failure North Bus 550 450 144 MCOV South Bus Auto 1 Auto 2 Benewah Boulder 230 kv Bus Arrangement

Boulder Breaker Failure North 87- BN2 87- BN1 550 CT Protection Systems: 87L 21 POTT VT 87- BS1 450 87- BS2 South

Boulder Breaker Failure System Log

Boulder Breaker Failure 207 08/09/2013 22:44:19.634 INST+SEQOC ASSERTED 206 08/09/2013 22:44:19.634 BK1GROUNDBFOC ASSERTED 205 08/09/2013 22:44:19.636 ZONE2PHASE ASSERTED 204 08/09/2013 22:44:19.636 ZONE1PHASE ASSERTED 3-PH Fault 198 08/09/2013 22:44:19.636 THREEPOLETRIP ASSERTED 197 08/09/2013 22:44:19.636 PERMTRIPSEND ASSERTED 196 08/09/2013 22:44:19.636 3POLEBFINITIATE ASSERTED 195 08/09/2013 22:44:19.636 BK1RETRIP ASSERTED 192 08/09/2013 22:44:19.636 OUT101BK1TC#1 ASSERTED 191 08/09/2013 22:44:19.636 OUT102BK1TC#2 ASSERTED 190 08/09/2013 22:44:19.636 OUT205BK2TC#1 ASSERTED 189 08/09/2013 22:44:19.636 OUT206BK2TC#2 ASSERTED 101 08/09/2013 22:44:19.698 BK1OPEN ASSERTED 100 08/09/2013 22:44:19.698 BK2OPEN ASSERTED 94 08/09/2013 22:44:19.705 BK2GROUNDBFOC ASSERTED 93 08/09/2013 22:44:19.707 INST+SEQOC ASSERTED 92 08/09/2013 22:44:19.707 BK2RETRIP ASSERTED 91 08/09/2013 22:44:19.709 PHASEINSTOC2 ASSERTED 90 08/09/2013 22:44:19.709 PHASEINSTOC1 ASSERTED 89 08/09/2013 22:44:19.709 BK2PHASECBFOC ASSERTED 88 08/09/2013 22:44:19.715 FORWARDNEGSEQ ASSERTED 87 08/09/2013 22:44:19.715 FORWARDDIRGROUND ASSERTED 86 08/09/2013 22:44:19.715 PHASEDIRINSTOC2 ASSERTED 85 08/09/2013 22:44:19.715 PHASEDIRINSTOC1 ASSERTED 84 08/09/2013 22:44:19.715 GROUNDINSTOC2 ASSERTED 83 08/09/2013 22:44:19.715 GROUNDINSTOC1 ASSERTED 82 08/09/2013 22:44:19.715 PERMTRIPSEND ASSERTED 81 08/09/2013 22:44:19.715 TMB1ASENDPERMTRIP ASSERTED 64 08/09/2013 22:44:19.823 BK2BKRFLRTRIPTO86 ASSERTED 63 08/09/2013 22:44:19.823 OUT20786B1BUS2 ASSERTED 62 08/09/2013 22:44:19.823 OUT20886B2BUS2 ASSERTED Trip Bkr1 and 2 Bkr1 and 2 Open C-G Fault Flashover Bkr2 Failure Operation

Boulder Breaker Failure 0.5 10,020 A 11,600 A

Boulder Breaker Failure Time Event Comment 23:44:19.634 3Ø Fault Fault inception 23:44:19.636 Boulder R-450:R-550 Trip Relay initiates trip by M1P 23:44:19.650 Benewah R-468:R-568 Trip Relay initiates trip by POTT 23:44:19.698 Boulder R-450:R-550 Open 3 Cycle operate 23:44:19.700 Benewah R-468:R-568 Open 3 Cycle operate 23:44:19.764 Boulder R-554, R-548, R-552 Boulder North bus clears Open 23:44:19.705 CG Fault Relay Attempts Trip Bkr2 23:44:19.819 86BS1:86BS2 lockout Trip Breaker Failure Trip 23:44:19.886 Boulder R-545, R-456, R-452 Open Boulder South bus clears

Boulder Breaker Failure Initial Fault 3Ø 10020 A 3.5 Cycles 2.32 mi. R-450:R-550 Open Flashover Fault @ 0.5 Cycles CG 11600A 10.5 Cycles Relay Targets R-450 BF 86BS1 86BS2 87-BN1 86BN1

Boulder Breaker Failure North 87- BN2 87- BN1 550 CT Overlapping zones indicate problem within R-550 87L 21 POTT VT 87- BS1 450 87- BS2 South

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