C2 Theory Overview, Recent Developments, and Way Forward

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C2 Theory Overview, Recent Developments, and Way Forward 21 st ICCRTS / 2016 KSCO London, U.K. Dr. David S. Alberts Institute for Defense Analyses 7 September 2016

Agenda What is C2 Theory? Evolution of Theory 1995 to 2016 Battlefield of 2050 and the Implications for C2 Frontiers of C2 Research 2

What is C2 Theory? C2 Theory focuses on answering a set of strategic-level questions in the context of military and civil-military missions and the environments in which these missions take place, including: How do C2 concepts, approaches, and capabilities need to evolve to meet the challenges posed by complex enterprises undertaking complex missions (Complex Endeavors)? What will S&T trends and the capabilities they enable affect the battlefields of the future and our ability to exercise C2? How can we more effectively and efficiently accomplish the functions associated with C2? What is the C2 value chain and how can it be observed and measured? 3

C2 Theory C2 Theory builds upon, applies, and integrates theories and evidence from disparate disciplines organizational design network science perception military history communication management sensemaking team building autonomy robotics cybersecurity collaboration leadership decision making agility sociology control theory culture knowledge management psychology Information science game theory simulation risk management and many more complex systems 4

Three Perspectives on C2 Commander (an individual) - Intent - Roles - Relationships - Information flows - ROE - Resources Command Approach Sensemaking Individual Characteristics & Behaviours Team Characteristics Individual Awareness, Understanding, & Knowledge Shared Awareness, Understanding, & Knowledge individual Decision making collective Quality of Decisions Actions Control Approach Quality of Information Information Collection & Dissemination Direct Effects Consequences State (t), State (t+ Δt) 5

Three Perspectives on C2 Team Organization - Collective - Intent - Roles - Relationships - Information flows - ROE - Resources Command Approach Sensemaking Individual Characteristics & Behaviours Team Characteristics Individual Awareness, Understanding, & Knowledge Shared Awareness, Understanding, & Knowledge individual Decision making collective Quality of Decisions Actions Control Approach Quality of Information Information Collection & Dissemination Direct Effects Consequences State (t), State (t+ Δt) 6

Three Perspectives on C2 Approach to Command and Control - Creates the conditions that shape how C2 functions are carried out on the battlefield and determine C2 effectiveness - Intent - Roles - Relationships - Information flows - ROE - Resources Command Approach Sensemaking Individual Characteristics & Behaviours Team Characteristics Individual Awareness, Understanding, & Knowledge Shared Awareness, Understanding, & Knowledge individual Decision making collective Quality of Decisions Actions Control Approach Quality of Information Information Collection & Dissemination Direct Effects Consequences State (t), State (t+ Δt) 7

Evolution of C2 Theory 1995-2016 Circa 1995 Cooperative Engagement Network Centric Warfare (now NEC) and Maturity Model C2 Approach Space C2 Agility C2 of Composite Networks 8

Shifting Focus and Emphasis from C2 to C3 to C3I to C4ISR and Back to C2 Human Aspects of C2 C2 Technologies 9

CCRP 1995-6 What is Information War? Unintended Consequences of Information Age Technologies Command Arrangements for Peace Operations Defensive Information Warfare Operations Other Than War Dominant Battlespace Knowledge 10

Cooperative Engagement Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) a real-time sensor netting system that enables high quality situational awareness and integrated fire control capability Broke the sensor to shooter stovepipe Developed a shared (common) operating picture Improved targeting precision by sensor data fusion Extended the engagement envelopes of weapons focus on improvements to a set of kill chains 11

Origins of Network Centric Warfare? NCW is an approach to operations that embraces Information Age concepts and is enabled by Information Age technologies What would we change if we had total situation awareness? Primordial Soup of NCW 12

What is Network Centric Warfare? NCW = an Information Age Transformation A new way of thinking about - how we accomplish our missions - how we organize and interrelate to one another - how we acquire and field the systems that support us NCW is not all about technology or a collection of systems; rather NCW is enabled by an increasingly capable infostructure NCW can be successfully practiced at various levels of maturity under difference circumstances 13

Tenets A robustly networked force improves Information Sharing Information Sharing and Collaboration enhances Quality of Information and Shared Situational Awareness Shared situational awareness enables Collaboration and Self-synchronization These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness. 14

Evolution of Terminology NCW NCO The W in NCW was deliberate - to emphasize the point that NCW was not about information technology and communications networks but rather about warfare The change to Network Centric Operations (NCO) was intended to counter the view that network centric concepts and capabilities were only applicable to highend combat rather than to the full mission spectrum including non kinetic missions 15

NCW (published 1999) This publication will assist the joint warfighting community in taking the necessary steps to pursue the change associated with the ongoing revolution in military affairs. The emerging evidence for network centric warfare as the intellectual basis for Joint Vision 2010. CJCS 16

Evolution of Terminology (network centric v. network enabled) The term network centric was chosen as a direct contrast to the then existing platform centric mindset The network centric proposition was that, for a given investment, one could generate more value by networking the force than by adding platforms Thus, it was networking (of entities) that is central to military operations, not individual platforms Many misunderstood the term network centric and focused on the technology as an end unto itself The adoption of the term network enabled was an attempt to make sure that the emphasis remained on the operations that were enabled, not on the technical networks 17

Conditions for Self Synchronization Common Perceptual Filters High Quality Information High Quality Situation Awareness High Quality Shared Situation Awareness Information Availability Collaborative C2 Processes Congruent Command Intent Effective Self-Synchronization Shared Knowledge & Experience Competence Trust Informational Organizational Military Education Training Exercises Operations Empowering Leadership 18

Network-Enabled Value Chain involves multiple domains Information Domain Cognitive Domain Physical Domain Robustly Networked Force Quality of Information Information Sharing Shared Situational Awareness Self- Synchronization Mission Effectiveness Collaboration Social Domain 19

Co evolution Information Domain Cognitive Domain Physical Domain Robustly Networked Force Quality of Information Information Sharing Shared Situational Awareness Self- Synchronization Mission Effectiveness Collaboration New & Co-evolved concepts of operations organization (roles, relationships) processes Alberts NEC2 Short 2016 Course ICCRTS Module 2 Network-Enabled Capability 20

The Magic of NEC Information Domain Cognitive Domain Physical Domain Robustly Networked Force Quality of Information Information Sharing Shared Situational Awareness Self- Synchronization Mission Effectiveness Collaboration This is where the magic of NEC happens 21

The Magic of NEC Information Domain Cognitive Domain Physical Domain Robustly Networked Force Quality of Information Information Sharing Shared Situational Awareness Self- Synchronization Mission Effectiveness The magic is new network-enabled approaches to C2 Collaboration This is where the magic of NEC happens 22

Network Enabled C 2 (NEC 2 ) Information flows must be freed from the chain of command Patterns of Interaction must be less constrained Roles and responsibilities need to change appropriately One Size Does Not Fit All 23

Network Enabled C 2 (NEC 2 ) Information flows must be freed from the chain of command Patterns of Interaction must be less constrained Roles and responsibilities need to change appropriately One Size Does Not Fit All We needed a new construct to help us think about C2 Approaches that helps us to compare and contrast their differences. 24

C2 Approach Space There are a great many possible approaches to accomplishing the functions that we associate with Command and Control. Developing the option space for Command and Control requires that major differences between possible approaches are identified. These differences are reflected in the dimensions of the C2 Approach Space (options available) Allocation of Decision Rights (ADR) Patterns of Interaction (PoI) Distribution of Information(DoI) A region in the C2 approach Space represents a specific approach to C2 PoI DoI C2 Approach Space 25 ADR

NCW Migration and the C 2 Approach Space Situational Awareness Command and Control Approach Traditional Collaboration Self-synch Distribution of Information Shared Awareness Information Sharing Organic sources 1 2 0 3 4 Patterns of Interaction Allocation of Decision rights Traditional Military C 2 26

Necessary C 2 related Changes Access to information to ensure that those who need it can get it Authority and processes that are consistent with who knows what and when they know it Doctrine and tactics to exploit information advantage Systems requirements to provide needed capabilities Policies to enable and encourage wide spread sharing of information and collaboration 27

C2 Agility There are many ways to accomplish the functions associated with Command and Control No one approach to accomplishing the functions associated with command and control fits all missions or situations whether for a single entity or a collection of independent entities (a collective) The most appropriate approach will be a function of the endeavor and the prevailing circumstances Therefore, Entities (and Collectives) will need to be able to employ more than one approach C2 Agility is the ability to appropriately move around in the C2 Approach Space in response to changing missions and circumstances Agile C2 systems and processes are required for C2 Agility and to make specific approaches to C2 more agile 28

C2 Agility Approach Space Endeavor Space This is a most appropriate C2 Approach for this particular set of circumstances 29

C2 Agility When circumstances change, a different approach might be more appropriate Approach Space Endeavor Space C2 Agility involves recognizing the significant of a change in circumstances, understanding the most appropriate C2 Approach for the circumstance and being able to transition to this approach. 30

Measuring C2 Agility The degree of agility possessed by an entity is a function of its ability to successful operate over an appropriate set of circumstances (Endeavor Space) A scalar measure of agility is defined as the area of the region in the Endeavor Space where an entity can successfully operate Endeavor Space Agility = Area of Area of 31

C2 Agility C2 Agility = f (C2 Approach Agility, C2 Maneuver Agility) Endeavor Space C2 Approach Agility is the area of the region in the Endeavor Space where an entity can operate successfully by employing a given approach to C2 C2 Agility C2 Maneuver Agility is the ability to recognize the C2 approach appropriate for the circumstances and transition to this approach in a timely manner. It is a function of the set of C2 Approaches available to the entity. Set of Available C2 Approaches 32

C2 Agility Hypotheses H1: Each C2 Approach is located in a distinct region of the C2 Approach Space H2: No one approach is always the most appropriate 33

C2 Agility Hypotheses H3: More network-enabled approaches are more appropriate for Complex Endeavors; while less network-enabled approaches are more appropriate for less complex missions/circumstances 34

C2 Agility Hypotheses H4: More network-enabled approaches are more agile (have greater C2 Approach Agility) 35

C2 Agility Hypotheses H5: The dimensions of the C2 approach Space are positively correlated with agility Agility Distance from Origin 36

C2 Agility Hypotheses H6: More network-enabled approaches are better able to maintain their intended positions in the C2 Approach Space H7: On-diagonal (balanced) approaches are more agile H8: Increasing C2 Maneuver Agility increases agility H9: More mature C2 capability is more agile than the C2 Approach Agility of the most network-enabled approach available H10: Self monitoring is required for C2 Maneuver Agility H11: The six enablers of agility are collectively exhaustive and thus all instances of observed agility can be traced to one or more of these enablers H12: Each of these enablers is positively correlated with agility 37

The Endeavor Spaces were populated by combining all possible values of multiple variables, each one corresponding to an aspect of the situation Creating an Endeavour Space Heat maps show the progressive degree of challenge of the Endeavour Spaces Darker shades of orange represent most challenging circumstances Values were normalized across the experiments Baseline 38

Comparative Agility Map Organization Approach Options Endeavor Space with varying conditions of signal to noise and with varying requirements for shared situation awareness and response time Edge Collaborative Coordinated De-conflicted Source: Alberts, D.S. The Agility Imperative, 2010 Part V: Agility Experiments 39

C2 Agility Elevator Speech NATO SAS-104 C2 Agility dynamically adjusts who and how decisions are made, how we work together and how information is shared. Agility is required because the world is dynamic, conditions and circumstances change, missions maybe unfamiliar, and what is currently working may not work well or continue to work well. C2 Agility Theory informs and helps institutionalize best practices. 40

Agenda What is C2 Theory? Evolution of Theory 1995 to 2016 Battle Field of 2050 and Implications for C2 Implications for C2 Research 41

Battlefield of 2050 Army Research Office (ARO) and Army Research Laboratory (ARL) Workshop Fewer human warriors, but with superhuman capabilities, both cognitively and physically enhanced Ubiquitous intelligent systems with varying degrees of autonomy Networked by the Military Internet of Things (IoT) Battle for the information domain cover, concealment, and cloaking v persistent surveillance deception and misinformation v. big data analysis Battle for cyberspace dominance The entity that can effectively command and control this heterogeneous collection of battlefield assets and capabilities will have a decisive advantage 42

Battlefield of 2050 Army Research Office (ARO) and Army Research Laboratory (ARL) Workshop Fewer human warriors, but with superhuman capabilities, both cognitively and physically enhanced Ubiquitous intelligent systems means with varying degrees of autonomy increased span of control of intelligent robots and agents Networked by the Military Internet of Things (IoT) Battle for the information domain cover, concealment, and cloaking v persistent surveillance deception and misinformation v. big data analysis Battle for cyberspace dominance The entity that can effectively command and control this heterogeneous collection of battlefield assets and capabilities will have a decisive advantage 43

Battlefield of 2050 Army Research Office (ARO) and Army Research Laboratory (ARL) Workshop Fewer human warriors, but with superhuman capabilities, both cognitively and physically enhanced Ubiquitous intelligent systems with varying degrees of autonomy Networked by the Military means Internet of Things (IoT) Battle for the information domain the Allocation of Decision Rights to deception large and misinformation numbers of v. robots big data and analysis agents Battle for cyberspace dominance cover, concealment, and cloaking v persistent surveillance The entity that can effectively command and control this heterogeneous collection of battlefield assets and capabilities will have a decisive advantage 44

Battlefield of 2050 Army Research Office (ARO) and Army Research Laboratory (ARL) Workshop Fewer human warriors, but with superhuman capabilities, both cognitively and physically enhanced Ubiquitous intelligent systems with varying degrees of autonomy Networked by the Military Internet of Things (IoT) Battle for the information domain means cover, concealment, and cloaking v persistent surveillance more dependence on a composite network deception and misinformation v. big data analysis Battle for cyberspace dominance The entity that can effectively command and control this heterogeneous collection of battlefield assets and capabilities will have a decisive advantage 45

Battlefield of 2050 Army Research Office (ARO) and Army Research Laboratory (ARL) Workshop means Fewer a target human rich warriors, environment but with that superhuman requires prioritization capabilities, both cognitively and physically & enhanced Ubiquitous standoff intelligent capabilities systems to with avoid varying targeting degrees of autonomy or Networked fleeting by the targets Military and Internet increased of Things surprise (IoT) Battle for the information domain cover, concealment, and cloaking v persistent surveillance deception and misinformation v. big data analysis Battle for cyberspace dominance The entity that can effectively command and control this heterogeneous collection of battlefield assets and capabilities will have a decisive advantage 46

Battlefield of 2050 Army Research Office (ARO) and Army Research Laboratory (ARL) Workshop Fewer human warriors, but with superhuman capabilities, both cognitively and physically means enhanced Ubiquitous persistent intelligent attacks systems that will with require varying effective degrees of autonomy cybersecurity defenses and adaptive networks Networked by the Military to minimize Internet of Things (IoT) Battle degraded for the network information connectivity, domain network performance and data quality cover, concealment, and cloaking v persistent surveillance deception and misinformation v. big data analysis Battle for cyberspace dominance The entity that can effectively command and control this heterogeneous collection of battlefield assets and capabilities will have a decisive advantage 47

C2 Battlefield 2050 Challenge Command and Control of a heterogeneous collection of networked battlefield assets with varying degrees of intelligence, experience, autonomy, and agility in a dynamic, unpredictable, and contested environment. 48

Battlefield 2050 Composite Network A Composite Network is a heterogeneous collection of intelligent interdependent networks Social networks consisting of humans, robots and agents that can be influenced / controlled Information networks that respond to or generate requests for information and disseminate information Communication networks that provide connectivity, routing and related services for both the social and information networks Social, Information, and Communication Networks can include agents that make them self-aware with the ability to sense the state of the network and modify its behaviors accordingly 49

Composite Network Model Overview Design Behaviors Performance Value C2/ Social Network Design Capabilities network performance map Information Network Design Capabilities network performance map Endeavor Space Communication Network Design Capabilities network performance map Probability of Success given mission/circumstances 50 Enterprise Agility

Integrated Design and C2 Integrated Design C2 / Social Information Design / Capabilities Space C 2 Approach Process QoC2 Performance Map QoC 2 Communications Design / Capabilities Space Characteristics Capabilities QoI Performance Map QoI Design / Capabilities Space Characteristics Capabilities QoC Performance Map QoC Probability of Mission Success given location in ES Enterprise Agility 51

C2 Approaches for Composite Networks Social / Cognitive Network Commanders can maneuver in the C2 Approach Space within organizational design constraints Information and Communications Networks Commanders can tune a set of the specific network design parameters values within network design constraints Effective C2 of Composite Networks requires a holistic approach 52

Frontiers of C2 Agility Research Composite Networks Integrated Design, Cyber Security, Automation and autonomy Monitoring and agile behaviors Integrated C2 C2 Agility Measurement Visualization for commanders Endeavor Space Coalition / Collective C2 Harmonizing entity C2 Approaches with the Collective 53

Thoughts? Questions? 54

Backup Slides 55

Traditional Military C 2 Assumptions Someone is recognized as in charge A single chain of command exists Patterns of interaction are defined by doctrine Information distribution follows the chain of command 56

NCW and C 2 NCO Is NCW an existential threat to traditional C 2? NEC 57

Approaches in the C2 Approach Space H1: Each of the NATO C2 Maturity Model approaches is located in a distinct region of the C2 Approach Space Theoretical Locations Observed Locations (IMAGE) 58

C2 Approach Locations Meta Analysis Conceptual Model Experimental Results Combined results show that C2 approaches are located in distinct regions of the C2 Approach Space 59

No One Size Fits All H2: No one approach to C2 is always the most appropriate H3: More network-enabled approaches to C2 are more appropriate for more challenging circumstances; however, less network-enabled C2 approaches to C2 are more appropriate for some circumstances ELICIT-IDA IMAGE ELICIT-TRUST WISE PANOPEA Conflicted De-Conflicted Coordinated Collaborative Edge 60

ELICIT-TRUST ELICIT-IDA More Network-Enabled = More Agility H4: More network-enabled approaches to C2 are more agile Same circumstance tested un different C2 Approaches Darker shades of teal correspond to higher levels of mission success (1), lighter ones to failure (0) Blank squares represent nonsimulated cases 61

PANOPEA WISE IMAGE More Network-Enabled = More Agility De-Conflicted was successful in 27 out of 54 circumstances Agility Score (IMAGE, De-Conflicted) = 27/54 = 0.50 Darker shades of teal correspond to higher levels of mission success (1.0), lighter ones to failure (0.0) Blank squares represent nonsimulated cases 62

Agility Score More Network-Enabled = More Agility Results suggest that Agility accelerates as C2 approaches become more networkenabled The relation between C2 Approach and Agility Score is quadratic (R 2 = 0.99) 0.8 0.6 R² = 0.9937 0.4 0.2 0 63

C2 Approach Space Agility H5: The dimensions of the C2 Approach Space are positively correlated with agility R 2 PoI = 0.858 R 2 ADR = 0.965 R 2 DoI = 0.983 Individually: Agility Score is strongly correlated to each dimension of the C2 Approach Space Collectively (multiple regression): Conflicted De-Conflicted Coordinated Collaborative Edge Agility Score = 0.030 + 0.460 x Allocation of decision rights 0.269 x Patterns of interaction + 0.274 x Distribution of information 64

Location Variations in C2 Approach Space H6: More network-enabled C2 approaches are better able to maintain their position in the C2 Approach Space Only patterns of interaction and distribution of information were affected by circumstances ELICIT-IDA The deviation was measured by the spreading, calculated from the area occupied by all circumstances Conflicted De-Conflicted Coordinated Collaborative Edge 65

Location Variations in C2 Approach Space H6: More network-enabled C2 approaches are better able to maintain their position in the C2 Approach Space ELICIT-IDA ELICIT-TRUST abelicit IMAGE WISE PANOPEA Conflicted De-Conflicted Coordinated Collaborative Edge Baseline Degraded Condition Success Failure 66

On vs. Off Diagonal H7: On-diagonal (balanced) approaches to C2 are more agile C2 Approach On-Diagonal Group Off-Diagonal Group Average % Maximum Effectiveness 82% 36% Average Distance from Diagonal 0.02 0.09 67

C2 Maturity C2 Agility H9: More mature C2 capability is more agile than the most agile C2 Approach that can be adopted Region of the Endeavor Space where a collective is successful Adapted from the Alberts, D.S. (2011). Agility Advantage, CCRP Conflicted De-Conflicted Coordinated Collaborative Edge 68

Agility Score C2 Maturity C2 Agility H9: More mature C2 capability is more agile than the most agile C2 Approach that can be adopted 0.8 0.6 C2 Maturity Level 0.4 0.2 0 69

Agility Score C2 Maturity C2 Agility Experimental results suggest more an imbricated model than a complementary one 0.8 0.6 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 C2 Approach C2 Maturity Level 0.4 0.2 0 70