11th IAEA TM 2017 GREIFSWALD Instrumentation and Control for the Neutral Beam Test Facility A.Luchetta 1, G.Manduchi 1, C.Taliercio 1, A.Rigoni 1, N.Pomaro 1, S.Dal Bello 1, M.Battistella 1, L.Grando 1, F.Paolucci 2, C.Labate 2, and RFX control team 1 Consorzio RFX, Padova, Italy 2 Fusion for Energy, Barcelona, Spain Outline: Introduction ITER heating neutral beam (HNB) Neutral beam test facility (NBTF) NBTF instrumentation and control SPIDER control SPIDER interlock SPIDER safety SPIDER to MITICA I&C toward HNB I&C Conclusions The work leading to this presentation has been funded partially by Fusion for Energy under the contract F4E-OFC-280. RFX control team
Introduction To achieve plasma high-confinement regime, ITER will be equipped with: Two heating neutral beam injectors (2 x 16.5 MW) Two ion cyclotron resonant antennae (2 x 10 MW, 40-55 MHz) One electron cyclotron heating system (24 gyrotrons x 1 MW, 170m MHz) Heating Neutral Beam Injectors (HNB) Table 1. ITER HNB requirements. Requirement Value Unit Ion species (negative) H- D- --- Acceleration voltage 1000 kv Ion beam current (H- D-) 45 50 A Beam power 16.5 MW Beam-on time 3600 s Beamlet divergence mrad Co-extracted electron fraction e-/h- e-/d- < 0.5 1 --- Fig. 1. CAD view of the ITER HNB. 2
ITER neutral beam injectors Fig. 2 shows the working principle of the ITER HNB. in high-energy beam injectors Table 1 - ITER HNB requirements. Fig. 2. ITER HNB working principle. High-energy neutral beam injectors use negative ions (H-/D-) H-/D- neutralization efficiency high (~60%) up to over 1 MeV energy H+/D+ neutralization efficiency drops dramatically above 100 kev energy Caesium diffusion for negative ion production 3
Neutral beam test facility ITER HNB requirements have never been met simultaneously ITER R&D program to develop and test up to nominal values the ITER HNB. R&D program is known as the Neutral Beam Test Facility F4E, JA-DA and IN-DA ITER domestic agencies are procuring in-kind the NBTF components. The NBTF is under construction in Padova, Italy at the Consorzio RFX premises. Fig. 3 shows the NBTF buildings that were newly constructed ad-hoc (Italy contribution). Fig. 3. Aerial view of NBTF buildings (completed in 2015). 4
Neutral beam test facility Two experiments are located in the NBTF Fig. 4. CAD view of NBTF buildings showing inner rooms and component allocation. 5
SPIDER injector - status Beam dump Beam source components Table 2. SPIDER requirements. Vacuum vessel High resolution calorimeter Fig. 5. SPIDER injector components. Requirements Unit H D Beam energy kev 100 100 Beam-on time s 3600 3600 Extracted Current density A/m 2 6
SPIDER power supply - staus Fig. 6. SPIDER power supply components. 7
MITICA injector Fig. 7. CAD view of MITICA injector. 8
MITICA - 1 MV power supply - status Fig. 8. MITICA power supply components. 9
NBTF Instrumentation and control SPIDER and MITICA are independent experiments and, thus, have independent instrumentation and control (I&C) systems. SPIDER and MITICA I&C require both: Central functions: Supervisory control, configuration control, scheduling, time generation, data storage, data access, communication Plant system functions: slow process control, continuous monitoring, fast control, data acquisition, communication SPIDER is no ITER plant system: PCDH is not mandatory Voluntary partial compliance (EPICS, slow control, HMI, Interlock, Safety) Non compliance: fast control (MARTe), data management (MDSplus), time communication (INCAA DIO4 modules) MITICA is a prototype of ITER HNB: HNB plant system should comply with PCDH Transition from non-compliant SPIDER I&C to compliant MITICA I&C ITER HNB: shall comply with PCDH v? (depends on procurement arrangements) 10
3-tier, 2-layer architecture? SPIDER I&C Table 3. SPIDER CODAS requirements. Plant Systems Plant units Control cycle time No. 5 (Power supply, injector, PRIMA, int/safety, diagnostics) No. 20 (ISEPS, AGPS, gas and vacuum, cooling, thermal, spectroscopy, cameras,...) Slow 100 ms Fast 500 µs Digital I/O 20,000 DAQ channels Expected pulse data amount No 1,000, sampling speed S/s to MS/s (CRDS 100 MS/s) 1 TB/pulse Fig. 9. ITER three-tier, two-layer I&C architecture (PCDH v7.0). Expected annual data amount 50 TB/year 11
SPIDER I&C - 3-tier, 3-layer architecture Practically, three-tier, three-layer architecture. Integration Fig. 10. Three-tier, three-layer architecture. 12
SPIDER CODAS - software frameworks SPIDER CODAS software frameworks. Fig. 11. Software framework integration. 13
SPIDER fast control - why MARTe A.Barbalace, IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci., 58, Dec. 2011. Fig. 12. MARTe vs EPICS latency and jitter. 14
SPIDER control Fig. 13. Software architecture. Fig. 11. Three-tier, three-layer architecture. 15
SPIDER central interlock system Table 3. Central Interlock system requirements. Requirements Slow functions Fast functions Reaction time - from detection to command 100 ms protection, 20 ms breakdown 10 µs I/O - digital DI / DO 144 / 44 Electric 24V, relais decoupling 52 / 36 optical Interfaced plant units 9 6 SIL2 safety-relevant functions?? Timestamp resolution 20 ms 1 µs Implementation S7-1500F PLC slow controller, Profinet safe 200SP remote I/O, ring topology, copper and fiber-optics National Instrument CompactRIO fast logic solver, IRS optical I/O, fail safe National Instrument CompactRIO optical interface, IRS optical I/O, fail safe National Instrument CompactRIO independent fast acquisition unit WinCC Open Architecture HMI, implementation up to SIL3 (IEC 61508) Data driven programming (both PLC and CompactRIO) 16
Central interlock system hardware Fig. 14. HMI showing SPIDER central interlock architecture. 17
Central interlock system - input processing Fig. 15. HMI showing input signal processing. 18
Central interlock - protection function matrix Fig. 16. Data driven approach. Incidence matrix configuration. Rows are input signals. Columns are protection actions. 19
SPIDER central interlock system issues Technical issues No redundancy in hardware, both S7-PLC and CRIO Mitigation: no continuous operation Periodic system self-check (including I/O) Little diagnosis functions in IRS modules (CompactRIO optical interface) Labview programming for the CompactRIO FPGA No redundancy within the FPGA Non-technical issues Getting proper IEC61508 SIL analysis from PU subcontractors is nearly impossible Imposing segregation of control and interlock in PU is very difficult Getting SIL qualification data on subcontractor components almost impossible Considering contract with external expert to analyze the system Identification of weak points (design, implementation) as built SIL analysis 20
SPIDER central safety system Occupational safety IEC 61508 formal procedure Identification of safety-related functions and associated SIL level Redundant S7-400FH PLC Redundant Profibus I/O fieldbus System procurement is under contract award Fig. 11. Three-tier, three-layer architecture. 21
SPIDER to MITICA I&C - what s different? HNB plant system corresponding to the plant system to be integrated in ITER ITER compliant high performance networks (PON, TCN, SDN, DAN) Formal process for MITICA interlock system (same implementation as SPIDER?) API to access high performance networks Compliant implementation of operating states (GOS, COS, and PSOS). Non enforced hardware compatibility - most likely the final HNB injectors will benefit of the evolution of the slow and fast controller catalogues (HNB I&C 2016). 22
SPIDER to MITICA I&C toward HNB I&C 23
Conclusions SPIDER CODAS (partially) and Interlock completed and delivered to F4E SPIDER CODAS and Interlock are undergoing the integrated commissioning in Spring 2017 SPIDER safety is under development SPIDER CODAS integrates CODAC Core System, MDSplus, and MARTe SPIDER Interlock implements slow (<100ms) and fast (< 10 µ) functions SPIDER safety applies IEC 61508 SPIDER I&C partially comply with ITER CODAC PCDH requirements MITICA I&C under design MITICA HNB plant system I&C will converge toward ITER CODAC PCDH requirements ITER Compliant Time Communication Network ITER Compliant Synchronous Databus Network ITER Compliant API for Data Acquisition Network 24
Thanks for your kind attention. This presentation reflects the views only of the authors, and Fusion for Energy cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein. The views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the ITER Organization. 25