The simplest games (from the perspective of logical structure) are those in which agents have perfect information, meaning that at every point where e

Similar documents
Resource Allocation and Decision Analysis (ECON 8010) Spring 2014 Foundations of Game Theory

Game Theory. Department of Electronics EL-766 Spring Hasan Mahmood

Repeated Games. Economics Microeconomic Theory II: Strategic Behavior. Shih En Lu. Simon Fraser University (with thanks to Anke Kessler)

International Economics B 2. Basics in noncooperative game theory

Game Theory: The Basics. Theory of Games and Economics Behavior John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1943)

FIRST PART: (Nash) Equilibria

ECON 2100 Principles of Microeconomics (Summer 2016) Game Theory and Oligopoly

THEORY: NASH EQUILIBRIUM

Backward Induction and Stackelberg Competition

Games in Extensive Form

Belief-based rational decisions. Sergei Artemov

CS510 \ Lecture Ariel Stolerman

Lecture 7: Dominance Concepts

Game Theory Refresher. Muriel Niederle. February 3, A set of players (here for simplicity only 2 players, all generalized to N players).

Game Theory: Introduction. Game Theory. Game Theory: Applications. Game Theory: Overview

Game theory attempts to mathematically. capture behavior in strategic situations, or. games, in which an individual s success in

1. Introduction to Game Theory

Non-Cooperative Game Theory

Summary Overview of Topics in Econ 30200b: Decision theory: strong and weak domination by randomized strategies, domination theorem, expected utility

Introduction to Industrial Organization Professor: Caixia Shen Fall 2014 Lecture Note 6 Games and Strategy (ch.4)-continue

Game Theory. Wolfgang Frimmel. Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium

The extensive form representation of a game

Advanced Microeconomics (Economics 104) Spring 2011 Strategic games I

Math 464: Linear Optimization and Game

DECISION MAKING GAME THEORY

Strategic Bargaining. This is page 1 Printer: Opaq

Minmax and Dominance

ECON 282 Final Practice Problems

ECON 312: Games and Strategy 1. Industrial Organization Games and Strategy

Solution Concepts 4 Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies

ECON 301: Game Theory 1. Intermediate Microeconomics II, ECON 301. Game Theory: An Introduction & Some Applications

Game Theory Lecturer: Ji Liu Thanks for Jerry Zhu's slides

n-person Games in Normal Form

Finite games: finite number of players, finite number of possible actions, finite number of moves. Canusegametreetodepicttheextensiveform.

Topic 1: defining games and strategies. SF2972: Game theory. Not allowed: Extensive form game: formal definition

Contents. MA 327/ECO 327 Introduction to Game Theory Fall 2017 Notes. 1 Wednesday, August Friday, August Monday, August 28 6

Dynamic Games: Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection

CMU Lecture 22: Game Theory I. Teachers: Gianni A. Di Caro

Computing Nash Equilibrium; Maxmin

Sequential Games When there is a sufficient lag between strategy choices our previous assumption of simultaneous moves may not be realistic. In these

ECO 220 Game Theory. Objectives. Agenda. Simultaneous Move Games. Be able to structure a game in normal form Be able to identify a Nash equilibrium

G5212: Game Theory. Mark Dean. Spring 2017

Microeconomics of Banking: Lecture 4

Strategies and Game Theory

U strictly dominates D for player A, and L strictly dominates R for player B. This leaves (U, L) as a Strict Dominant Strategy Equilibrium.

final examination on May 31 Topics from the latter part of the course (covered in homework assignments 4-7) include:

2. The Extensive Form of a Game

14.12 Game Theory Lecture Notes Lectures 10-11

Game theory Computational Models of Cognition

Chapter 30: Game Theory

Games of Perfect Information and Backward Induction

Domination Rationalizability Correlated Equilibrium Computing CE Computational problems in domination. Game Theory Week 3. Kevin Leyton-Brown

Game Theory and MANETs: A Brief Tutorial

Introduction to Game Theory

Chapter 2 Basics of Game Theory

SF2972 GAME THEORY Normal-form analysis II

Chapter 13. Game Theory

Applied Game Theory And Strategic Behavior Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 review

NORMAL FORM (SIMULTANEOUS MOVE) GAMES

Game theory. Logic and Decision Making Unit 2

Economics of Strategy (ECON 4550) Maymester 2015 Foundations of Game Theory

Distributed Optimization and Games

GOLDEN AND SILVER RATIOS IN BARGAINING

NORMAL FORM GAMES: invariance and refinements DYNAMIC GAMES: extensive form

Lecture 5: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. November 1, 2006

PARALLEL NASH EQUILIBRIA IN BIMATRIX GAMES ISAAC ELBAZ CSE633 FALL 2012 INSTRUCTOR: DR. RUSS MILLER

Game Theory. Lecture Notes By Y. Narahari. Department of Computer Science and Automation Indian Institute of Science Bangalore, India August 2012

Mixed Strategies; Maxmin

Introduction to (Networked) Game Theory. Networked Life NETS 112 Fall 2016 Prof. Michael Kearns

Reading Robert Gibbons, A Primer in Game Theory, Harvester Wheatsheaf 1992.

Economics 201A - Section 5

Introduction Economic Models Game Theory Models Games Summary. Syllabus

Applied Game Theory And Strategic Behavior Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. Author: Siim Adamson TTÜ 2010

Introduction to Game Theory

Game Theory ( nd term) Dr. S. Farshad Fatemi. Graduate School of Management and Economics Sharif University of Technology.

6. Bargaining. Ryan Oprea. Economics 176. University of California, Santa Barbara. 6. Bargaining. Economics 176. Extensive Form Games

Extensive-Form Games with Perfect Information

UPenn NETS 412: Algorithmic Game Theory Game Theory Practice. Clyde Silent Confess Silent 1, 1 10, 0 Confess 0, 10 5, 5

Appendix A A Primer in Game Theory

Session Outline. Application of Game Theory in Economics. Prof. Trupti Mishra, School of Management, IIT Bombay

Game Theory and an Exploration of 3 x n Chomp! Boards. Senior Mathematics Project. Emily Bergman

Weeks 3-4: Intro to Game Theory

Distributed Optimization and Games

Sequential games. Moty Katzman. November 14, 2017

Multiagent Systems: Intro to Game Theory. CS 486/686: Introduction to Artificial Intelligence

Sequential games. We may play the dating game as a sequential game. In this case, one player, say Connie, makes a choice before the other.

CMU-Q Lecture 20:

Note: A player has, at most, one strictly dominant strategy. When a player has a dominant strategy, that strategy is a compelling choice.

1\2 L m R M 2, 2 1, 1 0, 0 B 1, 0 0, 0 1, 1

arxiv: v1 [cs.gt] 23 May 2018

Homework 5 Answers PS 30 November 2013

Self-interested agents What is Game Theory? Example Matrix Games. Game Theory Intro. Lecture 3. Game Theory Intro Lecture 3, Slide 1

Fictitious Play applied on a simplified poker game

2. Extensive Form Games

Game Theory two-person, zero-sum games

Opponent Models and Knowledge Symmetry in Game-Tree Search

Extensive Games with Perfect Information. Start by restricting attention to games without simultaneous moves and without nature (no randomness).

Econ 302: Microeconomics II - Strategic Behavior. Problem Set #5 June13, 2016

DYNAMIC GAMES. Lecture 6

1 Simultaneous move games of complete information 1

Transcription:

%# &% 39 85,507-0 44 3 1:3.9 43, 06:,9 438,9 81 0/- # 02,33 09,1:3.9 43,.9:,,.44507,9 ;0,204150710.9 31472,9 43-09 003 98.4389 9:03990728 070 / 11070392,9 02,9., 1:3.9 43, 8 2-4 8 3. 9 0-089897,90,/4590/- 0,. 5, 0794 4.,90 0748432,9 02,9., 1 0 / 0,/894/ 8.4;07 3 9 0248989,- 0,77,3 02039415 8., 4.,9 4334397 ;, 074841# 02,33 09,1:3.9 43. 3 9:73 0,/894%#&% & $$ #! % $ $ 8; 8:, 0/-,; / -079/;,3.0/2,9 02,9.8 8,.9:,,,20-09 003 / 11070392,9 02,9., 8 2-4 8 070/ 11070398 2-4 814 4.079, 3/01 30/7: 08,2 4 3 940 903/ 8; 0 89,9 3 9,9039 702,9 02,9.8 3:2-079 047 3 5,79.:,7 980 1 8,.9:,,,20 070/ 11070395, 0785,,.44507,9 ;0,2094 70,.,99 0248989,- 006: -7 :289, 0 The mathematical theory of games was invented by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944).Game theory is the study of the ways in which strategic interactions among agents produce outcomes with respect to the preferences (or utilities) of those agents, where the outcomes in question might have been intended by none of the agents.. All situations in which at least one agent can only act to maximize his utility through anticipating (either consciously, or just implicitly in his behavior) the responses to his actions by one or more other agents is called a game. Agents involved in games are referred to as players. If all agents have optimal actions regardless of what the others do, as in purely parametric situations or conditions of monopoly or perfect competition we can model this without appeal to game theory; otherwise, we need it. Each player in a game faces a choice among two or more possible strategies. A strategy is a predetermined programme of play that tells her what actions to take in response to every possible strategy other players might use. The significance of the italicized phrase here will become clear when we take up some sample games below.

The simplest games (from the perspective of logical structure) are those in which agents have perfect information, meaning that at every point where each agent's strategy tells her to take an action, she knows everything that has happened in the game up to that point. This is so because in such games (as long as the games are finite, that is, terminate after a known number of actions) players and analysts can use a straightforward procedure for predicting outcomes. A player in such a game chooses her first action by considering each series of responses and counter-responses that will result from each action open to her. She then asks herself which of the available final outcomes brings her the highest utility, and chooses the action that starts the chain leading to this outcome. This process is called backward induction (because the reasoning works backwards from eventual outcomes to present choice problems). Nash equilibrium (NE) stages are the set of strategies so that no player can maximize payoff by unilateral deviations. John Forbes Nash devised a theorem for it which are known as Nash equilibrium stages. SNE(strong Nash equilibrium stages are the refinements of Nash equilibrium such that no player is going to benefit by unilateral or bilateral defimitions. 5742 3039 :809 0944 841,209 047 941 3/4:9/ 1107039,8 06: -7 :2 89, 08 39 81:3.9 43,,205, 0/-09 0032,9 02,9., 8 2-4 8,3// 8.4;07 3 9 0$9743,8 6: -7 :2 $ 89, 0941 3/4:99 0248906: -7 :289,90,3/9 :8 9 057010770/,/4590/80941897,90-09 003/ 11070395, 078,9 02,9.8 070 3:2-078,70 -,8.,,3 :, 0 94 705708039 8420 5 8.,,850.9 33,9:70:2-078,702,907, 89.705708039,9 4384184205 8.,,850.98 413,9:70 % 0805 8.,,850.98,70 3907.4330.90/ 9 0,. 49 07 33,9:70 9,9 8

0 34 3-89 0470241 3907.4330.90/30884185,.0 33,9:70:2-078,70 -,8., 2,907, 89. 2,3 1089,9 43 41 9 8 ;07,850.9 41 3,9:70 43 2,9 02,9., /42, 3% 85 8.,,-897,.941 3907.4330.90/30882, 083:2-0785 3!#% #% 070 0,. 3:2-07 0,.9 34 8 98 70,9 ;0 4.,9 43 70,9 ;09449 07,3/0,. 3:2-070,.9 34 80;07 9 3,-4:99 0 8947 41,20,3/ 49 07 3:2-078 5, 078 3 1,.9 5, 078 2,9 02,9., 8 2-4 8 /43 9 0 89 3/0503/039,. 5, 07 0 898-0.,:80 49 07 0 898 % 0,,70.4330.90/ 9 0,. 49 07 39 0803809,9 1,3 430.0,808940 89, 49 07 4: //484 7-09907 8, 1430.,3 08 49 078 4: /.,3 0,:942,9., 20,3, 9 05, 078 0703:2-078 8, 0, 0 89 79 0,. 49 07 0/4083 90 89:3 088 09.0 8983//4083 90 89:3 088 0 898 $4 0,. 3:2-07 0 34 8 98 70,9 ;0 4.,9 43 79 0,. 49 07 34 3 9 0 8947 41039 703:2-078 8902 9,9 8 4 3:2-078,;047 3,90/ 3,9:70 03.0 2,9 02,9., 1 0 / 41 3:2-078 -0 3 9 0 2,3 1089,9 43 41 5 8.,,850.9 41 3,9:70 3 07 98 9 0 5 8., 209,5 8.,.4390398 41,9:70. 4;0738 2,9 02,9.,, 428 4.,3/ 39: 9 43,3/ 84 43 % 8,8 7 390757090/ - 0-3,9 02,9.8,8 2470 41 209,5 8.,.439039 9,3 9 8 0307, 70.4 3 0/

070 35,79.:,7 ; 8:, 09 01:3.9 43, 06:,9 438,9 81 0/- # 02,33 09,1:3.9 43,8,20-09 003/ 1107039.4389 9:03990728.,70.4330.90/9 74: 2: 9 5.,9 43 8 343-49 8 /04106:, 9 8 34704;07 3:2-0785,,,204150710.9 31472,9 43,3/ 03.0 92:89,;0,9 0,89430$ $9743,8 06: -7 :2 89, 0.47708543/ 3 949 0,77,3 0203984 :9 43419 01:3.9 43, 06:,9 43 9 81:79 07;07 1 0/- : 3 89 047029,90;07 0 9038 ;01 3 901472,204150710.9 31472,9 432:89,;0,9 0,8984 :9 4389 8,80,.9 $89, 0.47708543/ 3 949 0 4.,9 434134397 ;, 0748439 0.7 9., 30 3 # 8 4,77,3 02039415, 078.,3 0,/94, 3 3/ ; /:, 5, 411- :3,907, 47-,907, /0;,9 43817429 8$89, 0 $4,9 4: /-0/4 3 81 3/ 3 9 0 4.,9 4384197 ;, 34397 ;, 0748-44 3 9 0,7 9 209.897:.9:7041# 02,33 09,1:3.9 43,3/-,55 3 9 09 4-,8.,7 9 209.413:207. 941 3/4:9/ 1107039809415488-9 08419, 3 074;, :0- / 1107039.4389 9:03990728 3,3:98 0 % 4 3941 3/ 3 9 0 0748419 81:3.9 :43 7,9 07-0 ; 8:, 3 9 0,7 9 209.897:.9:7041&% "&% 3. / 1107039.4389 9:03990728,70.4330.90/9 74: 2: 9 5.,9 ;08 3,3/:8 3,209 047 1 3/ 9 0$89, 094 4.,90 0748$4 9,8,7/,3 9 3 94/4 9,3 9 3 0 809,3,209 047,3/8 9,7 9 209.413:207. #0,/0788 4: /, 8497 94; 8:, 0,3/70, 0 %& % ' 4 3:2-078,70 0 314720/,-4:90,. 49 07 9 0 770,9 ;0 4.,9 43,3/9 0 7 8947 9,92, 08 9,,20 41!#% #%

% 0# 02,33 09,1:3.9 43 8 8,1:3.9 4341,.425 0 ;,7,- 08 Г 9 070 8,3/9,7097,/ 9 43, 349,9 438,884.,90/949 089:/ 419 0 1:3.9 43 % 014 4 3 31 3 90807 08.43;07 08147,.425 0 3:2-0788 9 70, 5,79 70,9079,3,3/ /01 308 8 39 8.,80 % 0# 02,33 09,1:3.9 43 8/01 30/,89 0,3, 9..439 3:,9 43419 01:3.9 43/01 30/ 147-9 08:2419 0570.0/ 3 807 08 % 0# 02,33 09,1:3.9 438,9 81 089 01:3.9 43, 06:,9 43 070 8 89 0,22,1:3.9 43. 8,306:, 9 4120742475.1:3.9 438;, /43 9 0 4 0.425 0 5,30% 806:,9 4370,908;, :08419 0# 02,33 09,1:3.9 43,9 9 054 3988,3/ 8% 0,22,1:3.9 43,8,8 25 054 0,90;07 343548 9 ;0 390 07 9 0701470 9 01:3.9 43, 06:,9 43 25 089,9 8,8,8 25 0 074,90,. 0;0330,9 ;0 390 078 3 9 080,709 097 ;, 074841 8 3. /039, 9 870,9 43 8 3907089 3, 84-0.,:80 9,.9:, 0-98 8,8, 7. 09 807 08 419 0 1:3.9 43. 8.43;07 039, -0 9343,-84 :90 39 0,7 07, 1 5,30 349 :89 :594,30 02039,7 1,.947 # 02,33, 8414:3/,8 22097.;078 43419 01:3.9 43, 06:,9 43 ;03-1 789 /01 3 3

$%%%41# 02,33 549 08 8 34397 ;, 074841# 02,33 09,1:3.9 43 3 9 0.7 9., 85,.0 # 8 0843# 8!70 2 3,7 08 :2-078 8902 8,.9:,,8 8902 0700,. 3:2-07.,3-0.425,70/94,5, 07 9 0 3:2-078 5, 078,.9:, 5,,,2041 50710.9 31472,9 43:2-078,709 0,3 :, 089470570803984205 8.,,850.98413,9:70% 0805 8.,,850.98,70 3907 3 0/ 9 0,. 49 07 33,9:70 0 89 0470289,9 3 3907.4330.90/3088,3/ 4., 9,9, / 89,3.0 % 82, 083:2-078-0,; 3 3,3 3907.4330.90/3088 2,3307,3/9,9 8 9 0700 898 4., 9,9/ 89,3.043.425 0 1 0 / 0,/ 3 949 0 3907.4330.90/30884197 ;, 34397 ;, 074841# 02,33

09,1:3.9 43%,9 8 3:207., ;, :089, 03- # 02,33 09,1:3.9 43 43/ 110703954 39843.425 0 1 0 /,70 3907 3 0/ 9 0,. 49 07,3/,70 349 3/0503/039-:970,9 ;0 /01 30/% 82, 089 0039 70.425 0 1 0 /,3 3907.4330.90/8 8902,3/,550,72 8907 4:8 ;039 05 8.,,850.98413:2-078,3/ 98.425 0 1 0 / ; 8:, 0 3:2-078,3/9 0 72,9 02,9., 1:3.9 4385, 3,50710.9 314720/,20,3/0 07. 8 3 24;09470,. 9 0248906: -7 :289, 0 $,20% 047 % 0472, 472#05708039,9 43,8.49,9 438 3 3:2-07415, 078 8, 5:70 897,90 415, 07 $ 8 8 < 9 0897,90 85,.0 47897,90 809 415, 07 070 5, 07,82897,90 08 3 07897,90 85,.0 8 8 8 9 0897,90 5741 0419 035, 078 9 0 4:9.420 419 0,20 8 8 8 8 8 9 0897,90 5741 0419 049 073 5, 078 8 8 8 039,9 8.43;03 039 : 8 8 9 05, 411945, 07,8,1:3.9 43419 0897,90 5741 05, 0/- 9 035, 078 39 0,20!, 41188 4: /-09 4: 941,8:9 9 08419 0 4:9.4208 9 4: 0 4..,8 43, $ 9 080941, 5488-0897,90 5741 08 022,8,3/9 04702

,8 6: -7 :2 089#0854380 475, 07,897,90 8,-08970854380949 0897,90 5741 0 1: : 8 147, 8 $ 4909,9 8,850. 1.897,90 5741 09,9.4: /-05, 0/- 9 049 07 5, 078 39 0,20 $ 3.0 2, 349-09 043-0897085438094 0., # 9 080941-0897085438081475, 07 94,3/34909,9 # 0.,3, 84.438 /079 0809# 41-089708543808415, 07 94 07-0 01,-4:99 0897,90 08-0 3 5, 0/- 9 049 075, 078 4909,9, 897.9 /42 3,90/897,90 830;07,-08970854380,8 6: -7 :2 897,90 5741 08 8 8 8,,8 6: -7 :2 10,. 5, 07 8 897,90 8, -089 70854380 94 9 0 897,90 5741 0 5, 0/ - 9 0 49 07 5, 078 39 0,20 0 8 8,,8 06: -7 :2 18 # 8 147, 5, 078 4706: ;, 039 1: 8 8 : 8 8 147, 8 $,3/147, 5, 078 01 3 9 438,20 41 50710.9 31472,9 43 8,,20 41.425 090 31472,9 43 3., 31472,9 43 8098 39 0,20 9700,70 8 3 09438 0 030;07,5, 07 8., 0/ :543949, 0,3,.9 43 8 0 34 80,.9 0708 0 8 39 09700 4706: ;, 039 8 0 34 89 00,.9 8947 419 0,20 : 3 8% 04702 ;07 1 3 900 9038 ;01472,20 9 50710.9 31472,9 43,8,9 0,8943084 :9 43- -,.,7/ 3/:.9 43 3,2084150710.9 31472,9 43 84 :9 438- -,.,7/ 3/:.9 43.47708543/94$ $9743,8 06: -7 :2 8903.0 $ 3.0 0;07 8:-,20 41, 1 3 90,20 41.425 090 31472,9 43,8,.47708543/ 3 1 3 90 3472, 1472,3/ 0;07 1 3 90 3472, 1472,20,8,9 0,89 430 32 0/897,90 08 0;07 1 3 90,20 41.425 090 31472,9 43 2:89,;0,9 0,89430$ % :8 $ 8,701 302039419,9,89 4/08 7,- 05745079 08 789 $,70

9,9/4349 3;4 ;0 3.70/ - 09 70,98475742 808$0.43/ 0;07 1 3 90,20 41.425 090 31472,9 43,8,9 0,89430$ 3.4390 9 41 1:3.9 43, 06:,9 43,20 5, 0/ - # 02,33 09, 1:3.9 438 3 9 0 0-9 070,709 45, 078 070.47708543/8948 3,3/.47708543/8 948 3 % 84 :9 43.43.059 3,209 047 3,20 9 047,8 06: -7 :2 89,908 701 302039 41,8 06: -7 :2 89, 08.47708543/ 94 9 0 84 :9 43,.,7/ 3/:.9 43 3,,20 41 50710.9 31472,9 43,, 8 0,/ 94,9 0,89 3,8 06: -7 :2 89, 0 Number system as an originally found quantum group:..47708543/8 94 9 0 84 :9 43 070 9 05 8., 4.,9 434134397 ;, 074841# 02,33 09,1:3.9 43 Number system is a physically FOUND commutative GROUP as in quantum world. a) For every a, b there exists a+b on the number line(group) b) There exists an identity element I su ch that a+i=i+a=a This will also be valid. if operator + is changed to *. Any way ^,* are derived out of + So, with any one operator, the number system is DEFINITELY QUANTUM GROUP FNATURE. On numbr line for everyelement 1) a, there exists 1/a, 2) a there exists a. Thus covering each and every point on the number line. Every a can generate another number b on it through operators +,-,*,/,^ 4)Entire negative part of number line is mapped onto the domain 0-1

e.g. 2^-3=1/8,2^-2=1/4,2^-1=1/2 5)and every positive side on number line can be mapped onto the domain after 1 e.g.,2^1=2,2^2=4,2^3=8 etc. 6) 0 is mapped onto 1 to maintain the symmetry of GROUP i.e. 2^0=1 What I am interested here is to so why NUMBER SYSTEM is an INTERCONNECRED GROUP. So, I wd like to say that THIS HAS ALL THE PROPERTY OF A QUANTUM SYMMETRY GROUP FOUND IN NATURE and being a qwuantum group IT S INTERCONCTED and perfectly informed group. Refe. Eugen Merzbacher -Quantum mechanics Chapter 17, Groups and Symmetrical invariancy in ORIGINALLY FOUND GROUP IN nature.!# :3.9 43, 06:,9 438,9 81 0/-!, 078 8 8 39 0039 70.425 0 /42, 3 8 8430,3/43 4309072430,. 8 /0418 3.,3,3/2:89-0 074,8 8 34906:, 94 343 0743:2-07 8 8 3 8 8 <,88 89 0 4.,9 4314754 0

8 <!, 07,89 4459 438940 07. 80 9.,30 07. 8043 430419 09 4 8 147# 8 8 147# 8 8 147# 8 8 147# 8 $ 2,7!, 07,8, 849 4459 438 9.,3, 840 07. 80430419 09 4 8 147# 8,3/8 2: 9,304:8 147# 8 8 1478 Г 9 :9 8 147# 8 4 0 44,99 0/ 11070395072:9,9 43841897,90 08,/4590/ 39 8,20,3/1 3/9 0 75, 4112,97!, 4112,97 419 8,20!, 070 07. 808 459 43!, 070 07. 808 3/459 43!, 070 07. 808 459 43

!, 070 07. 808 3/459 43 $ ( : 147 147 08009,9 # (147 # (147 % 8,8,8 06: -7 :289,908-44 3,99 080941# :98:2-07 30 8,.425 090 74:5 0470;07 # #< 3/ # #< 55 3 : 3 89 0470289,9089 0702:89-0,9 0,89$ 39 8,204150710.9 31472,9 43 $4 09:834 1 3/$ 8: 2, : < 84 & 2, : < 147

% :8$ 89 0$ 39 8,20-,.,7/ 3/:.9 43 % $ $% 84 :9 43 $89, 0 $$&!! #% & $% #,3/ 03.0 4: /-0 57010770/-, 9 05, 078942, 2 09 05, 411 9 4: 9 8,20,8,8 06: -7 :289,908,83430.,3-0301 9,83430.,3-0301 9- :3,907, /0;,9 438 -:99 09 80941897,90 4: /-09 0 $ $%# $ #"& # &89,90,89 8 8 22:3094-49 :3,907, /0;,9 438,3/.4, 9 43/0;,9 4383/ 03.0-49 9 05, 0782:890 07. 809 03/459 43894 2, 2 09 05, 411 % 8,8807989 097:9 1: 3088419 0# 02,33 549 08 89,997 ;, 0748 0439 0 54 3988,3/97 ;, 0748 0439 0# 8 % :8 9 25 089,9 8 147# 8 Г 9147 # 8,3/, 84 8 147# 8 " Reference: 1.GAME THEORY http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-theory/#games 2. Extensive form finite game of perfect information http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:ljfnd1jnbpyj:www.eecs.harv ard.edu/cs286r/archived/fall08/files/lecture3.pdf+finite+extensive+form+ga me&hl=en&gl=in&pid=bl&srcid=adgeesglax41fnxre9yxw1k51fnhuya19bv 8Yf3WmRbHOwAmahc33o2QaSHi2Ns0Q6dk4IUid2avKWibOoXKmC20Xm3Y

8c7NlxzmceD2qWQzeNFz4FsjlWIaJbAN4NDC_bq3tBAutI5F&sig=AHIEtbT22 Mjxlsq1 3) Official description of Riemann Hypothesis problem by Enrico Bombeiri Pw1hpwmsJONtCFAKQhttp://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:IdUCngHnmOoJ:www.clay math.org/millennium/riemann_hypothesis/riemann.pdf+rimeann+hypothesis+ooficial+descript ion+by+bombeiri&hl=en&gl=in&pid=bl&srcid=adgeesg857veuf9atzsyjwn1bisnb25hoha7m3vuc2irjjrsgs4lbklfgvtijxtsinmmiiy8wuicuih54gkkwy1wjbpfz4fdvk9bfjuqwx o2s4btahyq_beislbqg6gi4cdjohoxaq0&sig=ahietbsa-khwurcachkjvad9zl5b5oj4cq 4) Riemann zeta functional equation in the entire complex plane. http://www.google.co.in/imgres?q=riemann+zeta+function&start=60&hl=e n&safe=off&sa=n&gbv=2&ndsp=21&sout=0&tbm=isch&tbnid=5rsllrm5ngh lkm:&imgrefurl=http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/37301/18-112fall-2005/ocwweb/mathematics/18-112fall- 2005/CourseHome/index.htm&docid=cECkPL8ZuJTS8M&w=419&h=206&ei =QmkuToahEsTRrQetpMWcAw&zoom=1&iact=hc&vpx=340&vpy=382&dur =451&hovh=80&hovw=163&tx=116&ty=113&page=4&tbnh=80&tbnw=163 &ved=1t:429,r:15,s:60&biw=1280&bih=551