GNSS Interference Detection and Mitigation for UAV Navigation. May 22 nd, 2014

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GNSS Interference Detection and Mitigation for UAV Navigation May 22 nd, 2014 Presented in cooperation with GPS World Magazine Loctronix Corporation 2008, All Rights Reserved.

Today s Topics and Panelists Topics! GNSS Interference / Denials, Needs and Challenges! GNSS Interference and Attack Mitigation! Hybrid Solution for Improving GNSS Reliability and Robustness! Preliminary HGX Navigation Sensor Test Results Panelists! Franck Boynton VP and CTO, Navtech GPS! Peter F. MacDoran Chief Scientist, Loctronix Corporation! Dr. Michael B. Mathews CEO and Founder, Loctronix Corporation! Michael O. Davies Senior Engineer Loctronix Corporation

GNSS INTERFERENCE / DENIALS, NEEDS AND CHALLENGES Franck Boynton Vice President and CTO, NavtechGPS Fboynton@navtechgps.com

4 GNSS Vulnerabilities The received power of GNSS signals at the Earth s surface is very low! GNSS signals are internationally protected spectrums! GNSS signals can be overpowered! GPS L1 frequency received on Earth at -160dBW! Galileo L1 and other frequencies received on Earth at -152dBW! GLONASS L1 frequency received on Earth at -161dBW! Jamming can occur at any frequency in any location! Most receivers and antennas are not built with strong AJ qualities

5 Spoofing Denial of actual signal and replacement by pseudo signal: typically used to take over navigation of a device! Typically a problem in non- SAASM Rx! Difficult to achieve! Mimic the GNSS signal in real time! Receiver must transition smoothly from real to false signal! Must stay locked on! Claimed to have been used to hijack UAV s

6 Types of Jamming There are many jamming techniques and the more typical techniques for GPS jamming include:! Matched Spectral: Signal with the same PSD (Power Spectral Density) as the target signal. Close match making it difficult to counter! Chirp/Sweep: A jamming signal is broadcast in a short burst where the frequency of the carrier is changed with respect to time.! Random noise: Generated radio noise of a broad amplitude and bandwidth! Carrier: Specific attack on a narrow band of spectrum! Natural interference: Usually low including solar flares and scintillation! With all of these techniques it is still possible to read through parts of the actual signal, process and pull it through High power jammer ~120w, range 150KM claimed range

7 Why Jamming? Intentional jamming! Electronic Warfare! Terrorism! Self preservation/evasion! Security! Spoofing! LightSquared, there will be others 200mW personal 2-3W 50km claimed range Multi-band jammer

8 Why Jamming? Unintentional jamming, the reasons are not always obvious! Out of band interference! Harmonics! Bad LNA (Low Noise Amplifier)! Bad amplifier or other component! Oscillation from repeater system! Cell phone jammer that contains GPS jammer

9 What is typically done? It depends on who you are.! Intrinsically UAV s have some advantages at elevation! Typically jammers are ground based! In the air! Distance away from ground! Antennas mostly point upward and away! Can detect and avoid! U.S. military and some allies SAASM and ITAR restricted antennas! IMU s! Multi frequency bands within GPS! AJ antennas, nulling CRPA! Filtering! Civilian users can use non-itar hardware! IMU s! CRPA! Filtering in antenna, RF front-end and RF cables! Multiple frequencies within GPS L1, L2, L2C, L5! Change constellations! Many frequencies within GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, Compass KVH CG-5100 FOG SATIMO CRPA GPS Networking L1 filter Vector Nav VN-200

GNSS INTERFERENCE AND ATTACK MITIGATION Peter F. MacDoran Chief Scientist, Loctronix Corporation pete.macdoran@loctronix.com

Jamming Mitigation Techniques Avoidance Techniques! Notch Filter Useful against CW or narrowband electronic attacks. Internet available jammers are wideband and target multi-gnss constellations.! SAASM Selective Availability Anti-Spoof, not commercially available, DoD COMSEC authorization required and thus not for commercial applications.! Null Steering CRPA (Controlled Radiation Pattern Antenna), requires additional hardware, power, larger form factor and cost is an issue.! Multi-Constellation / Multi-Frequency may be of value, but, the jammer suppliers will adapt their products to continue jamming. Preferred Strategy Acceptance with Survival! Accept that Jamming / Interference will be a future fact of life. Design to Survive the Attacks!

Nature of the Jamming Challenge Internet available jammers transmit > 4.5 mw EIRP at L1 with 50 MHz bandwidth to attack:! GPS L1 & L2, and half GLONASS channels! Jammers cost between $30 and $300, mischief is cheap. 4.5 mw Jammer has ability to:! Disrupt GPS C/A acquisition at a distance of 117 km.! A typical COTS C/A receiver has only 20 db J/S jamming tolerance.

Response to the Jamming Challenge Explore alternative signal processing techniques! Achieve resilience comparable to with SAASM DAGR DoD receivers! Desired additional 15-20 db J/S Margin compared to conventional COTS GPS receivers. Detect interference early! Monitoring the GNSS in-channel RF power and presence of interfering source! Alert system to threat! Mitigate effect through multiple measures

Reducing the Signal Acquisition Denial (SAD) Zone The significance of superior J/S performance is best illustrated by the Signal Acquisition Denial (SAD) zone.! Consider even a low power (e.g., 4.5 mw jammer), which might easily be balloon-borne.! A commercial GPS receiver attacked by a low power jammer will have a 320 square kilometers SAD zone.! J/S Margins of 35 to 40 db continues to provide navigation to within 0.9 km of the jammer and reduces the SAD zone area to only 2.4 square kilometers.

The Benefit of Improving Max. J/S Operation Increased J/S performance significantly reduces effective jammed area 10 8 6 J/S Effective Area Jammer 40 db J/S 35 db J/S 20 db J/S 350 300 Jammed Area vs J/S 4 250 North (km) 2 0-2 -4-6 -8 Area ( km 2 ) 200 150 100 50 Loctronix targeted J/S for commercial UAV Nav -10-10 -5 0 5 10 East (km) 0 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 J/S (db)

4.5 mw Balloon-Borne Jammer over Seattle

GPS Jamming Background References 1. R.H. Mitch, et.al., Cornell University; and J.A. Bhatti, et.al., Univ. of Texas, Austin; ION GNSS 2011 2. H. Kuusniemi, Finnish Geodetic Institute, United Nations, Latvia Workshop on Applications of GNSS, May 2012 3. http://www.cnet.com/news/truck-driver-has-gps-jammer-accidentally-jams-newark-airport/, August 11, 2013 4. GPS World Magazine, Jersey Jammer Caper, April 2012 5. http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/1997/labjam.pdf 6. http://www.rockwellcollins.com/~/media/files/unsecure/products/product%20brochures/ Navigation%20and%20Guidance/GPS%20Devices/DAGR%20brochure.aspxLocation 7. A. Brown, et al, Jammer and Interference Location System Design and Initial Test Results, ION GPS 99, Nashville, TN

HYBRID SOLUTION FOR IMPROVING GNSS RELIABILITY AND ROBUSTNESS Dr. Michael B. Mathews CEO / Founder Loctronix Corporation michael.mathews@loctronix.com

Robust UAV Navigation Receiver Requirements Basic Interference Detection! Signal Level (J/S)! Obstruction detect! Affected bands and channels Attack Characterization (Advanced)! Noise! Chirp / Sweep! Carrier! Matched Spectral! Spoofing Mitigation Capabilities! 30-40 db J/S Margin! Integrated Inertials! Multi-Frequency / GNSS! SoOps (advanced) General Capabilities! 20 db-hz Acquisition Sensitivity! 15 db-hz Track Sensitivity! < 100 ms Latency! 50 Hz Max Update Rate! Meter-Level 3-D Accuracy! < 1s Fast Acquisition/Recovery

HGX Hybrid Navigation Sensor Hybrid RF Signal and Sensor Processing! Combines SCP and Traditional Correlation! Low Latency Federated Filter! Integrates Inertial / RF Sensor Observables Key Features! Multi-Frequency / Multi-Channel GNSS! Embeddable Software Defined Radio (SDR) Implementation! Real-time and Post-Processing Modes! Interference Simulation Tools! Integrated Interference Detection and Mitigation Functionality MultiFrequency / Multi-Channel GNSS Correlation SCP Sensor Fusion Inertial Sensors

HGX Toolkit and Sensor Architecture Toolkit ASR Workbench Configuration and Customization Performance Analysis Interference Simulation HGX SDR Sensor C/C++ Components 32/64 Bit Linux/Windows/Custom Interference Detection Interference Mitigation Controller Sensor Fusion Navigation Engine SCP Tracking and Acquisition Correlation Tracking and Acquisition Data Sampling Telemetry Extraction Software Correlators Software SCP DSP High Speed Data Storage Hdw. Logic ASR-2300 Direct to Baseband DSP RX / TX Barometer SCP DSP Hardware Correlators 9 Axis Accelerometer, Gyroscope, Compass L1, L2, and/or L5

ASR-2300 MIMO SDR / Motion Sensing Module RF / Multi-Sensor Signal Processing! 2 x 28 MHz Transceivers 300 MHz to 3.8 GHz Full Duplex! 9 RF Paths: 6 RF inputs / 3 RF outputs (U.FL)! Integrated L1 GPS and Wi-Fi Antennas! Integrated 10 axis MEMS sensors (accelerometer/ gyroscope / compass / barometer)! Expansion Port supports for MIMO / Data I/O ASR -2300 Electrical Interface! SuperSpeed USB 3.0 interface at 315 MB/s sustained data transfer! Very Large Spartan-6 FPGA: 6,822 / 58 DSP slices! 128 MiB RAM! 5 Volts @ 1.2 A (6 W) at full utilization.! 1.2 mbps UART! Li-Ion Battery external connection w/charger function Physical Specifications! 9.90 x 6.61 x 0.95 cm (3.898 x 2.60 x 0.375 in)! Weight ~ 48 grams (1.5 oz). ASR -2300-HK Bundle

ASR Workbench SDR Integrated Development Environment (IDE)! Drag-and-drop, real-time DSP modeling tool! Integrated support for the ASR-2300.! Freely available for users of the ASR-2300 Features! Process multiple ASR-2300 baseband I/Q sample streams.! Record/playback signals, analyze received signals using a variety of demonstration models.! Optimize the performance and configuration of the ASR-2300 module with a suite of diagnostic tools.

24 Spectral Compression Positioning (SCP) A non-linear operation on a broadband signal that enables extraction of amplitude, frequency, and phase information GPS example with Delay & Multiply! Spectral compression applies a delay and multiply operation on P(Y) ranging signals.! Fundamental chipping rate signals are extracted using an FFT on the Spectral Compressor output! Each peak in the FFT (containing amplitude, frequency, and phase) represents a single GPS satellite! Doppler frequency shift is used to uniquely identify the specific satellite given a GPS Almanac! No complicated tracking loops or correlators are required

Hybrid SCP and Correlation Has SWaP Advantages LEO Obs. 1 Channel of SCP signal processing is equivalent to 16 or more correlation channels

HGX Benefits and Roadmap Interference Mitigation! Additional 15-20 db J/S margin compared to conventional GPS! Multi-frequency capability! Access to GPS PPS! Multi-GNSS ready! Graceful Degradation Accuracy and Performance! Meter-level accuracy. Higher accuracy options also a possibility! Integrated Inertial! Multi-Frequency / GNSS! < 100 ms Latency! 50 Hz Max Update Rate! < 1s Fast Acquisition/Recovery HGX Available Summer 2014! Embedded solution! Multi-frequency GPS! Development toolkit w/asr-2300 See Preview At JNC 2014! June 16-18 th, 2014! Booth 31

PRELIMINARY HGX NAVIGATION SENSOR TEST RESULTS Michael O. Davies Senior Engineer, Loctronix Corporation michael.davies@loctronix.com

HGX Sensor in the Presence of a Simulated L1 Jammer

Hardware/Software Configuration A Jammer was simulated and added to the raw data streams collected during drive around A Code Correlation Receiver was compared to the Hybrid Receiver in the presence of a jammer. Drive Around Data Collection Signal Processing L1 GPS Antenna ASR-2300 L1 GPS Samples Hard Disk Sweep Jammer Config Interference Simulation SDR Code Correlation Receiver Loctronix SDR Hybrid Receiver Lat, Long, Height Lat, Long, Height

L1 GPS Data Collection Collected data driving in a 10 minute loop in Woodinville, WA The ASR-2300 was used to collect GPS L1 samples and write to disk. L1 C/A and P(Y) antenna, consumer grade L1 Antenna ASR-2300

31 The Woodinville Loop, COTS GPS Mode Start, End

Simulating a Jammer! 2 micro-watt Power Idealized Isotropic Jammer (direct line of sight)! Chirp-Sweep Jammer 13 MHz L1! Signal J/S varies with distance! Jammer was placed close to the drive-around loop to test performance as J/S dynamically changes J/S (db) 30 20 10 J/S along GPS Ground Track 400 200 0 2 micro-watt Jammer and GPS Ground Track GPS Track Jammer 20 db J/S 15 db J/S 5 db J/S 0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 Time (sec) Distance from Jammer along GPS Ground Track 2000 North (m) -200-400 -600 Distance (m) 1500 1000 500 0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 Time (sec) -800-1000 -1200-1200 -1000-800 -600-400 -200 0 200 400 600 800 Esat East (m)

Simulating a Jammer! As jammer gets closer, its power rises above thermal noise floor! Chirp-Sweep intended to wipe-out L1 C/A Code Correlators! Similar to commercial jammers: sweep 9 µs, BW = 13 MHz 10 8 L1 Sweep Jammer (9 usec period, +- 13 MHz) Jammer Frequency C/A Jammer Frequency -105-110 L1 C/A Jam Power Spectra (25 db J/S) J/S relative to L1 C/A RX Thermal Noise Floor 6 4-115 L1 Bandwidth [MHz] 2 0-2 -4 Power (dbm) -120-125 -130-6 -8-135 -10 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Time [us] -140-2 -1.5-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 Frequency (MHz)

HGX COTS Mode Operation with Jammer Enabled Code Correlation Fails, 23 J/S Code Correlation Recovers

HGX Hybrid Mode Operation with Jammer Enabled Interference Detected, Enable Mitigation Disable Mitigation

HGX Preliminary Testing Results Preliminary Testing Shows:! Significantly increases J/S margins by 15-20 db compared to conventional COTS GPS receiver.! Receiver can detect interference before failure! Mitigates failure by seamlessly switching operating modes and data types HGX is a Robust and Resilient Solution for Commercial UAV Navigation! Achieves near-saasm J/S performance without crypto access requirements

PLEASE VISIT LOCTRONIX AT JNC 2014, BOOTH 31 June 16-18, 2014 Orlando, Florida email: lew.larson@loctronix.com to schedule a meeting

Q&A Questions?

Today s Panelists Franck Boynton Vice President and CTO, Navtech GPS Fboynton@navtechgps.com Peter F. MacDoran Chief Scientist, Loctronix Corporation pete.macdoran@loctronix.com Dr. Michael B. Mathews President/Founder, Loctronix Corporation michael.mathews@loctronix.com Michael O. Davies Senior Engineer, Loctronix Corporation michael.davies@loctronix.com