BROADSHIELD CAPABILITIES OVERVIEW. Beyond the Frontier

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BROADSHIELD CAPABILITIES OVERVIEW Beyond the Frontier

BROADSHIELD from Protecting GPS/GNSS critical infrastructure against emerging threats Detects Interference and Spoofing within the GPS signal and GPS spectrum Over 75 Jamming and spoofing detection algorithms Seamlessly integrated with SecureSync Works with our standard commercial GPS/GNSS receiver Automatic enabling/disabling of GPS during interference events Status information through the UI Integrated notifications and alarms 2

WHAT IS BROADSHIELD? 75+ jamming and spoofing detection algorithms Software running on the SecureSync precise time and frequency ref. Algorithms work they have been field proven dating back to 2008 3

GPS JAMMING AND SPOOFING ATTACKS ARE ON THE RISE Hardware costs: <$1,000 Software defined radios (SDRs) Cigarette jammers Open Source Software Tutorials on YouTube More critical now more than ever to protect your PNT 4

5

BROADSHIELD PROTECTS YOU It s Like. Body Armor. For Your SecureSync You wouldn t go into battle without it. 6

THE BEST JAMMING AND SPOOFING DETECTION Detects Jamming Continuous Wave (CW) Swept CW Pulsed CW AWGN BPSK And more Calibration not required Dynamic range based on the receiver RF front end (AGC, LNA, etc.) Detects Spoofing GNSS simulators Anomalies in the GPS data Jumps in position and time And everything in between Alerts when jamming and/or spoofing is detected SecureSync automatically implements userdefined counter measures Allowing for continuous and reliable operation in adverse environments 7

REAL-WORLD DETECTION PROVEN CASE STUDY January 25, 2016: GPS Control Segment uploaded incorrect data to SVs (A0=13.7us, ToT=0, WN=0) BroadShield inference and detection algorithms detected the anomaly within 2 seconds Anomalies detected continuously for 12+ hours on 12 different SVs GPS Control Segment confirmed anomaly several hours later 8

BROADSHIELD WEBUI BUILT INTO SECURESYNC WEBUI View Jamming/Spoofing over time Real-time 8MHz Spectrum Download Logs Pro Feature 9

COLOR CODED WEBUI Spoofing Jamming Current spoofing/jamming line is below the critical threshold Current jamming line is above the critical threshold 10

BROADSHIELD VS BROADSHIELD PRO BroadShield Jamming detection Spoofing detection 75+ algorithms Integrated WebUI Spectrum Detection graph over time SecureSync automatically implements user-defined counter measures action during Jamming or Spoofing BroadShield Pro Jamming detection Spoofing detection 75+ algorithms Integrated WebUI Spectrum Detection graph over time SecureSync automatically implements user-defined counter measures action during Jamming or Spoofing Exportable recorded log files (.csv) and a binary receiver binary file (.bin) For deployed systems, no user action required. For advanced research and users that require logs for post action analysis. 11

FIELD TESTS Vulnerability research is on the rise. Field tests have identified the need for BroadShield SecureSync + BroadShield will outperform all competing solutions. 12

BROADSHIELD Protecting GPS/GNSS critical infrastructure against emerging threats Detects Interference and Spoofing within the GPS signal and GPS spectrum Over 75 Jamming and spoofing detection algorithms Seamlessly integrated with SecureSync Works with our standard commercial GPS/GNSS receiver Automatic enabling/disabling of GPS during interference events Status information through the UI Integrated notifications and alarms 13