Cost-based pragmatic implicatures in an artificial language experiment

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Cost-based pragmatic implicatures in an artificial language experiment Judith Degen, Michael Franke & Gerhard Jäger Rochester/Stanford Amsterdam Tübingen July 27, 2013 Workshop on Artificial Grammar Learning Tübingen Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 1 / 42

The Beauty Contest each participant has to write down a number between 0 and 100 all numbers are collected the person whose guess is closest to 2/3 of the arithmetic mean of all numbers submitted is the winner Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 2 / 42

The Beauty Contest (data from Camerer 2003, Behavioral Game Theory) Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 3 / 42

Signaling games sequential game: 1 nature chooses a world w out of a pool of possible worlds W according to a certain probability distribution p 2 nature shows w to sender S 3 S chooses a message m out of a set of possible signals M 4 S transmits m to the receiver R 5 R chooses an action a, based on the sent message. Both S and R have preferences regarding R s action, depending on w. S might also have preferences regarding the choice of m (to minimize signaling costs). Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 4 / 42

The Iterated Best Response sequence sends any true message S 0 R 0 interprets messages literally best response to S 0 R 1 S 1 best response to R 0 best response to R 1. S 2 R 2.. best response to S 1. Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 5 / 42

Quantity implicatures (1) a. Who came to the party? b. some: Some boys came to the party. c. all: All boys came to the party. Game construction ct = W = {w, w } w = {some}, w = {some, all} p = ( 1 /2, 1 /2) interpretation function: some = {w, w } all = {w } utilities: a a w 1, 1 0, 0 w 0, 0 1, 1 Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 6 / 42

Truth conditions some all w 1 0 w 1 1 Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 7 / 42

Example: Quantity implicatures S 0 some all w 1 0 w 1/2 1/2 R 1 w w some 1 0 all 0 1 R 0 w w some 1/2 1/2 all 0 1 S 1 some all w 1 0 w 0 1 F = (R 1, S 1 ) In the fixed point, some is interpreted as entailing all, i.e. exhaustively. Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 8 / 42

Lifted games 1 a. Ann or Bert showed up. (= or) b. Ann showed up. (= a) c. Bert showed up. (= b) d. Ann and Bert showed up. (= and) w a : Only Ann showed up. w b : Only Bert showed up. w ab : Both showed up. Truth conditions or a b and {w a } 1 1 0 0 {w b } 1 0 1 0 {w ab } 1 1 1 1 {w a, w b } 1 0 0 0 {w a, w ab } 1 1 0 0 {w b, w ab } 1 0 1 0 {w a, w b, w ab } 1 0 0 0 Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 9 / 42

Lifted games IBR sequence: 1 S 0 or a b and {w a } 1/2 1/2 0 0 {w b } 1/2 0 1/2 0 {w ab } 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4 {w a, w b } 1 0 0 0 {w a, w ab } 1/2 1/2 0 0 {w b, w ab } 1/2 0 1/2 0 {w a, w b, w ab } 1 0 0 0 Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 10 / 42

Lifted games IBR sequence: 2 R 1 {w a } {w b } {w ab } {w a, w b } {w a, w ab } {w b, w ab } {w a, w b, w ab } or 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 a 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 b 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 and 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 11 / 42

Lifted games IBR sequence: 3 S 2 or a b and {w a } 0 1 0 0 {w b } 0 0 1 0 {w ab } 0 0 0 1 {w a, w b } 1 0 0 0 {w a, w ab } 1/2 1/2 0 0 {w b, w ab } 1/2 0 1/2 0 {w a, w b, w ab } 1 0 0 0 Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 12 / 42

Lifted games or is only used in {w a, w b } in the fixed point this means that it carries two implicatures: exhaustivity: Ann and Bert did not both show up ignorance: Sally does not know which one of the two disjuncts is true Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 13 / 42

Predicting behavioral data Behavioral Game Theory: predict what real people do (in experiments), rather what they ought to do if they were perfectly rational one implementation (Camerer, Ho & Chong, TechReport CalTech): stochastic choice: people try to maximize their utility, but they make errors level-k thinking: every agent performs a fixed number of best response iterations, and they assume that everybody else is less smart (i.e., has a lower strategic level) Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 14 / 42

Stochastic choice real people are not perfect utility maximizers they make mistakes sub-optimal choices still, high utility choices are more likely than low-utility ones Rational choice: best response { 1 arg P (a i ) = j max u i if u i = max j u j 0 else Stochastic choice: (logit) quantal response P (a i ) e λu i Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 15 / 42

Stochastic choice λ measures degree of rationality λ = 0: completely irrational behavior all actions are equally likely, regardless of expected utility λ convergence towards behavior of rational choice probability mass of sub-optimal actions converges to 0 Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 16 / 42

Iterated Quantal Response (IQR) variant of IBR model best response ist replaced by quantal response predictions now depend on value for λ no 0-probabilities IQR converges gradually Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 17 / 42

Level-k thinking every player: performs iterated quantal response a limited number k of times (where k may differ between players), assumes that the other players have a level < k, and assumes that the strategic levels are distributed according to a Poisson distribution P (k) τ k /k! Pr(k) 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 Poisson distribution τ = 1.0 τ = 1.5 τ = 2.0 τ = 2.5 τ, a free parameter of the model, is the average/expected level of the other players 0 2 4 6 8 10 k Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 18 / 42

The experimental setup Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 19 / 42

The experimental setup Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 19 / 42

The experimental setup Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 20 / 42

The experimental setup Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 21 / 42

The experimental setup Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 22 / 42

Simple condition: Literal meanings S 0 R 0 1/2 0 0 1/2 0 0 1 0 0 1/2 1/2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1/2 1/2 1 0 0 Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 23 / 42

Simple condition: Iterated Best Response R 1 S 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1/2 0 0 1/2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 24 / 42

Complex condition: Literal meanings S 0 R 0 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 1/2 0 0 0 0 1 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/2 1/2 0 0 1 0 1/2 0 1/2 Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 25 / 42

Complex condition: Iterated Best response R 1 S 1 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/2 1/2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 26 / 42

Complex condition: Iterated Best response S 2 R 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1/3 1/3 1/3 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 27 / 42

Experiment 1 - comprehension test participants behavior in a comprehension task implementing previously described signaling games 48 participants on Amazon s Mechanical Turk two stages: language learning inference 36 experimental trials 6 simple (one-step) implicature trials 6 complex (two-step) implicature trials 24 filler trials (entirely unambiguous/ entirely ambiguous target) Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 28 / 42

Artificial language Zorx XEK RAV ZUB KOR Three stages of language learning: 1 2 3 Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 29 / 42

Artificial language Zorx XEK RAV ZUB KOR Three stages of language learning: 1 2 3 Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 29 / 42

Artificial language Zorx XEK RAV ZUB KOR Three stages of language learning: 1 2 3 Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 29 / 42

Artificial language Zorx XEK RAV ZUB KOR Three stages of language learning: 1 2 3 Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 29 / 42

Artificial language Zorx XEK RAV ZUB KOR Three stages of language learning: 1 2 3 Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 29 / 42

Artificial language Zorx XEK RAV ZUB KOR Three stages of language learning: 1 2 3 Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 29 / 42

Artificial language Zorx XEK RAV ZUB KOR Three stages of language learning: 1 2 3 Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 29 / 42

Inference trial Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 30 / 42

Results - proportion of responses by condition 1.0 Proportion of choices 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 Response target distractor competitor 0.0 ambiguous filler complex implicature simple implicature unambiguous filler Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 31 / 42

Results - proportion of responses by condition 1.0 Proportion of choices 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 Response target distractor competitor 0.0 ambiguous filler complex implicature simple implicature unambiguous filler Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 31 / 42

Results - proportion of responses by condition 1.0 Proportion of choices 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 Response target distractor competitor 0.0 ambiguous filler complex implicature simple implicature unambiguous filler Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 31 / 42

Experiment 2 - production test participants behavior in a production task implementing previously described signaling games 48 participants on Amazon s Mechanical Turk two stages: language learning inference 36 experimental trials 6 simple (one-step) implicature trials 6 complex (two-step) implicature trials 24 filler trials (entirely unambiguous/ entirely ambiguous target) Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 32 / 42

Results - proportion of responses by condition Proportion of choices 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 Response target distractors competitor ambiguous filler complex implicature simple implicature unambiguous filler Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 33 / 42

Experiment 3 - varying message costs Question 1: Are comprehenders aware of message costs? Question 2: If a cheap ambiguous message competes with a costly unambiguous one, do we find quantity implicatures, and if so, how does its likelihood depend on message costs? 240 participants on Amazon s Mechanical Turk three stages: language learning cost estimation inference (18 trials, 6 inference and 12 filler trials) Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 34 / 42

Extended Zorx cheap messages costly messages XEK RAV ZUB KOR XAB BAZ no cost BAZU XABI low cost BAZUZE XABIKO high cost Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 35 / 42

Cost estimation two cheap features one cheap & one costly feature Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 36 / 42

Results - proportion of costly messages Proportion of choice 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 Sent word cheap costly no cost low cost high cost The use of costly messages decreases as the cost of that message increases. Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 37 / 42

Simple condition: Literal meanings S 0 R 0 1/2 0 0 1/2 0 0 1 0 0 3/4 1/4 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1/2 1/2 1 0 0 Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 38 / 42

Inference results Proportion of choices 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 Response target distractor competitor no cost low cost high cost The Quantity inference becomes more likely as the cost of the ambiguous message increases. Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 39 / 42

Model fitting Fitted parameters cost estimation: mixed effects logistic regression on the data from experiment 3 reasoning parameters fitted via least squares regression: comprehension (experiments 1, 3) λ = 4.825, τ = 0.625, r = 0.99 production (experiment 2) Data 1.00 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.50 Prediction 0.75 1.00 Experiment Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Choice competitor distractor target λ = 8.853, τ = 0.818, r = 0.99 Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 40 / 42

Conclusion proof of concept: game theoretic model captures experimental data quite well both speakers and listeners routinely perform simple inference steps likelihood of nested inferences is rather low speakers behave more strategically than listeners Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 41 / 42

Collaborators Degen, Franke & Jäger (AGL-Workshop) Cost-based implicatures 7/27/2013 42 / 42