The Impact of the GPS UTC Anomaly Event of January 2016 on the Global Timing Community

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The Impact of the GPS UTC Anomaly Event of January 2016 on the Global Timing Community PTTI Monterey, USA 31 st January 2 nd February 2017 Charles Curry BEng, CEng, FIET, FRIN Chronos Technology Ltd

Black Swan Events Nassim Nicholas Taleb 2007 The Black Swan Surprise to the observer Significant impact With hindsight could have been predicted. Not necessarily a surprise to all

What can possibly go wrong? 'Matt Cartoon, The Daily Telegraph Telegraph Media Group Limited' http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/matt/ 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 3

Presentation Contents SVN-23 PRN-32 A Classic Bird but not a Black Swan! Previous History A GPS Black Swan The early stages Understanding and Clearing Up Impacts on networks and receivers Mathematical derivation of the UTC anomaly Similar Events & Conclusions

SVN-23 A Classic Bird! What car were you driving in 1990? Launched Nov 1990, Cape Canaveral 1 st of the Block IIA s USA-66 Satellite Vehicle Number 23 Originally PRN23 Decommissioned Feb 2004 Set Useable Feb 2008 PRN32 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 5

SVN23 - Previous History 1 st January 2004 Remember? PRN23 Atomic Clock failure Major GPS failure in BT network NANU2004001 Returned to service using another clock January 20 th NANU2004008 Retired Feb 2004 Reactivated Feb2008 at PRN32 Thanks to Wikipedia and NANU Archives at NAVCEN 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 6

Affected Area 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 7

Plot shows progressive failure 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 8

SVN23-26 th January 2016 Alarms at a major UK NOC early hours 26 th Red lights all over Panic! GPS signal into SSU disqualified Loads of system across the country in holdover! What was going on? Now we know..but then it was OMG! 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 9

Where was PRN32? Someone said PRN32 had disappeared! Not been watching NANU s Retired from Service NANU 2016008 25 th Jan Sky plot at 7:51 UTC 26th 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 10

PRN32 Definitely not there! University of Bath algorithm in the Chronos SENTINEL GPS Interference monitoring system 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 11

Chronos Support Team 26th 00:21 UTC 1 st alarm message logged @ CTL 02:00 UTC 1 st call to CTL Support Manager Clearly a major GPS problem! 07:49 UTC NAVCEN report problem 08:00 UTC other customers calling in 09:30 UTC proactive call around 13:10 UTC NAVCEN resolve problem 14:00 UTC phone contact with NAVCEN 09:00 UTC Weds 27 th calls still coming in 02:00 UTC Thurs 28 th last events logged Friday 29 th finally cleared all event logs 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 12

Event Summary Network Type Region Qty GPS Elements Customer A Fixed Line UK Large 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 13 Notes Generated nearly 2000 alarms and standing condition events throughout duration Customer B Transport Comms UK Small Customer in panic mode as systems in holdover Customer C Fixed Line Global Large Nearly 2500 alarms generated during event. Roughly 40 elements entered holdover due to lack of backup inputs. Customer D Fixed Line UK Small Element in holdover Customer E Transport Comms UK Small TimeSource only systems. Caused local switches to go into free run. Customer F Mobile UK Medium No adverse impact. All systems have backup network feeds and Rb clocks Customer G Private Network UK Small System backed up by Caesium Customer H Mobile UK Medium Difficult to determine number of affected elements but majority of elements have backup sync feeds taken from another Telecom operator. Customer I Fixed Line Sweden Medium Affected all SSU 2000 units Customer J Mobile UK Medium Some TimeSource inputs reporting high MTIE and MTIE alarms on SSU2000 Customer K Mobile UK Medium All SSU2000 disqualified GPS inputs. Systems reverted to line timing traceable to another carrier

Impacts on Receivers Some receivers impacted, some not Not all receivers of the same design impacted Did not impact navigation (RTK) receivers TRAIM had some mitigating effect Some receivers showed a -13.0µsec Some did not. Hmmmm Finally a Statement from USAF But not until the 27 th Jan 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 14

Impact and Duration 26th 2.5 µs/div -13.0µs 1 Hour/Div -13.0 µsec error in UTC message 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 15

Some GPS Rx Not Impacted 9ns/Div 2 Hours/Div Blue GPS, Red eloran 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 16

GPS v eloran 200ns/Div 2 Hours/Div TRAIM mitigates No Impact on eloran 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 17

USAF Statement 27 th Jan 2016 The official USAF press release stated: On 26 January [2016] at 12:49 a.m. MST, the 2nd Space Operations Squadron at the 50th Space Wing, Schriever Air Force Base, Colo., verified users were experiencing GPS timing issues. Further investigation revealed an issue in the Global Positioning System ground software which only affected the time on legacy L-band signals. This change occurred when the oldest vehicle, SVN 23, was removed from the constellation. While the core navigation systems were working normally, the coordinated universal time timing signal was off by 13 microseconds which exceeded the design specifications. The issue was resolved at 6:10 a.m. MST, however global users may have experienced GPS timing issues for several hours. U.S. Strategic Command s Commercial Integration Cell, operating out of the Joint Space Operations Center, effectively served as the portal to determine the scope of commercial user impacts. Additionally, the Joint Space Operations Center at Vandenberg AFB has not received any reports of issues with GPS-aided munitions, and has determined that the timing error is not attributable to any type of outside interference such as jamming or spoofing. Operator procedures were modified to preclude a repeat of this issue until the ground system software is corrected, and the 50th Space Wing will conduct an Operational Review Board to review procedures and impacts on users. Commercial and Civil users who experienced impacts can contact the U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center at 001 703 313 5900. 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 18

Press Coverage GPS Glitch Caused Outages, Fuelled Arguments for Backup 29 th Jan 2016 http://www.insidegnss.com/node/4831 UK radio disturbance caused by satellite network bug - 2 nd Feb 2016 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-35463347 Lights out for Space Vehicle Number 23: UK smacked when US sat threw GPS out of whack - 3 rd Feb 2016 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/02/03/decommissioned_ satellite_software_knocks_out_gps/ 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 19

Impact on DAB SFN Resilience at the Transmitter level, but not at the UTC source or technology level Interference GPS1 TX1 GPS2 TX2 GPS1 TX1 GPS2 TX2 City 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 20 City Not dissimilar to reuse of frequencies in cell clusters. eicic

Early Leads on the UTC Anomaly http://www.leapsecond.com/time-nuts.htm 1 st blog - Paul Boven Tue Jan 26 10:12:41 EST 2016-13.7µs jump Martin Burnicki - Meinberg Wed Jan 27 11:49:52 EST 2016 Confirmed that the A 0 term had moved -13.696 Refers to UTC time in IS-GPS-200H t UTC = t LS + A 0 + A 1 (t E t ot + 604800(WN-WN t )) Seconds Early lead from Marc Weiss indicated a week number issue Related to the SVN23 retirement event Origin of the -13.0 µs remained an elusive computation! sv sfw7 sfw8 wnt tot a0 bits a0[us] 09 0x3FFFF1B3 0x23800017 --> 00 000000: 0xFFFFC68E -13.696 * 07 0x3FFFFFEA 0x3FD3967B --> 89 319488: 0xFFFFFFFF -0.001 02 0x3FFFFFD5 0x3FD39644 --> 89 319488: 0xFFFFFFFF -0.001 06 0x3FFFF18C 0x23800028 --> 00 000000: 0xFFFFC68E -13.696 * 23 0x3FFFF18C 0x23800028 --> 00 000000: 0xFFFFC68E -13.696 * 30 0x00000000 0x00139664 --> 89 319488: 0x00000000 +0.000 05 0x0000003F 0x0013965B --> 89 319488: 0x00000000 +0.000 16 0x00000000 0x00139664 --> 89 319488: 0x00000000 +0.000 26 0x3FFFF18C 0x23800028 --> 00 000000: 0xFFFFC68E -13.696 * 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 21

Analytical Graphics Video Courtesy Ted Driver at Analytical Graphics via John Lavrakas https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/22447827/videos/gpsbadtiming2dmap.wmv 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 22

ION 2016 Portland OR GPS Receiver Impact from the UTC Offset (UTCO) Anomaly of 25-26 January 2016 Karl Kovach, Philip J. Mendicki, The Aerospace Corporation; Ed Powers, US Naval Observatory; Brent Renfro, ARL, The University of Texas at Austin EE Dataset Value of t UTC was -13.025 µs Shown pink and impacted 15 satellites 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 23

Calculating the UTC Offset t UTC = t LS + A 0 + A 1 (t E - t ot + 604800(WN-WN t )), seconds Where: t LS = current leap second t E = GPS receiver s estimate of current GPS TOW t ot = reference time for UTC data secs in week 604800 = number of seconds in a week WN = current full GPS week number WN t = UTC reference week number Page 123 - Section 20.3.3.5.2.4 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 24

Let s use real data Values are taken from the navigation message from SVN43/PRN13 (one of the first satellites to be impacted) for times before the event (23:13) and during (23:26) t UTC = t LS + A 0 + A 1 (t E - t ot + 604800(WN-WN t )) Date Time t UTC µs t LS A 0 A 1 t E t ot WN WN t 25 Jan 23:13-0.002 17s -9.93132e-10 5.33e-15 170034 319488 89 89 25 Jan 23:27-13.025 17s -1.3696e-05 1.24e-14 170874 0 89 0 Data and method courtesy John Lavrakas 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 25

So What Happened? A Satellite retirement event triggered the anomaly The SVN23 retirement in particular, but we should not blame SVN23! Previous retirements had gone OK So? So (I) assume procedure not followed or operator error NAVCEN and 2SOPS understandably coy about this A software bug was triggered by zeroing out the satellite s database values before removing the satellite from the database In every other case prior, the satellite was removed first, and so we never saw the problem Not looking for scapegoats GPS is an incredible machine The guys that fly and fix GPS are an incredible team 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 26

and why not all receivers? Mitigation due to RAIM effects Did not need new ephemeris during event? or collected from a good satellite Recognition of flawed UTCO data e.g. outside fit interval squelch GPS, ignore, mark GPS unhealthy Ideal topic for further research and testing! 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 27

Case Study & Further Reading SVN 23 Case Study RAEng Report on GNSS Vulnerabilities RAEng Report on Space Weather 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 28

Glonass in 2014 Glonass 1 st April 2014 All satellites broadcast corrupt data for 11 hours Massive positional errors Glonass 14 th April 2014 8 satellites set unhealthy for 30 minutes Press Coverage http://gpsworld.com/the-system-glonass-fumbles-forward/ http://gpsworld.com/the-system-glonass-in-april-what-went-wrong/ 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 29

Galileo in 2017 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 30

Beware the Ides of March! Week Number Rollover 2019 31 st March 2019 WN = 1023 7 th April 2019 WN = 0 Zeroing terms in t UTC caused grief in January 2016 What will happen in April 2019? 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 31

Conclusion SVN23 was a wake-up call for single UTC traceability solutions A true Black Swan! Ignore mitigation options at your peril Network backup PTP, SyncE Another GNSS Another off-air UTC Traceable PNT e.g. eloran Preferably 3 dissimilar sources of UTC over 3 dissimilar technological routes 27/02/2017 Chronos Technology: COMPANY PROPRIETARY 32

Thankyou www.chronos.co.uk www.gpsworld.biz www.taviga.com charles.curry@chronos.co.uk charles.curry@taviga.com