University of Macondo The need for a continuing conversation T HE SAFETY LESSONS OF THE MACONDO OIL SPILL of 2010 are elusive, as companies and regulators that were involved in the incident are reluctant to embrace language about advances, since the term itself would imply fault, error or liability at the time. This situation was made clear at the Safe Seas conference in Havana, October 19 20, 2015, when vendors made a point of speaking about preparedness and new features, but in a way that did not imply unpreparedness or defective features, operations or leadership in 2010. In this report, we propose to elevate the importance of the Macondo incident for the lessons that it has told us, as well as for lessons yet to be learned. We imagine a Macondo University in which there are three areas of ongoing study and discussion: Safety Environment, Site Governance and Incident Response. In each area, there are departments where vendors, regulators and academic researchers from around the world may gather and debate the evidence, causation and competing models of safety protocols, regulation and enforcement. We may conceive of the curriculum as concerned with the before, during and afterwards of the event. The Macondo literature is vast, much of it highly technical. Particularly instructive is the report of the Chief Counsel of the Department of Justice, issued in 2011. That report gives equal attention to the shortcomings of law, regulations and regulators as to inadequacies of management. Macondo Safety Lessons are important not only for stakeholders in the Gulf of Mexico, but also for those in other petroleum basins around the globe where joint preparedness by multiple, national jurisdictions is needed for an effective response to a future incident of the scale of the Macondo blowout and oil spill. Safe Seas conference info@energia.com MEXICO ENERGY INTELLIGENCE ISSN 2380 6400 Page 1 of 12
DISCUSSION A Houston, November 8, 2015 GREAT DEAL OF REGULATORY AND SAFETY DRIVEN ACTIVITY around the world has taken place as a consequence of the Macondo blowout and its aftermath. Much of this activity may be understood under four headings: 1) Public oversight, where the objective is to create institutions (as in Mexico s case) or perfect others (as in the US, UK, Cuba and many other jurisdictions) that can be responsive to the safety dimensions of a technologically evolving industry; 2) Better safety coordination between the operator and contractors 1 ; 3) Higher standards for well completion; and 4) Technological innovation. Much of what happened on April 20, 2010, came about as a sequence of missed opportunities to control a kick. 2 In this report, we want to turn the clock backwards to events that are not noted in the public record to the documented events that led to a botched execution of a faulty plan for temporary abandonment. From commerciality to temporary abandonment In our review of the literature, an inflection point in the succession of events that led to the incident is scarcely mentioned: the choice to not plug and abandon the well on safety grounds. BP management determined that the reservoir into which the Macondo well had drilled was a commercial discovery. At that point, a decision had to be made regarding the future of the well: 1) to complete the well for production (and shutting it in until production infrastructure were available) 2) partially complete the well, with temporary abandonment, pending a later completion with a less expensive rig, or 3) plug the well. In retrospect, the correct answer was (3), which, in the language of American cowboy movies, could be rendered as Get out of Dodge quick, before it s too late! Said differently again, before doing anything else, BP, knowing that there was a weak area below the flowable zones, and that the narrow safety margin represented a serious risk were partial completion attempted, the first order of business was to plug that area with light cement. 3 Once that cement had cured, BP would have sealed off the flowable zones with heavy cement. When the integrity of the cement barrier had been established, the drilling fluid could safely be displaced by sea water. At that point, the Deepwater Horizon (DWH), the deepwater 1 An example is API Bulletin 97 (December 2013): This bulletin. is intended to align the lease operator s safety and environmental management system (SEMS) with drilling contractor s safe work practices (CSWP). 2 The literature of Macondo is vast: http://www.vpsigroup.com/macondoreports.htm 3 In view of the recent experience of an underground blowout in that area, and given the narrow safety window, any error at or above 0.2 psi could cause the loss of the cement and lead to another blowout. Page 2 of 12
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info@energia.com MEXICO ENERGY INTELLIGENCE ISSN 2380 6400 Page 11 of 12
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BAKER & ASSOCIATES,ENERGY CONSULTANTS Management consulting Industry, policy and regulatory reports A management briefing is available on the topics covered in this report. (832) 434-3928 (text/cell) Mailing Address: Box 271506 Houston TX 77277 1506 To learn about our reporting, consult the title lists, by year or category, on http://www.energia.com, or write to us at info@energia.com