The Swedish Armed Forces Sensor Study

Transcription

1 The Swedish Armed Forces Sensor Study Requirements for Air surveillance and Sea surface surveillance beyond 2025 (2040)

2 The Swedish Armed Forces sensor study Chaired by SwAF HQ Plans And Policy Participants from HQ, Units, Schools & Agencys Conceptual level Pedagogical approach

3 Major inputs to the study Scenarios approved on a political level Perspective studies* Threat and technical development *Ref LtCol Hansson breifing yesterday

4 Principles for a system of sensors Key principles that should characterize a system of sensors These principles comes partly from experience drawn from war gaming conducted in the Armed Forces, international experience, but also experience from the group members These principles complement but also contradict each other and they are not listed in priority order

5 Ability against different types of targets A sensor system must be able to detect, follow and provide data for armed weapons allocation Aircraft, ships, cruise missiles, ballistic weapons and targets with small RCS place heavy demands on the performance of the sensor system. Different sensors have different characteristics and against different types of targets. For this reason, a system composed of sensors with different characteristics that complement each other is required.

6 The need for early warning vs earths curvature 9000 m 7000 m 5000 m 3000 m 1000 m m 500 m 6

7 Early warning A sensor 50 m above the ground or ocean surface can detect targets at lowest altitude at a distance of 30 km m -> 185 km 7000 m -> 340 km

8 Robustness Robustness can be achieved in several complementary ways Frequency diversity Weather sensitivity Resolution Potential range Low RCS Jamming Numerical strength is also part of robustness Sensor systems and its supporting communications network must also be able to counter for instance Cyber Attacks or Navigation Warfare.

9 Frequency Conflicts Armed forces and civilian frequencies expansion Civil telecommunications, data and satellite communications increasingly uses traditional radar bands with substantial consequences for military sensors and communications equipment. In 2002, the Telecommunications Authority responsible for frequency planning was transferred to the new authority, Swedish Post and Telecom Authority (PTS) The Armed Forces are now one actor among others

10 Mobility Tactical or strategic? Legacy sensor systems have a strategic mobility Attacker's ability to use long distance weapons Kinetic protection hard to achieve Reinforcement Gapfiller -> A need for highly mobile sensors!

11 Capability of passive surveillance Passive capability allows that targets can be detected and monitored without emitting your own electromagnetic energy. This can also enhance the ability of classification of non cooperative targets Also, this capability may force an attacker to adapt by not emitting signals from systems like datalinks, active sensors or other active equipment

12 Growth potential Swedish Supply Strategy advocates that existing stock shall be upgraded if possible The need for future upgrades as results of weapon and platform development

13 Cooperative Engagement Capability Enabling a (near)real-time sensor netting system that enables situational awareness and integrated fire control capability. Allows the sharing of radar and weapons systems data on air targets Requires a very fast communications network

14 Low peacetime operational cost Systems must be able to operate 24/7/365 with a very favourable MTB(C)F with a minimum of maintenance personnel Low life cycle cost

15 Agency cooperation The study has identified a potential and benefits in a specific, extended agency cooperation regarding the development of knowledge and monitoring of current activities in our region

16 International cooperation Early warning and monitoring of activities in our immediate surroundings through sensors located outside Sweden is very valuable. And vice versa Agreements with other countries on the exchange of sensor data is a reality in some areas. In other areas there are ambitions to expand cooperation, including within the framework of NORDEFCO. Agreements and different levels of conflict

17 The concept Modern highly mobile AESA sensors Passive ESM systems Updated/ Upgraded chain of coastal radars Updated/ Upgraded S-band sensors Updated/ Upgraded AEW/ AEW&C VHF/UHF sensors Modern high performance telecommunications systems Cooperation!

18 Thank you for your attention