Exam 2 Sample Questions. Material for Exam 2 comes from Chapter G.1, G.2, G.3, and 14.1, 14.2

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Exam 2 Sample Questions. Material for Exam 2 comes from Chapter G.1, G.2, G.3, and 14.1, 14.2"

Transcription

1 Math 1620 Exam 2 Sample Questions Material for Exam 2 comes from Chapter G.1, G.2, G.3, and 14.1, 14.2 The exam will have 4 sections: Matching, Multiple Choice, Short Answer and one Logic Problem. A list of words that will be in the Matching section are provided below. Sample questions for the Short Answer section and a sample Logic Problem are included here. Matching Know the definitions of the following words for this section. You will be asked to match the word with the definition. Contrapositive Converse Expected Value Fallacy Implication Inverse Optimal Mixed Strategy Preference Table Reduction by Dominance Saddle Point Sound Argument Statement Strictly Determined Game Tautology Two-player Zero Sum Game Valid Argument Short Answer Questions: For calculations, show how you set-up each problem to receive full credit. 1. Reduce the payoff matrix by dominance. Row Player R1 R2 R Set up the payoff matrix for the following scenario: You are deciding whether to invade Finland, Sweden, or Norway, and your opponent is simultaneously deciding which of these three countries to defend. If you invade a country that your opponent is defending, you will be defeated (payoff: -1), but if you invade a country your opponent is not defending, you will be successful (payoff: +1). 3. Determine the optimal pure strategies under the minimax criterion for both players Row Player R1 R2 R

2 4. Find the expected value of the game with the following payoff matrix and using the mixed strategies S = [ 1 4, 1 4, 1 4, 1 4 ] and T = [ 1 4, 1 4, 1 4, 1 4 ]T. P = Decide which pure strategy (or strategies) the row player should use in order to maximize the expected value game with the following payoff matrix if the column player uses the strategy T = [ 1 4, 1 4, 1 2 ]T. P = Consider the following payoff matrix: Row R1 PlayerR Find the optimal strategies for the two players AND the value of the game. To receive full credit you must plot the strategy lines for each of the s strategies and use this to determine your optimal p value. 7. Construct a truth table for the statement p ( q r). 8. Complete the following truth table. p q p q p q T T T F F T F F 9. Given the statement: Married people are healthier than single people and more economically stable than single people, and children of married people do better on a variety of indicators. (a) Write the statement in symbolic form. Assign letters to simple statements that are not negated. (b) Construct a truth table for the symbolic statement in part (a). 10. Construct a truth table for [(p q) (q p)] (p q)

3 11. Given the statement: If you do homework right after class then you will not fall behind, and if you do not do homework right after class then you will. (a) Write the statement in symbolic form. Assign letters to simple statements that are not negated. (b) Construct a truth table for the symbolic statement in part (a). 12. Write the converse, inverse and contrapositive of the statement: If the stereo is playing, then I cannot hear you. 13. Use De Morgan s laws to write a statement that is equivalent to: It is not the case that my high school encouraged creativity and diversity. 14. Write the negation of the statement: A bill becomes law and it does not receive majority approval. 15. Use a truth table to determine whether the symbolic form of the argument is valid or invalid. p q q r p r 16. Translate the following argument into symbolic form. Then determine whether the argument is valid or invalid. Show your truth table or the standard valid or invalid form that you used in your determination. If we close the door, there is less noise. There is less noise. We closed the door. 17. Use Euler diagrams to determine whether the following arguments are valid or invalid. (a) (b) All dancers are athletes. Savion Glover is an athlete. Therefore, Savion Glover is a dancer. No blank disks contain data. Some blank disks are formatted. Therefore, some formatted disks do not contain data. 18. The theater society members are voting for the kind of play they will perform next semester: a comedy (C), a drama (D), or a musical (M). Use the following preference table to answer the questions below. Number of Votes First Choice M C D C D M Second Choice C M C D M D Third Choice D D M M C C (a) How many students voted? (b) Which type of play is selected using the plurality method?

4 (c) Which type of play is selected using the Borda count method? (d) Which type of play is selected using the plurality-with-elimination method? (e) Which type of play is selected using the pairwise comparison method? 19. In one sentence each, describe each of the four fairness criteria. 20. The preference table gives the results of a straw vote among three candidates: A, B, and Number of Votes First Choice C B A A C. Second Choice A C B C Third Choice B A C B (a) Using the plurality-with-elimination method, which candidate wins the straw vote? (b) In the actual election, the four voters in the last column, who voted A, C, B, in that order, change their votes to C, A, B. Using the plurality-with-elimination method, which candidate wins the actual election? (c) Is the monotonicity criterion satisfied? Explain your answer.

5 Logic Problem: Solve the following Logic Puzzle. When the Keebler family did their weekly shopping at Giant Grocery yesterday, Mrs. Keebler allowed each of the five children, including Lara, to pick a salty snack and a sweet snack for the coming week. No two Keebler children picked the same product. Given the shopping list that follows, you should be able to solve for the salty snack (one child chose Fritos Corn Chips) and sweet treat each child chose. 1. Ian helped his younger brother get his choice of Oreo Cookies from the top shelf. 2. The two Keebler girls decided they would share their snacks during the week and decided on Rold Gold Pretzel Rods and one of the two chip products chosen as their salty snacks. 3. The child who chose the Pizza Combos filled pretzels isn t the one who selected the Pepperidge Farm Tahoe Cookies. 4. Jeremy isn t the Keebler child who picked the Hostess Ho Ho cakes. 5. Neither the child who decided on the Oreos nor the one who chose the Little Debbie s Christmas Tree Cakes picked the Cheez-It Crackers to go with it. 6. The two girls selected Chips Ahoy Chocolate Chip Cookies and one of the two cake products chosen as their sweet treats. 7. The child who chose the Wavy Lay s Potato Chips, who isn t Kim, didn t pair it with the Little Debbie s cakes. 8. Neither Jeremy nor Micah chose the Tahoe Cookies. 9. Ian s choice of salty snack was neither the Cheez-Its nor the Wavy Lay s chips.

Math 1001: Excursions in Mathematics Final Exam: 9 May :30-4:30 p.m.

Math 1001: Excursions in Mathematics Final Exam: 9 May :30-4:30 p.m. Math 1001: Excursions in Mathematics Final Exam: 9 May 2011 1:30-4:30 p.m. Name: Section Number: You have three hours to complete this exam. There are ten problems on twelve pages, worth a total of 100

More information

MA 110 Homework 1 ANSWERS

MA 110 Homework 1 ANSWERS MA 110 Homework 1 ANSWERS This homework assignment is to be written out, showing all work, with problems numbered and answers clearly indicated. Put your code number on each page. The assignment is due

More information

ECON 282 Final Practice Problems

ECON 282 Final Practice Problems ECON 282 Final Practice Problems S. Lu Multiple Choice Questions Note: The presence of these practice questions does not imply that there will be any multiple choice questions on the final exam. 1. How

More information

1. Simultaneous games All players move at same time. Represent with a game table. We ll stick to 2 players, generally A and B or Row and Col.

1. Simultaneous games All players move at same time. Represent with a game table. We ll stick to 2 players, generally A and B or Row and Col. I. Game Theory: Basic Concepts 1. Simultaneous games All players move at same time. Represent with a game table. We ll stick to 2 players, generally A and B or Row and Col. Representation of utilities/preferences

More information

Note that there are questions printed on both sides of each page!

Note that there are questions printed on both sides of each page! Math 1001 Name: Fall 2007 Test 2 Student ID: 11/7/07 Time allowed: 50 minutes Section: 10:10 11:15 12:20 This exam includes 7 pages, including this one and a sheet for scratch work. There are a total of

More information

Lecture Notes on Game Theory (QTM)

Lecture Notes on Game Theory (QTM) Theory of games: Introduction and basic terminology, pure strategy games (including identification of saddle point and value of the game), Principle of dominance, mixed strategy games (only arithmetic

More information

THEORY: NASH EQUILIBRIUM

THEORY: NASH EQUILIBRIUM THEORY: NASH EQUILIBRIUM 1 The Story Prisoner s Dilemma Two prisoners held in separate rooms. Authorities offer a reduced sentence to each prisoner if he rats out his friend. If a prisoner is ratted out

More information

Name: Exam Score: /100. Exam 1: Version C. Academic Honesty Pledge

Name: Exam Score: /100. Exam 1: Version C. Academic Honesty Pledge MATH 11008 Explorations in Modern Mathematics Fall 2013 Circle one: MW7:45 / MWF1:10 Dr. Kracht Name: Exam Score: /100. (110 pts available) Exam 1: Version C Academic Honesty Pledge Your signature at the

More information

GAME THEORY Day 5. Section 7.4

GAME THEORY Day 5. Section 7.4 GAME THEORY Day 5 Section 7.4 Grab one penny. I will walk around and check your HW. Warm Up A school categorizes its students as distinguished, accomplished, proficient, and developing. Data show that

More information

Math 611: Game Theory Notes Chetan Prakash 2012

Math 611: Game Theory Notes Chetan Prakash 2012 Math 611: Game Theory Notes Chetan Prakash 2012 Devised in 1944 by von Neumann and Morgenstern, as a theory of economic (and therefore political) interactions. For: Decisions made in conflict situations.

More information

Math 152: Applicable Mathematics and Computing

Math 152: Applicable Mathematics and Computing Math 152: Applicable Mathematics and Computing April 16, 2017 April 16, 2017 1 / 17 Announcements Please bring a blue book for the midterm on Friday. Some students will be taking the exam in Center 201,

More information

Math 152: Applicable Mathematics and Computing

Math 152: Applicable Mathematics and Computing Math 152: Applicable Mathematics and Computing May 8, 2017 May 8, 2017 1 / 15 Extensive Form: Overview We have been studying the strategic form of a game: we considered only a player s overall strategy,

More information

Game Theory two-person, zero-sum games

Game Theory two-person, zero-sum games GAME THEORY Game Theory Mathematical theory that deals with the general features of competitive situations. Examples: parlor games, military battles, political campaigns, advertising and marketing campaigns,

More information

Chapter 15: Game Theory: The Mathematics of Competition Lesson Plan

Chapter 15: Game Theory: The Mathematics of Competition Lesson Plan Chapter 15: Game Theory: The Mathematics of Competition Lesson Plan For All Practical Purposes Two-Person Total-Conflict Games: Pure Strategies Mathematical Literacy in Today s World, 9th ed. Two-Person

More information

Math 167 Ch 9 Review 1 (c) Janice Epstein

Math 167 Ch 9 Review 1 (c) Janice Epstein Math 167 Ch 9 Review 1 (c) Janice Epstein CHAPTER 9 VOTING Plurality Method: Each voter votes for one candidate. The candidate with the most votes is the winner. Majority Rule: Each voter votes for one

More information

Contents. MA 327/ECO 327 Introduction to Game Theory Fall 2017 Notes. 1 Wednesday, August Friday, August Monday, August 28 6

Contents. MA 327/ECO 327 Introduction to Game Theory Fall 2017 Notes. 1 Wednesday, August Friday, August Monday, August 28 6 MA 327/ECO 327 Introduction to Game Theory Fall 2017 Notes Contents 1 Wednesday, August 23 4 2 Friday, August 25 5 3 Monday, August 28 6 4 Wednesday, August 30 8 5 Friday, September 1 9 6 Wednesday, September

More information

(a) Left Right (b) Left Right. Up Up 5-4. Row Down 0-5 Row Down 1 2. (c) B1 B2 (d) B1 B2 A1 4, 2-5, 6 A1 3, 2 0, 1

(a) Left Right (b) Left Right. Up Up 5-4. Row Down 0-5 Row Down 1 2. (c) B1 B2 (d) B1 B2 A1 4, 2-5, 6 A1 3, 2 0, 1 Economics 109 Practice Problems 2, Vincent Crawford, Spring 2002 In addition to these problems and those in Practice Problems 1 and the midterm, you may find the problems in Dixit and Skeath, Games of

More information

Section Notes 6. Game Theory. Applied Math 121. Week of March 22, understand the difference between pure and mixed strategies.

Section Notes 6. Game Theory. Applied Math 121. Week of March 22, understand the difference between pure and mixed strategies. Section Notes 6 Game Theory Applied Math 121 Week of March 22, 2010 Goals for the week be comfortable with the elements of game theory. understand the difference between pure and mixed strategies. be able

More information

Majority Rule: Each voter votes for one candidate. The candidate with the majority of the votes wins. Majority means MORE than half.

Majority Rule: Each voter votes for one candidate. The candidate with the majority of the votes wins. Majority means MORE than half. Math 167 h 9 Week in Review 1 (c) Janice Epstein and Tamara arter HPTER 9 VOTING Majority Rule: Each voter votes for one candidate. The candidate with the majority of the votes wins. Majority means MORE

More information

7. Suppose that at each turn a player may select one pile and remove c chips if c =1

7. Suppose that at each turn a player may select one pile and remove c chips if c =1 Math 5750-1: Game Theory Midterm Exam with solutions Mar 6 2015 You have a choice of any four of the five problems (If you do all 5 each will count 1/5 meaning there is no advantage) This is a closed-book

More information

SF2972 Game Theory Written Exam March 17, 2011

SF2972 Game Theory Written Exam March 17, 2011 SF97 Game Theory Written Exam March 7, Time:.-9. No permitted aids Examiner: Boualem Djehiche The exam consists of two parts: Part A on classical game theory and Part B on combinatorial game theory. Each

More information

37 Game Theory. Bebe b1 b2 b3. a Abe a a A Two-Person Zero-Sum Game

37 Game Theory. Bebe b1 b2 b3. a Abe a a A Two-Person Zero-Sum Game 37 Game Theory Game theory is one of the most interesting topics of discrete mathematics. The principal theorem of game theory is sublime and wonderful. We will merely assume this theorem and use it to

More information

(b) In the position given in the figure below, find a winning move, if any. (b) In the position given in Figure 4.2, find a winning move, if any.

(b) In the position given in the figure below, find a winning move, if any. (b) In the position given in Figure 4.2, find a winning move, if any. Math 5750-1: Game Theory Midterm Exam Mar. 6, 2015 You have a choice of any four of the five problems. (If you do all 5, each will count 1/5, meaning there is no advantage.) This is a closed-book exam,

More information

Chapter 3 Learning in Two-Player Matrix Games

Chapter 3 Learning in Two-Player Matrix Games Chapter 3 Learning in Two-Player Matrix Games 3.1 Matrix Games In this chapter, we will examine the two-player stage game or the matrix game problem. Now, we have two players each learning how to play

More information

NORMAL FORM (SIMULTANEOUS MOVE) GAMES

NORMAL FORM (SIMULTANEOUS MOVE) GAMES NORMAL FORM (SIMULTANEOUS MOVE) GAMES 1 For These Games Choices are simultaneous made independently and without observing the other players actions Players have complete information, which means they know

More information

Math 152: Applicable Mathematics and Computing

Math 152: Applicable Mathematics and Computing Math 152: Applicable Mathematics and Computing May 12, 2017 May 12, 2017 1 / 17 Announcements Midterm 2 is next Friday. Questions like homework questions, plus definitions. A list of definitions will be

More information

Exercises for Introduction to Game Theory SOLUTIONS

Exercises for Introduction to Game Theory SOLUTIONS Exercises for Introduction to Game Theory SOLUTIONS Heinrich H. Nax & Bary S. R. Pradelski March 19, 2018 Due: March 26, 2018 1 Cooperative game theory Exercise 1.1 Marginal contributions 1. If the value

More information

Midterm (Sample Version 3, with Solutions)

Midterm (Sample Version 3, with Solutions) Midterm (Sample Version 3, with Solutions) Math 425-201 Su10 by Prof. Michael Cap Khoury Directions: Name: Please print your name legibly in the box above. You have 110 minutes to complete this exam. You

More information

Stat 155: solutions to midterm exam

Stat 155: solutions to midterm exam Stat 155: solutions to midterm exam Michael Lugo October 21, 2010 1. We have a board consisting of infinitely many squares labeled 0, 1, 2, 3,... from left to right. Finitely many counters are placed on

More information

Classwork Example 1: Exploring Subtraction with the Integer Game

Classwork Example 1: Exploring Subtraction with the Integer Game 7.2.5 Lesson Date Understanding Subtraction of Integers Student Objectives I can justify the rule for subtraction: Subtracting a number is the same as adding its opposite. I can relate the rule for subtraction

More information

D. Plurality-with-Elimination Method

D. Plurality-with-Elimination Method Chapter : The Mathematics of Voting (c) 5 + 4 + 3 + 2 + = 5 (d) 5 20 = 300 (e) 300 69 70 64 48 = 49 25. C wins with 500 5 20 25 = 40 points; the points sum to 4 50 + 3 50 + 2 50 + 50 = 500. 26. E. There

More information

MA 111 Worksheet Sept. 9 Name:

MA 111 Worksheet Sept. 9 Name: MA 111 Worksheet Sept. 9 Name: 1. List the four fairness criteria. In your own words, describe what each of these critieria say. Majority Criteria: If a candidate recieves more than half of the first place

More information

Game Theory Lecturer: Ji Liu Thanks for Jerry Zhu's slides

Game Theory Lecturer: Ji Liu Thanks for Jerry Zhu's slides Game Theory ecturer: Ji iu Thanks for Jerry Zhu's slides [based on slides from Andrew Moore http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~awm/tutorials] slide 1 Overview Matrix normal form Chance games Games with hidden information

More information

Game Theory. Problem data representing the situation are constant. They do not vary with respect to time or any other basis.

Game Theory. Problem data representing the situation are constant. They do not vary with respect to time or any other basis. Game Theory For effective decision making. Decision making is classified into 3 categories: o Deterministic Situation: o o Problem data representing the situation are constant. They do not vary with respect

More information

final examination on May 31 Topics from the latter part of the course (covered in homework assignments 4-7) include:

final examination on May 31 Topics from the latter part of the course (covered in homework assignments 4-7) include: The final examination on May 31 may test topics from any part of the course, but the emphasis will be on topic after the first three homework assignments, which were covered in the midterm. Topics from

More information

CS188 Spring 2010 Section 3: Game Trees

CS188 Spring 2010 Section 3: Game Trees CS188 Spring 2010 Section 3: Game Trees 1 Warm-Up: Column-Row You have a 3x3 matrix of values like the one below. In a somewhat boring game, player A first selects a row, and then player B selects a column.

More information

ECO 220 Game Theory. Objectives. Agenda. Simultaneous Move Games. Be able to structure a game in normal form Be able to identify a Nash equilibrium

ECO 220 Game Theory. Objectives. Agenda. Simultaneous Move Games. Be able to structure a game in normal form Be able to identify a Nash equilibrium ECO 220 Game Theory Simultaneous Move Games Objectives Be able to structure a game in normal form Be able to identify a Nash equilibrium Agenda Definitions Equilibrium Concepts Dominance Coordination Games

More information

Computing Nash Equilibrium; Maxmin

Computing Nash Equilibrium; Maxmin Computing Nash Equilibrium; Maxmin Lecture 5 Computing Nash Equilibrium; Maxmin Lecture 5, Slide 1 Lecture Overview 1 Recap 2 Computing Mixed Nash Equilibria 3 Fun Game 4 Maxmin and Minmax Computing Nash

More information

Student Name. Student ID

Student Name. Student ID Final Exam CMPT 882: Computational Game Theory Simon Fraser University Spring 2010 Instructor: Oliver Schulte Student Name Student ID Instructions. This exam is worth 30% of your final mark in this course.

More information

INSTRUCTIONS: all the calculations on the separate piece of paper which you do not hand in. GOOD LUCK!

INSTRUCTIONS: all the calculations on the separate piece of paper which you do not hand in. GOOD LUCK! INSTRUCTIONS: 1) You should hand in ONLY THE ANSWERS ASKED FOR written clearly on this EXAM PAPER. You should do all the calculations on the separate piece of paper which you do not hand in. 2) Problems

More information

CS510 \ Lecture Ariel Stolerman

CS510 \ Lecture Ariel Stolerman CS510 \ Lecture04 2012-10-15 1 Ariel Stolerman Administration Assignment 2: just a programming assignment. Midterm: posted by next week (5), will cover: o Lectures o Readings A midterm review sheet will

More information

Fair Game Review. Chapter 2. Name Date. Write the decimal as a fraction Write the fraction as a decimal. 7.

Fair Game Review. Chapter 2. Name Date. Write the decimal as a fraction Write the fraction as a decimal. 7. Name Date Chapter Fair Game Review Write the decimal as a fraction.. 0.6. 0.79. 0.7. 0.86 Write the fraction as a decimal.. 8 6. 7. 6 8. 7 0 9. A quarterback completed 0.6 of his passes during a game.

More information

Grade 7/8 Math Circles. February 14 th /15 th. Game Theory. If they both confess, they will both serve 5 hours of detention.

Grade 7/8 Math Circles. February 14 th /15 th. Game Theory. If they both confess, they will both serve 5 hours of detention. Faculty of Mathematics Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1 Centre for Education in Mathematics and Computing Grade 7/8 Math Circles February 14 th /15 th Game Theory Motivating Problem: Roger and Colleen have been

More information

1. Five cards are drawn from a standard deck of 52 cards, without replacement. What is the probability that (a) all of the cards are spades?

1. Five cards are drawn from a standard deck of 52 cards, without replacement. What is the probability that (a) all of the cards are spades? Math 13 Final Exam May 31, 2012 Part I, Long Problems. Name: Wherever applicable, write down the value of each variable used and insert these values into the formula. If you only give the answer I will

More information

Overview GAME THEORY. Basic notions

Overview GAME THEORY. Basic notions Overview GAME EORY Game theory explicitly considers interactions between individuals hus it seems like a suitable framework for studying agent interactions his lecture provides an introduction to some

More information

Introduction to Game Theory a Discovery Approach. Jennifer Firkins Nordstrom

Introduction to Game Theory a Discovery Approach. Jennifer Firkins Nordstrom Introduction to Game Theory a Discovery Approach Jennifer Firkins Nordstrom Contents 1. Preface iv Chapter 1. Introduction to Game Theory 1 1. The Assumptions 1 2. Game Matrices and Payoff Vectors 4 Chapter

More information

Adversary Search. Ref: Chapter 5

Adversary Search. Ref: Chapter 5 Adversary Search Ref: Chapter 5 1 Games & A.I. Easy to measure success Easy to represent states Small number of operators Comparison against humans is possible. Many games can be modeled very easily, although

More information

2359 (i.e. 11:59:00 pm) on 4/16/18 via Blackboard

2359 (i.e. 11:59:00 pm) on 4/16/18 via Blackboard CS 109: Introduction to Computer Science Goodney Spring 2018 Homework Assignment 4 Assigned: 4/2/18 via Blackboard Due: 2359 (i.e. 11:59:00 pm) on 4/16/18 via Blackboard Notes: a. This is the fourth homework

More information

CSC 396 : Introduction to Artificial Intelligence

CSC 396 : Introduction to Artificial Intelligence CSC 396 : Introduction to Artificial Intelligence Exam 1 March 11th - 13th, 2008 Name Signature - Honor Code This is a take-home exam. You may use your book and lecture notes from class. You many not use

More information

UPenn NETS 412: Algorithmic Game Theory Game Theory Practice. Clyde Silent Confess Silent 1, 1 10, 0 Confess 0, 10 5, 5

UPenn NETS 412: Algorithmic Game Theory Game Theory Practice. Clyde Silent Confess Silent 1, 1 10, 0 Confess 0, 10 5, 5 Problem 1 UPenn NETS 412: Algorithmic Game Theory Game Theory Practice Bonnie Clyde Silent Confess Silent 1, 1 10, 0 Confess 0, 10 5, 5 This game is called Prisoner s Dilemma. Bonnie and Clyde have been

More information

Game Theory and Randomized Algorithms

Game Theory and Randomized Algorithms Game Theory and Randomized Algorithms Guy Aridor Game theory is a set of tools that allow us to understand how decisionmakers interact with each other. It has practical applications in economics, international

More information

Sequential games. We may play the dating game as a sequential game. In this case, one player, say Connie, makes a choice before the other.

Sequential games. We may play the dating game as a sequential game. In this case, one player, say Connie, makes a choice before the other. Sequential games Sequential games A sequential game is a game where one player chooses his action before the others choose their. We say that a game has perfect information if all players know all moves

More information

Japanese. Sail North. Search Search Search Search

Japanese. Sail North. Search Search Search Search COMP9514, 1998 Game Theory Lecture 1 1 Slide 1 Maurice Pagnucco Knowledge Systems Group Department of Articial Intelligence School of Computer Science and Engineering The University of New South Wales

More information

Lecture 11 Strategic Form Games

Lecture 11 Strategic Form Games Lecture 11 Strategic Form Games Jitesh H. Panchal ME 597: Decision Making for Engineering Systems Design Design Engineering Lab @ Purdue (DELP) School of Mechanical Engineering Purdue University, West

More information

Name: Final Exam May 7, 2014

Name: Final Exam May 7, 2014 MATH 10120 Finite Mathematics Final Exam May 7, 2014 Name: Be sure that you have all 16 pages of the exam. The exam lasts for 2 hrs. There are 30 multiple choice questions, each worth 5 points. You may

More information

Dominant and Dominated Strategies

Dominant and Dominated Strategies Dominant and Dominated Strategies Carlos Hurtado Department of Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign hrtdmrt2@illinois.edu Junel 8th, 2016 C. Hurtado (UIUC - Economics) Game Theory On the

More information

Midterm Examination. CSCI 561: Artificial Intelligence

Midterm Examination. CSCI 561: Artificial Intelligence Midterm Examination CSCI 561: Artificial Intelligence October 10, 2002 Instructions: 1. Date: 10/10/2002 from 11:00am 12:20 pm 2. Maximum credits/points for this midterm: 100 points (corresponding to 35%

More information

5.4 Imperfect, Real-Time Decisions

5.4 Imperfect, Real-Time Decisions 5.4 Imperfect, Real-Time Decisions Searching through the whole (pruned) game tree is too inefficient for any realistic game Moves must be made in a reasonable amount of time One has to cut off the generation

More information

MTH 103 H Final Exam. 1. I study and I pass the course is an example of a. (a) conjunction (b) disjunction. (c) conditional (d) connective

MTH 103 H Final Exam. 1. I study and I pass the course is an example of a. (a) conjunction (b) disjunction. (c) conditional (d) connective MTH 103 H Final Exam Name: 1. I study and I pass the course is an example of a (a) conjunction (b) disjunction (c) conditional (d) connective 2. Which of the following is equivalent to (p q)? (a) p q (b)

More information

Incentives and Game Theory

Incentives and Game Theory April 15, 2010 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 License. Putting Utilitarianism to Work Example Suppose that you and your roomate are considering

More information

Probability --QUESTIONS-- Principles of Math 12 - Probability Practice Exam 1

Probability --QUESTIONS-- Principles of Math 12 - Probability Practice Exam 1 Probability --QUESTIONS-- Principles of Math - Probability Practice Exam www.math.com Principles of Math : Probability Practice Exam Use this sheet to record your answers:... 4... 4... 4.. 6. 4.. 6. 7..

More information

Mixed Strategies; Maxmin

Mixed Strategies; Maxmin Mixed Strategies; Maxmin CPSC 532A Lecture 4 January 28, 2008 Mixed Strategies; Maxmin CPSC 532A Lecture 4, Slide 1 Lecture Overview 1 Recap 2 Mixed Strategies 3 Fun Game 4 Maxmin and Minmax Mixed Strategies;

More information

Exam 4 Learning Objectives. Voting Methods

Exam 4 Learning Objectives. Voting Methods Exam 4 Learning Objectives Voting Methods Given the results of an election, determine the winner using o Majority rule or plurality o Borda count o Hare method o Pairwise-comparison o Tournament method.

More information

Dominant and Dominated Strategies

Dominant and Dominated Strategies Dominant and Dominated Strategies Carlos Hurtado Department of Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign hrtdmrt2@illinois.edu May 29th, 2015 C. Hurtado (UIUC - Economics) Game Theory On the

More information

Dominance and Best Response. player 2

Dominance and Best Response. player 2 Dominance and Best Response Consider the following game, Figure 6.1(a) from the text. player 2 L R player 1 U 2, 3 5, 0 D 1, 0 4, 3 Suppose you are player 1. The strategy U yields higher payoff than any

More information

Summary Overview of Topics in Econ 30200b: Decision theory: strong and weak domination by randomized strategies, domination theorem, expected utility

Summary Overview of Topics in Econ 30200b: Decision theory: strong and weak domination by randomized strategies, domination theorem, expected utility Summary Overview of Topics in Econ 30200b: Decision theory: strong and weak domination by randomized strategies, domination theorem, expected utility theorem (consistent decisions under uncertainty should

More information

Games. Episode 6 Part III: Dynamics. Baochun Li Professor Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Toronto

Games. Episode 6 Part III: Dynamics. Baochun Li Professor Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Toronto Games Episode 6 Part III: Dynamics Baochun Li Professor Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Toronto Dynamics Motivation for a new chapter 2 Dynamics Motivation for a new chapter

More information

CS 1571 Introduction to AI Lecture 12. Adversarial search. CS 1571 Intro to AI. Announcements

CS 1571 Introduction to AI Lecture 12. Adversarial search. CS 1571 Intro to AI. Announcements CS 171 Introduction to AI Lecture 1 Adversarial search Milos Hauskrecht milos@cs.pitt.edu 39 Sennott Square Announcements Homework assignment is out Programming and experiments Simulated annealing + Genetic

More information

CSC/MTH 231 Discrete Structures II Spring, Homework 5

CSC/MTH 231 Discrete Structures II Spring, Homework 5 CSC/MTH 231 Discrete Structures II Spring, 2010 Homework 5 Name 1. A six sided die D (with sides numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) is thrown once. a. What is the probability that a 3 is thrown? b. What is the

More information

BELLEVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS SUMMER MATH PACKET STUDENTS ENTERING 3 rd GRADE REQUIRED MATERIALS: Pencil Centimeter/Inch Ruler Scrap Paper

BELLEVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS SUMMER MATH PACKET STUDENTS ENTERING 3 rd GRADE REQUIRED MATERIALS: Pencil Centimeter/Inch Ruler Scrap Paper BELLEVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS SUMMER MATH PACKET STUDENTS ENTERING 3 rd GRADE 2016-2017 REQUIRED MATERIALS: Pencil Centimeter/Inch Ruler Scrap Paper SUMMER MATH PACKET 2016-2017 NAME: SCHOOL: 1.Carol is reading

More information

Computing optimal strategy for finite two-player games. Simon Taylor

Computing optimal strategy for finite two-player games. Simon Taylor Simon Taylor Bachelor of Science in Computer Science with Honours The University of Bath April 2009 This dissertation may be made available for consultation within the University Library and may be photocopied

More information

2. The Extensive Form of a Game

2. The Extensive Form of a Game 2. The Extensive Form of a Game In the extensive form, games are sequential, interactive processes which moves from one position to another in response to the wills of the players or the whims of chance.

More information

CS188 Spring 2010 Section 3: Game Trees

CS188 Spring 2010 Section 3: Game Trees CS188 Spring 2010 Section 3: Game Trees 1 Warm-Up: Column-Row You have a 3x3 matrix of values like the one below. In a somewhat boring game, player A first selects a row, and then player B selects a column.

More information

MATH 225: Foundations of Higher Matheamatics. Dr. Morton. Chapter 2: Logic (This is where we begin setting the stage for proofs!)

MATH 225: Foundations of Higher Matheamatics. Dr. Morton. Chapter 2: Logic (This is where we begin setting the stage for proofs!) MATH 225: Foundations of Higher Matheamatics Dr. Morton Chapter 2: Logic (This is where we begin setting the stage for proofs!) New Problem from 2.5 page 3 parts 1,2,4: Suppose that we have the two open

More information

3-4 Dividing Rational Numbers

3-4 Dividing Rational Numbers 1. Find the multiplicative inverse of each number. 8. 2. 9. 3. 63 10. 4. 11. 5. 101 12. 6. 7. 13. Sonia is making a quilted wall hanging that is 38 inches wide. If each quilt square is inches wide, how

More information

Homework 5 Answers PS 30 November 2013

Homework 5 Answers PS 30 November 2013 Homework 5 Answers PS 30 November 2013 Problems which you should be able to do easily 1. Consider the Battle of the Sexes game below. 1a 2, 1 0, 0 1b 0, 0 1, 2 a. Find all Nash equilibria (pure strategy

More information

Name: Hoped-for Major:

Name: Hoped-for Major: Name: Hoped-for Major: Math 102: Math for Liberal Arts Sample Final Exam Read each question carefully, answer each question completely, and show all of your work. Write your solutions clearly and legibly;

More information

CMPUT 396 Tic-Tac-Toe Game

CMPUT 396 Tic-Tac-Toe Game CMPUT 396 Tic-Tac-Toe Game Recall minimax: - For a game tree, we find the root minimax from leaf values - With minimax we can always determine the score and can use a bottom-up approach Why use minimax?

More information

Advanced Intermediate Algebra Chapter 12 Summary INTRO TO PROBABILITY

Advanced Intermediate Algebra Chapter 12 Summary INTRO TO PROBABILITY Advanced Intermediate Algebra Chapter 12 Summary INTRO TO PROBABILITY 1. Jack and Jill do not like washing dishes. They decide to use a random method to select whose turn it is. They put some red and blue

More information

ECON 2100 Principles of Microeconomics (Summer 2016) Game Theory and Oligopoly

ECON 2100 Principles of Microeconomics (Summer 2016) Game Theory and Oligopoly ECON 2100 Principles of Microeconomics (Summer 2016) Game Theory and Oligopoly Relevant readings from the textbook: Mankiw, Ch. 17 Oligopoly Suggested problems from the textbook: Chapter 17 Questions for

More information

Introduction to Spring 2009 Artificial Intelligence Final Exam

Introduction to Spring 2009 Artificial Intelligence Final Exam CS 188 Introduction to Spring 2009 Artificial Intelligence Final Exam INSTRUCTIONS You have 3 hours. The exam is closed book, closed notes except a two-page crib sheet, double-sided. Please use non-programmable

More information

All the children are not boys

All the children are not boys "All are" and "There is at least one" (Games to amuse you) The games and puzzles in this section are to do with using the terms all, not all, there is at least one, there isn t even one and such like.

More information

Mathematics Alignment Lesson

Mathematics Alignment Lesson Mathematics Alignment Lesson Materials Needed: Blackline Masters for each pair: o Product Game Rules o The Product Game board Blackline Masters for each student: o Product Game Recording Sheet o Playing

More information

Game Theory ( nd term) Dr. S. Farshad Fatemi. Graduate School of Management and Economics Sharif University of Technology.

Game Theory ( nd term) Dr. S. Farshad Fatemi. Graduate School of Management and Economics Sharif University of Technology. Game Theory 44812 (1393-94 2 nd term) Dr. S. Farshad Fatemi Graduate School of Management and Economics Sharif University of Technology Spring 2015 Dr. S. Farshad Fatemi (GSME) Game Theory Spring 2015

More information

CMPSCI 240: Reasoning Under Uncertainty First Midterm Exam

CMPSCI 240: Reasoning Under Uncertainty First Midterm Exam CMPSCI 240: Reasoning Under Uncertainty First Midterm Exam February 19, 2014. Name: ID: Instructions: Answer the questions directly on the exam pages. Show all your work for each question. Providing more

More information

Topics in Computer Mathematics. two or more players Uncertainty (regarding the other player(s) resources and strategies)

Topics in Computer Mathematics. two or more players Uncertainty (regarding the other player(s) resources and strategies) Choosing a strategy Games have the following characteristics: two or more players Uncertainty (regarding the other player(s) resources and strategies) Strategy: a sequence of play(s), usually chosen to

More information

MGF 1106 Final Exam Review 9) {5} D 10) D B 11) U

MGF 1106 Final Exam Review 9) {5} D 10) D B 11) U MGF 1106 Final Exam Review Use inductive reasoning to predict the next number in the sequence. 1) 7, -14, 28, -56, 112 Find n(a) for the set. 2) A = { 3, 5, 7, 9, 11} Let U = {q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y,

More information

SECTION NUMBER. Check that your exam contains 25 questions numbered sequentially.

SECTION NUMBER. Check that your exam contains 25 questions numbered sequentially. MATH 07 FAKE FINAL EXAM April 20 NAME STUDENT NUMBER INSTRUCTOR SECTION NUMBER On your scantron, write and bubble your PSU ID, Section Number, and Test Version. Failure to correctly code these items may

More information

Lect 15:Game Theory: the math of competition

Lect 15:Game Theory: the math of competition Lect 15:Game Theory: the math of competition onflict characterized human history. It arises whenever 2 or more individuals, with different values or goals, compete to try to control the course of events.

More information

MATH4994 Capstone Projects in Mathematics and Economics

MATH4994 Capstone Projects in Mathematics and Economics MATH4994 Capstone Projects in Mathematics and Economics Homework One Course instructor: Prof. Y.K. Kwok 1. This problem is related to the design of the rules of a game among 6 students for allocating 6

More information

6th Grade. Factors and Multiple.

6th Grade. Factors and Multiple. 1 6th Grade Factors and Multiple 2015 10 20 www.njctl.org 2 Factors and Multiples Click on the topic to go to that section Even and Odd Numbers Divisibility Rules for 3 & 9 Greatest Common Factor Least

More information

Game Theory and Algorithms Lecture 3: Weak Dominance and Truthfulness

Game Theory and Algorithms Lecture 3: Weak Dominance and Truthfulness Game Theory and Algorithms Lecture 3: Weak Dominance and Truthfulness March 1, 2011 Summary: We introduce the notion of a (weakly) dominant strategy: one which is always a best response, no matter what

More information

Introduction to Auction Theory: Or How it Sometimes

Introduction to Auction Theory: Or How it Sometimes Introduction to Auction Theory: Or How it Sometimes Pays to Lose Yichuan Wang March 7, 20 Motivation: Get students to think about counter intuitive results in auctions Supplies: Dice (ideally per student)

More information

ECO 463. SimultaneousGames

ECO 463. SimultaneousGames ECO 463 SimultaneousGames Provide brief explanations as well as your answers. 1. Two people could benefit by cooperating on a joint project. Each person can either cooperate at a cost of 2 dollars or fink

More information

TEKSING TOWARD STAAR MATHEMATICS GRADE 6. Student Book

TEKSING TOWARD STAAR MATHEMATICS GRADE 6. Student Book TEKSING TOWARD STAAR MATHEMATICS GRADE 6 Student Book TEKSING TOWARD STAAR 2014 Six Weeks 1 Lesson 1 STAAR Category 1 Grade 6 Mathematics TEKS 6.2A/6.2B Problem-Solving Model Step Description of Step 1

More information

ELSA SUPPORT 2017

ELSA SUPPORT 2017 ELSA SUPPORT 2017 WWW.ELSA-SUPPORT.CO.UK ELSA SUPPORT 2017 WWW.ELSA-SUPPORT.CO.UK Decorate your bauble with all the things you like about Christmas My name is I am years old. Draw a Selfie. You could draw

More information

Game Theory. Chapter 2 Solution Methods for Matrix Games. Instructor: Chih-Wen Chang. Chih-Wen NCKU. Game Theory, Ch2 1

Game Theory. Chapter 2 Solution Methods for Matrix Games. Instructor: Chih-Wen Chang. Chih-Wen NCKU. Game Theory, Ch2 1 Game Theory Chapter 2 Solution Methods for Matrix Games Instructor: Chih-Wen Chang Chih-Wen Chang @ NCKU Game Theory, Ch2 1 Contents 2.1 Solution of some special games 2.2 Invertible matrix games 2.3 Symmetric

More information

Professor Alan H. Stein

Professor Alan H. Stein Mathematics 103 Professor Alan H. Stein July 7, 2004 Solutions Final Examination (1) Consider an election among four candidates: James, Theresa, Marie and Donnie. Suppose 1850 voters cast ballots on which

More information

OFFICE OF CURRICULUM AND INSTRUCTION

OFFICE OF CURRICULUM AND INSTRUCTION Rising 2 nd Grade OFFICE OF CURRICULUM AND INSTRUCTION 1325 Lower Ferry Rd, Ewing NJ 08618 Don Wahlers, District Supervisor for Curriculum & Instruction Phone 609-538-9800 Ext. 3148 Fax 609-882-8172 S.T.E.M.

More information

MAT 17: Introduction to Mathematics Final Exam Review Packet. B. Use the following definitions to write the indicated set for each exercise below:

MAT 17: Introduction to Mathematics Final Exam Review Packet. B. Use the following definitions to write the indicated set for each exercise below: MAT 17: Introduction to Mathematics Final Exam Review Packet A. Using set notation, rewrite each set definition below as the specific collection of elements described enclosed in braces. Use the following

More information