ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Transcription

1 ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS Please check against delivery A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER APPROACH TO IMPLEMENTING THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR ROGELIO PFIRTER DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS CBRNe World Conference, The Hague, 28 October 2009

2 Distinguished guests, Ladies and gentlemen 1. I am very pleased to be able to address all of you in this distinguished conference this morning, and will begin by extending my appreciation to Mr Gwyn Winfield, the editor of CBRNe World magazine, for this special opportunity. Let me say that I m also pleased that The Hague was selected as host for this conference - a city renowned for its contributions to international peace and security, and which has consistently supported the work of my organisation. I therefore would like to extend a special welcome to the representatives from the Government of the Netherlands and The Hague municipality who are with us today. 2. I was happy to accept Mr Winfield s invitation to address the Conference because at this moment of time when we are seeing dramatic new momentum in multilateral disarmament efforts, I believe it is extremely important to promote greater public understanding of the Chemical Weapons Convention and greater appreciation for its achievements. In my view the Convention has proven to be a uniquely successful instrument in WMD disarmament and non-proliferation, and demonstrates that multilateral approaches are the most productive and sustainable for solving problems in this sphere. 3. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which is the implementing body for the Convention, unequivocally upholds the values of multilateralism and reaps the fruit of it every day in our work. From the time the Convention entered into force in April 1997, our Member States have shown remarkable goodwill and dedication in building the OPCW into a vibrant organisation. Their sustained 1

3 commitment is both a cause and effect of effective multilateralism, and a tribute to the world s determination to do away with the scourge of chemical weapons. Overview of the Convention 4. In this respect, I would begin by highlighting the fact that historically, chemical weapons have been used more frequently than any other weapon of mass destruction. From the fields of Ieper and other fronts of the World War I to the Iran-Iraq conflict, Halabja and the 1995 terrorist attack on the Tokyo subway, chemical weapons were used extensively throughout the 20 th Century. The end of the Cold War radically changed the geopolitical landscape and lifted an immense threat from large populations of Europe and Asia where there were active chemical weapons stockpiles. However, the task of ridding the world of these terrible weapons remained, as did the challenge of preventing the illicit spread of the technology and resources that produced them. 5. The conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention proved to be a watershed in the international community s efforts to ban these weapons. The Convention was negotiated entirely within a multilateral framework and remains the only international treaty that is designed to eliminate an entire category of WMDs with a stringent regime of inspections to verify compliance. It establishes rights and obligations of far-reaching scope to ensure that chemical weapons are effectively eliminated and never reemerge. 6. There are four main components of the Convention and of our work: destroying chemical weapons and their associated means of production; ensuring the non-proliferation of dangerous chemicals; providing 2

4 assistance and protection against the possible use of chemical weapons; and promoting the peaceful uses of chemistry. 7. The complete and irreversible destruction of all existing chemical weapons, and their effective non-proliferation, are at the core of the Convention. Within 30 days of joining, every State Party that possesses chemical weapons must provide a detailed declaration of its stockpiles to the OPCW. The Technical Secretariat immediately verifies the declarations and then monitors 24/7 the safe and complete on-site destruction of the stockpiles until the process is finished and irreversible. It also closely monitors chemical weapons production facilities, which must either be completely destroyed or converted to purposes not prohibited by the Convention. 8. To achieve the non-proliferation objectives of the Convention, the Technical Secretariat has established a verification mechanism of yearround inspections that covers more than 5,000 industrial facilities around the world producing toxic chemicals and precursors which could be used in chemical weapons and are grouped into three Convention Schedules of priority. OPCW is also giving greater attention to industries that don t produce Scheduled chemicals but whose production processes could lend themselves to making chemical weapons, which we refer to as Other Chemical Production Facilities or OCPFs. 9. But I want to stress as well the critical importance of the two other main areas of our work - assistance and protection, and international cooperation - because I believe they effectively contribute to the Convention s universal appeal. All of our Member States share a concern for the safety and security of their citizens, and OPCW contributes to that 3

5 with training, technical expertise and assistance against the use, or threat of use, of chemical weapons. In case of need, OPCW is prepared to mobilise teams for medical assistance, detection and decontamination, and teams to provide the necessary infrastructure support for assistance operations. At the same time, our Member States want to enjoy the benefits of national development, and the OPCW promotes the peaceful uses of chemistry with the fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment and information. Achievements of the Convention 10. The combination of these four components in the Convention has made the abolition of chemical weapons an attractive proposition, which is evidenced by the treaty s popularity and by its achievements. In just the first 12 and a half years since the Convention s entry into force, the OPCW has already attracted 188 States Parties with over 98% of the world s population and chemical industry. This is the fastest rate of accession for any arms treaty in history, and represents an overwhelming global consensus created by the OPCW against the development, production or use of chemical weapons. 11. In this time over 50% of the world s declared chemical weapons have been verifiably destroyed, and possessor States have consistently demonstrated their firm commitment to completing destruction of their stockpiles by the April 2012 deadline set by the Convention. These stockpiles originally contained more than 71,000 tonnes of deadly chemical agents and 8.7 million individual munitions, including large quantities of highly potent nerve agents like VX. As of today, three of the seven OPCW Member States that have declared possession of these weapons have completely destroyed their stockpiles. Russia, which has 4

6 the world s largest stockpile, has destroyed over 40% of it and the United States, with the second largest, has destroyed more than 65%. In addition, all of the production facilities for these weapons were deactivated early on, and all but a few have since been either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. 12. I also want to emphasize the importance of health and safety in these destruction activities. The Convention obligates States Parties not just to destroy their weapons but to do so in ways that ensure the health and safety of workers and surrounding communities and that protect the environment. This is extraordinarily challenging, as chemical weapons are among the most toxic substances ever invented, but in every case I m very proud to say that high standards of health and safety have been maintained and serious accidents avoided. This track record is a tribute to the determination of the possessor States to not only comply with their obligations, but to do so in the most conscientious way possible. 13. As regards non-proliferation, since 1997 the OPCW has conducted a total of 1,670 inspections of industrial facilities in 80 countries, and every day of the year, somewhere in the world, we are now inspecting chemical industries. I should add that the global chemical industry has been a key partner in these efforts by actively promoting adherence to the Convention among its constituents and by helping to sustain the effectiveness of our inspections regime. This collaborative relationship is a distinctive feature of the Chemical Weapons Convention in the sphere of arms control, and one that is indeed essential to the Convention s full implementation. 5

7 14. But verification inspections alone are not enough to achieve the nonproliferation goals of the Convention. National implementation is an equally essential element. All States Parties must establish and reinforce administrative and legislative measures so that key provisions of the Convention are in place. These include systematic declarations, industry monitoring, controls on transfers of chemicals, and regulatory measures to identify and track toxic chemicals. It is also vital for States Parties to be able to detect, pursue, and prosecute any breach of the Convention by their nationals, and in any area under their jurisdiction or control. For these reasons, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has invested significant resources in assisting States Parties with establishing a National Authority to coordinate implementation of the Convention, and with adopting legislation criminalising activities that violate its object and purpose. 15. In addition to fulfilling its mandate for disarmament and nonproliferation, the OPCW has also made significant contributions to strengthening the capacity of States Parties to assist and protect their populations against chemical weapons by organising regular trainings in detection, protection and decontamination. These trainings typically target first responders, hazardous materials specialists, government experts and emergency response units, and they are designed to strengthen national and regional capabilities and emergency response systems. To date, approximately 2,500 participants have benefited from these activities, and interest in them and support from States Parties has increased in recent years as a means to reduce the risk of terrorist attacks using chemical weapons. 6

8 16. However, we recognise that significant gaps still remain in preparedness, mainly in countries where resources are limited and the principal response units are fire brigades. For example, training activities in assistance and protection would benefit from greater involvement of health experts, particularly as regards developing capacity to recognize the signs and symptoms of chemical weapons. Just as early detection is critical to controlling an epidemic outbreak of disease, early recognition of chemical weapons use is critical to an effective response that can protect public health and save lives. 17. To this end, the OPCW prepared the chapters on chemical weapons for the current edition of WHO s Guidance on Public Health Response to Biological and Chemical Weapons, and has developed week-long training courses on detection, protection and decontamination which incorporate lessons learned from events like the Bhopal disaster, the Iran-Iraq war, the Tokyo subway attack, and 9/11. We also provide financial assistance and technical expertise for a training course in medical defence against chemical weapons which is held each year in Tehran and generally regarded as the best available in the field. 18. All of these training activities are conducted under Article X of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which requires the OPCW to provide expert advice on how State Parties can improve their protection against chemical weapons. Under this Article we also maintain a databank with information on protection against chemical weapons that is freely available to States Parties, as well as a network of specialists from more than 20 countries with expertise in various aspects of chemical protection. 7

9 Chemical weapons and terrorism 19. Another important dimension of our work that I would like to touch upon is in relation to terrorism. During the past decade there has been a quantum shift in the location of chemical production facilities from west to east as a result of the industry s pursuit of greater cost efficiencies and proximity to emerging markets. This shift has spurred economic development, created jobs and generated prosperity, and is without doubt a public good. 20. But this shift has also increased the challenge of maintaining adequate plant protection and safety, especially in regard to terrorism. Consequently, the OPCW is exploring ways to promote implementation of measures to ensure that industries engaged in the production of toxic chemicals have proper safeguards to prevent access by terrorists and other non-state actors. Such facilities need as well to be adequately protected against the threat of terrorist attacks, which would pose significant dangers to public health and safety in the areas where they are located. 21. The threat of terrorists obtaining and using chemical weapons has created renewed interest in the OPCW s ability to coordinate delivery of emergency assistance in the event of such an attack. Full implementation of the Convention by all States Parties, working together in all regions and with all stakeholders, is an essential means to reduce the threat. Furthermore, this accords entirely with the objectives of United Nations Security Council Resolution Although the OPCW is not an antiterrorism agency, the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons that falls within its remit has an important contribution to make in this area. The Organisation s role in this context is specifically recognised in the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the 8

10 General Assembly in 2006, and which the Assembly reaffirmed in September of last year. 22. In this spirit, the OPCW has worked with and provided cooperation to relevant UN bodies including the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED). At the recent comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 held in New York, the OPCW delegation presented inputs covering not only the cooperation that it offers to the UNODA and the 1540 Committee but also the various activities it organises on its own as well as jointly with States Parties in the context of anti-terrorism programmes. Universality of the Convention 23. I would like to offer as well some observations about the crucial need for universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention. As I stated at the outset of my presentation, in its first 12 years of existence the OPCW has already attracted 188 State Parties that collectively represent more than 98% of the world s population and chemical industry. This has reduced to just seven the number of UN Member States that have not yet joined namely Angola, the Democratic People s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Israel, Myanmar, Syria, and Somalia. 24. However, achieving universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention will remain essential to its ultimate success. The Convention is only as strong as its weakest link and the absence of any State - whether large or small, rich or poor, but particularly one that might have an active chemical weapons programme or stockpiles - undermines the goal of achieving a total ban on these weapons. Universality will contribute to a climate of enhanced confidence in existing treaty 9

11 structures and help promote further steps towards greater international security and stability. 25. On my part, I strongly believe there is no justification, moral or strategic, for retaining the chemical weapons option. Chemical weapons are of decreasing strategic significance in military terms and basically instruments of terror against civilians. Quite appropriately, therefore, the Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention that was held in April 2008 strongly urged the remaining States not Party to ratify or accede to the Convention as a matter of urgency and without preconditions. We must relentlessly continue to raise this issue with those countries. I have been keenly committed to this goal from day one of my tenure, and will remain so until the end of it. Future Challenges for the OPCW 26. I ve outlined the principal activities and achievements of the OPCW to date and now would like to turn to the main challenges facing the Organisation during the next few years. I ve just mentioned the imperative of achieving universality, and the OPCW will continue to use every opportunity for engaging with the seven remaining States not Party to encourage them to join. 27. Another urgent challenge is to complete the destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles by the April 2012 deadline set by the Convention. I have continued to call on both the Russian Federation and the United States to do everything in their power to complete their obligations within the deadline, but the short time available and significant quantities of chemical weapons still to be destroyed make it necessary for the policy making organs of the OCW to ensure that this core issue is appropriately addressed. 10

12 28. In this context, the OPCW Executive Council has just recently adopted a decision based on a proposal by Brazil - that requests the Council Chairperson to engage in informal consultations with interested delegations on how and when to initiate discussion by the Council on issues related to meeting the final destruction deadlines. The constructive spirit of cooperation and accommodation that has distinguished the multilateral experience at the OPCW has guaranteed the Convention s effectiveness and success. And I remain confident that our States Parties will once again find an adequate answer that will preserve the integrity of the Convention while also recognising the genuine constraints faced by the Russian Federation and the United States. 29. As regards non-proliferation, it s important to note that inspections of commercial enterprises under the Chemical Weapons Convention represent an unprecedented example of collaboration between the public and private sectors in a disarmament treaty context to promote security while not prejudicing legitimate business interests. But we are also cognisant of the fact that a declared total of 5,576 chemical facilities all over the world are liable to be inspected today by the OPCW. Reinforcing the industry verification regime is therefore necessary to maintain confidence in the non-proliferation provisions of the Convention. Continued refinement and higher intensity of our industry inspection efforts with a focus on facilities most relevant to the Convention is an indispensable undertaking, particularly in relation to Other Chemical Production Facilities. 30. Another important challenge for our industry verification efforts is the rapid evolution in the global chemical industry. While new products and 11

13 processes and greater efficiencies promise more prosperity, these also give rise to the potential for great harm if not properly supervised. Developments that need to be carefully followed are increasing overlaps between chemical and biological sciences, the integration of chemical engineering into the life sciences, and the fusion between these and information technology. New technologies such as nanotechnology or the creation of new chemical manufacturing methodologies will likewise need to be kept under constant study and review. 31. Industry verification is, however, not the only means of promoting non-proliferation. Deterrence against the possible acquisition, development and misuse of toxic chemicals and their precursors needs to be firmly and efficiently established within the domestic jurisdiction of our Member States. States Parties have to ensure that the prohibitions under the Convention are translated into domestic rules applicable to any individual or other entities operating within their jurisdiction or control. 32. The First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2003 adopted an Action Plan to boost effective national implementation of the Convention globally. Since then, there has been a steady increase in the number of States Parties that introduced the appropriate legislation, including penal legislation. 97% of our States Parties today have established or designated a National Authority as required by the Convention, and 46% of States Parties have enacted comprehensive legislation. Another 42 States Parties have laws in place that cover various key aspects of the Convention. The role of the European Union in supporting through its various Joint Actions, programmes designed to improve the implementation of the Convention worldwide, has been crucial in this endeavour. 12

14 33. But we still have to cover considerable ground before all of our States Parties have in place the necessary tools for the effective domestic implementation of the Convention s prohibitions and provisions. What is noteworthy, however, is the fact that the institutional support provided by the OPCW to its States Parties through a variety of support programmes makes the national implementation of the CWC substantially better than the implementation of other non-proliferation obligations, such as those included in UN Security Council Resolution Unique virtues of the Convention 34. Before concluding, I want to touch upon a few virtues of the Chemical Weapons Convention that our experience has shown to be crucial to its success, and which I believe offer important insights for other multilateral treaties in this sphere. 35. Certainly one of the Convention s most important virtues is its nondiscriminatory character. All OPCW members share the same rights and obligations, and all are equally accountable for complying with the provisions of the Convention. This principle has engendered both a broad sense of ownership among OPCW members and strong commitment to achieving the Convention s goals. 36. Another virtue of the Convention is its ethos of mutual support, whereby States Parties pledge to provide assistance to other members should chemical weapons ever be used, or threatened to be used, against them. This ethos encourages the sharing of know-how and resources among Members States, and by doing so, engenders solidarity. In particular, the requests for sharing OPCW expertise in assistance and 13

15 protection against chemical weapons have increased significantly as a result of concerns about the possible resort by terrorists to chemicals, including to non-scheduled ones. 37. A third virtue is our collaborative relationship with the chemical industry. Dialogue with the chemical industry about the most effective ways of conducting industrial verification has always been essential for the proper functioning of the Convention. From the outset, industry worked with the OPCW Technical Secretariat to design a credible verification system and to help train our inspectors, and it remains a key collaborator in the implementation process. In addition, the chemical industry implements its own governance measures to ensure that its products and technologies are not diverted for hostile purposes. For all these reasons, the OPCW recognizes the chemical industry as a major Stakeholder and is justifiably proud of the cooperation we enjoy with the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA), the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) and with chemical associations around the world. 38. The last virtue I would mention in terms of implementing the Convention is the OPCW s tradition of consensus-based policymaking, meaning that competing interests must be reconciled to reach agreement on all policy issues. We are all actively engaged in this way of operating, which can sometimes be difficult and time-consuming, but consensus lies at the basis of the trust and commitment of our Member States and has returned great dividends to the Organisation. 39. The most recent example of this tradition in action was a consensus decision by the OPCW Executive Council earlier this month to 14

16 recommend Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü of Turkey for appointment as my successor to become the next Director-General. This was indeed a proud moment for the OPCW, and demonstrated the maturity and profound unity of purpose which the Organisation has attained in its mission to create a world free of chemical weapons. Thank you. END 15